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   i	  
Abstract	  	  This	   thesis	   seeks	   to	   understand	   why	   similar	   semi-­‐peripheral	   developing	   economies	  might	  benefit	  differently	  from	  transnational	  market	  integration.	  It	  wishes	  to	  establish	  a	  dialogue	  with	  a	  current	  debate,	  marked	  by	  very	  different	  interpretations	  regarding	  the	  economic	   and	   developmental	   performance	   of	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   European	   (CEE)	  countries.	   It	   argues	   that	   from	   similar	   starting	   positions,	   individual	   sectors	   in	   CEE	  economies	  could	  follow	  widely	  different	  modes	  of	  transnationalization	  in	  sectors	  where	  access	   to	   technology	  was	  cheap	  –	  yet	  domestic	  actors	  needed	  to	  secure	  capital,	  which	  neither	   the	   state	   nor	   domestic	   private	   banking	   sectors	   could	   offer	   them.	   Contrary	   to	  technology-­‐intensive	  sectors	  where	  proprietary	   technologies	  might	   “force”	  developing	  economies	  to	  adopt	  an	  integrationist	  strategy	  relying	  on	  MNCs	  to	  secure	  financial	  assets	  and	   technology,	   in	   less	   technology-­‐intensive	   sectors,	   different	   pathways	   of	  transnationalization	   remained	   open,	   yielding	   different	   developmental	   outcomes.	   For	  illustrating	   this	   argument,	   the	   thesis	   uses	   the	   case	   of	   the	   dairy	   sector’s	   post-­‐Socialist	  restructuring	   in	  Hungary	  and	  Poland:	  Hungary	  experienced	   the	  developmental	   failure	  of	   an	   integrationist	   strategy,	   while	   Poland	   illustrates	   the	   unforeseen	   benefits	   of	   an	  autonomist	  pathway.	  The	  thesis	  argues	  that	  different	  policy	  choices	  in	  the	  two	  countries	  reflected	  differences	  in	  the	  resources	  and	  organization	  of	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  the	  types	  of	   linkages	  tying	  them,	  and	  different	   institutional	   legacies	  stretching	  back	  to	  the	  Socialist	  period.	  In	  so	  doing,	   it	  seeks	  to	  show	  that	  even	  for	  small	  and	  open	  economies,	  the	  diversity	  of	  developmental	  pathways	   is	   substantially	  wider	   than	  usually	  assumed:	  neither	   too	   deterministic	   theories	   such	   as	   dependent	   underdevelopment,	   nor	   too	  general	   typologies	  such	  as	   the	  Varieties	  of	  Capitalism	   framework	  can	  grasp	   the	  actual	  diversity	  of	  developmental	  experiences,	  which	  exist	  at	  a	  sector	   level,	  especially	   in	   less	  technology-­‐intensive	  sectors	  where	  a	  wide	  scope	  for	  variation	  exists.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	   thesis	   also	   shows	   that	   particular	   modes	   of	   transnationalization	   can	   also	   be	  abandoned	   for	   alternative	   strategies	   when	   they	   fail	   to	   secure	   tangible	   benefits	   to	  domestic	   actors.	   Modes	   of	   transnationalization	   for	   developing	   economies	   are	   more	  diverse	  but	  also	  more	  transient	  than	  often	  assumed.	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Introduction	  	  The	   present	   thesis	   is	   a	   study	   of	   diverging	   developmental	   outcomes	   produced	   by	  different	   modes	   of	   transnational	   market	   integration	   in	   the	   context	   of	   post-­‐Socialist	  transition	   economies	   in	   the	   Central	   Eastern	   European	   (CEE)	   region.	   The	   complex	  challenge	  of	   transforming	   authoritarian	  one-­‐party	   regimes	   characterized	  by	   command	  economies	  set	  the	  region	  apart	  from	  counterparts	  in	  the	  “Global	  South”	  where	  the	  task	  of	   democratizing	   politics	   could	   at	   least	   build	   on	   pre-­‐existing	  market	   economies	   (Offe,	  2004).	  Industrial	  productive	  capacities	  built	  during	  the	  Socialist	  period	  and	  a	  centralized	  public	   administration	   equally	   distinguished	   these	   countries	   from	   LDCs	  where	   neither	  the	   basic	   Weberian	   administrative	   capacities	   of	   the	   state,	   nor	   an	   industrial	  infrastructure	  had	  been	  established	  before	  they	  joined	  transnational	  markets.	  In	  spite	  of	  these	  advantages,	  when	  state	  Socialism	  collapsed	  in	  the	  region	  in	  1989-­‐1991,	  integrating	  CEE	   into	   regional	   and	   global	   markets	   posed	   fundamental	   challenges	   in	   transforming	  them	  into	  viable	  market	  economies,	  which	  wouldn’t	  simply	  collapse	  under	  free	  market	  conditions.	  	  	  For	  these	  reasons,	  CEE	  became	  an	  ideal	  case	  study	  for	  the	  students	  of	  capitalism	  as	  an	  open	  laboratory	  in	  market	  building	  strategies.	  One	  research	  agenda	  used	  CEE	  transition	  for	  studying	  the	  complex	  re-­‐combinations	  of	  particular	  domestic	  institutional	  legacies	  in	  a	   new	  opportunity	   structure	   (Stark	  &	  Bruszt,	   1998):	  Already	  by	   the	  mid	  1990s,	   these	  authors	   were	   puzzled	   by	   the	   degree	   of	   intra-­‐regional	   variation	   in	   post-­‐Communist	  economies’	  emerging	   institutional	  structures.	  Another	  scholarship	  studied	   institutional	  re-­‐configurations	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   Varieties	   of	   Capitalism	   (VoC)	   literature	  pioneered	  by	  Peter	  Hall	   and	  David	  Soskice	   (Hall	  &	  Soskice,	  2001).	  The	  recent	  work	  of	  Bohle	   and	   Greskovits	   (2012)	   proposed	   to	   extend	   the	   VoC	   tradition’s	   focus	   on	  institutional	   complementarities	  determining	  particular	   comparative	  advantages	  with	  a	  Polanyian	   approach	   to	   market-­‐society	   relations.	   In	   spite	   of	   substantial	   differences	   in	  their	   theoretical	   frameworks,	   these	   approaches	   converged	   in	   a	   shared	   attempt	   at	  identifying	  particular	  sub-­‐regional	  institutional	  patterns	  of	  post-­‐Socialist	  economies.	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A	   more	   recent	   research	   agenda	   has	   begun	   investigating	   the	   developmental	  consequences	   of	   post-­‐Communist	   restructuring	   and	   transnationalization.	   Bruszt	   and	  McDermott	   (2014)	  studied	   the	  distributional	  problems	  of	   transnationalization	   in	  what	  they	  called	  different	  Transnational	  Integration	  Regimes	  (TIRs)	  –	  in	  their	  framework,	  CEE	  was	   used	   as	   a	   case	   study	   for	   examining	   the	   specific	   advantages	   and	   limitations	   of	   an	  integration	   project	   fundamentally	   tied	   with	   the	   process	   of	   economic	   and	   regulatory	  integration	  with	   the	   EU’s	   common	  market	   -­‐	   in	   light	   of	   the	   gravitational	   pull	   that	   this	  regional	  hegemon	  exerted	  on	  CEE.	   In	  parallel,	   Scepanovic’s	   recent	  work	  examined	   the	  developmental	  benefits	  and	  pitfalls	  of	   transnationalization	  through	  FDI	  and	  the	  role	  of	  multinational	   companies	   (MNCs)	   as	   potential	   agents	   of	   competitive	   upgrading	   in	   CEE	  economies	  (Scepanovic,	  2013)	  .	  	  	  We	  place	  the	  present	  thesis	  in	  the	  continuity	  of	  these	  latter	  research	  agendas,	  focusing	  on	   the	   developmental	   consequences	   of	   different	   modes	   of	   transnationalization	   that	  emerged	   in	   the	   CEE	   region.	   However,	   the	   abovementioned	   literatures	   have	   put	   a	  stronger	   emphasis	   on	   the	   role	   of	   external	   public	   (EU)	   and	   private	   actors	   (MNCs)	   in	  shaping	  regional	  varieties	  of	  capitalism:	  in	  that	  sense,	  CEE	  was	  used	  as	  a	  case	  study	  for	  uncovering	   the	   developmental	   impacts	   of	   transnational	   actors.	   Bruszt	   and	   Langbein	  (2014)	   examined	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   EU	   functioned	   as	   an	   agent	   of	   economic	  upgrading	  in	  specific	  domestic	  contexts,	  while	  Scepanovic	  (2013)	  studied	  how	  MNC	  car	  manufacturers	   contributed	   to	   economic	   modernization	   in	   the	   region.	   We	   propose	   to	  examine	   the	   other	   facet	   of	   this	   problem,	   namely	   the	   differentiated	   role	   played	   by	  domestic	  agency	  in	  shaping	  developmental	  outcomes	  in	  these	  deeply	  transnationalized	  semi-­‐peripheral	   economies.	   In	   so	   doing,	   we	   also	   hope	   to	   establish	   a	   dialogue	   with	   a	  larger	  research	  question	  far	  overstretching	  the	  confines	  of	  CEE,	  that	  is	  the	  room	  left	  for	  developmental	   public	   agency	   in	   peripheral	   and	   semi-­‐peripheral	   economies	   in	   a	  globalized	  world	  economy	  (H.	  J.	  Chang,	  2006).	  	  We	  propose	  to	  examine	  how	  domestic	  actors	  in	  Hungary	  and	  Poland	  -­‐	  two	  CEE	  countries	  often	   considered	   as	   most	   similar	   cases	   in	   light	   of	   their	   macroeconomic	   institutional	  features1	  –	   actively	   shaped	   their	   own	  modes	   of	   transnationalization	   into	   regional	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Bohle	  and	  Greskovits	  group	  them	  together	  notably	  in	  light	  of	  a	  similar	  heritage	  in	  implementing	  market-­‐friendly	   reforms	  under	   Socialism	  based	   on	   the	   “Welfarist	   social	   contract”	   concluded	  between	   state	   and	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global	  markets	  in	  remarkably	  distinct	  ways	  at	  the	  sector	  level	  –	  leading	  to	  very	  different	  consequences	   for	   their	   sector’s	   overall	   economic	   competitiveness	   as	  well	   as	   different	  distributions	  of	  benefits	  between	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  actors.	  We	  examine	  this	  process	  of	   developmental	   divergence	   through	   the	   comparative	   case	   studies	   of	   Polish	   and	  Hungarian	  dairy	  sectors’	  restructuring	  in	  the	  post-­‐1989	  period.	  	  By	   contrasting	   two	   similar	   countries,	   which	   had	   to	   confront	   the	   same	   fundamental	  challenges	   of	   post-­‐Socialist	   restructuring	  with	   comparable	   resources,	  we	   seek	   to	   shed	  light	  on	  how	  radically	  different	  were	  the	  strategies,	  which	  domestic	  actors	  embraced	  in	  managing	   the	   transnational	   integration	   of	   a	   particular	   sector	   to	   regional	   and	   global	  markets.	  	  	  As	  with	  any	  case	  selection,	  the	  milk	  and	  dairy	  sector	  offers	  a	  number	  of	  advantages	  and	  drawbacks.	  Agri-­‐food	  processing	  represents	  a	  strategic	  sector	  in	  the	  EU:	  it	  is	  the	  biggest	  industrial	   sector	   and	   the	   third	   largest	   employer	  with	   2,6	  million	   employees	   (van	   der	  Meulen	  &	  van	  der	  Velde,	  2006,	  p.561),	  while	   it	   is	  also	  of	  strategic	   importance	   for	   food	  security.	   The	   dairy	   sector	   relies	   on	   a	   complex	   coordination	   between	   three	   distinct	  segments	  in	  the	  supply	  chain:	  the	  production	  of	  milk	  at	  farm	  level,	  the	  transformation	  of	  milk	  into	  processed	  goods	  at	  processing	  plants	  and	  the	  sale	  of	  end	  products	  in	  retail.	  As	  such	   it	   offers	   potentially	   rich	   lessons	   in	   different	   institutional	   solutions	   to	   vertical	  coordination	   along	   the	   supply	   chain.	   Furthermore,	   in	   light	   of	   the	   food	   security	   crises	  experienced	   in	   Europe	   throughout	   the	   1990s,	   agri-­‐food	   sectors	   are	   among	   the	   most	  tightly	  regulated	  industries	  in	  the	  EU	  where	  stringent	  public	  and	  private	  production	  and	  product	   standards	   regulate	   the	   sector.	   Given	   important	   adaptation	   costs	   entailed	   by	  food	   safety	   standards,	   economic	   upgrading	   in	   the	   sector	   required	   substantial	   capital	  investments	   throughout	   the	   transition	   phase	   as	   well	   as	   importing	  modern,	   and	  more	  productive	  technologies	  than	  what	  either	  country	  disposed	  of	  in	  1989.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  society	  in	  the	  post-­‐Socialist	  period	  (Bohle	  &	  Greskovits,	  2012p.141).	  	  The	  VoC	  framework	  considers	  them	  similar	   in	   light	   of	   their	   comparative	   advantage	   in	   the	   assembly	   of	   semi-­‐standardized	   industrial	   goods	  (Nolke	  &	  Vliegenhart,	  2009).	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In	   that	   regard,	   the	   challenge	   of	   restructuring	   dairy	   sectors	   reflected	   a	   basic	   problem	  common	   to	   all	   late-­‐industrializers:	   the	   need	   to	   secure	   capital	   and	   technology	   in	   a	  domestic	  context	  where	  both	  assets	  were	  rare.	  Unlike	  more	  technology-­‐intensive	  sectors	  such	  as	  electronics	  or	  automotive	  however,	  accessing	  proprietary	  technology	  wasn’t	  as	  important	   as	   securing	   the	   financial	   capital	   necessary	   for	   modernizing	   domestic	  capacities:	  in	  other	  words,	  as	  technology	  could	  be	  purchased,	  dairy	  offered	  a	  wider	  room	  for	   different	   strategies	   aimed	   at	   securing	   financial	   capital2.	   Although	   this	   specificity	  might	  be	  considered	  a	  disadvantage,	  we	  argue	  that	  it	  has	  also	  benefits	  from	  a	  theoretical	  perspective:	  In	  a	  sector	  such	  as	  dairy,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  highly	  disadvantageous	  and	  poorly	  competitive	   situation	   characterizing	   both	   the	   Polish	   and	   the	  Hungarian	   sectors	   at	   the	  onset	   of	   transition,	   there	   was	   no	   clear	   limit	   as	   to	   how	   far	   these	   countries	   could	  potentially	  strengthen	  their	  competitiveness	  on	  domestic	  and	  export	  markets…	  neither	  was	  it	  clear	  how	  deep	  they	  could	  fall.	  	  Restructuring	  these	  sectors	  was	  not	  only	  a	  question	  of	  economic	  modernization,	  but	   it	  also	   represented	   a	   distributive	   problem:	   Elizabeth	   Dunn	   (2003)	   was	   among	   the	   first	  authors	  to	  underline	  that	  since	  EU	  integration	  required	  regulatory	  harmonization	  with	  modern	   food	   safety	   standards,	   the	   question	   soon	   turned	   into	   how	   many	   and	   which	  domestic	   actors	   could	   access	   the	   capital	   (and	   technologies)	   necessary	   for	   regulatory	  compliance	   and	   for	  withstanding	   competition.	   	   In	   other	  words:	  who	   counts,	   and	  who	  gets	  to	  survive	  (Bruszt	  &	  Stark,	  2003)?	  	  	  In	   this	   developmental	   conundrum,	   the	   state	   had	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   arbitrating	   between	  economic	   and	   social	   priorities,	   with	   potentially	   highly	   skewed	   outcomes.	   Thus,	   by	  studying	  different	  domestic	  policy	  choices	  within	  a	  highly	  standardized	  industrial	  sector,	  one	  can	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  scope	  left	  for	  differentiated	  developmental	  public	  agency	  even	  within	   a	   particularly	   constrained	   environment.	   Furthermore,	   the	   dairy	   sector	   has	  already	  fuelled	  interest	  among	  the	  students	  of	  post-­‐Communist	  market	  making:	  Bruszt	  and	   Langbein	   (2014)	   used	   the	   sector	   for	   demonstrating	   how	   the	   EU’s	   pre-­‐accession	  agenda	  of	   regulatory	  harmonization	  contributed	   to	   inserting	   the	  Romanian	  and	  Polish	  dairy	  sectors	  in	  different	  positions	  within	  the	  EU	  market.	  Another	  group	  of	  authors	  led	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  As	  discussed	  later,	  more	  technology-­‐intensive	  sectors	  often	  rely	  on	  proprietary	  technologies	  and	  patents	  controlled	  by	  MNCs:	  in	  dairy	  however,	  technology	  embedded	  in	  machinery	  can	  be	  purchased.	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by	   Johan	   Swinnen	   argued	   that	   the	   dairy	   sector	   in	   CEE	   exemplified	   the	   positive	  developmental	   role	   played	   by	   foreign	   capital	   in	   the	   transition	   phase	   (Dries,	   Germenji,	  Noev,	  &	  Swinnen,	  2009;	  Dries	  &	  Swinnen,	  2002,	  2005;	  Dries	  &	  Swinnen,	  2010;	  H.	  Gow,	  D.	  H.	  Streeter,	  &	  J.	  F.	  M.	  Swinnen,	  2000;	  Gow	  &	  Swinnen,	  1998;	  H.	  R.	  Gow,	  D.	  H.	  Streeter,	  &	  J.	  F.	  M.	  Swinnen,	  2000;	  Johan	  F.M.	  Swinnen,	  Dries,	  Noev,	  &	  Germenji,	  2006;	  J.	  F.	  M.	  Swinnen	  &	  Maertens,	   2007).	  We	  would	   argue	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   that	   diverging	   developmental	  outcomes	  observed	  at	  the	  sector	  level	  in	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  offer	  a	  graphic	  illustration	  of	  a	  substantial	  room	  for	  variation	   in	  domestic	  developmental	  objectives,	  sustained	  by	  different	  actor	  coalitions.	  	  	  Against	   this	   background,	   this	   thesis	   seeks	   to	   answer	   the	   following	   questions:	   what	  explains	  that	  two	  comparable	  economies	  such	  as	  Hungary	  and	  Poland,	  faced	  with	  similar	  constraints,	   nonetheless	   experienced	   dramatically	   different	   outcomes,	   namely	   a	  competitive	  downgrading	  in	  Hungary,	  while	  Poland	  became	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  foremost	  dairy	  exporters?	  Furthermore,	  why	  did	  restructuring	  marginalize	  domestic	  farmers	  and	  processors	   in	   Hungary,	   while	   domestically	   owned	   cooperatives	   inherited	   from	   state	  Socialism	  became	  the	  key	  winners	  of	  restructuring	  in	  Poland?	  	  We	  argue	   that	   the	   two	  sectors’	   specific	  modes	  of	   transnationalization	  was	  determined	  by	   domestic	   state	   and	   non	   state	   actors:	   in	   Poland	   and	   Hungary,	   domestic	   variables	  explain	   substantially	   better	   the	   diverging	   developmental	   pathways	   of	   the	   two	   sectors	  than	  differentiated	   strategies	  of	   transnational	  public	   and	  private	   actors.	   In	   turn,	   these	  modes	  of	  transnationalization	  fared	  very	  differently	  from	  a	  developmental	  perspective.	  	  The	   relatively	   simple	   most-­‐similar-­‐case	   design	   allows	   for	   a	   process	   tracing	  methodology,	   which	   can	   identify	   how	   actors	   faced	   with	   similar	   constraints	   chose	  different	   strategies	   for	   altering	   their	   conditions:	   Drawing	   on	   a	   long	   tradition	   of	  developmental	   studies	   starting	  with	  Albert	  O.	  Hirschman	   (1958),	   Cardoso	   and	   Faletto	  (1979)	  and	  Peter	  Evans	  (1979),	  the	  dissertation	  is	  led	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  while	  structures	  shape	  opportunity	  structures,	  they	  do	  not	  determine	  outcomes	  –	  ultimately,	  only	  actors	  do.	   Based	   on	   this	   insight,	   the	   dissertation	   examines	   how	   actors	   have	   shaped	   the	  structures	   that	   they	   inherited	   and	   how	   these	   choices	   in	   turn	   produced	   two	   diverging	  developmental	  pathways.	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  The	  thesis	  is	  structured	  as	  follows:	  In	  the	  first	  chapter,	  we	  provide	  a	  critical	  overview	  of	  the	   extant	   political	   economy	   literatures	   on	   CEE	   transition	   in	   their	   attempt	   at	  conceptualizing	   developmental	   outcomes	   and	   pathways.	   We	   define	   developmental	  outcomes	   along	   two	   axes:	   economic	   upgrading	   and	   the	   capacity	   for	   domestic	   private	  actors	  to	  benefit	  from	  market	  liberalization	  and	  transnational	  market	  integration.	  In	  the	  second	   chapter,	   we	   review	   the	   competing	   hypotheses	   in	   the	   current	   literatures	   as	   to	  which	   independent	   variables	   could	   best	   explain	   variation	   in	   developmental	   outcomes	  and	  pathways:	  we	  propose	   a	   theoretically	   grounded	  argument	   for	  understanding	  how	  differences	  in	  the	  sector-­‐level	  organization	  of	  public	  and	  private	  actors,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  linkages	  have	  led	  to	  diverging	  policy	  choices	  yielding	  different	  developmental	  outcomes.	  In	   the	   third	   and	   fourth	   chapters,	   we	   provide	   an	   empirical	   analysis	   of	   the	   two	   case	  studies	   –	   respectively	   Hungary	   and	   Poland’s	   dairy	   sectors	   over	   the	   course	   of	   post-­‐Communist	   restructuring	   and	   EU	   accession.	   Finally,	   we	   clarify	   how	   domestic	  developmental	   coalitions	   co-­‐evolved	   with	   domestic	   institutional	   structures,	   shaping	  particular	  contexts	  in	  which	  transnational	  actors	  were	  embedded	  differently.	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Chapter	  1	  	  This	   thesis	   explores	   the	   developmental	   consequences	   of	   market	   liberalization	   and	  transnational	  integration	  in	  semi-­‐peripheral	  Central	  Eastern	  European	  (CEE)	  economies.	  It	  seeks	  to	  understand	  why	  the	  post-­‐Socialist	  restructuring	  of	  an	  agri-­‐food	  sector	  such	  as	  dairy	   shows	   dramatically	   different	   outcomes	   in	   terms	   of	   competiveness	   and	  inclusiveness	   for	   domestic	   actors	   in	   Hungary	   and	   Poland,	   two	   CEE	   economies	  consistently	   classified	   as	   most	   similar	   cases.	   Hungary	   and	   Poland’s	   post-­‐Socialist	  economies	  have	  entered	  transnational	  markets	  in	  a	  similar	  opportunity	  structure	  in	  the	  1990s:	  they	  have	  been	  classified	  together	  as	  core	  cases	  of	  a	  Visegrad	  sub-­‐regional	  model	  of	   capitalism	   (Nolke	   &	   Vliegenhart,	   2009).	   On	   closer	   inspection	   however,	   in	   a	   given	  sector	   such	   as	   dairy,	   one	   observes	   symmetrically	   opposite	   trajectories:	   a	   successful	  insertion	  of	   the	   sector	  with	  broad	  based	  benefits	   for	  domestic	   actors	   in	  Poland,	   and	  a	  gradual	  collapse	  of	  competitiveness	  in	  Hungary	  alongside	  a	  marginalization	  of	  domestic	  actors.	  	  	  From	   the	   perspective	   of	   peripheral	   and	   semi-­‐peripheral	   economies,	   integrating	  transnational	  markets	  and	  transnational	  regulatory	  regimes	  is	  a	  necessity	  few	  can	  resist:	  The	  gradual	  demise	  of	  protected	  national	  markets	  has	  spurred	  a	  variety	  of	  pathways	  to	  transnationalization	   ranging	   from	   bi-­‐	   or	   multi-­‐	   lateral	   trade	   agreements	   to	   regional	  common	   market	   areas	   or	   the	   integration	   of	   domestic	   sectors	   into	   the	   global	   supply	  chains	   (GVCs)	   of	   MNCs	   (Baldwin,	   Martin,	   &	   Ottaviano,	   2001).	   While	   transnational	  integration	  might	  be	   inescapable,	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	  domestic	  public	   and	  private	  actors	   in	   the	   global	   periphery	   and	   semi-­‐periphery,	  what	  matters	   is	   how	   their	   specific	  pathways	   of	   transnationalization	   affect	   their	   developmental	   trajectories.	   More	   than	   a	  question	   of	   trade,	   transnational	   integration	   is	   thus	   fundamentally	   a	   developmental	  problem,	   which	   underscores	   the	   necessity	   for	   a	   theoretical	   and	   methodological	  framework	  able	  to	  define	  and	  compare	  developmental	  outcomes.	  	  In	  light	  of	  these,	  it	  is	  surprising	  that	  important	  gaps	  remain	  in	  the	  extant	  literatures	  on	  the	  diversity	   in	  developmental	  performance	  of	  different	  modes	  of	   transnationalization	  in	   the	   global	   periphery.	   CEE,	   one	   of	   the	   best-­‐studied	   semi-­‐peripheral	   regions,	  exemplifies	   these	   contradictions.	   There	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   consensus	   for	   assessing	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developmental	  outcomes	  in	  post-­‐Socialist	  CEE:	  some	  view	  the	  region	  as	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  successful	  insertion	  into	  global	  markets	  and	  a	  regional	  integration	  project	  steered	  by	  the	  EU,	  while	  others	  speak	  of	   the	  region’s	   colonial	  exploitation	  by	  Western	  public	  and	  private	   actors.	   These	   debates	   are	   rooted	   in	   a	   disagreement	   over	   the	   indicators	   and	  methods	   for	   operationalizing	   “developmental	   pathways”	   and	   “developmental	  performance”	  in	  global	  markets.	  	  	  The	   present	   chapter	   provides	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   literatures,	   which	   offered	  methodological	   guidelines	   for	   comparing	   the	   developmental	   consequences	   of	  transnational	   integration	   in	  CEE	   and	   it	   provides	   a	   framework	   that	   is	   better	   suited	   for	  capturing	   the	   puzzle	   of	   divergent	   developmental	   outcomes	   in	   similar	   economies:	  specifically,	  we	  argue	  that	  developmental	   trajectories	  ought	  to	  be	  captured	  not	  only	   in	  reference	  to	  a	  given	  sector’s	  changing	  position	  in	  regional	  and	  global	  markets,	  but	  also	  crucially,	  the	  position	  of	  domestic	  actors	  (producers	  and	  firms)	  should	  be	  re-­‐evaluated:	  Sidelining	  the	  question	  of	  ownership	  and,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  -­‐	  ignores	  the	  actual	  economic	  and	  social	  consequences	  of	   transnational	   integration	   for	  domestic	  actors.	  	  	  The	   first	   section	   of	   this	   chapter	   positions	   CEE	   in	   the	   broader	   literature	   on	  developmental	   strategies	   in	   peripheral	   and	   semi-­‐peripheral	   economies.	   A	   second	  part	  highlights	   the	   advantages	   and	   drawbacks	   of	   the	   methodologies	   offered	   by	   the	   extant	  scholarships	  in	  defining	  developmental	  outcomes	  in	  CEE.	  In	  a	  third	  part,	  an	  alternative	  framework	   is	  proposed,	  where	  a	  domestic	  sector’s	  performance	   in	  regional	  and	  global	  markets,	   and	   the	   relative	   position	   of	   domestic	   actors	   comprise	   two	   dimensions	   of	  developmental	   outcomes.	   Finally,	   the	   case	   of	   Polish	   and	   Hungarian	   divergence	   at	   the	  sector	  level	  is	  located	  in	  this	  framework.	  	  
	  
Part	  1.	  Specificities	  of	  CEE	  in	  the	  wider	  literature	  on	  developmental	  strategies	  in	  
the	  periphery	  	  The	   post-­‐Communist	   restructuring	   of	   the	   CEE	   region	   offered	   an	   unprecedented	  opportunity	  for	  the	  students	  of	  new	  modes	  of	  transnationalization	  given	  the	  particular	  experience	   of	   the	   region	   in	   the	   1990s	   and	   2000s:	   not	   only	   were	   market	   economies	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created	  ex	  nihilo,	  but	  contrary	  to	  “autonomist”	  developmental	  strategies	  reigning	  in	  the	  global	   South	   until	   the	   1980s,	   CEE	   became	   one	   of	   the	   most	   deeply	   transnationalized	  regions	  of	  the	  world.	  	  Although	   a	   vast	   literature	  on	   economic	  development	  bloomed	  after	   the	   Second	  World	  War	   and	   subsequent	   decolonization	   waves,	   the	   objects	   of	   these	   studies	   were	   mainly	  South-­‐East	   Asian	   and	   Latin	   American	   countries	   that	   experimented	   with	   varieties	   of	  economic	  dirigisme,	  relying	  on	  a	  strong	  and	  relatively	  competent	  and	  autonomous	  state	  to	   implement	   sector-­‐level	   national	   plans	   in	   order	   to	   catch	   up	   with	  Western	   levels	   of	  growth	   and	   competitiveness	   (Amsden,	   1989,	   2001;	   Evans,	   1979;	   Johnson,	   1989).	  Following	  the	  terminology	  used	  by	  Alice	  Amsden	  (2001),	  countries	  ranging	  from	  Brazil	  to	   South	   Korea	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   varieties	   of	   an	   autonomist	   form	   of	  developmentalism	   aimed	   at	   building	   entire	   supply	   chains	   at	   the	   domestic	   level	   in	  strategic	  industrial	  sectors	  identified	  by	  the	  state:	  while	  the	  goal	  was	  similar,	  differences	  between	  Latin-­‐American	  and	  South-­‐East	  Asian	  countries	  concerned	  the	   instruments	  of	  public	   interventionism	   where	   import	   tariffs,	   export	   subsidies	   and	   relations	   between	  public	  administrations	  and	  the	  private	  sector	  were	  articulated	  differently.	  	  By	  contrast,	  the	  process	  of	  post-­‐Communist	  transition	  in	  CEE	  followed	  a	  fundamentally	  different	   route:	   The	   challenge	   for	   these	   countries	   was	   on	   the	   contrary	   to	   dismantle	  national	  conglomerates	  and	  reduce	  public	  ownership	  as	  much	  as	  the	  state’s	  institutions	  of	   economic	   mobilization	   and	   coordination	   in	   a	   global	   environment	   that	   actively	  discouraged	  these	  countries	  from	  using	  the	  state	  as	  the	  prime	  agent	  of	  development.	  The	  widespread	   consensus	   among	   both	   CEE	   elites	   and	   those	   international	   financial	  institutions	  (IFIs)	  and	  international	  organizations	  (IOs)	  that	  played	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  process	  (such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank,	  BERD,	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  EU)	  -­‐	  was	  to	  keep	  as	  little	  public	  influence	   over	  markets	   as	   possible.	   Three	   factors	   single	   out	   the	   CEE	   experience	   from	  previous	  modes	  of	  transnationalization	  in	  other	  semi-­‐peripheral	  regions:	  The	  timing	  of	  the	   transition	   and	   restructuring	   processes,	   the	   role	   played	   by	   foreign	   capital	   in	   post-­‐Socialist	  restructuring	  and	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  regional	  hegemon.	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Timing	  
	  From	  a	  constructivist	  perspective,	  the	  paradigmatic	  shift	  represented	  by	  the	  neoliberal	  turn	  came	  close	  to	  a	  hegemonic	  ideology	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s	  in	  Western	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  the	  early	  1990s	  when	  CEE	  states	  needed	  models	  as	  well	  as	  political	  and	  economic	  assistance	  in	  restructuring	  their	  economies,	  the	  dominant	  view	  favored	  a	  dramatic	  downscaling	  of	  public	  interventionism	  in	  the	  marketplace	  –	  an	  argument	  that	  received	  a	  warm	  reception	  among	  CEE	  elites	  that	  had	  been	  increasingly	  concerned	  over	  unsustainable	   levels	   of	   foreign	   debt	   and	   the	   burden	   of	   costly	   public	   subsidization	  schemes	   on	   state	   budgets	   throughout	   the	   last	   decades	   of	   state	   Socialism	   (Aligica	   &	  Evans,	  2009).	  	  Second,	   the	   world	   economy	   in	   which	   post-­‐War	   developmental	   states	   thrived	   in	   the	  Global	   South	   had	   been	   displaced	   by	   a	   qualitatively	   different	   system	   by	   the	   time	   CEE	  embarked	   on	   post-­‐Socialist	   transition.	   By	   the	   1990s,	   due	   to	   the	   gradual	   reduction	   of	  tariffs	   and	   the	   liberalization	   of	   transnational	   capital	   flows	   spearheaded	   by	   GATT	   and	  later	   the	   WTO,	   MNCs	   de-­‐territorialized	   the	   world	   economy	   by	   establishing	   global	  production	  chains	  where	  individual	  production	  stages	  were	  relocated	  to	  countries	  that	  enjoyed	   a	   comparative	   advantage	   in	   any	   given	   production	   segment.	   For	   developing	  economies,	  a	  new	  challenge	  arose:	  either	  to	  pursue	  a	  developmental	  strategy	  that	  aimed	  at	  building	  entire	  domestic	  supply	  chains	  from	  scratch	  (autonomism),	  or	  to	  integrate	  the	  global	   supply	   chains	  of	  MNCs	   (integrationism).	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  Richard	  Baldwin,	  by	  the	   1980s	   it	   was	   virtually	   impossible	   for	   late-­‐industrializers	   to	   sustain	   the	   “classical”	  
dirigiste	   developmental	   recipe:	   not	   only	   because	   building	   up	   entire	   industrial	   sectors	  had	  always	  been	  a	  hazardous	  endeavor	  that	  could	  easily	  derail	  but	  because	  the	  virtually	  cost-­‐free	  strategy	  of	  integrating	  MNC	  supply	  chains	  offered	  immediate	  jobs	  and	  a	  secure	  outlet	  for	  domestic	  production	  in	  the	  form	  of	  soaring	  export	  levels	  overnight	  (Baldwin,	  2013)	   .	   The	   second	   crucial	   difference	   with	   the	   preceding	   decades	   was	   rooted	   in	   the	  reluctance	  of	  private	  creditors	  and	   IFIs	   to	  continue	   financing	   the	  appetite	  of	  emerging	  economies	   for	   the	   foreign	   capital	   necessary	   to	   finance	   ambitious	   industrialization	  programs:	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  1982	  debt	  crisis	  that	  spread	  from	  Latin	  America,	  state-­‐managed	   industrialization	   plans	   financed	  with	   foreign	   debt	   in	   protected	   sectors	  were	  consensually	   rejected	   by	   foreign	   creditors.	   In	   such	   a	   context,	  which	   Baldwin	   calls	   the	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“second	   unbundling	   of	   the	   world	   economy”,	   late-­‐industrializers	   had	   temporal	  constraints	   that	   didn’t	   allow	   them	   to	   experiment	   the	   lengthy	   trial	   and	   error	   phase	  previously	   enjoyed	   by	   Korea	   or	   Japan	   since	   they	   were	   in	   immediate	   competition	   on	  world	   markets	   with	   countries	   that	   followed	   the	   alternative	   model	   of	   “overnight	  industrialization”	  through	  foreign	  direct	  investments	  (FDI)	  by	  MNCs.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  their	   ability	   to	   raise	   capital	   through	   the	   traditional	   channel	   of	   foreign	   debt	   was	  compromised.	   By	   the	   time	   CEE	  was	   faced	  with	   the	   task	   of	   building	   functional	  market	  economies,	  an	  “integrationist”	  developmental	  alternative	  (Amsden	  2001,	  p.271)	  offered	  clear	  advantages	  and	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  an	  unprecedented	  flow	  of	  FDI	  to	  the	  region.	  	  	  
Foreign	  Capital	  	  As	   mentioned	   before,	   the	   Zeitgeist	   of	   the	   1990s	   favored	   neoliberal	   developmental	  strategies.	  International	  donor	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  IMF	  rolled	  back	   on	   their	   support	   to	   autonomist	   strategies	   and	   instead	   favored	   export-­‐oriented,	  
integrationist	   industrialization:	   rather	   than	   insulating	   emerging	   domestic	   sectors,	  liberalizing	   domestic	   markets	   through	   trade	   became	   a	   commendable	   strategy	  (World_Bank,	   1979,	   pp.	   27-­‐28).	   In	   the	   face	   of	   a	   structural	   lack	   of	   domestic	   capital	   to	  purchase	  Socialist	  assets	  and	  weakly	  capitalized	  domestic	  banking	  sectors	  -­‐	  a	  situation	  Szelényi	  et	  al.	  called	  a	  “capitalism	  without	  capitalists”	  (Eyal,	  Szelényi,	  &	  Townsley,	  1998)	  -­‐	  it	  became	  apparent	  in	  the	  first	  years	  of	  the	  transition	  period	  that	  brown-­‐	  or	  greenfield	  foreign	  investments	  	  (FDI)	  would	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  adaptation	  of	  Socialist	  firms	  to	  the	  market	  economy.	  With	  the	  partial	  exception	  of	  Slovenia,	  and	  important	  variations	  between	   sectors,	   foreign	   ownership	   of	   productive	   assets	   became	   a	   distinguishing	  feature	  of	  CEE	  varieties	  of	   capitalism	  setting	   the	   region	  apart	   from	  Western	  European	  forms	  of	  capitalism.	  	  	  The	  prominence	  of	  FDI	  in	  CEE	  economies	  was	  not	  only	  different	  from	  the	  experience	  of	  Asian	   and	   Latin	   American	   developmental	   states	   but	   it	   also	   set	   the	   region	   apart	   from	  Western	  Europe.	  Ironically,	  the	  dual	  process	  of	  economic	  and	  regulatory	  integration	  to	  transnational	   markets	   and	   the	   parallel	   process	   of	   EU	   integration	   -­‐	   in	   actual	   fact	  entrenched	   a	  model	   of	   capitalism	  different	   from	  Western	   Europe	   (Bruszt,	   2002):	   CEE	  became	   a	   region	   where	   foreign	   ownership	   of	   economic	   assets	   and	   external	   political	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norms	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  steering	  the	  direction	  of	   institutional	  change	  with	  a	  severely	  reduced	  margin	  of	  manoeuver	  left	  to	  elected	  officials.	  Conversely,	  CEE	  exports	  substantially	   less	   capital	   than	   Western	   Europe,	   which	   marks	   an	   asymmetrical	  integration	  to	  regional	  and	  global	  financial	  and	  trade	  markets	  as	  illustrated	  below	  with	  the	  examples	  of	  Poland	  and	  Hungary.	  
Figure	  1.1.	  Inward	  FDI	  Stocks	  in	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  in	  %	  of	  GDP	  
	  
Source:	  OECD	  
Figure	  1.2.	  Outward	  FDI	  Stock	  in	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  in	  %	  of	  GDP	  
	   	  
Source:	  OECD	  
	  The	  reliance	  of	  CEE	  states	  on	  FDI	   in	  particular	  has	   led	  the	  students	  of	  CEE	  varieties	  of	  capitalism	  to	  label	  them	  as	  “dependent	  market	  economies”	  (Nolke	  &	  Vliegenhart,	  2009),	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structurally	   different	   from	   “core”	   capitalist	   models.	   However,	   while	   FDI	   indisputably	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  throughout	  the	  region	  at	  the	  macro	  level,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  the	  extant	  literatures	  often	  underplay	  important	  differences	  in	  how	  CEE	  states	  managed	  the	  penetration	   of	   their	   domestic	   markets	   by	   MNCs.	   The	   actual	   heterogeneity	   of	   FDI	  penetration	  between	  CEE	  countries	  is	  apparent	  at	  a	  macro	  level	  as	  shown	  in	  figure	  1.3.	  but	   further	   differences	   can	   be	   identified	   at	   sector	   levels	   even	   between	   countries	  clustered	  in	  the	  same	  sub-­‐regional	  models,	  as	  the	  following	  chapters	  will	  show.	  Briefly	  put,	   CEE	   “dependent	   market	   economies”	   actually	   encompass	   different	   modes	   of	  transnational	  integration	  where	  foreign	  capital	  was	  embedded	  differently	  into	  domestic	  economies.	  	  
Figure	  1.3.	  Inward	  FDI	  Stocks	  in	  CEE	  in	  %	  of	  GDP	  
	  
Source:	  Eurostat	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previous	  enlargement	  waves,	   the	  EU	  equally	  engaged	  in	  direct	   institution-­‐building	  and	  implemented	  new	  pre-­‐accession	  assistance	  programs	  (Bruszt	  &	  Holzhacker,	  2009).	  	  The	   EU	   defined	   developmental	   goals	   vis	   a	   vis	   CEE	   essentially	   negatively:	   	   Bruszt	   and	  Vukov	  argue	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  German	  reunification	  had	  sensitized	  the	  Commission	  against	   the	  potential	  costs	  of	  an	  overall	   collapse	  of	  domestic	   industries.	  Therefore,	   the	  primary	   aim	   of	   the	   EU	  was	   to	   build	   up	   a	   sufficient	   degree	   of	   competitiveness	   in	   CEE,	  which	  could	  weather	  the	  shock	  of	  foreign	  competition	  within	  the	  Common	  Market:	  the	  Copenhagen	   criteria	   for	   EU	   accession	   accepted	   in	   1993	   coined	   it	   as	   the	   “capacity	   to	  withstand	  competitive	  pressure”	  (Bruszt	  &	  Vukov,	  2014).	  	  The	  EU	  used	  a	  complex	  set	  of	  tools	  to	  “manage”	  CEE	  transition:	  regular	  monitoring	  through	  annual	  “progress	  reports”	  measured	   the	   pace	   of	   regulatory	   harmonization,	   while	   targeted	   assistance	   took	   the	  shape	  of	  capital	  transfers	  under	  pre-­‐accession	  funds	  such	  as	  PHARE	  or	  SAPARD	  as	  well	  as	   administrative	   training	   programs	   for	   bureaucrats	   such	   as	   TAIEX	   or	   so-­‐called	  Twinnings	  (Bruszt	  &	  McDermott,	  2014a).	  Another	  type	  of	  intervention	  consisted	  in	  the	  selective	   empowerment	   of	   domestic	   target	   groups	   such	   as	   advocacy	   coalitions,	   NGOs,	  which	  had	  incentives	  to	  deepen	  regulatory	  harmonization	  in	  fields	  such	  as	  human	  rights	  or	  environmental	  standards	  (Andonova,	  2004;	  Grabbe,	  2006;	  Hughes,	  Sasse,	  &	  Gordon,	  2004;	  Vachudová,	  2005).	  Oftentimes,	  such	  groups	  acted	  as	  the	  domestic	  counterparts	  to	  the	  EU’s	   external	   conditionality	   system	  by	   forming	   advocacy	  networks	   that	   pressured	  the	   state	   to	   accelerate	   regulatory	   harmonization	   and	   compliance	   with	   EU	   norms	   in	  specific	   issue	   areas	   where	   they	   enjoyed	   a	   tangible	   benefit	   from	   EU	   accession:	   such	  benefits	   were	   not	   primarily	   financial	   but	   could	   be	   measured	   in	   terms	   of	   reputation,	  prestige	   and	   influence	   both	   on	   domestic	   policy	   making	   and	   within	   transnational	  European	  networks	  of	  NGOs	  and	  experts	  (Andonova	  &	  Tuta,	  2014).	  As	  such,	  NGOs	  often	  played	   the	   role	   of	   domestic	  watchdogs	   of	   EU	   law	  enforcement,	   partially	   offsetting	   the	  cost	   of	   monitoring	   from	   the	   shoulders	   of	   the	   Commission.	   In	   spite	   of	   these,	   the	   EU’s	  “developmental”	  concern	  regarding	  CEE	  restructuring	  was	  defined	   largely	  negatively	  –	  in	  a	  minimalist	  form,	  to	  avoid	  a	  costly	  economic	  collapse.	  The	  EU	  had	  no	  clear	  positive	  developmental	  agenda	  for	  CEE:	  the	  EU	  Commission	  had	  no	  roadmap	  for	  defining	  specific	  pathways	   of	   transnationalization,	   neither	   did	   it	   have	  measurable	   objectives	   regarding	  the	  region’s	  catching	  up	  with	  EU15	  economies.	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Part	  2.	  Measuring	  and	  Assessing	  Development	  in	  CEE	  	  We	   have	   so	   far	   remained	   elusive	   as	   to	   what	   precisely	   constitute	   “developmental	  outcomes”.	  It	  is	  now	  time	  to	  spell	  out	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  lack	  of	  consensus	  in	  the	  extant	   literatures	   on	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   post-­‐Socialist	   CEE	   restructuring	   for	  operationalizing	  indicators	  of	  economic	  development	  –	  consequently,	  there	  are	  equally	  large	   gaps	   between	   widely	   different	   normative	   assessments	   of	   the	   region’s	  developmental	   performance	   in	   light	   of	   the	   measures	   used	   by	   various	   camps.	   What	  structures	   the	   debates	   however	   is	   the	   theme	   of	   catching	   up	   –	   whether	   and	   to	   what	  extent	  CEE	  economies	  converge	  to-­‐	  or	  diverge	  from-­‐	  Western	  European	  economies.	  The	  capacity	  of	  late	  industrializers	  to	  catch-­‐up	  with	  rich	  industrialized	  economies	  has	  been	  a	  central	  research	  theme	  since	  Gerschenkron’s	  seminal	  work	  on	  economic	  backwardness	  (Gerschenkron,	   1962).	   It	   is	   thus	   hardly	   surprising	   that	   post-­‐Socialist	   development	   in	  CEE	  has	  been	  framed	  in	  relational	  terms	  vis	  a	  vis	  Western	  European	  economies.	  Broadly	  speaking,	   three	   positions	   can	   be	   identified:	   A	   first	   group	   of	   authors	   posit	   that	   their	  indicators	   show	   a	   gradual	   convergence	   of	   CEE	   economies	   to	   Western	   European	  standards.	   For	   a	   second	   group	   of	   authors,	   CEE	   is	   on	   the	   contrary	   an	   example	   of	  dependent	  underdevelopment.	  Finally,	   a	   cautiously	  pessimistic	   third	  camp	  argues	   that	  their	   evidence	   points	   to	   temporary	   gains	   in	   competitiveness	   without	   actual	  convergence.	  	  	  
Successful	  Catching	  Up?	  	  For	   a	   first	   group	   of	   authors,	   CEE	   restructuring	   has	   been	   largely	   positive	   in	   spite	   of	  widespread	  pessimism	  in	   the	  early	  1990s.	  Operationalizing	  developmental	   trajectories	  in	  this	  view	  typically	  rests	  with	  comparing	  GDP	  growth	  levels	  and	  GDP	  per	  capita.	  	  In	  a	  2009	  study	  commissioned	  by	  the	  EU	  Commission	  regarding	  the	  economic	  effects	  of	  EU	  integration	   for	   CEE,	   the	   authors	   of	   the	   report	   argued	   that	   “The	   econometric	   test	   of	  
economic	  growth	  determinants	  shows	  that	   four	  variables	  related	  to	  the	  EU	  enlargement:	  
FDI	  inflow,	  economic	  freedom,	  progress	  of	  structural	  reforms,	  and	  aid	  inflow,	  are	  positively	  
and	  significantly	  correlated	  with	  GDP	  growth	  rates	  in	  the	  CEE	  countries”	  (…)	  “The	  results	  
indicate	  that	  the	  EU	  enlargement	  significantly	  contributed	  to	  economic	  growth	  of	  the	  CEE-­‐
10	  countries	  (…)	  There	  has	  been	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  income-­‐level	  convergence	  between	  the	  CEE-­‐10	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countries	  and	  the	  EU-­‐15.	  The	  former	  grew	  on	  average	  faster	  than	  the	  latter	  during	  1996-­‐
2007	  while	  their	   initial	   income	  level	  was	  much	  lower.	  Moreover,	  the	  convergence	  process	  
accelerated	  after	  2000	  as	  the	  EU	  enlargement	  approached”	  (Rapacki	  &	  Prochniak,	  2009).	  Based	  on	  this	  trend,	  the	  authors	  are	  confident	  enough	  to	  propose	  precise	  timeframes	  for	  the	  developmental	  catching-­‐up	  of	  EU10	  with	  EU15	  countries	  in	  the	  table	  below,	  as	  they	  argue:	  “According	  to	  our	  projections,	  the	  actual	  process	  of	  convergence	  between	  individual	  
CEE-­‐10	  countries	  and	  the	  EU15	  may	  take	  between	  8	  and	  33	  years”	  (Rapacki	  &	  Prochniak,	  2009,	  p.19).	  	  
Table	  1.1.	  CEE’s	  Catching-­‐Up	  Scenarios	  with	  EU15	  Economies	  
	  
Source:	  (Rapacki	  &	  Prochniak,	  2009,	  p.20)	  	  The	   long-­‐term	   performance	   of	   the	   region	   seems	   to	   support	   the	   claim	   of	   catching-­‐up	  between	  CEE	  and	  EU15	  countries:	   In	  1994,	  CEE’s	  average	  GDP	  per	  capita	  amounted	  to	  50%	  of	  that	  of	  EU15	  countries	  while	  by	  2012,	  it	  had	  increased	  to	  68%	  (see	  figure	  1.5).	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Figure	  1.5.	  GDP	  per	  capita	  in	  CEE	  and	  EU15	  Countries	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access	   to	   technology,	   which	   is	   empirically	   limited	   by	   ever	  more	   stringent	   intellectual	  property	   rights	   protection	   regimes.	   Duncan	   and	   Smith	   add	   that	   nothing	   substantiates	  the	   assumption	   that	   EU15	   and	  CEE	   countries	  would	   be	   converging	   on	   the	   same	   long-­‐term	  growth	  rates.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  they	  find	  that	  strong	  economic	  inequalities	  remain	  between	   the	   two	  groups	  of	   countries	   –	  with	  CEE	  economies	   facing	   trade-­‐offs	  between	  gains	   in	   productivity	   or	   higher	   employment	   levels.	   Overall,	   operationalizing	  developmental	  pathways	  in	  CEE	  with	  GDP	  growth	  rates	  seems	  far	  from	  satisfactory	  and	  the	  optimism	  of	  short-­‐term	  catching	  up	  with	  EU15	  economies	  is	  hardly	  grounded.	  	  
Dependent	  Underdevelopment?	  	  	  A	   second	  group	  of	  authors	   reach	  widely	  different	   conclusions	  by	   focusing	  on	  different	  indicators	   –	   namely,	   that	   instead	   of	   convergence	   and	   equalization,	   post-­‐Socialist	  restructuring	   entrenched	   a	   combination	   of	   old	   and	   new	   disparities	   between	   CEE	   and	  Western	  Europe.	  	  József	   Böröcz	   thus	   argues	   that	   developmental	   trajectory	   of	   CEE	   relative	   to	   Western	  Europe	   and	   the	   world	   economy	   can	   be	   captured	   in	   a	   matrix	   where	   the	   relative	  contribution	  of	  the	  region	  to	  world	  GDP	  -­‐	  and	  GDP	  per	  capita	  as	  a	  share	  of	  world	  mean	  -­‐	  constitute	   two	   axes	   for	   a	   comparison	   of	   dynamic	   pathways	   (Böröcz,	   2012).	   In	   this	  matrix,	   Böröcz	   finds	   that	   in	   spite	   of	   a	   rebound	   in	   GDP	   per	   capita	   after	   the	   initial	  contraction	  of	  the	  1990s	  (as	  discussed	  previously),	  the	  weight	  of	  CEE	  economies	  relative	  to	  the	  world	  economy	  has	  uniformly	  diminished	  throughout	  the	  restructuring	  phase.	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Figure	  1.6.	  Böröcz’	  Matrix	  of	  Developmental	  Pathways	  in	  CEE	  
	  
Source:	  (Böröcz,	  2012	  p.113)	  
	  If	   anything,	   the	   region	   has	   thus	   been	   unambiguously	   marginalized	   according	   to	   him:	  “The	   uncomplicated	   modernizationist	   expectations	   that	   the	   post-­‐state	   socialist	   states	  
would	   rapidly	   catch	  up	  with	   the	   rest	   of	  Europe	  were	   simply	  wrong.	  This,	   by	   itself	   comes	  
hardly	   as	   a	   surprise	   to	   global	   analysts.	   What	   is	   most	   striking	   about	   the	   post-­‐1989	  
transformation	   is	   the	   uniformity	   with	   which	   the	   global	   economic	   positions	   of	   a	   vast	  
majority	   of	   the	   region's	   states	   collapsed,	   along	   basically	   a	   single	   precipitous	   pattern,	  
followed	   by	   a	   somewhat	   feebler	   rebound.	   It	   appears	   that,	   ironically,	   the	   state	   socialist	  
period	   showed	   much	   more	   variation	   among	   members	   of	   the	   Soviet	   bloc	   than	   poststate	  
socialism.	   Whether	   they	   are	   predominantly	   western	   Christian,	   eastern	   Orthodox,	   or	  
Muslim,	   whether	   their	   governments	   pursue	   policies	   that	   are	   neoliberal	   embedded	  
neoliberal,	   or	   neocorporatist	   (Bohle	   and	   Greskovits	   2007),	   whether	   they	   are	   poorer	   or	  
richer,	   small,	   medium-­‐sized	   or	   large,	   whether	   they	   privatized	   their	   assets	   primarily	   to	  
foreign	  multinationals	  or	  domestic	  oligarchs,	  whether	   their	  current	  economy	  depends	  on	  
exports	   of	  machine	   products,	   agricultural	   goods,	   or	   energy	   and	   raw	  materials,	   each	   lost	  
global	  positions,	  to	  a	  significant	  degree,	  along	  both	  of	  the	  dimensions	  previously	  surveyed.	  
At	  best,	  some	  could	  boast	  only	  of	  having	  regained	  their	  already	  reduced	  positions	  of	  1990	  
in	   GDP	   per	   capita	   terms;	   others	   have	   not	   succeeded	   in	   making	   even	   that	   dubious	  
achievement.	  Even	  more	  striking,	  none	  among	  the	  27	  postsocialist	  states	  surveyed	  here	  had	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by	   2009	   recuperated	   its	   already	   significantly	   reduced	   global	   economic	   weight	   of	   1989”	  (Böröcz	  2009,	  p.119).	  	  	  	  The	  contributions	  of	   Jacoby	  et	  al.	   typify	  the	   insertion	  of	  CEE	  into	  world	  markets	  as	  an	  outcome	   of	   Western	   public	   and	   private	   strategies	   in	   what	   they	   call	   “backyard	  management”	  –	   resulting	   in	  an	   increase	  of	  Western	   competitiveness	  at	   the	  expense	  of	  entrenching	   structural	   differences	   between	   CEE	   and	  Western	   Europe	   (Epstein,	   2014;	  Jacoby,	   2010;	   Jacoby	  &	  Epstein,	   2014).	   Jacoby	   and	  Epstein	   argue	   that	   the	   insertion	   of	  CEE	   to	   regional	   and	   global	   markets	   was	   shaped	   asymmetrically	   by	   EU15	   actors:	   for	  Western	   firms,	   CEE	   represented	   an	   investment	   opportunity	   for	   restructuring	   their	  supply	   chains,	   while	   for	   Western	   states,	   CEE	   economies	   represented	   potentially	  dangerous	  competitors	  given	  their	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  low	  wages.	  The	  “backyard	  management”	   thesis	  argues	   that	  while	  EU15	  public	  and	  private	   interests	  often	  clashed	  regarding	  the	  preferred	  economic	  mode	  of	  integration	  of	  CEE	  –	  ultimately,	  they	  reached	  uneasy	  settlements	  in	  different	  issue	  areas.	  In	  all	  cases	  however,	  the	  newfound	  position	  of	  CEE	  economies	  within	   the	  European	  market	  was	  decided	  West	  of	   the	  Rhine.	   Jacoby	  identifies	   three	   measures	   as	   relevant	   for	   capturing	   the	   changing	   position	   of	   CEE	  economies	  in	  this	  process:	  (1)	  flows	  of	  capital,	  (2)	  flows	  of	  labor	  and	  (3)	  flows	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  (Jacoby	  2010).	  In	  terms	  of	  capital	  flows,	  CEE	  is	  particular	  in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  or	   only	   marginally	   exports	   capital,	   while	   it	   is	   among	   the	   first	   targets	   of	   foreign	  investments	  –	  a	  point	  we	  have	  illustrated	  previously	  with	  FDI	  flows	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Poland	  and	  Hungary.	   Jacoby	   reminds	   that	   the	   share	   of	   FDI	   in	   GDP	  was	   39%	   in	   CEE	   by	   2004	  (twice	  the	  world	  average),	  with	  particular	  strongholds	  such	  as	  the	  financial	  sector	  where	  foreign	  ownership	  totaled	  over	  50%	  compared	  to	  the	  OECD’s	  20%	  average.	  Briefly	  put,	  in	  the	  field	  of	  capital	  flows,	  EU15	  private	  interests	  prevailed,	  which	  resulted	  in	  a	  transfer	  of	   ownership	   from	   CEE	   to	   EU15	   actors	   in	   industrial	   and	   banking	   sectors.	   In	   terms	   of	  labor	   flows	   on	   the	   contrary,	   EU15	   states	   managed	   to	   embed	   legal	   safeguards	   that	  substantially	  limited	  the	  opportunities	  of	  CEE	  workers	  to	  migrate:	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Ireland,	   the	   UK	   and	   Sweden,	   the	   remaining	   12	   EU15	   states	   introduced	   temporary	  limitations	   on	   CEE	   mobility.	   Finally,	   in	   terms	   of	   trade	   flows,	   the	   early	   Europe	  Agreements	  concluded	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  individual	  CEE	  states	  were	  initially	  overtly	  protectionist	   bilateral	   treaties:	   CEE	   sectors	  where	   the	   region’s	   comparative	   advantage	  was	   blatant	   such	   as	   steel,	   iron,	   chemicals	   and	   agricultural	   products	   –	   were	   purely	  
	  	   21	  
excluded.	  However,	  once	  CEE	  productive	  capacities	  fell	  into	  EU15	  hands	  in	  the	  course	  of	  privatization,	   these	   restrictions	   were	   gradually	   relaxed:	   as	   Jacoby	   argues,	   this	   can	   be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  EU15	  firms	  use	  CEE	  for	  assembling	  and	  re-­‐exporting	  industrial	  goods	   to	   EU15	  markets.	   In	   other	   words,	   CEE’s	   export	   competitiveness	   is	   a	   statistical	  mirage,	  which	   ignores	   the	   question	   of	   ownership:	   CEE	   “exports”	   are	   in	   fact	   to	   a	   large	  extent	   EU15	   re-­‐imports	   where	   the	   value	   added	   contribution	   of	   domestic	   sectors	   is	  minimal.	   As	   summarized	   by	   Epstein	   (2014),	   the	   new	   position	   of	   CEE	   economies	   has	  entrenched	  pre-­‐existing	  forms	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  inequalities	  between	  West-­‐	  and	  Central	  Europe	  rather	  than	  leveling	  the	  playing	  field.	  	  	  Overall,	  Böröcz’	  operationalization	  of	  developmental	  pathways	   is	   interesting	   inasmuch	  his	  indicators	  study	  actual	  economic	  performance	  and	  his	  two	  relational	  GDP	  indicators	  do	   paint	   a	   different	   picture	   than	   neoclassical	   models	   of	   convergence.	   However	   his	  analysis	   also	   suffers	   from	  weaknesses:	   Firstly,	   he	   fails	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   the	   post-­‐Socialist	   loss	  of	  economic	  weight	   in	   the	  world	  economy	   is	  not	   the	  specificity	  of	  a	  new,	  colonial	  form	  of	  semi-­‐peripheral	  integration	  to	  world	  markets.	  In	  fact,	  his	  data	  shows	  a	  similar	   downward	   trajectory	   for	   all	   “core”	   capitalisms	   (likely	   not	   independently	   from	  the	  concomitant	  rise	  of	  India	  and	  China).	  Second,	  out	  of	  his	  two	  indicators,	  one	  (GDP	  per	  capita)	   does	   in	   fact	   show	   CEE’s	   stability	   (after	   an	   initial	   contraction)	   instead	   of	  downgrading	   divergence	   relative	   to	   the	   world	   economy.	   Third,	   he	   chooses	   to	   ditch	  Poland’s	  clear	  upgrading	  trajectory	  on	  both	  his	  dimensions	  as	  a	  unique	  outlier	  case.	  We	  argue	   that	   as	   with	   many	   analyses	   rooted	   in	   dependency	   theory,	   his	   framework	   pays	  insufficient	  attention	  to	  different	  individual	  developmental	  trajectories:	  the	  danger	  with	  these	  approaches	  is	  that	  cases	  that	  disconfirm	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  unilateral	  exploitation	  in	   the	   semi-­‐periphery	   are	   simply	   ignored.	   	  The	   theoretical	  weaknesses	  of	  dependency	  theory	  –	  on	  which	  Böröcz’	  own	  analysis	   rests	   -­‐	   for	  explaining	  different	  developmental	  trajectories	   in	  post-­‐Socialist	  CEE	  are	  discussed	   in	  the	   following	  chapter	   in	  more	  detail.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   “backyard	   management”	   is	   a	   highly	   stimulating	   framework	   for	  analyzing	   the	  position	  of	  CEE	   in	  European	  and	  global	  markets	  and	   flows,	  however,	  we	  would	  contend	  that	  this	  operationalization	  is	  less	  attentive	  to	  the	  actual	  performance	  of	  CEE	  economies	  than	  to	  the	  institutional	  foundations	  of	  power	  disparities	  between	  EU15	  and	   CEE	   public	   and	   private	   actors.	   Put	   differently,	   Jacoby	   et	   al.	   mostly	   examine	  institutional	  dimensions	  of	  divergence	  between	  EU15	  and	  CEE	  and	  it	  is	  only	  in	  the	  trade	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flow	  dimension	  where	  this	  framework	  actually	  examines	  indicators	  of	  CEE	  performance.	  However,	   Jacoby	   et	   al.	   raise	   important	   points	   regarding	   trade	   flows:	   firstly,	   that	   the	  value	   added	   contribution	   of	   domestic	   sectors	   are	   better	   indicators	   of	   developmental	  upgrading	   than	   nominal	   trade	   flows.	   Second,	   that	   trade	   indicators	   are	   blind	   to	   the	  question	   of	   domestic	   or	   foreign	   ownership,	   which	   is	   highly	   relevant	   from	   a	  developmental	  perspective:	  CEE	  dependency	  on	  EU15	  economies	  is	  only	  apparent	  when	  it	   is	   singled	   out	   that	   industrial	   productive	   assets	   and	   domestic	   banking	   sectors	   are	  largely	  controlled	  by	  EU15	  firms	  and	  banks.	  This	  is	  crucial	  because	  EU15	  MNCs	  have	  the	  capacity	   to	   shape	   the	   domestic	   value	   added	   content	   of	   their	   CEE	   subsidiaries	   and	   the	  distribution	  of	  profits	   internally,	  within	   their	   supply	   chains.	   Second,	   contrary	   to	  EU15	  countries	  but	  also	  very	  differently	  from	  previous	  late-­‐industrializers,	  CEE	  states	  are	  not	  in	  control	  of	  their	  financial	  sectors	  –	  whereas	  public	  developmental	  programs	  in	  earlier	  periods	   crucially	   relied	   on	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   state	   to	   channel	   foreign	   capital	   to	  particular	  sectors.	  	  	  
CEE	  in	  a	  Middle	  Income	  Trap?	  	  	  Finally,	   a	   third	  group	  of	  authors	  display	  a	   cautiously	  pessimistic	  view	  regarding	  CEE’s	  capacity	   to	   catch	   up	   with	   EU15	   and	   other	   rich,	   industrialized	   economies.	   We	   would	  classify	   here	   those	   authors	   whose	   research	   was	   influenced	   by-­‐	   or	   responded	   to-­‐	   the	  Varieties	  of	  Capitalism	  (VoC)	   framework.	   It	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	   the	   “VoC	   in	  CEE”	  scholarship	   constitutes	   a	   broader	   research	   agenda	  within	  which	   the	   Gerschenkronian	  question	  of	  developmental	  catching	  up	   is	  only	  one	  among	  other	  themes:	   these	  authors	  seek	   to	  capture	  particular	  configurations	  of	  political	  and	  economic	   institutions	   in	  CEE,	  driven	  by	  a	   taxonomical	   impetus	   to	  classify	  CEE	  varieties	  of	  capitalisms.	  The	  extent	   to	  which	  these	  institutional	  configurations	  enable	  or	  prohibit	  convergence	  is	  a	  (relatively)	  subsidiary	  question	  in	  this	  framework.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  “VoC	  in	  CEE”	  framework	  cannot	  escape	  the	  question	  of	  CEE	  performance	  in	  regional	  and	  global	  markets	  and	  this	  group	  of	  authors	  reaches	  relatively	  similar	  conclusions	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  catching	  up	  potential	  of	  CEE	  economies.	  	  	  The	   VoC	   in	   CEE	   agenda	   is	   premised	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   particular	   domestic	  institutional	  complementarities	  create	  specific	  comparative	  advantages	   that	  determine	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in	   turn	   different	   pathways	   of	   transnationalization:	   consequently,	   this	   tradition	   puts	   a	  heavy	   emphasis	   on	   the	   region’s	   insertion	   into	   trade	   flows	   in	   particular.	   Nolke	   and	  Vliegenthart	   (2009)	   were	   among	   the	   first	   to	   transpose	   explicitly	   the	   VoC	   framework	  developed	  by	  Hall	  and	  Soskice	  to	  the	  CEE	  region,	  specifically	  to	  the	  Visegrad	  countries	  (Poland,	  Czech	  Republic,	  Slovakia	  and	  Hungary).	  They	  argue	   that	   the	  combination	  of	  a	  qualified	  workforce	   and	   low	  wages	   have	   specialized	   these	   economies	   in	   the	   export	   of	  complex,	   human-­‐capital	   intensive,	   semi-­‐standardized	   industrial	   goods.	   Bohle	   and	  Greskovits	   (2012)	   consider	   that	  while	   the	   value	   added	   content	   of	   exports	   in	  Visegrad	  countries	   reflects	  an	  upgrading	   trend	   into	   increasingly	  complex	  products,	  productivity	  levels	  continue	  to	  set	  the	  region	  apart	  from	  Western	  Europe	  (2012,	  p.172).	  More	  of	  less	  explicitly,	   Nolke	   and	   Vliegenthart	   as	   well	   as	   Bohle	   and	   Greskovits	   warn	   of	   a	   looming	  middle-­‐income	   trap	   in	   CEE,	   which	   is	   bound	   to	   actually	   differentiate	   these	   economies	  further	   from	   Western	   types	   of	   capitalism	   rather	   than	   produce	   convergence	   (Paus,	  2012):	   while	   the	   trade	   integration	   of	   CEE	   (specifically	   the	   Visegrad	   sub-­‐type	   of	  countries)	   through	   foreign	  MNCs	   allows	   for	   short-­‐term	   economic	   gains	   (employment,	  higher	  wages,	  increasing	  value	  added	  content	  of	  exports),	  these	  authors	  argue	  that	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  these	  economies	  don’t	  have	  endogenous	  innovation	  systems,	  which	  could	  (1)	  sustain	   long-­‐term	  productivity	   growth	   and	   (2)	   create	   new	   comparative	   advantages	   in	  capital-­‐	   and	   technology-­‐intensive	   sectors.	   For	   these	   authors,	   the	   danger	   is	   that	   the	  institutional	   structure	   of	   Visegrad	   economies	   rely	   precisely	   on	   the	   outsourcing	   of	  technological	  innovation,	  which	  is	  borrowed	  through	  FDI	  rather	  than	  being	  domestically	  engineered:	  Visegrad	  states	  have	  no	  incentives	  to	  finance	  costly	  investment	  programs	  in	  human	   capital,	   RD	   and	   innovation	  while	  MNCs	   equally	   lack	   incentives	   for	   specializing	  their	   CEE	   plants	   in	   production	   segments	   that	  would	   go	   substantially	   beyond	   the	   pre-­‐existing	   comparative	   advantage	   of	   the	   local	  workforce	   in	   low	  wages.	   The	   VoC	   in	   CEE	  agenda	   thus	   points	   to	   a	   superficial	   short-­‐term	   convergence	   between	   CEE	   and	   West	  European	  economies,	   captured	  by	   improvements	   in	   aggregate	   indicators	   such	  as	  GDP,	  GDP	  per	  capita	  or	  trade	  balances	  –	  which	  in	  fact	  overshadow	  a	  structural	  difference	  in	  the	   institutional	   foundations	   of	   innovation	   between	   EU15	   and	   CEE	   countries.	   This	  insight	   is	   confirmed	  by	  data	  on	  productivity	  differences	  between	  Western	  and	  Central	  Europe	  –	  where	  convergence	  is	  all	  but	  absent.	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Figure	  1.7.	  Labor	  Productivity	  in	  CEE	  and	  EU15	  countries	  
	  
Source:	  Eurostat	  	  
A	  note	  on	  methods	  for	  operationalizing	  developmental	  outcomes	  in	  CEE	  	  In	   this	   section,	   we	   sought	   to	   stress	   how	   dramatically	   different	   a	   picture	   the	   extant	  scholarships	   paint	   regarding	   developmental	   outcomes	   and	   trajectories	   in	   CEE	  economies.	   As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   the	   Gerschenkronian	   question	   of	   catching	   up	  continues	   to	   structure	   the	   current	   debates,	   however,	   different	   methods	   for	  operationalizing	   developmental	   outcomes	   or	   pathways	   result	   in	   very	   different	  assessments	  of	  developmental	  performance.	  In	  spite	  of	  these	  confusions,	  we	  argue	  that	  an	  overview	  of	   these	   literatures	  nonetheless	  holds	   important	   lessons	   for	  proposing	  an	  alternative	  comparative	  framework	  of	  developmental	  outcomes	  in	  CEE.	  	  	  The	   first	   methodological	   lesson	   is	   that	   distinctions	   between	   indicators	   of	   economic	  performance	   and	   the	   institutional	   independent	   variables	   affecting	   these	   outcomes	  should	  be	   clarified:	  Drahokoupil	   and	  Myant	   (2015)	   argue	   that	   an	   important	   source	   of	  confusion	  in	  these	  debates	   lies	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  two	  interpretations	  of	  developmental	  divergence/convergence	  are	  often	  used	  interchangeably:	  the	  institutional	  dimensions	  of	  CEE	   economies,	   and	   indicators	   of	   these	   very	   institutions’	   economic	   performance	   over	  time:	  “(…)	  The	  concern	  with	  institutional	  performance,	  however	  specified,	  should	  be	  one	  of	  
the	   central	   directions	   in	   the	   CC	   (comparative	   capitalism)	   agenda.	   The	   VoC	   approach	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proposed	   a	   typological	   theory	   with	   such	   a	   purpose.	   The	   debate	   in	   the	   comparative	  
capitalism	  literature	  that	  started	  with	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  weak	  points	  of	  the	  VoC	  approach	  
led	   CC	   research	   away	   from	   explaining	   the	   economic	   and	   other	   effects	   of	   institutions”	  (Drahokoupil	  &	  Myant,	  2015).	  	  	  The	   second	   methodological	   lesson	   is	   that	   many	   researchers	   identify	   a	   problem	   with	  what	   common	   aggregates	   might	   actually	   conceal.	   To	   put	   it	   clearly,	   the	   question	   of	  domestic	  versus	  foreign	  ownership	  constitutes	  a	  methodological	  problem	  for	  assessing	  developmental	  outcomes	  in	  CEE:	  given	  the	  striking	  role	  of	  FDI	  as	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  productive	   investments	   in	   CEE	   economies	   and	   the	   overwhelming	   share	   of	   foreign	  ownership	   in	   strategically	   important	   sectors,	   common	   aggregates	   such	   as	   GDP	   per	  capita	   or	   even	   trade	   balances	   represent	   a	   statistical	   mirage.	   Crucial	   contributions	   by	  Bohle	  and	  Greskovits	   	  (2012)	  as	  well	  as	  by	  Scepanovic	  (2013)	  single	  out	  precisely	  that	  the	   institutional	   foundations	  of	  technological	   innovation	  constitute	  a	   fundamental	  area	  of	   divergence	   between	  EU15	   and	   CEE	   economies:	   this	   difference	  might	   all	   but	   escape	  conventional	  statistics	  although	  it	  is	  deeply	  consequential.	  Bluntly	  put,	  improving	  trade	  balances	   for	   instance	   might	   sustain	   the	   illusion	   of	   an	   improving	   position	   of	   CEE	  economies	   in	  transnational	  markets	  –	  but	   if	  one	  fails	   to	  acknowledge	  that	  CEE	  exports	  are	   overwhelmingly	   created	   by	   EU15	   MNCs	   that	   own	   directly	   domestic	   productive	  assets	   in	   CEE	   and	   capture	   the	   lion’s	   share	   of	   profits	   relative	   to	   domestic	   actors	   -­‐	   as	  mentioned	  by	  Jacoby	  (2010)	  –	  these	  figures	  might	  not	  reveal	  much	  in	  themselves	  about	  catching	   up.	   Similarly,	   variations	   in	   the	   value	   added	   content	   of	   exports	   are	   only	  meaningful	  if	  one	  understands	  that	  CEE	  is	  highly	  dependent	  on	  technology	  “borrowed”	  from	  MNCs	   that	   these	   national	   economies	   do	   not	   own	   and	  would	   be	   hard	   pressed	   to	  replicate	  (Scepanovic.	  2013).	  	  	  
Part	  3.	  An	  Alternative	  Comparative	  Framework	  	  	  In	   light	   of	   these	   problems,	   we	   argue	   that	   an	   alternative	   comparative	   framework	   of	  developmental	   outcomes	   and	   performance	   in	   CEE	   would	   be	   beneficial.	   Such	   a	  framework	   should	   (1)	   separate	   dependent	   variables	   of	   performance	   from	   the	  institutional	   explanations	   thereof,	   and	   (2)	   recognize	   that	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   actors	  might	   benefit	   differently	   from	   a	   given	   mode	   of	   transnationalization	   within	   the	   same	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sector.	  We	   therefore	   propose	   an	   analytical	   framework	   that	   combines	   the	   question	   of	  economic	   upgrading	   with	   particular	   attention	   to	   the	   question	   of	   ownership,	   or	   more	  precisely	   the	   question	   of	   an	   uneven	   distribution	   of	   benefits	   between	   foreign	   and	  domestic	   actors.	   While	   methodological	   nationalism	   might	   have	   a	   lot	   of	   enemies	   in	  international	  political	  economy	  in	  particular,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  public	  and	  private	  actors	   in	  semi-­‐peripheral	  economies,	   the	  only	  relevant	  policy	  question	   is	   the	  extant	   to	  which	  they	  stand	  to	  gain	  from	  a	  particular	  mode	  of	  transnationalization.	  Therefore,	  we	  propose	   to	   replace	   the	   broader	   Gerschenkronian	   research	   question:	   “Is	   there	  
developmental	   catching	   up	   between	   CEE	   and	  Western	   Europe?”	   -­‐	   with	   a	   more	   precise	  formulation:	  “Does	  a	  particular	  mode	  of	  transnational	  integration	  improve	  the	  position	  of	  
a	  domestic	  sector	  in	  regional	  and	  transnational	  markets?	  And	  who	  does	  it	  benefit:	  MNCs,	  
domestic	  actors	  or	  both?”	  Upgrading	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  between	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  actors	  thus	  constitute	  the	  two	  dimensions	  of	  our	  comparative	  framework	  of	  developmental	  outcomes	  at	  the	  sector	  level.	  	  
Ownership	  	  Stark	  and	  Vedres	  (2006)	  examined	  the	  ownership	  question	  in	  post-­‐Socialist	  economies	  was	  in	  innovative	  ways.	  The	  authors	  proposed	  to	  measure	  how	  transnational	  integration	  modified	  linkages	  between	  domestic	  firms	  and	  MNCs	  in	  CEE.	  This	  opened	  a	  particularly	  stimulating	   agenda	   as	   they	   considered	   the	   transnationalization	   of	   CEE	   economies	   as	  dynamic	  relational	  processes	  between	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  actors.	  Given	  the	  particular	  salience	  of	  foreign	  ownership	  in	  the	  region,	  post-­‐Socialist	  CEE	  economies	  could	  thus	  be	  viewed	   as	   new	   forms	   of	   “mixed”	   (domestic/foreign)	   economies3.	   Stark	   and	   Vedres	  examined	  different	  forms	  of	  networks	  between	  domestic	  firms	  and	  MNCs:	  this	  approach	  implicitly	   raised	   the	   question	   of	   distributive	   problems	   between	   domestic	   and	   foreign	  actors.	   Unfortunately	   from	   our	   perspective,	   the	   allocation	   of	   resources	   and	   the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  could	  only	  be	  gauged	  indirectly	  in	  this	  framework,	  which	  focused	  more	   on	   the	   qualities	   of	   networkedness	   than	   on	   the	   underlying	   distributive	   problems	  and	  backward	  linkages	  between	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  actors.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  This	   research	   agenda	   was	   in	   line	   with	   Stark’s	   previous	   work	   on	   assemblages	   of	   public	   and	   private	  property	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  post-­‐Socialist	  privatizations.	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Figure	  1.8.	  Relative	  Share	  of	  Different	  Forms	  of	  Networks	  Between	  Domestic	  Firms	  and	  
MNCs	  in	  Hungary	  Between	  1987	  and	  2001	  	  
	  
Source:	  (Stark	  &	  Vedres,	  2006)	  
	  
Sector-­‐level	  performance	  qualified	  by	  ownership	  	  One	   recent	   approach	   by	   Scepanovic	   	   (2013)	   offers	   perhaps	   the	   most	   comprehensive	  attempt	  at	  operationalizing	  developmental	  performance	  at	  the	  sector	  level	  in	  CEE,	  while	  simultaneously	   exploring	   the	   question	   of	   distributive	   problems	   between	   foreign	   and	  domestic	  firms	  through	  spillovers	  and	  backward	  linkages.	  Her	  account	  of	  the	  automotive	  sector	   reads	   as	   an	   extreme	   case	   where	   domestic	   suppliers	   are	   virtually	   entirely	  marginalized	  in	  the	  new	  supply	  chains	  controlled	  by	  MNCs	  –	  all	  the	  while	  trade	  statistics	  paint	  a	  rosy	  picture	  of	  improving	  trade	  competitiveness.	  Scepanovic’s	  meticulous	  study	  shows	  precisely	  that	  while	  conventional	  indicators	  of	  economic	  performance	  showcase	  clear	   signs	   of	   upgrading	   in	   CEE	   automotive	   production	   and	   trade	   –	   improvements	   in	  volumes	  and	  revenues	  from	  trade,	  but	  even	  in	  the	  value	  added	  content	  of	  exports	  -­‐	  fail	  to	  highlight	   a	   crucial	   weakness,	   namely	   that	   automotive	   supply	   chains	   are	   entirely	  controlled	  by	   foreign	  MNCs	  with	  minimal	   linkages	   to	  domestic	  actors.	  For	  Scepanovic,	  this	   raises	   a	   problem	   that	   goes	   beyond	   the	   question	   of	   social	   exclusion	   for	   domestic	  actors	  in	  liberalized	  sectors:	  even	  more	  important	  than	  the	  marginalization	  of	  domestic	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firms	  per	  se,	  the	  problem	  lies	  with	  absent	  technology	  transfers	  between	  MNCs	  and	  CEE	  economies.	  Her	  work	  reads	  as	  a	  doubly	  cautionary	  tale:	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  she	  highlights	  the	   empirical	   limitations	   of	   upgrading	   strategies	   where	   FDI	   plays	   both	   the	   role	   of	  primary	   financial	   capital	   but	   also	   –	   allegedly	   –	   substitutes	   for	   the	   need	   of	   domestic	  innovation,	  investment	  in	  human	  capital,	  skill	  formation	  and	  RD.	  While	  CEE	  states	  might	  have	   hoped	   that	   becoming	   industrial	   exporting	   powerhouses	   in	   the	   new	   European	  regional	   market	   could	   be	   realized	   without	   costly	   public	   investments	   and	   most	  importantly	   without	   domestically	   engineered	   technological	   progress	   –	   in	   fact	   these	  economies	   became	   entirely	   dependent	   on	   reproducing	   their	   unique	   comparative	  advantage	   in	   low	   wages,	   thus	   falling	   into	   the	   middle	   income	   trap	   hinted	   at	   by	   the	  students	  of	  the	  VoC	  scholarship.	  When	  the	  effects	  of	  such	  a	  weak	  comparative	  advantage	  will	  fade,	  these	  economies	  risk	  losing	  entire	  industrial	  sectors	  overnight	  –	  ones	  they	  had	  in	   fact	   never	   owned	   nor	   controlled.	   Second,	   Scepanovic’s	   work	   equally	   reads	   as	   a	  methodological	  warning	  for	  the	  students	  of	  economic	  upgrading	  in	  semi-­‐peripheral	  late	  industrializers:	   her	   case	   study	   shows	   in	   rich	   detail	   how	   conventional	   statistics	   of	  economic	   performance	   can	   consistently	   portray	   catching	   up,	   while	   simultaneously	  concealing	   the	   structural	   weakness	   of	   a	   particular	   mode	   of	   transnationalization	   that	  relies	  exclusively	  on	  FDI	  –	  if	  the	  question	  of	  ownership	  is	  ignored.	  	  	  Therefore,	   we	   would	   place	   our	   own	   framework	   in	   the	   continuity	   of	   Scepanovic’s	  insightful	   research	   agenda.	   Our	   dual	   research	   question	   of	   a	   specific	   sector’s	   overall	  economic	  performance	  in	  transnational	  markets	  and	  the	  distributive	  problems	  between	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  actors	  mirrors	   to	  a	   large	  extent	  Scepanovic’s	  own	  formulation	  of	  her	   developmental	   question	   in	   CEE:	   “(…)	   the	   main	   research	   question	   –	   how	   foreign	  
investment	  impacts	  development	  –	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  being	  two	  questions.	  The	  first	  asks	  
about	  the	  mechanics	  of	  FDI-­‐led	  development:	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  FDI	  translates	  into	  growth	  
and	   competitiveness,	   and	   the	   structure	   of	   alliances	   and	   institutions,	   which	   support	   the	  
activities	   of	   foreign	   firms.	   The	   second	   meaning	   of	   the	   question	   concerns	   the	   nature	   of	  
development	  taking	  place	  under	  the	  tutelage	  of	  foreign	  capital	  –	  its	  stability,	  inclusiveness,	  
distributional	  consequences,	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages”	  (Scepanovic,	  2013,	  p.8).	  	  However,	  we	  would	  also	  add	  two	  important	  remarks:	  First,	   in	  Scepanovic’s	  case	  study,	  the	   mode	   of	   the	   automotive	   sector’s	   transnationalization	   is	   uniform	   across	   different	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Visegrad	  countries.	   Integration	  occurs	  entirely	   through	  FDI	  and	  the	  dissolution	  of	  pre-­‐existing	   industrial	   capacities/firms	   in	   the	   internal	   supply	   chains	   of	   MNCs.	   Second,	  outcomes	  are	  equally	  similar	  across	   the	  region:	   the	  entire	  marginalization	  of	  domestic	  competitors	   and	   even	   suppliers	   of	  MNCs	   –	   in	   parallel	   to	   improving	   trade	   balances.	   In	  spite	  of	  the	  glaring	  importance	  of	  automotive	  sectors	  for	  Visegrad	  economies,	  we	  would	  contend	   that	   at	   a	   theoretical	   level,	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   for	   assuming	   that	   similar	   sub-­‐regional	   CEE	   varieties	   of	   capitalism	   would	   uniformly	   follow	   the	   same	   patterns	   of	  transnationalization	  across	  countries	  in	  a	  given	  sector.	  In	  industrial	  sectors	  with	  lower	  technology	  content	   in	  particular,	   there	  would	  be	  a	  priori	  greater	  scope	  for	  variation	  of	  transnationalization	  modes:	  when	  accessing	  technology	  is	  cheaper,	  different	  options	  for	  harnessing	  it	  open	  up	  for	  similar	  countries.	  Consequently,	  the	  distribution	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits	   between	   foreign	   and	   domestic	   actors	   could	   likewise	   follow	   very	   different	  patterns.	  	  	  Simply	  put,	  in	  proposing	  a	  coherent	  comparative	  framework	  that	  is	  able	  to	  capture	  and	  contrast	   developmental	   performance	   in	   deeply	   transnationalized	   semi-­‐peripheral	  countries,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  best	  option	  is	  to	  combine	  the	  methodological	  insights	  gained	  from	  two	  sources:	  measures	  of	  upgrading/downgrading	  trajectories	  should	  be	  evaluated	  in	  light	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  between	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  actors.	  Gereffi	  et	  al.	  have	  consistently	  analyzed	  upgrading	  at	  the	  firm	  level	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  Global	  Value	  Chains	   (GVC)	   theory	   (Barrientos,	  Gereffi,	  &	  Rossi,	  2011;	  Cattaneo,	  Gereffi,	  Miroudot,	  &	  Taglioni,	   2013;	   Gereffi,	   Humphrey,	   &	   Sturgeon,	   2005;	   Gereffi	   &	  Wyman,	   1990):	   their	  insights	   can	   be	   mobilized	   for	   understanding	   what	   are	   the	   different	   scenarios	   for	  upgrading	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  domestic	  firms.	  This	  literature	  identified	  four	  routes	  of	   possible	   upgrading:	   1.)	   Process	   upgrading	   occurs	   if	   within	   the	   same	   production	  segment	   the	   productivity	   of	   a	   firm	   increases,	   2.)	   Product	   upgrading	   occurs	   if	  increasingly	   higher	   value	   added	   products	   are	   produced	   by	   the	   firm,	   3.)	   Functional	  upgrading	  occurs	  when	  firms	  climb	  up	  the	  value	  chain	  and	  capture	  a	  higher	  value	  added	  production	   segment	   previously	   owned	   by	   their	   buyers	   or	   suppliers.	   4.)	   Value	   chain	  upgrading	   occurs	   when	   the	   firm	   is	   able	   to	   diversify	   into	   new	   sectors	   altogether	  (Cattaneo	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  	  MNCs	  can	  affect	  two	  types	  of	  domestic	  actors:	  local	  suppliers	  and	  domestically	  owned	  competitors.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  whether	  domestic	  suppliers	  of	  MNCs	  do	  increase	  their	  productivity	  or	  the	  value	  added	  content	  of	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their	   outputs	   because	   of	   their	   inclusion	   in	   buyer-­‐driven	   transnational	   supply	   chains	  (Gereffi,	  1994).	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  identify	  whether	  the	  domestic	  competitors	  of	  MNCs	  are	   able	   to	   increase	   their	  productivity,	   value	  added	   contribution	  and	  market	  share	  or	  if	  they	  are	  gradually	  marginalized	  due	  to	  the	  competitive	  pressure	  of	  MNCs.	  	  	  Such	   a	   framework	   should	   be	   able	   to	   identify	   two	   trends:	   (1)	   Whether	   upgrading	   or	  downgrading	   occurs	   within	   a	   national	   sector	   over	   time,	   as	   measured	   by	   aggregate	  measures	   on	   production	   and	   export	   profiles,	   productivity	   gains	   and	   value	   added	  content.	  This	  dimension	  should	  reflect	   the	  overall	  performance	  of	  a	  domestic	  sector	   in	  transnational	  markets.	   (2)	  By	  disentangling	   the	   “domestic	   sector”	  by	  ownership,	  what	  can	  be	  examined	  is	  whether	  domestic	  firms	  gain	  or	  lose	  in	  the	  process	  relative	  to	  MNCs	  (with	   a	   further	   distinction	   between	   suppliers	   of	   MNCs	   and	   domestically	   owned	  competitors	  to	  MNCs)	  –	  that	  is,	  whether	  MNCs	  can	  coexist	  with	  domestic	  rivals	  or	  even	  participate	   in	   the	   upgrading	   of	   domestic	   capacities	   through	   horizontal	   or	   vertical	  spillovers	   -­‐	   or	   if	   foreign	   capital	   merely	   destroys	   the	   competitiveness	   and	   chances	   of	  survival	  of	  domestic	  firms.	  	  	  If	   one	   disentangles	   the	   question	   of	   a	   sector’s	   overall	   performance	   in	   transnational	  markets	   from	   the	   problem	  of	   relative	   positions	   of	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   actors,	   at	   the	  theoretical	  level,	  at	  least	  four	  different	  outcomes	  can	  be	  envisaged:	  	  	  (1)	   Improving	   competitiveness	   on	   transnational	   markets	   alongside	   improving	  competitiveness	  of	  domestic	  firms	  relative	  to	  MNCs.	  MNC	  penetration	  does	  not	  threaten	  the	   position	   of	   domestic	   firms	   and	   producers	  who	   control	   the	  majority	   of	   a	   domestic	  market	  and	  find	  stable	  access	  to	  capital	  and	  technology	  that	  improves	  their	  competitive	  position.	   One	   can	   hypothesize	   such	   an	   outcome	   in	   lower	   technology	   content	   sectors	  where	   domestic	   firms	   are	   not	   entirely	   dependent	   on	   MNCs’	   proprietary	   technologies	  and	  human	  capital.	  	  (2)	   Improving	   competitiveness	   on	   transnational	   markets	   accompanied	   by	   a	  marginalization	  of	  domestic	  actors.	  This	  is	  the	  situation	  described	  by	  Scepanovic	  in	  the	  automobile	   sector,	   where	   both	   competitors	   and	   suppliers	   of	   MNCs	   are	   entirely	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marginalized.	   This	   outcome	  might	   be	   correlated	  with	   high	   technology	   content,	   which	  neither	   domestic	   firms	   nor	   the	   state	   are	   capable	   or	   willing	   to	   engineer.	   While	   the	  position	   of	   a	   domestic	   sector	   might	   improve	   on	   transnational	   markets,	   the	   real	  beneficiaries	  are	  MNCs.	  	  	  (3)	  Downgraded	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  domestic	  sector	  but	  stable	  position	  of	  domestic	  actors.	  Domestic	  firms	  resist	  MNC	  competition	  on	  their	  market,	  however	  they	  don’t	  have	  the	  necessary	  resources	  (capital	  and	  technology)	   to	   improve	  on	   their	  competitiveness.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  position	  of	  the	  domestic	  sector	  in	  global	  markets	  dwindles.	  	  	  (4)	  Downgraded	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  sector	  and	  a	  marginalization	  of	  domestic	  actors.	  In	  this	  situation,	  MNCs	  have	  no	  incentives	  for	  improving	  the	  trade	  position	  of	  a	  domestic	  sector:	   instead,	   they	  deplete	  existing	  resources.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  domestic	   firms	  are	  equally	   incapable	   to	   upgrade	   because	   they	   don’t	   have	   a	   stable	   access	   to	   capital	   and	  technology.	  	  	  
	  
Part	  4.	  Polish	  and	  Hungarian	  developmental	  divergence	  in	  dairy	  	  Manufacturing	   sectors	   have	   provided	   the	   bulk	   of	   comparative	   case	   studies	   for	   the	  students	  of	  developmental	  outcomes	  in	  CEE	  due	  to	  their	  important	  contributions	  to	  GDP	  and	  exports	  in	  the	  Visegrad	  group	  in	  particular.	  A	  less	  well-­‐studied	  sector	  is	  agro-­‐food,	  which	  might	  be	  surprising	  considering	  that	   it	   is	   the	   largest	   industrial	  sector	   in	  the	  EU.	  Moreover,	   the	  complex	  organization	  of	   the	  sector	  equally	   lends	   itself	   to	  examining	   the	  developmental	  effects	  of	  transnationalization:	  It	  is	  an	  industrial	  sector	  organized	  around	  the	  vertical	   integration	  of	  three	  separate	  segments,	  namely	  production,	  processing	  and	  retail.	   FDI	   targeted	   the	   processing	   and	   retail	   segments	   of	   the	   industry	   early	   on	  throughout	   CEE,	   while	   production	   largely	   remained	   in	   domestic	   hands	   –as	   discussed	  below,	   even	   countries	   with	   comparable	   comparative	   advantages	   such	   as	   Poland	   and	  Hungary	  have	   followed	   very	  different	  modes	   of	   transnationalization	   in	   the	   processing	  and	  retail	  segments.	  Given	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  food	  security,	  agriculture	  and	  agro-­‐food	  are	  among	  the	  most	  regulated	  sectors	  both	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  globally.	  However,	  because	  of	  the	  complex	  coordination	  needed	  between	   the	  production,	  processing	  and	  retail	   segments	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pitting	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  interests	  against	  one	  another,	  agro-­‐food	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  most	  politically	  contested	  economic	  sectors.	  	  	  A	  practical	  reason	  for	  studying	  specifically	  the	  dairy	  sector	  in	  CEE	  is	  that	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  case	  studies	  that	  have	  been	  explicitly	  studied	  from	  a	  developmental	  perspective	  in	  the	   region.	   The	   current	   scholarship	   on	   the	   post-­‐Socialist	   restructuring	   of	   CEE	  dairy	   is	  dominated	   by	   a	   small	   group	   of	   authors	   around	   Johan	   Swinnen	   since	   the	   mid-­‐1990s.	  Their	   conclusions	  mirror	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   the	   optimistic	   stance	   regarding	   an	   export-­‐oriented	  developmental	  model	   in	   the	  broader	  debate	  over	  CEE’s	   catching	  up	   capacity.	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  FDI	  on	  CEE	  dairy	  sectors	  has	  been	  largely	  positive:	  MNCs	  brought	  modern	  technologies	  which	  increased	  productivity,	  have	  implemented	  modern	  food	  standards	  that	  increased	  domestic	  competitiveness	  by	  offering	  new	  export	  markets	  especially	   in	  Western	   Europe,	  where	   EU	   food	   standards	   had	   previously	   functioned	   as	  non-­‐tariff	   trade	   barriers.	   Furthermore,	   through	   their	   dissemination	   of	   formal	  contractual	  relations	  between	  farmers,	  processors	  and	  retailers,	   they	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  re-­‐establishment	  of	  trust	  and	  coordination	  throughout	  the	  supply	  chain,	  after	  the	  dramatic	   disorganization	   that	   followed	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   collapse	   of	   Communist	  centralized	   hierarchical	   organization	   (Dries,	   Falkowski,	   Malak-­‐Rawlikowska,	   &	  Milczarek-­‐Andrzejewska,	  2011;	  Dries	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Dries	  &	  Swinnen,	  2002,	  2005;	  Dries	  &	  Swinnen,	  2010;	  H.	  Gow	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Gow	  &	  Swinnen,	  1998;	  H.	  R.	  Gow	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Johan	  F.M.	   Swinnen	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   J.	   F.	   M.	   Swinnen	   &	   Maertens,	   2007).	   Not	   only	   did	   they	  contribute	   to	   the	   upgrading	   of	   their	   own	   suppliers	   through	   various	   loan	   and	   training	  programs,	   but	   domestic	   competitors	   of	  MNCs	   also	   adopted	   their	   innovations	   through	  learning	  and	  emulation.	  	  	  The	  present	  thesis	  refutes	  a	  number	  of	  these	  arguments:	  notably	  a	  biased	  case-­‐selection	  whereby	  most	  of	  these	  conclusions	  were	  drawn	  from	  the	  Polish	  dairy	  sector’s	  trajectory	  –	  a	  country	  with	  relatively	  low	  levels	  of	  FDI	  in	  the	  sector,	  which	  is	  thus	  particularly	  ill-­‐suited	  for	  generalizations	  regarding	  the	  inherent	  upgrading	  capacity	  of	  FDI.	  By	  focusing	  on	   a	   comparison	   between	  Hungary	   and	   Poland’s	   dairy	   sector,	   this	   thesis	   first	   aims	   at	  redressing	   this	   bias	   by	   singling	   out	   the	   differentiated	   developmental	   impact	   of	  MNCs.	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  present	  thesis	  is	  based	  on	  a	  very	  different	  premise	  in	  that	  it	  seeks	  to	  understand	  why	  two	  transition	  countries	  with	  comparable	  resources	  and	  faced	  with	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the	  same	  opportunity	  structure	  followed	  different	  modes	  of	  transnationalization	  leading	  to	  vastly	  different	  developmental	  outcomes.	  	  The	  dairy	  sector	  offers	  an	   interesting	  case	  study	   in	  diverging	  developmental	  pathways	  firstly	  because	  the	  structure	  of	  supply	  chains	  in	  this	  sector	  reflects	  a	  complex	  interaction	  of	  domestic	   and	   foreign	   agents.	  Three	   segments	   can	  be	   identified	   in	   the	   supply	   chain:	  farmers/producers	   of	   raw	   milk,	   processors	   (domestic	   or	   foreign	   firms)	   and	   retailers	  (domestic	   or	   foreign	   firms).	   Global	   agri-­‐food	   supply	   chains	   have	   experienced	   what	  Reardon	  et	  al.	  termed	  the	  “supermarket	  revolution”	  in	  the	  1990s,	  that	  is	  the	  global	  rise	  of	   retailer	   MNCs	   both	   in	   the	   Global	   North	   and	   South:	   agri-­‐food	   sectors	   have	   become	  buyer-­‐driven	  supply	  chains	  where	   the	  oligopsonies	  of	  a	   few	  regional	  or	  global	   retailer	  chains	   have	   been	   able	   to	   influence	   both	   prices	   and	   the	   top	   to	   bottom	   diffusion	   of	  regulatory	  standards	  down	  the	  supply	  chain	  to	  processors	  and	  producers	  (T.	  Reardon,	  Timmer,	  &	  Minten,	  2012).	  While	  the	  concentration	  of	  the	  retail	  segment	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  MNCs	   in	   agri-­‐food	   chains	   is	   a	   global	   phenomenon,	   important	   variations	   subsist	   in	   the	  market	  share	  and	  competitiveness	  of	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  firms	  in	  the	  processing	  and	  production	  segments.	  	  	  Poland	   and	  Hungary	   entered	  post-­‐Socialist	   restructuring	   faced	  with	   similar	   problems:	  Productivity	   levels	  were	  substantially	   lower	  than	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  the	  genetic	  stock	  of	   existing	   cow	   herds	  was	   poor,	   resulting	   in	   low	  milk	   yields	   and	   low	   quality.	   Neither	  public	   nor	   private	   actors	   were	   prepared	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   complex	   food	  standard	   regulations	   such	  as	  HACCP	  and	   ISO	  9000,	   that	   functioned	  as	  non-­‐tariff	   trade	  barriers	   on	   Western	   European	   markets.	   Domestic	   producers	   and	   processing	   firms	  required	   new	   sources	   of	   capital	   and	   access	   to	   technology	   for	   realizing	   the	   necessary	  investments	  for	  remaining	  on	  the	  market.	  In	  parallel,	  domestic	  markets	  were	  gradually	  liberalized	   in	   both	   countries	   and	   better	   capitalized	  MNCs,	   specialized	   in	   higher	   value	  added	  products	  represented	  a	  new	  form	  of	  competition	  both	  on	  domestic	  and	  on	  export	  markets	   –	   all	   the	   while	   traditional	   Socialist	   export	   markets	   coordinated	   under	  COMECON	  collapsed.	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In	  Poland	  and	  Hungary,	  FDI	  has	  targeted	  both	  the	  retail	  and	  the	  processing	  segments	  of	  the	  dairy	  supply	  chain	  differently:	  In	  Hungary	  the	  state	  actively	  fostered	  FDI	  as	  early	  as	  the	   first	   wave	   of	   privatizations	   in	   1992-­‐93.	   The	   concentration	   of	   the	   four	   biggest	  operators	   in	   retail	   amounted	   respectively	   to	   59%	   in	   Hungary	   and	   21%	   in	   Poland	   by	  2003	   (Lukácsik	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   decade,	   Hungarian	   dairy	   was	  extraordinarily	   concentrated	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   MNCS:	   foreign	   supermarket	   chains	  controlled	   82%	   of	   the	   retail	   market	   and	   the	   share	   of	   foreign	   participation	   in	   dairy	  processing	   rose	   from	  59%	   in	  1997	   to	  87%	  by	  2000	   (Vőneki	  &	  Mándi-­‐Nagy,	  2014).	  By	  contrast,	   Polish	   dairy	   processors	   continue	   to	   control	   close	   to	   80%	   of	   the	   domestic	  market	   as	   opposed	   to	   MNCs	   (Szajner	   &	   Vőneki,	   2014b).	   Both	   Poland	   and	   Hungary	  experienced	   a	   dual	   trend:	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   a	   steady	   decline	   in	   the	   number	   of	   farms,	  especially	  among	  smallholders	  who	  proved	  incapable	  to	  implement	  new	  food	  standards.	  This	  social	  cost	  was	  compensated	  for	  by	  an	  increase	  in	  productivity	  and	  rising	  revenues	  from	  exports.	  Productivity	  measured	  in	  milk	  yields	  increased	  faster	  in	  Hungary,	  notably	  due	   to	   the	   concentration	   of	   producers	   in	   larger	   farms	   endowed	  with	  more	   capital:	   it	  increased	  by	  35%	  between	  2000	  and	  2010	  and	  only	  19%	  in	  Poland	  (Szajner	  &	  Vőneki,	  2014b).	  	  This	   differentiation	   doesn’t	   only	   boil	   down	   to	   the	   difference	   in	   market	   size:	   one	   can	  observe	   a	   steady	   upgrading	   of	   higher	   value	   added	   product	   types	   in	   Poland	   (butter,	  cheese,	   curd),	  while	   on	   the	   contrary	  Hungary	   increasingly	   specialized	   in	   lower	   value-­‐added	  market	   segments	   (concentrating	   on	   raw	  milk	   and	   powders).	  Hungary	   began	   to	  import	  higher	  value-­‐added	  products	  while	  specializing	  in	  the	  production	  and	  export	  of	  the	  lowest	  value-­‐added	  dairy	  products	  (fresh	  milk	  and	  powder).	  Even	  more	  surprisingly,	  by	  the	  turn	  of	   the	  millennium,	  Hungary	  began	  to	  experience	  a	  trade	  deficit	  not	  only	   in	  high-­‐	   but	   also	   in	   low	   value-­‐added	   dairy	   goods	   such	   as	   fresh	  milk.	   The	   exact	   opposite	  trend	   played	   out	   in	   Poland	   where	   not	   only	   did	   the	   sector	   achieve	   a	   positive	   trade	  balance	   but	   where	   the	   most	   dynamically	   growing	   product	   types	   were	   precisely	  concentrated	  in	  higher	  value-­‐added	  good	  such	  as	  cheese	  and	  curd.	  	  Poland	   and	  Hungary	   thus	   followed	   two	   different	   routes	   to	   the	   transnationalization	   of	  their	   dairy	   sectors	   with	   equally	   diverging	   developmental	   consequences	   on	   domestic	  actors:	  Hungary	  integrated	  the	  dairy	  sector	  to	  transnational	  markets	  almost	  exclusively	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through	   MNCs.	   The	   consequence	   was	   a	   gradual	   collapse	   of	   competitiveness	   and	   a	  downgrading	  of	  production	  and	  exports	   into	  lower	  value-­‐added	  products.	  MNCs	  firmly	  controlled	  both	   the	   retail	   and	  processing	   segments	  while	  domestic	   competitors	   in	   the	  processing	   segments	   virtually	   disappeared	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1990s4.	   In	   Poland	   by	  contrast,	   FDI	   never	   threatened	   the	   market	   share	   of	   domestic	   processing	   firms.	   The	  Polish	   sector	   specialized	   into	   increasingly	   complex	   products	  with	   higher	   value	   added.	  The	  2004	  EU	  accession	  marks	  a	  key	  critical	  juncture	  after	  which	  Poland’s	  dairy	  exports	  soared.	   Conversely,	   the	   period	   following	   EU	   accession	   marked	   for	   Hungary	   the	  beginning	  of	  a	  trade	  deficit	  in	  dairy	  products,	  the	  rise	  of	  imports	  in	  higher	  value	  added	  products	  such	  as	  cheese	  (imported	  not	  only	  from	  EU15	  countries	  but	  also	  from	  Poland)	  and	  a	  specialization	  into	  the	  most	  primitive	  products	  such	  as	  fresh	  milk	  and	  powder.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  This	   trend	   has	   reverted	   over	   the	   last	   decade,	   an	   interesting	   evolution	   that	   is	   examined	   in	   the	   third	  chapter.	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Chapter	  2	  
	  	  We	   have	   proposed	   a	   framework	   for	   contrasting	   developmental	   outcomes	   and	  trajectories	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   which	   answered	   to	   an	   empirical	   puzzle,	   namely	  diverging	   performance	   and	   different	   distribution	   of	   benefits	   between	   MNCs	   and	  domestic	   actors	   at	   the	   sector	   level	   in	   two	   semi-­‐peripheral	   transition	   economies	  confronted	  with	  the	  same	  challenges.	  The	  present	  chapter	  offers	  a	  theoretical	  basis	  for	  identifying	   independent	   variables	   that	   could	   account	   for	   this	   divergence.	  We	   examine	  competing	   arguments	   in	   the	   literatures	   on	   developmental	   potentials	   in	   transnational	  markets	  and	  argue	   that	  neither	   the	  over-­‐determination	  of	  dependency	   theory,	  nor	   the	  agency	   of	   external	   actors	   can	   fully	   account	   for	   the	   empirical	   divergence	   in	   modes	   of	  transnationalization	   and	   developmental	   outcomes	   displayed	   in	   Polish	   and	   Hungarian	  dairy.	   Therefore	   we	   present	   an	   alternative	   hypothesis,	   namely	   that	   variation	   in	   the	  capacities	   and	   organization	   of	   domestic	   public	   and	   private	   actors	   as	   well	   as	   their	  linkages	  are	  better	  suited	  to	  explaining	  these	  contrasted	  developmental	  pathways.	  The	  fact	  that	  domestic	  actors	  steered	  transnationalization	  differently	  in	  these	  two	  countries	  has	   important	   theoretical	   and	   policy	   implications:	   it	   would	   point	   at	   an	   understudied	  scope	  for	  domestic	  developmental	  agency	  even	  in	  “dependent	  market	  economies”	  such	  as	  Visegrad	  economies,	  in	  sectors	  such	  as	  dairy	  -­‐	  where	  lower	  technology	  requirements	  than	  in	  automotive	  or	  electronic	  sectors	  resulted	  in	  a	  substantial	  scope	  for	  variation	  in	  developmental	   trajectories.	   	   In	   a	   first	   section,	   we	   clarify	   the	   role	   of	   capital	   and	  technology	  as	  the	  basic	  assets	  needed	  for	  spurring	  competitive	  upgrading	  in	  developing	  economies.	  In	  a	  second	  section,	  we	  examine	  why	  theories	  of	  transnationalization	  rooted	  in	   the	   dependent	   underdevelopment	   framework	   are	   unable	   to	   explain	   diverging	  developmental	   outcomes	   between	   similar	   semi-­‐peripheral	   economies.	   In	   a	   third	   part,	  we	   examine	   the	   role	   of	   transnational	   private	   and	   public	   actors	   as	   potential	  developmental	   engines	  with	   a	   capacity	   to	   distribute	   financial	   and	   technological	   assets	  necessary	  for	  upgrading	  domestic	  sectors	  such	  as	  dairy.	  In	  a	  fourth	  part,	  we	  define	  the	  dimensions	  of	  public	  policy,	  which	  determined	  how	  diverging	  developmental	  pathways	  resulted	   in	   an	   “autonomist”	   developmental	   model	   in	   Poland	   and	   an	   “integrationist”	  model	   in	  Hungary.	  Finally,	  we	  mobilize	   the	   insights	  of	  Evans	  to	  show	  how	  variation	   in	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the	   capacities	   and	   organization	   of	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors,	   as	  well	   as	   their	   type	   of	  linkages	  might	  explain	  why	  the	  two	  countries	  followed	  diverging	  pathways.	  	  
Part	  1.	  Resources	  for	  Development:	  Capital	  as	  financial	  and	  technological	  assets	  	  	  A	  number	  of	  hypotheses	  have	  been	  proposed	   for	  explaining	  economic	  development	  or	  the	   lack	   thereof:	   at	   a	  most	   basic	   level,	   differences	   in	  wealth	   and	   competitiveness	   are	  rooted	   in	   different	   stocks	   of	   capital.	   Building	   on	   the	  work	   of	   Douglas	  North	   (North	  &	  Thomas,	   1973),	   it	   is	   common	   to	   distinguish	   between	   physical	   and	   human	   capital:	   the	  former	   encompasses	   financial	   and	   non-­‐financial	   economic	   assets	   necessary	   for	  production,	   and	   the	   latter	   represents	   accumulated	   knowledge	   and	   the	   transmission	  thereof	   (education,	   skill	   formation).	   The	   combination	   of	   a	   given	   stock	   of	   physical	   and	  human	   capital	   determines	   the	   total	   factor	   productivity	   (TFP)	   of	   an	   economy	   (Baier,	  Dwyer,	  &	  Tamura,	  2006):	  logically,	  the	  more	  important	  the	  available	  stock,	  the	  higher	  is	  TFP.	  The	  developmental	  upgrading	  of	  dairy	  sectors	  in	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  would	  thus	  have	   required	   financial	   capital	   and	   technology/human	   capital	   at	   the	   onset	   of	   the	  transition	   process,	   similarly	   to	   any	   other	   industrial	   sector.	   Low	  productivity,	   obsolete	  machinery	   and	   technologies	   that	   characterized	   these	   sectors	   necessitated	   costly	  investments	   in	  dairy	  production	  and	  processing.	  However,	   it	   should	  be	  also	   clear	   that	  more	   capital-­‐	   or	   more	   labor-­‐	   intensive	   activities	   require	   different	   combinations	   of	  economic	   and	   human	   capital,	   in	   other	   words	   financial	   assets	   and	   technology.	   A	  difference	  in	  agri-­‐food	  sectors	  such	  as	  dairy	  -­‐compared	  with	  the	  automotive	  industry	  for	  instance,	   as	   examined	   by	   Scapanovic	   (2013)	   –	   lies	   with	   a	   lower	   level	   of	   technology	  requirements:	  technology	  is	  embedded	  in	  machinery	  that	  can	  be	  purchased,	  whereas	  in	  capital-­‐intensive	  high-­‐tech	  sectors	  such	  as	  automobiles,	  the	  sector-­‐specific	  technology	  is	  a	   form	  of	  knowledge	  and	  human	  capital	   that	   is	  proprietary	   to	   firms,	  essentially	  MNCs,	  that	  control	  the	  market.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  sectors	  such	  as	  dairy,	  access	  to	  financial	  capital	  not	  only	  solves	  the	  need	  for	  investments	  necessary	  for	  upgrading	  but	  it	  also	  guarantees	  access	   to	   technologies,	  which	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   raise	   productivity,	   and	   allow	   for	   the	  production	  of	  higher	  value	  added	  goods.	  Financial	  capital	  cannot	  substitute	  perfectly	  for	  human	   capital,	   knowledge	   and	   technologies:	   methods	   of	   management,	   inter-­‐firm	  relations	  such	  as	   the	  vertical	   coordination	  of	   the	  supply	  chain	  between	  producers	  and	  processors	  cannot	  be	  bought	  entirely.	  Yet	  the	  substitution	  of	  financial	  capital	  for	  human	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capital	   is	   easier	   than	   in	   sectors	  where	   technology	   transfers	   are	   legally	   constrained	  by	  intellectual	   property	   rights	   regulations.	   Concretely	   from	   the	   point	   of	   dairy	   producers	  and	  processors	  in	  Poland	  and	  Hungary,	  this	  means	  that	  their	  upgrading	  hinged	  primarily	  on	  finding	  access	  to	  financial	  assets:	  knowledge	  and	  technology	  could	  be	  bought	  for	  the	  larger	  part	  at	  least.	  	  	  However,	   deriving	   developmental	   outcomes	   from	   variation	   in	   stocks	   of	   TFP	   is	   largely	  tautological:	   rich	   countries	   are	   assumed	   richer	   because	   they	   have	   more-­‐,	   and	   better	  factors	  of	  production.	  Semi-­‐peripheral	  and	  transition	  economies	  such	  as	  CEE	  suffer	  from	  a	   higher	   scarcity	   of	   both	   physical	   and	   human	   capital	   compared	   with	   Core	   capitalist	  economies,	  which	  explains	  why	  they	  are	  relatively	  less	  productive,	  less	  competitive	  and	  poorer.	  What	  is	  missing	  is	  a	  theory	  of	  developmental	  change	  over	  time.	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  Acemoglu	  et	  al.,	  the	  real	  question	  is	  what	  explains	  differences	  in	  TFP	  across	  time	  and	  societies,	   or	   in	   our	   case,	   what	   explains	   increasingly	   better	   or	   worse	   developmental	  outcomes	  between	   two	  semi-­‐peripheral	  economies	  over	   time	  (D.	  Acemoglu,	  Gallego,	  &	  Robinson,	  2014;	  Daron	  Acemoglu	  &	  Robinson,	  2012).	  And	  here	  the	  apparent	  academic	  consensus	  is	  shattered:	  some	  expect	  transnational	  market	  integration	  to	  downgrade	  the	  competitiveness	   in	   semi-­‐peripheries	   such	   as	   CEE,	   others	   think	   on	   the	   contrary	   that	  external	   private	   and	   public	   actors	   can	   remedy	   the	   relative	   shortage	   of	   capital	   and	  increase	  competitiveness,	  while	  a	  third	  camp	  argues	  that	  domestic	  variables	  are	  better	  suited	   for	   explaining	   diverging	   developmental	   pathways.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   extant	  literatures	  on	  transnationalization	  have	  fundamentally	  different	  expectations	  as	  to	  how	  the	  integration	  of	  a	  capital-­‐scarce,	  poorly	  competitive	  domestic	  sector	  into	  transnational	  markets	   would	   change	   opportunities	   for	   accessing	   economic	   and	   human	   capital	  necessary	  for	  upgrading.	  	  	  	  
Part	  2.	  Underdevelopment	  in	  the	  semi-­‐periphery:	  The	  limitations	  of	  Dependency	  
Theory	  	  
Dependency	  Theory’s	  appeal	  for	  understanding	  development	  in	  the	  CEE	  region	  	  The	   argument	   of	   structural	   underdevelopment	   in	   transnational	  markets	   is	   tied	   to	   the	  literature	  on	  dependency.	  This	  view	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  a	  Marxist	  interpretation	  of	  the	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international	   division	   of	   labor	   (IDL)	   (Lenin,	   1963),	   later	   complemented	   with	  Emmanuel’s	   unequal	   exchange	   theory	   (Emmanuel,	   1969),	   which	   built	   itself	   on	   Raul	  Prebisch’s	  work,	  who	   had	   identified	   an	   uneven	   distribution	   of	   profits	   in	   international	  trade	  between	  exporters	  of	  manufactured	  goods	   in	  “Core”	  economies	  and	  exporters	  of	  raw	   materials	   in	   the	   “periphery”	   (Birkan,	   2015).	   	   The	   work	   of	   André	   Gunder	   Frank	  (1966)	   and	   Immanuel	   Wallerstein	   (1974)	   further	   cemented	   the	   scholarship	   of	   what	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  dependency	  theory.	  In	  this	  view,	  economic	  exchanges	  are	  assumed	  structurally	  unequal	  and	  serve	  to	  assert	  hierarchical	  relations	  of	  exploitation.	  However,	  dependency	   theory	   goes	   further	   in	   refuting	   a	   tenet	   of	   classical	   Marxism,	   namely	   that	  capitalism	   would	   be	   capable	   of	   producing	   economic	   development	   at	   all.	   Dependency	  theory	  in	  its	  orthodox	  variant	  argues	  on	  the	  contrary	  that	  instead	  of	  compensating	  for	  a	  domestic	   shortage	   in	   capital,	   technology	   and	   knowledge	  which	   developing	   economies	  could	   use	   to	   their	   advantage,	   transnational	   markets	   in	   fact	   fix	   a	   stable	   position	   of	  exploitation	   between	   the	   Core	   and	   “the	   Rest”	   in	   the	   IDL.	   For	   André	   Gunder	   Frank	  (1966),	  only	   temporary	   isolation	   from	  the	   “Core”	  did	  historically	  allow	   for	  a	   relatively	  egalitarian	   distribution	   of	   wealth	   increase	   in	   developing	   countries.	   Stronger	   ties	   to	  leading	   capitalist	   economies	   on	   the	   contrary	   produced	   an	   economic	   geography	   of	  hierarchical	  dependence	  between	  Western	  metropolises,	   their	  satellite	  metropolises	   in	  the	  South	  and	  finally	  the	  underdeveloped	  agricultural	  hinterlands	  thereof.	  The	  argument	  is	   not	   only	   that	   transnational	   integration	   is	   developmentally	   detrimental	   to	   poorer	  economies,	   but	   that	   developmental	   gains	   from	   transnationalization	   in	   the	   Core	   and	  developmental	  costs	  in	  the	  periphery	  and	  semi-­‐periphery	  are	  part	  of	  the	  same	  process:	  it	   is	   the	   forced	   underdevelopment	   of	   the	   Rest,	   which	   ensures	   the	   extraction	   of	   rents	  from	  unequal	  exchange	  by	  Core	  economies.	  	  	  The	   later	   formulations	   of	   dependency	   theory	   relax	   the	   hypothesis	   of	   absolute	  developmental	   stasis	   in	   the	   IDL	   but	   argue	   that	   individual	   “deviations”	   of	   successful	  catching-­‐up	   constitute	   a	   minority	   of	   outliers,	   which	   don’t	   refute	   the	   fundamentally	  negative	  developmental	  effect	  of	  transnational	  integration	  for	  poorer	  economies.	  Arrighi	  et	  al.	  argue	  that	  those	  -­‐	  Amsden	  in	  particular	  -­‐	  who	  see	  a	  rise	  of	  developing	  nations	  in	  the	  late	  20th	  century	  confuse	  economic	  development	  with	   industrialization	  (Arrighi,	  Slver,	  &	  Brewer,	  2003)	  .	  They	  argue	  that	  when	  observing	  the	  evolution	  of	  differences	  in	  wealth	  between	  peripheral,	  semi-­‐peripheral	  and	  core	  economies	  throughout	  the	  20th	  century,	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the	  developmental	  gap	  remains	  stable	  notwithstanding	  a	  “real”	  convergence	   limited	  to	  the	   degree	   of	   industrialization	   (between	   industrializing	   semi-­‐peripheries	   and	   a	   de-­‐industrializing	   Core).	   In	   Prebisch’s	   and	   Emmanuel’s	   footsteps,	   they	   believe	   that	   the	  developmental	   gap	   between	   the	   Core	   and	   “the	   Rest”	   follows	   cycles	   where	   core	  economies	   dispose	   of	   a	   surplus	   of	   accumulated	   economic	   and	   human	   capital,	   which	  enables	   them	   to	   invest	   periodically	   in	   new	   comparative	   advantages	   when	   the	   semi-­‐periphery	  begins	  to	  threaten	  their	  competitiveness.	  Catching-­‐up	  is	  elusive	  because	  gains	  in	  productivity	  and	  competitiveness	  rely	  on	  the	  diffusion	  of	  knowledge	  and	  technologies	  from	  the	  core	  to	  “the	  Rest”,	  while	  the	  rate	  of	  profit	  of	  such	  innovations	  declines	  in	  time	  and	   in	   space:	   by	   the	   time	   peripheral	   and	   semi-­‐peripheral	   economies	   can	   adopt	   these	  innovations,	   all	   their	   competitors	   equally	   dispose	   of	   them.	   Emerging	   economies	   thus	  always	   face	   competitive	   pressures	   unknown	   to	   innovators	   and	   early	   adopters	   in	   the	  capitalist	   Core	   that	   had	   enjoyed	   monopoly	   rents	   from	   these	   innovations	   in	   the	  timeframe	  when	  most	  of	  their	  competitors	  hadn’t	  had	  access	  to	  similar	  knowledge	  and	  technology.	  Eventually,	  when	  the	  rate	  of	  profit	  of	  innovations	  becomes	  marginal	  for	  core	  economies	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  diffusion	  in	  the	  developing	  world,	  the	  Core	  disposes	  of	  an	  accumulated	  surplus,	  which	  can	  be	  invested	  in	  engineering	  new	  comparative	  advantages	  and	  buffer	  the	  adaptation	  costs	  to	  a	  new	  innovation	  cycle.	  Far	  from	  a	  peculiar	  tropism,	  Arrighi’s	   argument	   is	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   most	   approaches	   rooted	   in	   the	   World-­‐System	  Analysis	  developed	  by	  Wallerstein,	  where	  inequalities	  between	  economies	  are	  perceived	  as	  cyclically	  reproduced.	  	  	  The	  hypotheses	  of	  the	  dependency	  framework	  inform	  to	  various	  degrees	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  contemporary	   work	   on	   development	   in	   CEE:	   we	   mentioned	   in	   the	   first	   chapter	   that	  Böröcz	   (2012),	   Jacoby	   (2010),	  Epstein	   (2014),	  Drahokoupil	   and	  Myant	   (2015)	   share	  a	  number	   of	   underlying	   hypotheses	   regarding	   the	   rent-­‐extracting	   efforts	   on	   the	   part	   of	  EU15	  economies	  in	  relation	  to	  CEE:	  namely	  that	  CEE	  was	  integrated	  into	  supply	  chains	  controlled	   by	   EU15	   MNCs,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   these	   MNCs	   could	   exploit	   comparative	  advantages	  in	  CEE	  to	  increase	  their	  own	  competitiveness	  –	  with	  a	  distribution	  of	  profits	  clearly	  tilting	  in	  favor	  of	  MNCs.	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Limitations	  of	  Dependency	  Theory	  for	  explaining	  sector-­‐level	  developmental	  divergence	  	  In	   our	   empirical	   case,	   the	   dependency	   framework	   might	   offer	   an	   explanation	   to	   the	  downward	   trajectory	   experienced	   by	   the	   Hungarian	   dairy	   sector:	   the	   argument	   that	  deeper	   transnationalization,	   higher	   FDI-­‐	   and	   MNC	   penetration	   actually	   force	   semi-­‐peripheral	  economies	  to	  specialize	  in	  low	  value	  added	  (VA)	  production	  segments	  could	  be	   a	   guiding	   hypothesis	   behind	   the	   faltering	   competitiveness	   of	   the	   Hungarian	   case,	  where	  MNCs	  acquired	  an	  overwhelming	  majority	  in	  the	  processing	  and	  retail	  sectors	  in	  the	   1990s.	   	   Symmetrically,	   however,	   dependency	   is	   unable	   to	   explain	   how	   the	   Polish	  dairy	   sector	   could	   increase	   its	   competitiveness	   over	   the	   same	   period.	   If	   public	   and	  private	   actors	   strategies	   located	   in	   the	   “Core”	   determined	   entirely	   the	   developmental	  pathways	  of	  semi-­‐peripheral	  economies,	   it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  understand	  why	  MNCs	  would	  have	  tolerated	  a	  Polish	  dairy	  sector	  largely	  owned	  by	  domestic	  actors	  to	  become	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  dairy	  exporters	  in	  the	  world	  –	  all	  the	  while	  they	  actively	  downgraded	  the	  Hungarian	  sector’s	  competitiveness.	  Dependency	  theory	  thus	  offers	  no	  explanation	  to	  the	  divergence	  in	  developmental	  outcomes	  between	  the	  two	  countries:	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  developmentally	  negative	  effect	  of	  transnationalization	  is	  supposedly	  constant,	  since	   it	   is	  determined	  by	   the	   interests	  of	  MNCs	   located	   in	   the	  Core	   to	  maintain	  higher	  productivity	   than	   their	   suppliers	   and	   competitors	   in	   the	   semi-­‐periphery,	   dependency	  theory	   is	   unable	   to	   explain	   empirical	   developmental	   trajectories	   that	   show	  developmental	   divergence	  between	   countries	   located	   in	   the	   same	   region	  of	   the	   global	  economic	   geography	   structuring	   the	   IDL.	   Therefore,	  we	   examine	   in	   the	   following	   two	  competing	  arguments,	  which	  propose	  on	  the	  contrary	  hypotheses	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  developmental	  upgrading	  through	  transnationalization.	  	  
Part	  3.	  Securing	  Capital	  and	  Technology	  in	  Open	  Markets	  	  
Upgrading	  through	  MNCs	  	  Contrary	   to	   the	   dependency	   argument,	   a	   large	   literature	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   precisely	  through	   transnational	   market	   integration	   that	   poorer	   economies	   stand	   a	   chance	   for	  moving	  upwards	  in	  the	  IDL	  as	  transnational	  actors	  might	  compensate	  for	  the	  structural	  lack	  of	  domestic	  resources,	  which	  hinders	  developmental	  upgrading.	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  Amsden’s	  work	  integrated	  the	  question	  of	  ownership	  to	  the	  developmental	  question	  of	  access	  to	  capital:	  she	  argued	  that	  foreign	  capital	  could	  indeed	  help	  peripheral	  economies	  bypass	   the	   technology	   frontier	   and	   move	   into	   higher	   VA	   sectors	   (industrial	   goods)	  (Amsden,	   2001,	   p.52)	   .	   In	   her	   view,	   foreign	   non-­‐financial	   capital	   embeds	   technical-­‐scientific	   innovation	   and	   know-­‐how,	   consequently,	   buying-­‐,	   borrowing-­‐	   (or	   stealing)	  foreign	  capital	  substitutes	  foreign	  capital	  –	  that	  is,	  more	  productive	  innovation	  -­‐	  for	  the	  lack	   of	   endogenous	   innovation	   in	   developing	   economies.	   In	   other	   words,	   acquiring	  foreign	  capital	  bypasses	  the	  need	  for	  late-­‐industrializers	  to	  engineer	  innovation	  systems	  from	  scratch	  (at	  least	  in	  the	  initial	  phase	  of	  technology	  adoption).	  Amsden	  contrasts	  two	  distinct	   modes	   of	   foreign	   capital	   appropriation:	   the	   autonomist	   strategy	   of	   post-­‐War	  South-­‐East	  Asian	  countries	  where	  domestic	  firms	  could	  buy	  foreign	  technology	  and	  the	  integrationist	   developmental	   pathway,	  where	   foreign	   capital	   came	   hand	   in	   hand	  with	  direct	  foreign	  ownership	  of	  domestic	  firms	  and	  productive	  assets	  (factories,	  production	  plants	   etc.).	   In	   light	   of	   the	   Visegrad	   countries’	   performance	   in	   the	   automotive	   sector,	  Scepanovic	  (2013)	  proposed	  to	  amend	  Amsden’s	  framework	  by	  adding	  the	  category	  of	  “hyper-­‐integrationism”	   for	   describing	   a	   mode	   of	   transnationalization	   where	   domestic	  firms	   are	   largely	   marginalized	   by	   MNCs,	   both	   as	   competitors	   and	   as	   suppliers,	   and	  where	  they	  do	  not	  benefit	  from	  any	  technological	  spillovers.	  Scepanovic	  thus	  argues	  that	  in	   high	   technology-­‐content	   sectors,	   technology	   transfers	   are	   an	   empirically	  unsubstantiated	  myth.	  By	  contrast,	  Amsden’s	  more	  optimistic	  stance	  is	  better	  suited	  to	  sectors	  such	  as	  dairy,	  where	  domestic	  firms	  can	  actually	  acquire	  technology	  embedded	  in	  machinery:	  in	  other	  words,	  an	  integrationist	  mode	  of	  transnationalization	  is	  likelier	  to	  manifest	   in	   a	   sector	   such	   as	   dairy,	   than	   Scepanovic’s	   hyper-­‐integrationism	   because	  technology	  transfer	  is	  not	  limited	  by	  proprietary	  technologies.	  	  Yet,	   the	   question	   is	   what	   theoretical	   ground	   is	   there	   to	   expect	   MNCs	   as	   providers	   of	  foreign	  capital	  and	  owners	  of	  domestic	  assets	  to	  play	  an	  upgrading	  developmental	  role	  in	   receiving	   economies:	   how	   can	   they	   compensate	   for	   a	   lack	   of	   financial	   and	   human	  capital	   among	   domestic	   firms?	   The	   potential	   upgrading	   role	   of	   MNCs	   on	   a	   receiving	  economy	   is	   threefold:	   (1)	   The	   decision	   for	   MNCs	   to	   invest	   abroad	   entails	   important	  transaction	   costs,	   it	   is	   therefore	   argued	   that	  MNCs	   only	   ever	   invest	   if	   they	   have	   firm-­‐specific	   assets	   that	   domestic	   companies	   don’t	   dispose	   of	   (Dunning,	   1979).	   In	   other	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words,	   MNCs	   are	   (in	   theory)	   by	   definition	   more	   competitive	   than	   their	   domestic	  counterparts:	  the	  capital	  and	  technology	  they	  bring	  into	  a	  host	  economy	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  more	  productive	   than	  domestic	   factors	   of	   production.	   The	  question	   is	  whether	   the	  host	   economy	   (domestic	   firms)	   can	  benefit	   from	   financial	   assets	   and	  more	  productive	  technologies	  used	  by	  MNCs.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  vast	  literature	  on	  the	  topic,	  the	  venues	  of	  such	  diffusion	   can	   be	   broadly	   clustered	   into	   three	   channels	   of	   transmission:	   (1)	   direct	  linkages	   between	   MNCs	   and	   domestic	   firms,	   (2)	   indirect	   linkages	   and	   (3)	   positive	  externalities	  derived	  from	  the	  presence	  of	  MNCs.	  	  	  
Direct	  Linkages	  
	  Direct	   transmission	   mechanisms	   between	   MNCs	   and	   domestic	   firms	   entail	   a	   wide	  spectrum	   of	   inter-­‐firm	   and	   inter-­‐sector	   processes.	   Vertical	   spillovers	   occur	   between	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  firms	  integrated	  in	  a	  single	  supply	  chain	  of	  buyers	  and	  suppliers.	  Horizontal	   spillovers	   cover	   inter-­‐firm	   relations	   between	   MNCs	   and	   domestic	   firms,	  which	   operate	   in	   distinct	   supply	   chains	   at	   similar	   stages	   of	   the	   production	   chain	   (e.g.	  MNCs	  and	  their	  domestic	  competitors	  or	  MNCs	  and	  domestic	  firms	  in	  different	  sectors,	  linked	   through	   inter-­‐sector	   outputs)	   (Lenaerts	  &	  Merledeve,	   2011).	  Vertical	   spillovers	  have	  only	  been	  studied	  extensively	  since	  the	  1990s	  although	  the	  extant	  scholarship	  finds	  more	   empirical	   evidence	   for	   them	   than	   for	   horizontal	   spillovers	   (Javorcik,	   2004).	   In	  vertical	   spillovers,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   the	   more	   productive	   capital	   and	   proprietary	  technology	  of	  MNCs	  can	  have	  an	  upgrading	  effect	  on	  domestic	  suppliers	  and	  buyers	  of	  MNC	  outputs.	  The	  mechanisms	  hypothesized	  behind	  this	  trickle	  down	  effect	  are	  diverse:	  (1)	  In	  relation	  to	  their	  domestic	  suppliers,	  MNCs	  might	  opt	  to	  upgrade	  them	  directly	  by	  providing	  them	  with	  capital	  (preferential	   loans	  typically)	  when	  domestic	  outputs	  don’t	  conform	   to	   product-­‐	   and	   process-­‐	   standards	   required	   by	   MNCs	   (Moran,	   2001).	   (2)	  Increased	  competition	  is	  an	  alternative	  route:	  Instead	  of	  direct	  financial	  transfers,	  MNCs	  might	   simply	   use	   stringent	   product	   and	   process	   standards	   in	   their	   procurement	  contracts	   to	   increase	   competition	   among	   domestic	   firms	   that	   seek	   to	   integrate	   their	  supply	  chains.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  this	  would	  incentivize	  domestic	  firms	  to	  find	  alternative	  routes	  for	  productivity	  gains	  or	  make	  new	  investments	  (when	  they	  actually	  have	  access	  to	   financial	   capital)	   that	   they	   wouldn’t	   have	   otherwise	   undertaken	   (De	  Mello	   &	   Luiz,	  1997;	   Wang	   &	   Blomström,	   1992).	   (3)	   The	   demonstration	   effect	   of	   managerial	   or	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marketing	  techniques	  used	  by	  the	  MNC	  upstream	  might	  convince	  domestic	  suppliers	  to	  adopt	   these	   innovations	   in	   order	   to	   realize	   productivity	   gains	   (Wang	   &	   Blomström,	  1992).	  	  	  	  
Indirect	  Linkages	  	  Indirect	   linkages	   correspond	   to	   horizontal	   spillovers,	  when	  MNCs	   and	   domestic	   firms	  are	   not	   directly	   integrated	   in	   the	   same	   supply	   chain.	   They	   might	   be	   competitors	   or	  trading	  partners	  but	  located	  in	  different	  industries,	  purchasing	  intermediary	  goods	  from	  one	   another.	  The	  mechanisms	  behind	   such	   spillovers	   are	  notably	   (1)	   competition	   and	  (2)	  the	  demonstration	  effect	  (just	  as	  in	  vertical	  spillovers).	  Since	  MNCs	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  more	  competitive	   than	  domestic	   firms,	   their	  arrival	   increases	  competitive	  pressure	  on	  domestic	  firms	  that	  have	  new	  incentives	  for	  realizing	  productivity	  gains	  (in	  the	  same	  way	   that	   domestic	   MNC	   suppliers	   might	   compete	   between	   themselves)	   (Aitken	   &	  Harrison,	   1999;	   Kokko,	   1996).	   The	   demonstration	   effect	   (or	   emulation)	   presupposes	  that	   domestic	   firms	   copy	   technological	   or	  managerial	   innovations	   used	   by	  MNCs	   and	  thus	   drive	   their	   own	   competitiveness	   upward.	   Another	   form	   of	   indirect	   linkage	   for	  spillovers	   can	   be	   the	   movement	   of	   skilled	   workforce	   from	   MNCs	   to	   domestic	   firms,	  whereby	   investments	   in	   domestic	   human	   capital	   realized	   by	   MNC	   are	   eventually	  “shared”	  with	  domestic	  firms	  when	  former	  MNC	  employees	  join	  domestic	  firms	  (Fosfuri	  &	  Ronde,	  2001;	  Haacker,	  1999).	  	  	  
Positive	  externalities	  	  MNCs	   can	   also	   have	   indirect	   positive	   externalities	   on	   receiving	   economies:	   since	   the	  decision	   of	   MNCs	   to	   invest	   abroad	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   based	   on	   firm-­‐specific	   assets	  domestic	  firms	  don’t	  dispose	  of,	  MNCs	  are	  likelier	  to	  specialize	  in	  more	  capital-­‐intensive	  activities	   and/or	   be	   more	   productive	   than	   the	   bulk	   of	   domestic	   firms.	   Higher	  productivity	  in	  MNCs	  is	  expected	  to	  translate	  into	  higher	  wages	  for	  the	  workforce	  than	  in	  domestically	  owned	  firms.	  Higher	  wages	  could	  in	  turn	  augment	  demand	  and	  thus	  spur	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investments	  in	  a	  virtuous	  upgrading	  cycle5.	  A	  second	  type	  of	  indirect	  positive	  externality	  is	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   shift	   in	   the	   receiving	   economy’s	   export	   profile	   due	   to	   MNCs’	  pioneering	   role	   in	   paving	   the	   way	   for	   export	   markets	   that	   domestic	   firms	   hadn’t	  previously	  exploited:	  competition	  on	  the	  domestic	  market	  or	  the	  demonstration	  effect	  of	  MNCs	  export	  strategies	  could	  thus	  incentivize	  domestic	  firms	  to	  specialize	  in	  new	  export	  markets	  (Greenaway,	  Sousa,	  &	  Wakelin,	  2001).	  	  Before	  turning	  to	  the	  relevance	  of	  this	  literature	  in	  highlighting	  the	  empirical	  puzzle	  of	  the	  present	  thesis,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  although	  a	  particularly	  large	  body	  of	  work	  on	  the	   upgrading	   potential	   of	   MNCs	   in	   emerging	   economies	   has	   indeed	   highlighted	   a	  number	  of	  theoretically	  grounded	  venues	  for	  the	  transmission	  of	  capital	  and	  technology	  from	   the	   core	   to	   the	   periphery	   through	   FDI	   and	   MNCs,	   the	   empirical	   tests	   remain	   –	  somewhat	  surprisingly	  -­‐	  largely	  inconclusive:	  Blomström	  (1999)	  and	  Görg	  (2003)	  have	  proposed	   extensive	   reviews	   of	   the	   extant	   literature	   on	   evidence	   for	   spillovers	   in	  empirical	   case	   studies	   and	   find	   that	  no	  general	  positive	   relationship	  between	  FDI	   and	  domestic	  upgrading	  seems	  to	  exist.	  Instead,	  contradictory	  empirical	  evidence	  opened	  up	  new	  research	  agendas	   integrating	  new	   independent	  variables	   for	  explaining	  spillovers	  or	   the	   lack	   thereof,	   most	   notably	   a	   receiving	   economy’s	   absorptive	   capacity,	   which	   is	  particularly	  relevant	  for	  our	  argument	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  section	  on	  domestic	  institutional	  pre-­‐requisites	  for	  developmental	  upgrading.	  	  	  The	   literature	   on	   the	   upgrading	   role	   of	   FDI	   and	   MNCs	   in	   the	   periphery	   and	   semi-­‐periphery	  offers	  one	  potential	  explanation	  to	  the	  divergence	  in	  developmental	  outcomes	  observed	   at	   the	   sector	   level	   in	   Polish	   and	   Hungarian	   dairy.	   First,	   contrary	   to	   the	  developmental	  stasis	  or	  downgrading	  assumed	  by	  the	  dependency	  scholarship,	  it	  argues	  that	   transnational	   integration	   can	   on	   the	   contrary	   spur	   upgrading	   and	   an	   upward	  movement	   in	   the	   IDL.	   Second,	   this	   would	   imply	   in	   particular	   that	   the	   developmental	  upgrading	   observed	   in	   the	   Polish	   case	   reflects	   some	   form	   of	   technology-­‐	   and	   capital	  transfer	  from	  MNCs	  to	  domestic	  firms	  and	  suppliers.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  the	  relationship	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Amsden	  	  also	  elaborated	  briefly	  on	  this	  form	  of	  positive	  externality	  (upgrade	  through	  higher	  wages)	  but	  it	   has	   to	   be	   mentioned	   that	   at	   the	   theoretical	   level,	   it	   isn’t	   very	   solid:	   the	   share	   of	   MNCs	   in	   domestic	  employment	  would	  have	   to	  be	  overwhelming,	  while	  an	   increase	   in	  purchasing	  power	   is	   likelier	   to	   raise	  imports	  especially	  in	  higher	  value-­‐added	  goods.	  At	  the	  empirical	  level,	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  for	  higher	  wages	  paid	  by	  MNCs	  than	  domestic	  firms,	  but	  not	  of	  an	  entire	  shift	  in	  comsuption	  patterns	  resulting	  from	  it	  (Head,	  1998;	  Lipsey	  &	  Sjöholm,	  2001).	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between	   FDI	   and	   the	   competiveness	   of	   Polish	   dairy	   has	   received	   a	   focused	   attention	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  and	  a	  distinct	  literature	  argues	  precisely	  that	  foreign	  capital	  played	  the	  key	  role	  in	  upgrading	  domestic	  capacities.	  	  
Upgrading	  through	  FDI	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Polish	  and	  Hungarian	  Dairy	  	  Dries,	  Germenji,	  Noev	  and	  Swinnen	  (2009)	  studied	  the	  upgrading	  effect	  of	  FDI	  on	  CEE	  dairy	  sector	  competitiveness:	  they	  defined	  different	  dependent	  variables	  whereupon	  the	  effect	   of	   MNCs	   can	   be	   observed,	   such	   as	   herd	   size,	   competitiveness,	   (measured	   as	  productivity	  in	  milk	  yields	  and	  food	  safety	  standard	  adoption),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  stability	  of	  inter-­‐firm	   coordination	   through	   the	  use	  of	   private	   contractual	   relations	  between	  MNC	  buyers	   (either	   in	   the	   milk	   processing	   segment	   or	   by	   retail	   chains)	   and	   domestic	  suppliers	   (either	   farmers	   or	   	   domestic	   processing	   firms).	   Although	   they	   didn’t	   use	  regression	  models	   because	   of	   the	   scattered	   nature	   of	   data,	   they	   relied	   on	   descriptive	  statistics,	  qualitative	  interviews	  and	  process	  tracing.	  They	  argued	  that	  a	  positive	  relation	  seemed	  to	  exist	  throughout	  the	  CEE	  region	  between	  FDI	  (MNC	  presence)	  and	  upgrading	  in	   all	   the	   abovementioned	   dimensions.	   These	   authors	   have	   jointly	   and	   independently	  produced	   further	   evidence	   for	   this	   thesis:	   Dries	   and	   Swinnen	   (2004)	   studied	   vertical	  integration	  in	  the	  Polish	  sector	  under	  FDI	  and	  argued	  that	  after	  an	  initial	  breakdown	  of	  buyer-­‐supplier	  relations	  previously	  organized	  by	  State	  Ministries	  under	  Socialism,	  MNCs	  offered	   an	   alternative	   in	   the	   form	   of	   private	   contracts,	   which	   helped	   restructure	   the	  market	   as	   a	   stable	  mechanism	   for	   vertical	   integration	   and	   coordination	   in	   the	   supply	  chain.	   This	   confirmed	   a	   previous	   study	   by	   Gow	   and	   Swinnen	   (2000)	  where	   they	   had	  similarly	   noted	   a	   stabilization	   of	   vertical	   coordination	   through	   private	   contracts	  between	  MNCs	  and	  domestic	  firms	  in	  CEE.	  Furthermore,	  they	  found	  in	  the	  same	  paper	  that	  MNCs	  usually	  offered	  direct	  access	  to	  financial	  capital	  to	  their	  domestic	  suppliers	  in	  CEE:	  typically,	  MNCs	  would	  guarantee	  collaterals	  when	  suppliers	  applied	  for	  loans	  from	  commercial	   or	   development	   banks.	   It	   is	   argued	   that	   those	   domestic	   producers,	  which	  took	  part	  in	  this	  form	  of	  private	  assistance,	  saw	  their	  revenues	  increase	  (MNCs	  worked	  indirectly	  as	  providers	  or	  rather	  guarantors	  of	  access	  to	  capital	  for	  realizing	  investments	  which	  increased	  their	  productivity)	  (Dries	  &	  Swinnen,	  2004;	  Dries	  &	  Swinnen,	  2010).	  	  	  	  Another	  venue	  of	  capital	  and	  technology	  transmission	  from	  MNCs	  to	  domestic	  firms	  and	  producers	   was	   the	   use	   of	   stringent	   food	   safety	   standards	   integrated	   into	   the	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procurement	   contracts:	   Dries,	   Germenji,	   Noev	   and	   Swinnen	   (2009)	   	   argue	   that	  MNCs	  played	  a	  pioneering	   role	   in	   the	  diffusion	  of	  more	   stringent	   food	   safety	   standards	   than	  the	  ones	   in	  place	  before	   their	  arrival.	  This	   is	   important	  because	  standards	  act	  as	  non-­‐trade	  barriers	  to	  trade:	  therefore,	  the	  adoption	  of	  stringent	  standards	  allows	  for	  foreign	  export	   market	   penetration,	   which	   would	   be	   otherwise	   impossible.	   They	   argued	   that	  domestic	   competitors	  of	  MNCs	   soon	  emulated	   these	  practices:	  Polish	  processing	   firms	  began	  to	  implement	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  standards	  that	  MNCs	  required	  from	  their	  suppliers	  and	  gradually	  learned	  from	  the	  pioneering	  role	  of	  MNCs	  in	  finding	  new	  export	  markets	  (particularly	   exports	   to	   the	   EU).	   Finally,	   Dries,	   Germenji	   Noev	   and	   Swinnen	   (2006)	  equally	  studied	  the	  effects	  of	  FDI	  on	  CEE	  dairy	  sectors	  in	  the	  retail	  segment	  through	  the	  arrival	   of	  MNCs	   supermarket	   chains.	   They	   recognize	   a	   negative	   effect	   on	   the	   survival	  rate	  of	  domestic	  producers	  throughout	  the	  1990s,	  when	  farmers	  unable	  to	  comply	  with	  the	   procurement	   contract	   clauses	   (most	   notably	   food	   safety	   standard	   compliance)	   of	  MNC	  retail	  chains	  were	  forced	  out	  of	  the	  market:	  in	  Poland,	  Hungary,	  the	  Czech	  Republic,	  Slovakia	  and	  Estonia,	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  the	  registered	  workforce	  left	  the	  market	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  post-­‐Communist	   transition	   in	  agri-­‐food	  sectors.	  However,	   the	  authors	   suggest	  that	   in	   spite	   of	   this	   social	   cost,	   even	   this	   process	   resulted	   in	   positive	   developmental	  outcomes	   such	   as	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   average	   farm	   size	   and	   increased	   concentration	  upstream	  in	  the	  production	  segment.	  Furthermore,	   they	  argued	  that	  MNC	  retail	  chains	  played	   an	   equally	   important	   role	   in	   the	   enforcement	   of	   food	   safety	   standards,	   just	   as	  their	   colleagues	   in	   the	   processing	   segment,	   and	   thus	   contributed	   to	   a	   substantial	  increase	  in	  competitiveness	  (Johan	  F.M.	  Swinnen	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  	  	  Overall,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  this	  particular	  literature	  on	  FDI	  and	  upgrading	  in	  CEE	  dairy	  sectors	   offers	   a	   convincing	   explanation	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   movement	   between	  developmental	  positions	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  first	  chapter.	  What	  is	  more,	  it	   finds	   empirical	   evidence	   for	   the	   transition	   mechanisms	   of	   capital	   and	   technology	  highlighted	   in	   the	   broader	   literature	   on	   FDI,	   MNCs	   and	   upgrading.	   Indeed,	   the	  phenomena	   described	   by	   these	   authors	   confirm	   many	   of	   the	   abovementioned	  hypotheses:	   the	   existence	   of	   vertical	   spillovers	   and	   backward	   linkages	   between	  MNC	  processors/retailers	   and	   domestic	   producers/suppliers	   (through	   direct	   financial	  assistance,	   capital	   provision,	   standard	   diffusion)	   as	   well	   as	   horizontal	   spillovers	  exemplified	   by	   the	   demonstration	   effect	   that	   domestic	   competitors	   would	   have	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benefitted	  from	  (learning	  by	  emulation)	  and	  an	  increased	  climate	  of	  competition,	  which	  would	  have	  improved	  domestic	  productivity.	  	  In	   light	   of	   such	   an	   overwhelming	   evidence	   to	   the	   positive	   correlation	   between	   FDI,	  MNCs	   and	   developmental	   upgrading,	   it	   could	   seem	   surprising	   that	   the	   present	   thesis	  questions	   many	   of	   these	   findings:	   We	   argue	   that	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   convincingly	  falsifiable	  quantitative	  data	  based	  on	  a	  lack	  of	  available	  resources,	  the	  evidence	  for	  such	  a	   positive	   correlation	   is	   at	   the	   very	   least	   questionable	   in	   light	   of	   Poland’s	   relatively	  lesser	  level	  of	  inward	  FDI	  in	  the	  dairy	  sector	  compared	  with	  other	  CEE	  countries	  such	  as	  Hungary	  for	  instance:	  while	  Hungary	  had	  enjoyed	  earlier	  and	  substantially	  higher	  FDI	  in	  the	   dairy	   sector,	   it	   underwent	   a	   gradual	   collapse	   in	   competitiveness	   throughout	   the	  1990s,	   especially	   accelerating	   after	   EU	   accession	   when	   the	   trade	   balance	   became	  negative	  even	  in	  lower	  value-­‐added	  dairy	  products	  (while	  imports	  of	  higher	  value-­‐added	  goods	   have	   symmetrically	   risen).	   The	   Swinnen,	   Dries	   et	   al.	   literature	   –	  mirroring	   the	  hypotheses	   of	   the	   broader	   literature	   on	   the	   upgrading	   role	   of	   FDI	   and	  MNCs	   –	  would	  expect	  precisely	  the	  opposite	  trend	  in	  Poland	  and	  Hungary’s	  developmental	  pathway,	  if	  indeed,	   developmental	   upgrading	   was,	   as	   argued	   in	   these	   literatures,	   primarily	  determined	   by	   the	   trickle-­‐down	   effect	   in	   financial	   and	   human	   capital	   from	   MNCs	   to	  domestic	  firms.	   	  In	  light	  of	  these,	  it	  would	  seem	  on	  the	  contrary	  that	  the	  hypotheses	  of	  the	  broader	  and	  sector-­‐specific	  literatures	  on	  FDI	  as	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  upgrading	  in	  peripheral	   and	   semi-­‐peripheral	   economies	   don’t	   reflect	   the	   empirical	   cases	   studied	   in	  this	   thesis:	   as	   such,	   their	   hypotheses	   don’t	   offer	   convincing	   explanations	   for	   such	   a	  divergence	  in	  developmental	  trajectories	  between	  Poland	  and	  Hungary.	  	  	  
Upgrading	  through	  transnational	  public	  actors	  and	  integration	  regimes	  (TIRs)	  	  A	   different	   literature	   studies	   another	   form	   of	   exogenous	   upgrading,	   namely	   the	  developmental	  role	  of	  Transnational	  Integration	  Regimes	  (TIRs)	  as	  coined	  by	  Bruszt	  and	  McDermott	  (2014).	  The	  TIR	  literature	  extends	  a	  concern	  for	  developmental	  outcomes	  to	  a	   vast	   array	   of	   pre-­‐existing	   scholarship	   on	   transnational	   market-­‐,	   regulatory-­‐	   and	  regional-­‐	   integration,	   where	   distributive	   outcomes	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   receiving	  developing-­‐	  or	  transition	  economies	  are	  often	  overlooked	  (Bartley,	  2007;	  Büthe	  &	  Mattli,	  2011;	  Burkard	  Eberlein	  &	  Grande,	  2005).	  In	  parallel	  to	  the	  scholarship	  on	  the	  upgrading	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role	  of	  FDI	  and	  MNCs,	  the	  TIR	  literature	  argues	  that	  transnational	  public	  actors	  such	  as	  the	  EU	  Commission	   (in	   the	  particular	   context	  of	  European	   regional	   integration)	  might	  upgrade	  domestic	  public	  and	  private	  capacities	  in	  transition	  economies,	  with	  the	  result	  of	   increased	   competitiveness.	   A	   prime	   case	   study	   for	   examining	   this	   hypothesis	   is	  precisely	   the	   experience	   of	   CEE	   countries,	   where	   domestic	   institutional	   change	   was	  conditioned	  and	  steered	  by	  a	  decade-­‐long	  regulatory	  harmonization	  process	  (EU	  acquis	  adoption).	   The	   TIR	   literature	   notably	   uses	   the	   evidence	   uncovered	   by	   the	  Europeanization	   research	   agenda,	   which	   had	   focused	   on	   the	   effects	   of	   regulatory	  harmonization	  on	  domestic	  institutions	  (F.	  Schimmelfennig,	  2005;	  F.	  Schimmelfennig	  &	  Scholtz,	  2010;	  Frank	  Schimmelfennig	  &	  Sedelmeier,	  2005;	  F.	  Schimmelfennig	  &	  Trauner,	  2009),	  but	  rather	  than	  staying	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  formalistic	  legal	  transposition-­‐,	  compliance-­‐	  or	  infringement	  with	  EU	  regulations,	  it	  also	  studies	  the	  effects	  that	  this	  form	  of	   externally-­‐steered	   institutional	   change	   had	   on	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   national	  economies	   in	  CEE	   (as	  well	   as	   other	   similar	   semi-­‐peripheral	   regions	   such	  as	  Mexico	   in	  NAFTA).	  	  	  Bruszt	  and	  Vukov	  (2014)	  provide	  a	  rationale	  as	  to	  why	  Core	  economies	  might	  have	  used	  the	   EU	   Commission’s	   agency	   in	   order	   to	   improve	   competitiveness	   in	   CEE:	   they	   argue	  that	   the	   historical	   experience	   of	   German	   reunification	   proved	  decisive	   in	   showing	   the	  tremendous	  social	  and	  economic	  costs	  entailed	  by	  a	  complete	  economic	  collapse	  such	  as	  the	  one	  endured	  by	  the	  former	  GDR	  (Bruszt	  &	  Vukov,	  2014,	  p.16).	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  Copenhagen	   criteria	   for	   EU	   accession	   adopted	   in	   1993	   formulated	   a	   key	   criterion,	  namely	   “the	   capacity	   to	  withstand	   competitive	   pressure”,	   in	   reference	   to	   the	   negative	  experience	  of	  German	  reunification:	  as	  a	  consequence,	  EU15	  countries	  would	  have	  had	  a	  rational	  stake	  in	  guaranteeing	  that	  CEE	  economies	  be	  competitive	  enough	  by	  the	  time	  of	  EU	  accession	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  a	  rapid	  meltdown	  in	  the	  Common	  Market.	  Another	  motive	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  Commission	  was	  the	  fear	  that,	  firms	  from	  the	  CEE	  countries	  will	  have	  low	  capacity	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  EU	  market	  rules	  and	  large-­‐scale	  non-­‐compliance	  on	  the	  side	  of	   CEE	   firms	   might	   undermine	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   common	   market.	   The	   question	  however,	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  motive	  would	  have	  translated	  into	  a	  “positive”	  or	  a	  “negative”	  developmental	  agenda.	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The	   TIR	   literature	   identifies	   mechanisms	   through	   which	   a	   transnational	   public	   actor	  such	  as	  the	  EU	  could	  have	  a	  positive	  developmental	  upgrading	  effect	  on	  CEE	  economies.	  It	   is	  argued	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  that	   the	  EU	  disposed	  of	  positive	   instruments	   for	  capacity	  building:	   (1)	   institution-­‐building	   (such	   as	   the	   establishment	   of	   national	   regulatory	  authorities	   or	   the	   necessity	   for	   candidate	   states	   to	   re-­‐learn	   sector-­‐level	   planning	  through	  national	   development	   plans,	   strategies	   and	   frameworks),	   (2)	   the	   provision	   of	  financial	  capital	  channeled	  to	  specific	  domestic	  target	  groups	  or	  policy	  areas	  in	  the	  form	  of	   pre-­‐accession	   funds	   and	   post-­‐accession	   structural	   funds	   and	   (3)	   the	   selective	  empowerment	   of	   domestic	   advocacy	   coalitions	   (most	   notably	   NGOs	   invested	   in	   the	  adoption	  of	  more	  stringent	  EU	  standards	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  human	  rights	  or	  environmental	  regulation).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  conditionality	  method,	  which	  systematically	  pointed	  out	   and	   sanctioned	   areas	   of	   non-­‐compliance	  with	   EU	   regulation	   (and	   thus	   raised	   the	  credible	   threat	  of	  delayed	  or	  blocked	  accession)	   in	  yearly-­‐compiled	  progress	  reports	  –	  constituted	   the	   “negative”	  developmental	  arm	  of	   the	  EU’s	   “sticks	  and	  carrots”	   strategy	  vis	  a	  vis	  CEE.	  	  	  Overall,	   the	   TIR	   framework	   argues	   that	   the	   combination	   of	   negative	   and	   positive	  instruments	   ensured	   –	   in	   theory	   –	   the	   capacity	   for	   the	   Commission	   to	   affect	   both	   the	  external	  “supply”	  and	  the	  domestic	  “demand”	  for	  institutional	  change	  (compliance	  with	  the	  EU	  acquis).	  Furthermore,	   this	   literature	  argues	   that	  besides	  policy	  instruments,	   the	  EU’s	  management	  of	  CEE	  accession	  also	  made	  use	  of	  innovative	  governance	  mechanisms,	  which	   it	   calls	   a	   non-­‐hierarchical	   “multiplex	   problem-­‐solving	   ability”,	   in	   line	   with	   a	  number	  of	  researchers,	  who	  had	  emphasized	  the	  EU’s	  capacity	  for	  adapting	  governance	  methods	   to	   the	   problems	   uncovered	   during	   the	   pre-­‐accession	   phase	   (B.	   Eberlein	   &	  Radaelli,	  2010;	  Grabbe,	  2006;	  Lavenex,	  Lehmkuhl,	  &	  Wichmann,	  2009;	  Sabel	  &	  Zeitlin,	  2010;	  Zeitlin,	  2011).	  	  Thus,	   the	   TIR	   framework	   argues	   that	   transnational	   public	   actors	   such	   as	   the	   EU	  disposed	   of	   policy	   instruments	   that	   could	   –	   a	   priori	   -­‐	   strengthen	   domestic	  competitiveness	   through	   at	   least	   three	   channels:	   (1)	   in	   relation	   to	   domestic	   firms,	  targeted	  programs	  of	  capital	  provision	  mirror	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  the	  upgrading	  role	  of	  MNCs	   in	   providing	   easier	   access	   to	   productive	   (financial)	   capital,	   (2)	   What	   Bruszt-­‐McDermott	  and	  the	  anterior	  Europeanization	  literature	  call	  the	  conditionality	  method	  is	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functionally	  a	   system	  of	  disciplinary	   regulatory	   implementation,	  which	  encompasses	  a	  wide	   array	   of	   technical	   product	   and	   process	   standards	   that	   were	   written	   into	   the	  accession	  chapters.	  In	  that	  sense,	  the	  EU’s	  capacity	  to	  enforce	  and	  implement	  technical	  standards	  can	  be	  likened	  to	  the	  role	  that	  MNCs	  played	  in	  the	  diffusion	  of	  such	  standards	  through	  their	  inclusion	  into	  procurement	  contracts	  with	  domestic	  producers	  and	  firms.	  Assuming	   that	   the	   adoption	   of	   MNC	   or	   EU	   technical	   norms	   entails	   positive	  developmental	   outcomes	   (increased	   competitiveness	   for	   domestic	   actors)6,	   there	   is	   a	  theoretical	   similarity	   between	   the	   role	   of	   MNCs	   and	   the	   EU	   as	   developmental	   agents	  through	  regulatory	  diffusion.	  (3)	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  TIR	  literature	  argues	  that	  the	  EU	  had	  an	  upgrading	  role	  on	  domestic	  public	  institutions.	  This	  is	  a	  major	  difference	  with	  the	  literature	   on	   MNCs	   and	   FDI	   as	   the	   prime	   drivers	   of	   developmental	   upgrading:	   the	  underlying	   hypothesis	   is	   that	   domestic	   public	   institutions	   matter	   for	   developmental	  outcomes,	   a	   question	   often	   ignored	   by	   the	   former	   scholarship,	   with	   tremendous	  consequences	  as	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  subsequent	  parts.	  	  
Upgrading	  CEE	  dairy	  sectors	  in	  TIRs	  	  Besides	  providing	  a	  general	  theoretical	   framework	  for	  considering	  the	  EU	  (and	  similar	  public	   transnational	   organizations)	   as	   a	   potential	   upgrading	   agent,	   the	   TIR	   literature	  equally	  conducted	  empirical	  case	  studies	   for	  verifying	  these	  hypotheses.	  Most	  relevant	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  present	  thesis	  is	  a	  study	  by	  Bruszt	  and	  Langbein	  	  (2014)	  on	  the	   EU’s	   role	   in	   the	   evolution	   of	   Polish	   and	   Romanian	   competitiveness	   in	   the	   dairy	  sector.	   The	   paper	   identifies	   a	   similar	   puzzle	   to	   our	   research	   agenda:	   an	   upward	  trajectory	  in	  Polish	  competitiveness	  and	  a	  downward	  trajectory	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Romania.	  However,	   it	  seeks	  to	  uncover	  specifically	  the	  role	  that	  the	  EU	  accession	  process	  played	  on	  these	  trends.	  The	  authors	  propose	  contrasted	  findings:	  (1)	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  EU’s	  intervention	   in	   the	   dairy	   sector	   mirrored	   its	   “sticks	   and	   carrots”	   approach	   to	   CEE	  accession:	  the	  EU’s	  pre-­‐accession	  funds	  represented	  a	  (relatively)	  cheap	  access	  to	  capital	  for	   domestic	   firms	   but	   the	   EU	   also	   imposed	   regulatory	   compliance	   with	   technical	  standards,	   which	   increased	   the	   risk	   of	   market	   exclusion	   for	   under-­‐capitalized	   small	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  A	   hypothesis	   which	   is	   naturally	   highly	   contentious	   empirically,	   since	   the	   costs	   associated	   with	   rule	  compliance	  have	  clear	  exclusionary	  effects	  on	  domestic	   firms	  unable	   to	  secure	   the	  capital	  necessary	   for	  investments	  that	  could	  guarantee	  compliance	  (Lee,	  Gereffi,	  &	  Beauvais,	  2010).	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producers	  and	  firms,	  (2)	  Bruszt	  and	  Langbein	  recognize	  that	  a	  substantial	  difference	  in	  developmental	  outcomes	  resulting	  from	  EU	  accession	  in	  the	  dairy	  sector	  can	  be	  found	  in	  pre-­‐existing	   institutional	   differences	   between	   the	   two	   countries,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	  domestic	  actors’	  capacity	  to	  organize	  effectively	  (strong	  coordination	  and	  organization	  in	   Poland,	   atomized	   actors	   in	   Romania)	   and	   in	   the	   two	   states’	   public	   administrative	  capacities	  (competent	  in	  Poland,	  inefficient	  and	  corrupt	  in	  Romania).	  	  	  Ultimately,	  Bruszt	  and	  Langbein	  show	  that	  at	  the	  theoretical	  level,	  a	  transnational	  public	  actor	  such	  as	  the	  EU	  disposed	  of	  resources	  that	  were	  vital	  for	  the	  competitive	  upgrading	  of	  CEE	  dairies	  (financial	  capital	  and	  technological	  modernization	  –	  notably	  through	  food	  safety	   standard	  adoption).	  The	  EU	  Commission	  guaranteed	  a	  potential	   access	   to	   these	  resources,	  however	  it	  left	  CEE	  states	  free	  to	  distribute	  these	  among	  domestic	  non-­‐state	  actors	   as	   they	   saw	   fit.	   Consequently,	   while	   the	   Polish	   state	   efficiently	   used	   these	  resources	  for	  an	  inclusionary	  upgrading	  investment	  program,	   in	  the	  Romanian	  context	  however,	  the	  state	  allocated	  these	  resources	  to	  a	  few	  large	  (often	  foreign	  owned)	  dairy	  firms.	   Different	   interest	   coalitions	   and	   differences	   in	   the	   two	   states’	   administrative	  capacity	   to	   implement	   public	   policies	   resulted	   in	   widely	   different	   developmental	  outcomes.	   Thus,	   Bruszt	   and	   Langbein’s	   case	   study	   showed	   that	   while	   transnational	  public	  actors	  such	  as	   the	  EU	  can	  provide	  capital	  and	   technology	   -­‐	  ultimately	  accessing	  and	  distributing	  these	  resources	  varies	  with	  the	  organization	  of	  domestic	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	   actors	   in	   CEE.	  Overall,	   Bruszt	   and	   Langbein	   concede	   that	   the	   EU	   is	   an	   engine	   of	  development	   only	   a	   minima	   in	   CEE,	   where	   its	   developmental	   effects	   are	   largely	  mediated	  by	  domestic	  variables.	  	  
A	  note	  on	  theories	  of	  exogenous	  developmental	  upgrading	  (FDI	  and	  TIRs)	  
	  The	  dependency	  argument,	  which	  assumes	  a	  stasis	  or	  downgrading	  for	  semi-­‐peripheral	  economies	  over	   the	   course	  of	   transnationalization,	  proves	  unable	   to	   shed	   light	  on	  our	  empirical	  puzzle	  on	  two	  accounts:	  Polish	  dairy’s	  upward	  developmental	  trajectory	  over	  the	  course	  of	  market	  liberalization	  and	  EU	  accession	  most	  fundamentally	  contradicts	  the	  over-­‐determination	   of	   the	   dependent	   underdevelopment	   argument.	   Second,	   this	  literature	   offers	   no	   convincing	   explanation	   to	   increasing	   divergence	   in	   developmental	  trajectories	   between	   similar	   countries.	   Building	   on	   these	   insufficiencies,	   we	   have	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examined	  two	  competing	  hypotheses,	  that	  provide	  on	  the	  contrary	  a	  theoretical	  basis	  for	  (positive-­‐,	   upward-­‐)	   dynamic	   change	   between	   developmental	   positions	   over	   time:	   the	  first	  hypothesis	   argues	   that	   increasing	   transnationalization	   in	   the	   form	  of	  FDI	  and	   the	  arrival	   of	   MNCs	   can	   compensate	   for	   the	   domestic	   shortage	   of	   financial	   capital	   and	  technology.	  However,	   this	   literature	  would	  expect	  diametrically	  opposing	  outcomes	   to	  the	   empirical	   trajectories	   of	   Poland	   and	   Hungary	   if	   there	   was	   a	   stable	   correlation	  between	  FDI	   levels	  and	  increasing	   inclusionary	  competitiveness.	  Thirdly,	  we	  examined	  the	  hypothesis	  put	  forward	  by	  the	  TIR	  literature,	  which	  argues	  that	  transnational	  public	  actors	   and	   integration	   regimes	   such	   as	   the	   EU	   might	   play	   a	   similar	   role	   to	   MNCs	   in	  facilitating	   access	   to	   capital	   and	   diffusing	   stringent	   technical	   standards	   in	   semi-­‐peripheral	  economies.	  However,	  the	  very	  case	  study	  of	  developmental	  divergence	  in	  CEE	  dairy	   sectors	   put	   forward	   in	   the	   TIR	   framework	   draws	   attention	   to	   a	   third	   factor	  explaining	  developmental	  success	  or	  failures:	  domestic	  institutions.	  	  	  Upon	  closer	  scrutiny,	  it	  seems	  that	  these	  two	  literatures,	  which	  study	  the	  developmental	  role	  of	  transnational	  private	  and	  public	  actors	  converge	  on	  a	  crucial	  insight,	  namely	  that	  variation	  in	  domestic	  factors	  is	  probably	  more	  important	  for	  explaining	  developmental	  outcomes	  than	  transnational	  public	  or	  private	  agency.	  In	  fact,	  the	  vast	  literature	  on	  the	  relation	   between	   FDI,	   MNCs	   and	   developmental	   upgrading	   underwent	   an	   important	  evolution	   where	   domestic	   variables	   have	   been	   re-­‐evaluated:	   Blomström	   (1999)	  recognizes	   that	   domestic	   public	   policies	   are	   crucial	   for	   explaining	   spillovers	   between	  MNCs	  and	  domestic	  firms.	  In	  fact,	  an	  important	  subfield	  of	  research	  on	  FDI	  is	  concerned	  today	  with	  the	  identification	  of	  what	  they	  call	  a	  receiving	  economy’s	  domestic	  absorptive	  
capacity:	   empirical	   evidence	   shows	   that	   the	   economic-­‐,	   social-­‐	   and	   technological	  upgrading	   effect	   of	   FDI	   is	   strongest	   in	   economies	   that	   already	   possess	   a	   reliable	  infrastructure,	   an	   efficient	   state,	   investments	   in	  human	   capital	   etc.	   (Nguyen,	  Duysters,	  Patterson,	  &	  Sander,	  2009).	  	  	  In	   parallel	   to	   the	   FDI	   literature,	   Bruszt	   and	   Langbein	   (2014)	   also	   point	   to	   domestic	  institutions	  as	  key	  variables	  for	  explaining	  developmental	  upgrade	  in	  Poland	  and	  stasis	  or	   downgrade	   in	   Romania.	  We	   argue	   that	   the	   theoretical	   consequences	   derived	   from	  these	   observations	   are	   notable:	   The	   fact	   that	   domestic	   actors	   and	   institutions	   filter	  transnational	   processes	   and	   agency	   seems	   intuitive	   and	   banal…	   However,	   if	   it	   can	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empirically	   demonstrated	   that	   variations	   in	   domestic	   variables	   can	   explain	   diverging	  developmental	   trajectories	   even	   in	   deeply	   transnationalized	   regions	   such	   as	   CEE,	  typically	  used	  as	  prime	  examples	  of	  dependency,	   it	  would	  mean	  that	  contrary	  to	  many	  extant	   underlying	   hypotheses	   about	   the	   developmental	   consequences	   of	  transnationalization,	   which	   argue	   that	   the	   developmental	   trajectories	   of	   small,	   open	  developing	  economies	  are	  over-­‐determined	  by	  exogenous	  factors,	  there	  remains	  in	  fact	  a	  crucially	   important	   (however	   reduced)	   scope	   for	   different	   strategies	   of	  transnationalization	   even	   in	   highly	   transnationalized	   semi-­‐peripheral	   or	   transition	  economies…	  at	  very	  least,	  in	  less	  technology-­‐intensive	  sectors.	  	  	  
Part	  4.	  Domestic	  Developmental	  Public	  Policies	  	  The	   more	   orthodox	   tendencies	   of	   dependency	   theory’s	   appetence	   for	   explaining	  underdevelopment	   don’t	   help	   understanding	   dynamic	   developmental	   pathways:	  especially	  not	  when	  semi-­‐peripheral	   countries	  might	  empirically	  display	  an	  upgrading	  trajectory	   both	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   sector’s	   competitiveness	   but	   also	   to	   the	   degree	   of	  inclusiveness	  afforded	  to	  domestic	  actors	  –	  which	  corresponds	  to	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Polish	  dairy	  sector.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  while	   the	  developmental	   role	  of	   transnational	  private	  and	   public	   actors	   has	   spurred	   a	   vast	   scholarship	   on	   processes	   by	  which	   these	   actors	  might	   compensate	   for	   a	  domestic	   lack	  of	   capital	   and	   technology	   (financial	   and	  human	  capital),	   the	   evidence	   remains	   inconclusive:	   the	   literature	   on	   MNCs’	   upgrading	   role	  stresses	   the	   receiving	   economy’s	   pre-­‐existing	   absorptive	   capacity,	   while	   the	   TIR	  literature	  identifies	  transnational	  public	  actors	  such	  as	  the	  EU	  as	  having	  a	  minimalistic,	  negatively-­‐defined	  developmental	  agenda	  vis	  a	  vis	  CEE.	  Empirically,	  the	  Hungarian	  dairy	  sector’s	   performance	   seems	   to	   run	   fundamentally	   counter	   the	   argument	   of	   successful	  upgrading	  through	  FDI.	  Therefore,	  while	  transnational	  actors	  certainly	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  influencing	  the	  course	  of	  post-­‐Socialist	  restructuring	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  dairy	  sector	  in	  Poland	  and	  Hungary,	  the	  question	  remains:	  Why	  did	  the	  two	  countries	  exploit	  a	  similar	  opportunity	   structure	   differently,	   resulting	   in	   so	   different	   outcomes?	   In	   the	   following	  sections,	   we	   will	   first	   clarify	   how	   domestic	   policies	   differed	   between	   Poland	   and	  Hungary,	   that	   is,	  what	  were	   the	   dimensions	   in	  which	   domestic	   developmental	   agency	  could	   diverge	   between	   the	   two	   countries.	   In	   the	   last	   section,	   we	   will	   provide	   a	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theoretically	  grounded	  argument	  as	  to	  why	  the	  two	  pathways	  followed	  different	  routes	  leading	  to	  differentiated	  developmental	  outcomes.	  	  
Developmental	  Public	  Policies	  in	  autonomist	  and	  integrationist	  models	  	  	  In	   attempting	   to	   find	   theoretical	   justifications	   to	   the	   developmental	   effects	   of	   public	  policies,	  it	  seems	  relevant	  to	  yet	  again	  refer	  to	  Amsden.’s	  work:	  Amsden	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  vocal	  critics	  of	  an	  over-­‐determination	  towards	  developmental	  stasis	  or	  downgrade	  inherent	  to	  the	  dependency	  scholarship,	  whether	  in	  its	  traditional	  “orthodox”	  form	  or	  in	  its	  later	  “ASB”	  formulation.	  In	  her	  view,	  public	  developmental	  policies	  played	  the	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  catching-­‐up	  of	  late-­‐industrializers	  (Amsden,	  2001).	  	  	  Amsden	   (2001)	   argues	   that	   historically,	   developmentally	   successful	   emerging	  economies	  never	  followed	  a	  “low-­‐road	  industrialization”	  strategy:	  the	  successes	  of	   late	  19th-­‐early	   20th	   century	   rising	   champions	   of	   industrializations	   such	   as	   Germany	   or	   the	  U.S.A.	  never	  based	   their	  catching	  up	  with	  Britain	  on	   low	  wages	  and	   low	  skills.	  Neither	  did	   post-­‐War	   Japan	   nor	   South	   Korea.	   In	   fact	   an	   important	   critical	   scholarship	  demonstrated	   that	   successful	   economic	   development	   always	   hinged	   on	   protectionist	  policies	  rather	  than	  the	  myth	  of	  free	  trade,	  be	  it	  in	  pre-­‐industrial	  Britain	  (Chang,	  2008),	  or	  post-­‐War	  Japan	  (Johnson,1989)	  and	  South	  Korea	  (Amsden,	  1989).	  	  	  Amsden	   draws	   a	   distinction	   between	   two	   types	   of	   developmental	   successes:	  Western	  first	   industrializers	   that	   increased	   their	   competitiveness	   through	   radical	   innovation	  during	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution	  (eg.	  Germany	  or	  the	  U.S.A.),	  and	  “late	  industrializers”	  in	  the	   20th	   century,	  which	  managed	   to	   catch	   up	  with	   the	   former	   even	   in	   the	   absence	   of	  endogenous	  technological	  innovation.	  These	  two	  processes	  had	  different	  pre-­‐requisites:	  institutional	   histories	   in	   the	   longue	   durée	   in	   the	   Western	   case	   (the	   emergence	   of	   a	  bourgeoisie,	  or	  of	  scientific	  rationality)	  were	  boosted	  by	   investments	   in	  human	  capital	  resulting	   in	   feedback	   loops	   between	   science	   and	   industry,	  which	   spurred	   innovations	  that	  increased	  gains	  in	  productivity	  (e.g.	  Fordism).	  In	  the	  South-­‐East	  Asian	  case	  of	  late-­‐industrializers,	   moving	   beyond	   a	   comparative	   advantage	   in	   low-­‐skill	   and	   low-­‐wage	  sectors	  was	  possible	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   the	  state	  proved	  capable	  of	  putting	   in	  place	  an	  incentive	   structure	   based	   on	   export	   subsidies	   conditional	   on	   the	   performance	   of	   the	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private	  sector.	  The	  metrics	  of	  performance	  could	  be	  multifaceted:	  be	  they	  targets	  for	  an	  increase	   in	   output,	   productivity	   gains	   or	   compliance	   with	   technical	   standards,	   what	  mattered	   was	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   state	   to	   monitor,	   reward	   compliers	   (extending	  subsidies)	  and	  sanction	  non-­‐compliers	  (withdrawing	  subsidies).	  What	  is	  remarkable	  in	  Amsden’s	  concept	  of	  successful	  late-­‐industrialization	  is	  that	  to	  her,	  the	  lengthy	  Western	  process	   of	   endogenous	   innovation	   resulting	   in	   productivity	   gains	   could	   be	   artificially	  engineered	  by	  a	  disciplinarian	   conditionality	  method,	   a	   role,	  which	   fell	   on	   the	   state	   in	  post-­‐War	  Asia:	  this	  system	  of	  rewards	  and	  punishments	  guiding	  and	  shaping	  the	  private	  sector	   towards	   increasingly	   complex	   technology	   played	   the	   same	   role	   in	   Asia	   as	   the	  lengthy	   trials	  and	  errors	  of	   spontaneous	  attempts	  by	   innovators	  and	  entrepreneurs	   in	  the	  West7.	  	  	  What	  distinguishes	  autonomist	  and	  integrationist	  developmental	  strategies	  in	  Amsden’s	  framework	   is	   most	   fundamentally	   the	   ownership	   of	   firms	   (in	   other	   terms,	   FDI)	   that	  acquire	   and	   transpose	   more	   productive	   knowledge	   and	   innovation	   into	   a	   developing	  economy.	   Autonomists	   rely	   on	   domestic	   firms	   and	   use	   the	   instrument	   of	   conditional	  export	   subsidies,	   that	   is	   the	   state’s	   disciplinarian	   conditionality	   mechanism	   for	  rewarding	   efficient	   learning	   as	   described	   above,	  while	   integrationists	   rely	   entirely	   on	  MNCs	   for	  skill	   formation	  and	  RD.	   In	  other	  words,	   learning	   is	  an	  outsourced	  process	   in	  the	  integrationist	  model	  and	  an	  endogenous	  process	  in	  the	  autonomist	  one.	  Policies	  are	  also	   salient	   for	   integrationist	   strategies	   as	   for	   autonomists:	   for	   the	   former	   however,	  public	  policies	  are	  not	  meant	  at	  nurturing	  the	  learning	  capacity	  of	  domestically	  owned	  firms	  but	   rather	  at	   incentivizing	  FDI	  by	  MNCs	   in	  order	   for	  domestic	   firms	   to	   integrate	  these	   foreign-­‐owned	   supply	   chains	   and	   benefit	   from	   MNC-­‐supplied	   technology	   and	  innovation	   without	   actually	   owning	   them:	   “Moreover,	   even	   the	   success	   of	   the	  
‘‘integrationist’’	   approach	  depends	   strongly	   on	   the	   level	   of	   local	   capabilities;	   the	  weaker	  
the	   capabilities,	   the	   fewer	   the	   ‘‘spillovers’’	   from	   foreign	   firms.	   Nevertheless,	   the	  
independent	  model	  emphasizes	   ‘‘getting	  the	  institutions	   ‘right’	   ’’	  and	  building	  skills,	  while	  
the	  integrationist	  model	  emphasizes	  ‘‘getting	  the	  prices	  ‘right’	  ’’	  and	  buying	  skills.	  From	  the	  
viewpoint	   of	   knowledge-­‐based	   assets,	   the	   two	   approaches	   are	   very	   distinct	   and,	   as	  
suggested	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  not	  necessarily	  of	  equal	  promise”	   (Amsden	  &	  Chu,	  2003,	  p.293).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Briefly	  put,	  this	  is	  what	  Amsden	  calls	  „learning”	  in	  late-­‐industrialization.	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  Briefly	  put:	  public	  agency	  can	  play	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  mode	  of	  a	  sector’s	  transnationalization	  leading	  to	  differentiated	  developmental	  outcomes	  for	  the	  sector	  in	  general	   and	   for	   domestic	   actors	   in	   particular.	   (1)	   First,	   the	   state	   can	  mobilize	   foreign	  
capital	  and	  channel	  it	  to	  particular	  domestic	  target	  groups	  that	  it	  seeks	  to	  upgrade.	  (2)	  Second,	   it	   can	   shape	   property	   rights	   institutions,	   which	   guarantee	   a	   broader	   or	   more	  restricted	   access	   to	   resources	   for	   domestic	   actors.	   (3)	   Thirdly,	   it	   can	   use	   public	  
regulation	  for	  managing	  the	  competition	  between	  MNCs	  and	  domestic	  actors.	  We	  argue	  that	   the	   Polish	   and	  Hungarian	   states	   differed	   substantially	   in	  how	   they	   used	   all	   three	  instruments.	  	  	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  State	  in	  harnessing	  foreign	  capital	  	  Albert	   O.	   Hirschman	   famously	   said	   that	   “Development	   depends	  not	   so	  much	  on	   finding	  
optimal	  combinations	  for	  given	  resources	  and	  factors	  of	  production	  as	  on	  calling	  forth	  and	  
listing	  for	  development	  purposes	  resources	  and	  abilities	  that	  are	  hidden,	  scattered	  or	  badly	  
utilized”	   (Hirschman,	   1958,	   p.5).	   For	   Hirschman	   the	   problem	   of	   underdevelopment	   is	  thus	   not	   a	   lack	   of	   resources	   (capital)	   per	   se,	   but	   is	   instead	   rooted	   in	   the	   inefficient	  utilization	   of	   existing	   capacities.	   For	   him,	   development	   is	   an	   organizational	   problem	   -­‐	  and	   therefore	   an	   institutional	   problem.	   The	   broader	   institutional	   determinants	   of	  developmental	  upgrading	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  subsequent	  section,	  however	  Hirschman’s	  insight	  is	  first	  relevant	  to	  us	  because	  it	  highlights	  a	  dimension	  where	  the	  state	  can	  play	  a	  fundamental	  role:	  if	  development	  hinges	  less	  on	  available	  stocks	  of	  capital	  than	  it	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  different	  methods	  for	  coordinating	  whatever	  available	  resources,	  “listed	  for	  development	   purposes”	   –	   the	   state	   is	   an	   ideal	   candidate	   for	   pooling,	   organizing	   and	  coordinating	   capital	   transfers	   in	   less	   competitive	   sectors.	   When	   domestic	   capital	   is	  scarce,	  the	  state	  can	  harness	  foreign	  capital	  in	  different	  forms	  and	  channel	  it	  to	  domestic	  sectors	  where	  it	  is	  lacking.	  	  	  As	   pointed	   out	   previously,	   the	   competitive	   upgrading	   of	   Polish	   and	   Hungarian	   dairy	  sectors	   depended	   to	   an	   important	   degree	   on	   accessing	   financial	   capital.	   As	   the	   two	  subsequent	  empirical	   chapters	  discuss	   in	  detail,	   the	   starting	  position	   in	  Poland	  and	   in	  
	  	   59	  
Hungary	   was	   similar:	   domestic	   producers	   and	   farmers	   had	   an	   urgent	   need	   for	  productive	   investments	   in	   order	   to	   improve	   their	   competitiveness.	   However,	   in	   both	  countries,	   financial	   capital	   was	   dramatically	   scarce:	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   state	   budgets	  experienced	  worsening	  current	  account	  deficits	  aggravated	  by	  punitive	  levels	  of	  foreign	  debt	   accumulated	   under	   state	   Socialism.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   emerging	   domestic	  financial	  markets	  were	  severely	  undercapitalized	  and	   fragile,	  a	   fact	   further	  aggravated	  by	   incompetent	   public	   regulatory	   choices:	   Stark	   and	   Bruszt	   showed	   for	   instance	   how	  reforming	   the	  Hungarian	   law	   on	   accounting	   in	   1991	   actually	   created	   private	   debt	   for	  domestic	   companies	   by	   classifying	   assets	   as	   liabilities	   (Stark	   &	   Bruszt,	   1998,	   p.150).	  Neither	   the	   state	   nor	   a	   nascent	   commercial	   banking	   sector	   could	   provide	   the	   capital	  necessary	   for	   saving	  domestic	   dairy	   producers	   and	  processors	   from	  bankruptcy,	   even	  less	  to	  satisfy	  their	  needs	  for	  productive	  investments.	  However,	  the	  domestic	  shortage	  of	  financial	   capital	   has	  been	  a	   staple	  of	   all	   late-­‐industrializers:	   in	   this	   situation,	   the	   state	  can	  play	  an	  alternative	  role	  by	  harnessing	  foreign	  capital	  and	  channeling	  it	  to	  strategic	  domestic	   sectors	   and	   target	   groups.	   Yet,	   contrary	   to	   late-­‐industrializers	   in	   the	   Global	  South	   in	   previous	   eras,	   the	   sources	   of	   foreign	   capital	   were	   substantially	   reduced	   for	  Poland	  and	  Hungary:	  unlike	  South	  East	  Asian	  economies,	  they	  couldn’t	  count	  on	  foreign	  creditors	   to	   continue	   financing	   their	   budgets	   as	   they	  had	   already	  been	   entangled	   in	   a	  debt	  crisis	  by	  the	  early	  1990s.	   In	  this	  situation,	   the	  available	  sources	  of	   foreign	  capital	  would	   take	  on	  different	   shapes:	   IFIs	   and	   the	  EU’s	   financial	   transfers	  were	   initially	   the	  only	   sources	  on	  which	   the	   state	   could	   count.	   Surprisingly,	   Poland	  utilized	   a	   structural	  adjustment	   loan	   from	   the	   World	   Bank	   called	   ASAL	   for	   saving	   domestic	   dairy	  cooperatives	   from	   bankruptcy.	   Later,	   the	   Polish	   state	   built	   a	   complex	   institutional	  framework	  for	  pooling	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  capital,	  and	  channeling	  it	  specifically	  for	  the	  investment	   needs	   of	   domestic	   agri-­‐food	   firms	   (among	   which	   dairy):	   newly	   created	  public	   organizations	   such	   as	   the	   Agricultural	   Modernization	   Agency	   (ARMA)	   and	   the	  Foundation	   of	   Assistance	   Programmes	   for	   Agriculture	   (FAPA)	   were	   tasked	   with	  coordinating	   foreign	  capital	  accessed	  from	  the	  World	  Bank,	  bilateral	  aid	   from	  Western	  European	  governments,	  and	  the	  EU’s	  early	  assistance	  programs.	  In	  a	  stark	  contrast,	  the	  Hungarian	   state	   satisfied	   the	   financial	   appetite	   for	   capital	   investments	   by	   privatizing	  domestic	  dairy	  processing	  firms	  and	  transferring	  them	  in	  bulk	  to	  MNCs.	  In	  other	  words,	  by	  selecting	  different	  methods	  for	  solving	  the	  undercapitalization	  problem	  of	  domestic	  dairy	   sectors,	   Poland	   and	   Hungary	   selected	   widely	   different	   modes	   of	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transnationalization	  for	  their	  sectors.	  The	  Polish	  strategy	  -­‐	  although	  relying	  on	  aid	  and	  structural	  adjustment	   loans	   instead	  of	  public	   foreign	  debt	  –	   in	  many	  ways	  mirrors	   the	  “traditional”,	  autonomist	  developmental	  strategy	  of	  20th	  century	  late	  industrializers.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  Hungarian	  strategy	  closely	  followed	  Amsden’s	  “integrationist”	  model	  –	  relying	  on	  MNCs	  for	  accessing	  financial	  capital	  and	  technology,	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  through	  horizontal	   and	   vertical	   spillovers,	   they	   would	   upgrade	   the	   sector’s	   overall	  competitiveness	   and	   domestic	   capacities.	   In	   light	   of	   their	   respective	   economic	  performance,	  clearly,	  the	  Polish	  model	  fared	  substantially	  better	  both	  in	  upgrading	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  domestic	  dairy	  sector	  on	  transnational	  markets	  and	  in	  securing	  the	   position	   of	   domestic	   dairy	   cooperatives.	   The	   last	   section	   of	   this	   chapter	   further	  details	  why	  these	  two	  states	  might	  have	  opted	  for	  radically	  different	  strategies.	  	  For	  the	  time	  being,	  what	  is	  important	  is	  that	  differences	  in	  how	  the	  state	  solves	  the	  problem	  of	  access	  to	  (foreign)	  capital	  are	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  different	  modes	  of	  transnationalization:	  in	  an	  autonomist	  model,	   the	   state	   can	  be	  expected	   to	  use	   its	  own	   institutions	   to	   channel	  foreign	  capital	  from	  any	  available	  source	  to	  the	  domestic	  sector	  it	  seeks	  to	  upgrade.	  In	  an	   integrationist	  model,	   the	   state	  on	   the	   contrary	   solves	   the	   capitalization	  problem	  of	  domestic	  firms	  by	  integrating	  them	  to	  the	  supply	  chains	  of	  MNCs	  –	  in	  laymen	  terms	  by	  selling	  them.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	   fact,	   the	  Polish	  state	  chose	  the	   first	  option,	  while	  Hungary	  opted	   for	   the	   second:	   by	   providing	   different	   policy	   answers	   to	   the	   problem	   of	  undercapitalization,	   Poland	   and	   Hungary	   also	   selected	   different	   modes	   of	  transnationalization	  –	  which	  fared	  very	  differently	  from	  a	  developmental	  perspective.	  	  
The	  Role	  of	  the	  State	  in	  shaping	  property	  right	  institutions	  	  While	  earlier	  research	  on	  economic	  take	  off	  and	  development	  had	  focused	  on	  the	  role	  of	  factors	   of	   production	   such	   as	   financial	   stocks	   and	   technology,	   there	   reigns	   today	   a	  consensus	  on	  the	  primordial	  role	  of	  domestic	  institutions	  –	  particularly	  property	  rights	  institutions	  –	  as	  even	  more	   fundamental	  determinants	  of	   economic	  development.	  This	  constitutes	   an	   area	   where	   domestic	   public	   agency	   can	   crucially	   affect	   developmental	  outcomes	  is	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  state	  to	  shape	  property	  rights	  institutions.	  In	  that	  regard	  too,	   the	   Polish	   and	  Hungarian	   state	   opted	   for	  widely	   different	   strategies	   in	   reshaping	  property	  rights	  during	  the	  early	  1990s.	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The	   institutional	   dimension	   of	   development	   was	   not	   a	   discovery	   ex	   nihilo:	  modernization	  theory	  had	  since	  Marx	  and	  Durkheim	  posited	  the	  necessity	  for	  peripheral	  countries	   to	   replicate	   the	   Western	   experience	   of	   institutional	   change	   while	   later	  contributions	   debated	   the	   possibility	   for	   late-­‐industrializers	   to	   leapfrog	   some	   of	   the	  institutional	  pre-­‐requisites	  that	  had	  been	  necessary	  for	  the	  consolidation	  of	  competitive	  economies	   in	   the	   capitalist	   Core	   (Gerschenkron,	   1962).	   In	   light	   of	   our	   puzzle,	   a	   first	  relevant	  question	  is	  which	  domestic	  institutions	  can	  affect	  developmental	  outcomes,	  the	  second	   is	   whether	   the	   Polish	   and	   Hungarian	   states	   managed	   these	   “developmentally	  relevant”	  institutions	  differently.	  	  	  Douglass	   North	   defined	   institutions	   as	   the	   “humanly-­‐devised	   constraints	   that	   shape	  
human	   interaction	   (which)	   structure	   incentives	   in	   exchange,	   whether	   political,	   social	   or	  
economic”	  (North	  1992,	  p.5).	  While	  neo-­‐classical	  economics	  had	  assumed	  that	  exchanges	  realized	   Pareto-­‐optimal	   equilibria	   under	   pure	   and	   perfect	   market	   conditions,	   North	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  information	  asymmetry	  and	  important	  transaction	  costs,	  institutions	   function	   as	   solutions	   to	   reducing	   the	   uncertainty	   inherent	   to	   both.	  Institutions	  form	  the	  framework	  for	  the	  organization	  of	  polity	  and	  economic	  exchange,	  however	  path	  dependency	  occurs	  since	  “the	  organizations	  (which)	  owe	  their	  existence	  to	  
the	  institutional	  matrix,	  they	  will	  be	  an	  ongoing	  interest	  group	  to	  assure	  the	  perpetuation	  
of	  that	  institutional	  structure”	  (North	  1993,	  p.6)	  .	  In	  other	  words,	  institutions	  determine	  the	   context	   within	   which	   political	   and	   economic	   actors	   operate,	   and	   their	   rules	   fix	   a	  particular	   opportunity	   structure,	   which	   sanctions	   alternative	   rationalities,	   while	  “insiders”	   (i.e.	   political	   and	  economic	  elites)	  have	  a	   structural	   interest	   in	  perpetuating	  the	  very	  rules,	  which	   favor	   the	  concentration	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  power	   in	   their	  hands.	  However,	   institutions	   are	  not	   created	  equal	   from	  a	  developmental	  perspective:	  some	  favor	  economic	  growth	  while	  others	  impede	  it.	  	  	  By	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   century,	   Peter	   Evans	   (2004)	   considered	   the	   “institutional	   turn”	   as	  complete	   in	   the	   field	  of	  development	   studies	  when	  he	  quoted	  Hoff	   and	  Stiglitz	   (2001)	  saying	  "[d]evelopment	  is	  no	  longer	  seen	  primarily	  as	  a	  process	  of	  capital	  accumulation	  but	  
rather	  as	  a	  process	  of	  organizational	  change."	  "Capital	  fundamentalism,"	  with	  its	  focus	  on	  
increasing	  the	  capital	  stock,	  has	  been	  supplanted,	  first	  by	  "technology,"	  then	  by	  the	  role	  of	  
ideas	  more	   generally,	   and	   finally	   by	   "institutions”.	  The	   notion	   that	   institutions	   are	   the	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primary	   independent	   variables	   for	   explaining	   different	   developmental	   trajectories	   is	  also	   captured	   by	   Dani	   Rodrik’s	   famous	   argument	   that	   “institutional	   quality	   trumps	  
everything	  else8”	   (Rodrik,	   Subramanian,	  &	  Trebbi,	   2004).	   	  However,	  which	   institutions	  matter	  for	  development	  remains	  a	  contentious	  question.	  	  The	  neoliberal	  agenda	  offers	  a	  minimalist	  approach	  to	  the	  linkage	  between	  institutions	  and	  developmental	  outcomes.	  In	  hindsight	  it	  is	  perhaps	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  donor	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  IMF	  were	  early	  adopters	  of	  the	  institutionalist	   paradigm:	   variation	   in	   domestic	   institutions	   served	   as	   a	   convenient	  scapegoat	   for	   explaining	   away	   the	   failure	   of	   generic	   export-­‐oriented	   developmental	  strategies	   to	   spur	   growth	   in	   the	   periphery	   for	   two	   decades	   (H.	   J.	   Chang,	   2007).	  Neoliberal	   developmentalism	   borrowed	   from	   New	   Institutional	   Economics	   (NIE)	   the	  hypothesis	  that	  economic	  exchanges	  are	  perturbed	  by	  transaction	  costs	  and	  information	  asymmetry,	   consequently	   developmentally	   “good”	   institutions	   are	   those	   that	   reduce	  transaction	   costs:	   from	   that	   perspective,	   public	   infrastructure	   (transportation	   and	  telecommunication)	  is	  a	  first	  key	  to	  economic	  development	  (Cattaneo	  et	  al.,	  2013)9.	  The	  second	   type	   is	   a	   plethora	   of	   governance-­‐related	   indicators	   of	   	   “good	   governance”	   and	  “institutional	   quality”	   that	   reduce	   transaction	   costs10:	   donor	   organizations	   devised	  “global	  standards	   institutions”	  akin	   to	  decontextualized	  Platonic	   ideals11	  and	  sought	   to	  transplant	   them	   in	   highly	   diverse	   pre-­‐existing	   domestic	   institutional	   contexts	   in	  what	  Evans	   called	   “institutional	   monocropping”	   (Evans,	   2004).	   Third	   come	   property	   rights	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Rodrik	  was	  arguing	  primarily	  against	  Jeffrey	  Sachs	  and	  Jared	  Diamond	  for	  whom	  geography	  and	  climate	  played	  a	  more	  fundamental	  role	  in	  explaining	  developmental	  pathways.	  	  9	  Although	  even	  the	  role	  of	  infrastructure	  proved	  contentious:	  World	  Bank	  economists	  Bernard	  Hoekman	  and	   Ben	   Shepherd	   (2013)	   argued	   that	   projects	   targeting	   infrastructure	   upgrading	   (such	   as	   the	   ones	  widely	  financed	  by	  the	  World	  Bank)	  reduce	  transaction	  costs	  for	  all	  firms	  (Hoekman	  &	  Shepherd,	  2013),	  while	   Mayer	   and	   Milberg	   (2013)	   argued	   on	   the	   contrary	   that	   infrastructure	   upgrading	   largely	   profits	  MNCs	  while	  smaller	  domestic	  firms	  and	  communities	  are	  unlikely	  to	  benefit	  from	  such	  gains	  unless	  they	  are	  exceptionnally	  well	  organized.	  	  10	  Such	  as:	  “political	  democracy;	  an	  independent	  judiciary;	  a	  professional	  bureaucracy,	  ideally	  with	  open	  and	  
flexible	   recruitments;	   a	   small	   public-­‐enterprise	   sector,	   supervised	   by	   a	   politically	   independent	   regulator;	   a	  
developed	   stock	   market	   with	   rules	   that	   facilitate	   hostile	   M&A	   (mergers	   and	   acquisitions);	   a	   regime	   of	  
financial	  regulation	  that	  encourages	  prudence	  and	  stability,	   through	  things	   like	  the	  politically-­‐independent	  
central	  bank	  and	  the	  BIS	  (Bank	  for	  International	  Settlements)	  capital	  adequacy	  ratio;	  a	  shareholder-­‐oriented	  
corporate	  governance	  system;	  labour	  market	  institutions	  that	  guarantee	  flexibility”	  (Chang	  ,2007,	  p.19).	  	  11	  Such	  as	  the	  „efficient	  protection	  of	  property	  rights”,	  „accountability”,	  „transparency”,	  „human	  rights”	  etc.	  All	  of	  which	  became	  „governance-­‐related	  conditionalities”	  attached	  to	  loans.	  See	  notably	  Kapur	  and	  Webb	  (2000)	  in	  Evans	  (2004).	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institutions:	  while	  the	  former	  two	  are	  rather	  contentious,	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  consensus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  property	  rights	  institutions	  as	  stepping-­‐	  or	  stumbling	  blocks.	  	  	  Property	  rights	  institutions	  are	  important	  in	  two	  dimensions:	  First,	  they	  represent	  rules	  for	   the	   distribution	   of	   wealth	   among	   diverse	   domestic	   groups.	   Second,	   the	   stable	  guarantee	  of	  private	  property	  rights	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  profit	  motive	  and	  thus	  for	  the	  accumulation	   and	   productive	   investment	   of	   capital	   necessary	   to	   spur	   growth.	   Thus	  property	   rights	   institutions	   vary	   in	   two	   dimensions	   from	   less	   to	   more	   egalitarian	  systems	  of	  wealth	  distribution,	  and	  from	  less	  to	  more	  stable	  systems	  of	  private	  property	  protection.	   Acemoglu,	   Johnson	   and	   Robinson	   have	   offered	   extensive	   work	   on	   the	  developmental	   impacts	  of	  variation	  in	  these	  two	  dimensions	  (D.	  Acemoglu	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  D.	   Acemoglu,	   Johnson,	  &	  Robinson,	   2001):	   they	   argue	   that	   “good	  economic	   institutions	  
are	  those	  that	  provide	  security	  of	  property	  rights	  and	  relatively	  equal	  access	  to	  economic	  
resources	  to	  a	  broad	  cross-­‐section	  of	  society”	   (D.	  Acemoglu,	   Johnson,	  &	  Robinson,	  2005,	  p.395).	  The	  underlying	  hypothesis	   is	  that	  property	  rights	  institutions,	  which	  guarantee	  access	   to	   capital	   and	   technology	   to	   a	   “broad	   cross-­‐section”	   of	   domestic	   actors	   create	  incentives	   for	   the	   state	   to	   cooperate	   with	   empowered	   private	   actors.	   Alongside	  Acemoglu	  et	  al.,	  Peter	  Evans	  argues	   that	   these	  developmental	  coalitions	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  are	  vital	  for	  pooling	  and	  distributing	  whatever	  available	  resources:	  By	   contrast,	   exclusionary	   property	   right	   regimes	   are	   likely	   to	   pit	   the	   interests	   of	   a	  minority	   against	   the	   needs	   of	   a	   national	   sector:	   productive	   investments	   necessary	   for	  upgrading	   domestic	   competitiveness	   will	   be	   resisted	   if	   the	   protected	   minority	   of	   big	  owners	  considers	  these	  as	  jeopardizing	  their	  profits	  (Evans,	  2007).	  	  Similarly,	   unstable	   property	   rights,	   that	   is	   legal	   systems,	   which	   don’t	   define	   private	  property	   clearly	   and	   don’t	   offer	   credible	   guarantees	   to	   the	   protection	   thereof,	   are	  likelier	   to	   discourage	   capital	   accumulation	   and	   productive	   investment.	   What	   is	   more	  original	   is	   that	   Acemoglu	   et	   al.	   are	   fully	   aware	   of	   the	   political-­‐economic	   struggles	  sustaining	   different	   types	   of	   property	   rights	   institutions.	   They	   argue	   that:	   “Economic	  
institutions	   encouraging	   economic	   growth	   emerge	   when	   political	   institutions	   allocate	  
power	  to	  groups	  with	  interests	  in	  broad-­‐based	  property	  rights	  enforcement”	  (D.	  Acemoglu	  et	   al.,	   2005,	   p.387).	   In	   other	   words,	   and	   contrary	   to	   Marx,	   they	   hypothesize	   the	  precedence	   of	   political	   institutions	   over	   economic	   ones:	   developmentally	   positive	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(relatively	   egalitarian)	   economic	   institutions	   only	   emerge	   if	   the	   interests	   of	   political	  elites	  correspond	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  a	  “broad	  cross-­‐section	  of	  society”.	   	  Acemoglu	  et	  al.	  offer	   numerous	   historical	   examples	   to	   sustain	   this	   claim,	  most	   notably	   under	   colonial	  conditions:	  in	  colonies	  where	  Europeans	  settled	  en	  masse,	  they	  established	  democratic	  institutions,	   economic	   institutions	   were	   also	   more	   egalitarian,	   which	   in	   turn	   spurred	  growth	   and	   economic	   development	   (and	   conversely) 12 .	   Mahoney	   reached	   similar	  conclusions	   by	   studying	   the	   developmental	   pathways	   of	   four	   Central	   American	   coffee	  exporting	   economies	   (Guatemala,	   El	   Salvador,	   Colombia	   and	  Costa	  Rica):	   he	   identified	  two	  institutional	  models,	  one	  where	  agricultural	  land	  remained	  exclusively	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  small	  elite	  cultivating	  latifundia	  (in	  Guatemala	  and	  El	  Salvador)	  and	  a	  model	  where	  the	  plots	  of	  smallholder	  farmers	  were	  tolerated	  (Colombia,	  Costa	  Rica)	  (Mahoney,	  2001)	  	  	  The	   latter	   model	   spurred	   higher	   investments	   in	   human	   capital	   by	   the	   state	   and	  produced	   an	   inclusive	   type	   of	   growth,	  while	   the	   former	  maximized	   oligopolistic	   rents	  but	  maintained	  the	  relatively	  low	  VA	  comparative	  advantage	  of	  these	  economies13.	  	  In	   the	   regional	   context	   of	   CEE,	   the	   state	   had	   a	   key	   role	   in	   shaping	   property	   rights	  institutions:	  post-­‐Socialist	  restructuring	  entailed	  precisely	  a	  new	  allocation	  of	  resources	  from	   primarily	   state-­‐owned	   forms	   of	   ownership	   to	   private	   property.	   Privatization	  strategies	   determined	   new	   property	   rights	   institutions,	   and	   the	   extant	   literatures	   on	  different	   privatization	   schemes	   across	   states	   and	   sectors	   suggests	   that	   the	   resulting	  property	  rights	  institutions	  showed	  considerable	  variation	  in	  both	  the	  legal	  stability	  of	  ownership	   and	   the	   inclusiveness	   criteria	   singled	   out	   by	   Acemoglu	   et	   al.	   Just	   as	   in	  relation	   to	   the	  problem	  of	  access	   to	  capital,	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  also	  diverged	   in	  how	  they	   reformed	   property	   rights	   institutions:	   In	   Poland,	   the	   state	   stopped	   short	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Acemoglu	  et	  al.	  consider	  that	  local	  population	  density	  and	  the	  avaibility	  of	  natural	  resources	  explain	  in	  turn	   the	   establishment	   of	  more	  or	   less	   equalitarian	  political	   and	   economic	   institutions	   in	   a	   paradoxical	  way:	   where	   population	   density	   was	   higher,	   colonizers	   were	   likelier	   to	   establish	   extractive	   institutions	  exploiting	   the	   local	   workforce.	   Where	   resources	   were	   scarcer	   and	   population	   density	   lower,	   they	   had	  incentives	  to	  establish	  more	  democratic	  political	  institutions	  that	  favored	  a	  more	  equalitarian	  distribution	  of	  wealth.	  	  	  13	  There	  might	  be	  reasons	  to	  criticize	  this	  type	  of	  research:	  for	  instance	  Chang	  (2007)	  argues	  that	  in	  light	  of	   the	  vast	   literature	  produced	   in	   this	   framework,	   the	  very	  definition	  of	  property	  rights	   institutions	  still	  remains	   elusive.	   They	   notably	   single	   out	   that	   institutional	   forms	   and	   institutional	   functions	   are	  systematically	  confused:	   the	  more	  or	   less	  equalitarian	  distribution	  of	  wealth	   is	  an	   institutional	   function,	  which	  can	  be	  satisfied	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  institutional	  forms.	  However,	  we	  contend	  that	  the	  general	  argument	  remains	  valid	  even	  if	  better	  definitions	  are	  necessary.	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eliminating	  dairy	  cooperatives	  inherited	  from	  state	  Socialism.	  The	  major	  benefit	  is	  that	  these	  represent	  inclusive	  property	  right	  institutions,	  where	  farmers-­‐producers	  also	  own	  processing	   plants.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Hungary’s	   privatization	   agenda	   virtually	  eliminated	   producer	   cooperatives,	   while	   it	   chose	   to	   sell	   processing	   plants	   to	   MNCs	   –	  therefore	  instituting	  an	  exclusionary	  property	  right	  regime	  in	  the	  dairy	  sector	  (from	  the	  perspective	   of	   domestic	   actors),	   where	   farmers’	   access	   to	   productive	   assets	   was	  undermined	  –	  while	  domestic	  actors	  lost	  the	  ownership	  of	  processing	  plants	  as	  well.	  	  	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  State	  in	  regulating	  MNC-­‐domestic	  firm	  relations	  	  The	  two	  preceding	  dimensions	  of	  public	  developmental	  agency	  –	  (1)	  harnessing	  foreign	  capital	  “to	  be	  listed	  for	  development	  purposes”	  and	  (2)	  devising	  more	  or	  less	  inclusionary	  property	  rights	   institutions	  command	  vast	  scholarships.	  However,	   there	   is	  also	  a	   third	  arena	   where	   the	   state	   can	   shape	   developmental	   outcomes,	   namely	   re-­‐regulating	  relations	   between	   MNCs	   and	   domestic	   firms.	   This	   last	   dimension	   has	   received	   less	  attention:	   the	   developmental	   effects	   of	   public	   regulation	   are	   usually	   analyzed	   in	   the	  context	   of	   protectionist	   economies	   where	   tariffs	   shield	   off	   competition	   and	   public	  subsidies	   nurture	   infant	   industries.	   What	   is	   seldom	   examined	   is	   the	   capacity	   of	  developing	  states	  to	  re-­‐regulate	   linkages	  between	  MNCs	  and	  domestic	  firms	  even	  after	  liberalizing	  a	  domestic	  sector.	  	  	  While	   MNCs	  might	   –theoretically–	   provide	   domestic	   actors	   with	   financial	   capital	   and	  technology,	   they	   also	   pose	   tangible	   threats	   to	   domestic	   firms,	   whether	   their	   own	  suppliers	   or	  domestically	   owned	   competitors.	   In	   relation	   to	  domestic	   suppliers,	  MNCs	  can	  choose	   to	  shift	   the	  costs	  of	  adaptation	   to	   technical	   standards	  entirely	  on	  domestic	  SMEs	  and	  producers.	  Similarly,	  MNCs,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  dispose	  of	  more	  productive	  capital	  and	  technology	  than	  domestic	  competitors,	  pose	  an	  obvious	  competitive	  threat	  to	  the	   latter	   both	   on	   the	   domestic	   and	   on	   export	   markets.	   The	   marginalization	   of	   less	  competitive	   domestic	   suppliers	   or	   direct	   competitors	   is	   sometimes	   treated	   as	   a	  developmentally	   positive	   effect	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   FDI	   and	   upgrading	   as	   described	  above,	   however,	   this	   argument	   ignores	   the	   tremendous	   social	   and	   economic	   costs	  resulting	   from	  wide-­‐scale	   economic	  marginalization.	   In	   the	  previous	   chapter,	  we	  have	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defined	   developmental	   outcomes	   explicitly	   encompassing	   the	   rate	   of	   survival	   of	  domestic	  suppliers	  and	  competitors.	  	  	  Some	   authors	   have	   previously	   proposed	   a	   classification	   of	   policies	   regulating	   MNC-­‐domestic	   firms	   linkages,	   such	   as	   David	   Greenaway	   (1992),	   whose	   typology	   of	   “Trade	  Related	  Investment	  Measures”	  or	  TRIMS	  was	  simplified	  by	  Görg	  (2003)	  as	  in	  table	  2.1.	  	  
Table	  2.1.	  David	  Greenaway’s	  typology	  of	  Trade	  Related	  Investment	  Measures	  
	  
Source:	  Görg,	  2003,	  p.34	  	  The	   state	   can	   play	   a	   developmental	   role	   by	   regulating	   MNC-­‐domestic	   firms	   relations	  through	   different	   instruments:	   (1)	   A	   first	   venue	   is	   for	   the	   state	   to	   strengthen	   the	  competitiveness	  of	  domestic	  suppliers	  and	  competitors	  relative	   to	  MNCs.	   (2)	  A	  second	  alternative	  is	  to	  incentivize	  spillovers	  between	  MNCs	  and	  domestic	  firms,	  (3)	  Finally,	  a	  third	  alternative	   is	   to	  punish	  or	  use	  the	  threat	  of	  public	  regulation	   in	  order	  to	  prevent	  MNCs	  from	  acquiring	  unfair	  rents	  in	  relation	  to	  domestic	  firms.	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Support	  domestic	  firms:	  level	  the	  playing	  field	  between	  MNCs	  and	  domestic	  firms	  	  The	  use	  of	  national	  preference	  clauses	  in	  public	  procurement	  laws	  are	  a	  common	  feature	  of	   thinly	   veiled	   protectionism	   even	   in	   smaller	   emerging	   economies	   (OECD,	   2013).	  	  Another	  method,	  particularly	  common	  in	  the	  retail	  sector,	  is	  to	  increase	  administrative	  costs	   on	   bigger	   (MNC)	   stores	   in	   a	   bid	   to	   protect	   smaller	   (domestic)	   shops:	   legislating	  opening	   hours	   and	   store	   size	   is	   widespread	   in	   transition	   (e.g.	   Hungary)	   and	   Core	  economies	   as	   well	   (e.g.	   France,	   UK)	   (Haskel	   &	   Sadun,	   2009).	   The	   state	   can	   also	   use	  branding	  and	  public	  certification	  schemes	   to	   increase	   the	  competitiveness	  of	  domestic	  products:	   the	  rise	  of	  private	  standards	  often	  constitutes	  an	  overwhelming	  challenge	  to	  domestic	   suppliers	   in	   developing	   countries	   who	   often	   lack	   the	   necessary	   capital	   to	  invest	   in	   modernization	   and	   thus	   integrate	   the	   supply	   chains	   of	   TNCs	   (Berdegue,	  Balsevich,	   Flores,	   &	   Reardon,	   2005;	   Fabrizio	   Cafaggi,	   2011).	   “Branding	   from	   below”	  entails	   the	   creation	   of	   certification	   schemes	   that	   can	   either	   brand	  regional/geographic/national	  products	  or	  market	  the	  sustainability	  and	  fair	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  created	  in	  the	  production	  chain	  (fair-­‐trade)	  (Humphrey	  &	  Memedovic,	  2006).	  An	   important	   constraint	   on	   the	   state’s	   ability	   to	   level	   the	  playing	   field	  between	  MNCs	  and	  domestic	   firms	   in	  open	  markets	   is	   that	   subsidies	  and	  state	  aid	  are	  often	  explicitly	  banned	   in	   WTO	   regulations,	   bi-­‐	   and	   multilateral	   trade	   agreements	   or	   in	   regional	  integration	  projects	  and	  free	  trade	  areas	  such	  as	  the	  EU.	  However,	  there	  remain	  sectors	  both	  at	  the	  global	  and	  regional	   levels	  where	  subsidies	  remain	   in	  place:	  agriculture	   is	  a	  key	   example	   (the	   EU’s	   Common	   Agricultural	   Policy	   still	   represented	   40%	   of	   total	   EU	  expenditure	   in	   2013	   down	   from	   70%	   in	   1980) 15 .	   Price-­‐,	   quality-­‐	   and	   export	  subsidization	  has	  been	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  EU’s	  agricultural	  support	  policy:	  however,	  there	  is	  ample	  evidence	  that	  MNCs	  benefit	  rather	  more	  from	  CAP	  and	  EU	  structural	  funds	  than	  smaller	   domestic	   firms	   and	   producers	   (Medve	   Bálint,	   2014).	   Alternatively,	   public	  regulation	  can	  also	  enhance	  the	  sector-­‐level	  organizational	  capacity	  of	  domestic	  actors:	  specifically	   in	   agro-­‐food	   sectors,	   a	   global	   problem	   rooted	   in	   the	   imbalance	   between	  highly	   concentrated	   segments	   of	   the	   supply	   chain	   in	   higher	   value	   added	   activities	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15Source:	  http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-­‐post-­‐2013/graphs/graph1_en.pdf	  accessed	  01/02/2014	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(processing	   and	   retail),	   typically	   controlled	   by	   MNCs,	   while	   domestic	   actors	  concentrated	   in	   production	   remain	   atomized	   (Thomas	   Reardon,	   Barrett,	   Berdegue,	   &	  Swinnen,	   2009).	   In	   such	   instances,	   the	   creation	   and	   subsidization	   of	   collective	  ownership-­‐,	   coordination-­‐	   and	   mobilization	   institutions	   (typically	   cooperatives	   and	  sector	  level	  unions)	  aims	  at	  increasing	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  domestic	  actors.	  	  	  Overall,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  solid	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  public	  policy	   support	   (whether	   in	   the	   form	   of	   capital	   transfers,	   investments	   in	   skills,	   RD	   or	  regulatory	   tools)	   destined	   to	   enhance	   the	   capacities	   of	   domestic	   suppliers	   and	  competitors	  to	  MNCs	  are	  doubly	  beneficial:	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  they	  lessen	  the	  chances	  of	  a	  negative	   competitive	   shock,	   which	   would	   out-­‐crowd	   domestic	   firms	   due	   to	   high	  differences	   in	   productivity.	   Just	   as	   importantly,	   enhanced	   competitiveness	   actually	  increases	   the	  possibilities	   for	   spillovers	  between	  MNCs	   and	  domestic	   firms:	  Glass	   and	  Saggi	   (1998)	   suggest	   that	   higher	   levels	   of	   technological	   capacity	   increase	   potential	  spillovers	  from	  MNCs.	  Ari	  Kokko	  (1994)	  found	  that	  backward	  linkages	  increased	  when	  levels	  of	  productivity	  between	  MNCs	  and	  domestic	  suppliers	  were	  lower,	  while	  Moran	  et	  al.	   considered	   that:	   “the	   level	   of	   technological	   and	  managerial	   capabilities	   among	   local	  
businesses	  determines	  whether	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  qualify	  as	  suppliers	  to	  foreign	  investors	  or	  
to	   respond	  positively	   to	   the	  productivity	   shock	   created	  by	   the	   foreign	  presence”	   (Moran,	  Graham,	  &	  Blomström,	  2005,	  p.393).	  	  
	  
Foster	  spillovers	  	  Mandatory	   national	   content	   requirements	   or	   tying	   MNC	   investment	   to	   joint-­‐ventures	  with	  domestic	  firms	  have	  been	  widespread	  strategies	  in	  China’s	  developmental	  strategy	  (OECD,	   2013).	   Both	   instruments	   seek	   to	   propel	   vertical	   spillovers	   and	   backward	  linkages	   for	   domestic	   firms	   to	   benefit	   from	   MNC	   technologies	   and	   know-­‐how.	   	   A	  limitation	   of	   these	   instruments	   lies	   with	   the	   size	   of	   the	   domestic	  market:	   aside	   from	  BRICS	  and	  similar	  big	  emerging	  economies,	  smaller	  countries	  pursuing	  an	  integrationist	  strategy	  usually	  don’t	  have	  sufficient	  leverage	  over	  MNCs	  to	  impose	  such	  rules.	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Constrain	  MNCs	  	  Besides	   the	   threat	  of	  MNCs	  outcompeting	  domestic	  competitors,	  a	  related	  concern	   lies	  with	   their	   treatment	   of	   domestic	   suppliers:	   limited	   labor	   rights,	   constrained	  wages	   of	  locally	   employed	   workforce	   but	   also	   financial	   concerns	   such	   as	   payment	   delays	   to	  suppliers	   (an	   important	   concern	   in	   agro-­‐food	   sectors	   where	   goods	   are	   rapidly	  perishable)	   are	   potential	   areas	   where	   MNCs’	   asymmetric	   buying	   power	   on	   domestic	  firms	  might	  encourage	  them	  to	  extract	  unfair	  rents	  from	  domestic	  firms	  and	  producers	  (Gereffi	  &	  Christian,	  2009).	  Domestic	  public	  regulation	  might	  preempt	  this	  through	  two	  channels:	   (1)	   The	   public	   regulation	   of	   private	   contract	   law:	   In	   this	   case,	   public	  authorities	   have	   oversight	   over	   the	   contractual	   clauses	   between	   MNCs	   and	   domestic	  firms.	  Ironically,	   in	  order	  to	  safeguard	  the	  interests	  of	  domestic	  firms,	  competition	  law	  can	  be	  a	  useful	  instrument	  for	  defining	  illegal	  practices	  (F.	  Cafaggi,	  2011;	  Scott,	  Cafaggi,	  &	  Senden,	  2011).	  The	  public	  legislator	  can	  either	  fix	  compulsory	  minimum	  standards	  in	  these	   contracts	   or	   define	   a	   set	   of	   unfair	   contractual	   clauses	   and	   unfair	   business	  practices,	  which	  can	  be	  punished	  by	  a	  national	  regulatory	  agency.	  The	  alternative	  is	  that	  public	   authorities	   don’t	   regulate	   MNC-­‐domestic	   firms	   relations	   directly	   but	   use	   the	  threat	  of	  hierarchy	  to	  force	  the	  adoption	  of	  self-­‐regulatory	  standards.	  	  	  As	  the	  next	  chapters	  will	  show,	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  followed	  equally	  different	  paths	  in	  the	  use	  of	  regulatory	  instruments	  meant	  at	  shielding	  off	  domestic	  actors	  from	  MNCs:	  the	  Hungarian	   state	   has	   become	   highly	   proactive	   in	   that	   regard,	   while	   in	   Poland	   these	  instruments	  are	  not	  considered	  necessary.	  	  	  	  
Part	  5.	  Explaining	  Developmental	  Divergence	  at	  the	  Sector	  Level	  in	  Poland	  and	  
Hungary	  	  In	   light	   of	   the	   dominant	   theories	   on	   economic	   development,	   we	   identified	   financial	  capital	  and	  technology	  (or	  human	  capital)	  as	  the	  two	  fundamental	  resources	  necessary	  for	  upgrading.	  We	  examined	  whether	  the	  role	  of	  external	  public	  and	  private	  actors	  such	  as	   the	   EU	   and	   MNCs	   in	   compensating	   for	   a	   lack	   of	   domestic	   stocks	   of	   capital	   could	  explain	   developmental	   divergence	   between	   Poland	   and	   Hungary.	   We	   have	   concluded	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that	  neither	  the	  role	  of	  transnational	  public	  nor	  private	  actors	  can	  explain	  alone	  why	  the	  two	   cases	   followed	   dramatically	   different	   pathways.	   The	   argument	   of	   dependent	  underdevelopment	  would	   expect	   the	   sort	   of	   developmental	   downgrading	   observed	   in	  Hungary,	   but	   it	   is	   unable	   to	   explain	   Poland’s	   upward	   trajectory.	   Conversely,	   the	  literature	  on	  upgrading	  through	  FDI	  would	  expect	  stronger	  competitiveness	  in	  Hungary	  than	  in	  Poland	  in	  light	  of	  deeper	  foreign	  capital	  penetration:	  yet	  the	  empirical	  situation	  is	   the	   exact	   opposite.	   In	   light	   of	   these,	   we	   identified	   three	   arenas	   in	   which	   domestic	  public	   agency	   could	   affect	   developmental	   pathways:	   We	   argued	   that	   public	  developmental	   agency	   can	   play	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   selecting	   a	   particular	   mode	   of	  transnationalization	   and	   can	   affect	   developmental	   outcomes	   in	   three	  ways:	   (1)	   States	  can	  choose	  different	  options	  for	  providing	  the	  financial	  and	  human	  capital	  necessary	  for	  economic	   development.	   They	   can	   take	   on	   themselves	   the	   task	   of	   harnessing	   foreign	  capital	   from	  various	   sources	   and	   coordinating	   investment	  programs	  necessary	   for	   the	  sector’s	   competitive	   upgrading,	   or	   they	   can	   solve	   the	   capital	   requirement	   problem	  by	  transferring	   domestic	   firms	   to	   richly	   capitalized	  MNCs.,	   (2)	   States	   have	   the	   ability	   to	  change	   property	   right	   institutions	   in	   a	   more	   or	   less	   inclusive	   manner,	   thus	  strengthening	  or	  weakening	  domestic	  private	  actors	  and	  (3)	  States	  dispose	  of	  a	  series	  of	  hard-­‐	   and	   soft	   law	   instruments	   for	   regulating	   relations	   between	   MNCs	   and	   domestic	  suppliers	  as	  well	  as	  competitors	  thereof.	  	  	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  did	  in	  fact	  diverge	  in	  all	  these	  policy	  areas	  as	  the	  next	  chapters	  will	  show	   in	  more	  detail.	   In	  Poland,	   the	  state	  played	  a	  key	  role	   in	  pooling	   financial	  capital,	  while	  the	  Hungarian	  state	  counted	  on	  MNCs	  to	  “solve”	  capitalization.	  In	  Poland,	  the	  state	  opted	   for	   a	   more	   inclusionary	   property	   right	   regime	   in	   the	   dairy	   sector	   by	   keeping	  Socialist	   producer	   cooperatives	   in	   place,	   while	   in	   Hungary	   the	   state	   enforced	   an	  exclusionary	  property	   right	   regime	  by	  dismantling	   cooperatives.	   In	  Hungary,	   the	   state	  eventually	  began	  using	  regulatory	  tools	   for	  redressing	  the	  marginalization	  of	  domestic	  actors	   vis	   a	   vis	   MNCs,	   while	   in	   Poland	   such	   instruments	   were	   seldom	   used	   after	   EU	  accession	  once	  domestic	  dairy	  cooperatives	  were	  upgraded	  to	  a	  level	  where	  they	  could	  survive	  on	  open	  markets.	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The	  fact	  that	  these	  two	  countries	  chose	  so	  different	  policy	  options	  might	  be	  surprising	  because	   the	  scope	   for	  public	  developmental	  agency	   in	  CEE	   is	  often	  assumed	  marginal.	  Given	  the	  structural	  specificities	  of	  post-­‐Socialist	  transition	  in	  the	  1990s	  as	  opposed	  to	  previous	   developmental	   trajectories	   in	   the	  Global	   South,	   CEE	   is	   often	   singled	   out	   as	   a	  textbook	   example	   of	   economic	   dependency	   given	   the	   role	   played	   by	   FDI	   in	   strategic	  (high-­‐tech)	   industrial	   sectors:	   consequently,	   the	   bulk	   of	   current	   theories	   consider	   the	  role	   of	   domestic	   public	   agency	   as	   marginal	   for	   explaining	   how	   these	   economies	  integrated	   regional	   and	   global	   markets,	   even	   less	   for	   explaining	   the	   competitive	  performance	  of	   these	  sectors	  over	  time.	  We	  argue	  that	  this	  perception	   is	  rooted	   in	  the	  assumption	   that	   FDI	   and	  MNCs	   played	   similar	   roles	   in	   a	   given	   sector	   in	   similar	   sub-­‐regional	  economies:	  That	  may	  be	  true	  in	  technology-­‐intensive	  industrial	  sectors	  where	  MNCs	  were	   the	  only	  available	  sources	   for	  accessing	  proprietary	   technologies	  and	   thus	  the	   integration	   of	  MNC	   supply	   chains	   –	  what	   Scepanovic	   calls	   hyper-­‐integrationism	   –	  was	   the	   only	   available	   strategy	   for	   integrating	   domestic	   sectors	   to	   transnational	  markets…	   leading	   to	   similar	   developmental	   outcomes.	   However,	   in	   sectors	   where	  accessing	   financial	   assets	   proved	   more	   important	   for	   developmental	   upgrading	   than	  technology,	  different	  modes	  of	  transnationalization	  were	  available.	  	  	  While	  we	  consider	  it	  a	  notable	  contribution	  to	  single	  out	  that	  the	  transnationalization	  of	  a	  given	  sector	  in	  similar	  sub-­‐regional	  varieties	  of	  CEE	  capitalism	  could	  actually	  take	  on	  dramatically	  different	  shapes	  leading	  to	  widely	  different	  developmental	  outcomes	  –	  the	  deeper	   question	   remains:	   why	   did	   these	   two	   states	   follow	   different	   modes	   of	  transnationalization	  yielding	  different	  outcomes?	  	  	  Following	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  Peter	  Evans,	  developmental	  models	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  depending	   on	   three	   variables:	   (1)	   The	   capacities	   and	   organization	   of	   the	   state	   at	   the	  sector	   level,	   (2)	  The	  capacities	  and	  organization	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  at	   the	  sector	   level,	  and	  (3)	  State-­‐society	  relations.	  State	  capacities	  account	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  for	  the	  state’s	  Weberian	   administrative	   capacity,	   but	   also	   for	   the	   sectorial	   state’s	   institutional	  organization:	   the	   latter	   is	   more	   useful	   for	   us	   since	   Poland	   and	   Hungary	   didn’t	   have	  fundamentally	   different	   administrative	   capacities	   but	   very	   different	   segments	   of	   the	  state	   were	   in	   charge	   of	   overseeing	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   dairy	   sector.	   Non-­‐state	  actors’	  capacities	  and	  resources	  depend	  on	  their	  sector-­‐level	  organization	  and	  political	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representation,	   but	   also	   on	   inclusive	   property	   right	   regimes:	   Inclusive	   property	   right	  institutions	   offer	   considerable	   economic	   and	   organizational	   resources	   for	   domestic	  actors	  to	  defend	  their	  interests	  vis	  a	  vis	  the	  state	  or	  MNCs.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  dairy	  sector,	  producers’	   processing	   cooperatives	   clearly	   represent	   a	   more	   inclusive	   property	   right	  regime	   than	  a	   segmentation	  of	   the	   supply	   chain	  where	  producers	   are	  only	   segmented	  suppliers	   to	   processors	   and	   retailers.	   Finally,	   Evans	   has	   long	   singled	   out	   the	   role	   of	  interest	   coalitions	   between	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors	   in	   determining	   developmental	  pathways	   in	   developing	   countries:	   his	   earlier	   work	   had	   stressed	   the	   capacity	   of	  developing	  states	  to	  steer	  developmental	  coalitions	  with	  (private)	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  actors	  (Evans,	  1979).	  In	  his	  later	  work,	  Evans	  explicitly	  linked	  this	  agenda	  with	  the	  rich	  theme	  of	  coproduction:	  In	  his	  book	  State-­‐Society	  Synergy	  –	  Government	  and	  Social	  Capital	  
in	  Development,	  he	  concluded	  from	  a	  series	  of	  case	  studies	  that	  public	  goods	  and	  public	  services	   such	   healthcare,	   education,	   waste	   management	   or	   irrigation	   necessitate	   the	  mobilization	  and	  coordination	  of	  public	  and	  private	  actors	  and	  resources	  (Evans,	  1997;	  Ostrom,	   1997)	   .	   In	   this	   framework,	   the	   existence	   of	   stable	   coalitions	   and	   a	   form	   of	  mutual	   dependency	   between	   state	   and	   domestic	   non-­‐state	   actors	   are	   necessary	   pre-­‐requisites	   for	   successful	   economic	   upgrading	   strategies:	   domestic	   firms	  might	   depend	  on	   the	   state’s	   willingness	   and	   capacity	   to	   harness	   foreign	   capital	   and	   technology	   for	  upgrading	   domestic	   competitiveness,	   but	   the	   state	   is	   equally	   dependent	   on	   the	  cooperation	  of	  domestic	  private	  actors	  to	  monitor	  the	  implementation	  of	  developmental	  programs	   and	   serve	   as	   an	   informational	   feedback	   loop	   (Evans,	   2008).	   This	   research	  agenda	   is	  useful	   for	  us	   in	  highlighting	   the	   role	  of	  developmental	   coalitions	   in	   steering	  different	   developmental	   pathways	   in	   Poland	   and	  Hungary:	  we	   argue	   that	   in	   Poland,	   a	  developmental	  alliance	  between	  the	  state	  and	  dairy	  cooperatives	  efficiently	  coproduced	  developmental	  upgrading,	  while	  in	  Hungary,	  the	  disintegrative	  effect	  of	  the	  state	  on	  the	  sector	  weakened	  domestic	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  thus	  precluding	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  domestic	  developmental	  alliance.	  	  	  Different	  developmental	  coalitions	  sustaining	  different	  policy	  choices	  were	  also	  shaped	  by	   differences	   in	   institutional	   histories	   affecting	   the	   organization	   of	   the	   state	   at	   the	  sector	   level:	   In	   Poland,	   the	   collectivization	   of	   agriculture	   under	   state	   Socialism	   was	  halted	  in	  1956	  under	  Gomulka’s	  leadership,	  when	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  opposition	  of	  farmers	   could	  prove	   fatal	   for	   the	  Communist	   Party’	   grip	   on	  power.	  As	   a	   consequence,	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previous	   policies	   of	   Sovietization	  were	   abandoned.	   This	   had	   immediate	   consequences	  on	   the	  dairy	   sector.	   In	  1951,	  pre-­‐existing	  dairy	   cooperatives	  had	  been	  nationalized	  by	  the	  state,	  but	  in	  1957,	  the	  Party	  backtracked:	  farmers’	  cooperatives	  were	  re-­‐instated.	  In	  Hungary,	   the	   collectivization	   of	   agriculture	   had	   been	   far	  more	   advanced:	   in	   the	   dairy	  sector,	   processing	   companies	  were	   nationalized	   and	  became	   state	   property	   under	   the	  supervision	  of	  a	  sector-­‐level	  Dairy	  Trust:	  farmer	  cooperatives	  had	  no	  direct	  ownership	  of	  dairy	  processing	  plants	  unlike	  in	  Poland.	  This	  historical	  difference	  became	  important	  in	   1989,	  when	   the	   two	   countries	   faced	   similar	   problems:	   In	   Hungary,	   the	  Ministry	   of	  Finance	  had	  the	  ability	  to	  transfer	  dairy	  processing	  companies	  from	  the	  Dairy	  Trust	  to	  a	  newly	   created	   State	   Asset	   Management	   Agency	   (AVU).	   It	   faced	   no	   opposition	   from	  farmers,	  since	  these	  firms	  had	  been	  an	  exclusive	  property	  of	  the	  state.	  The	  objective	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  was	  simple:	  it	  sought	  to	  privatize	  all	  accessible	  assets	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible	  in	  order	  to	  finance	  the	  foreign	  debt	  service.	  Dairy	  processing	  firms	  fell	  in	  the	  first	  group	  of	  state-­‐owned	  assets	  that	  were	  privatized	  in	  1993.	  In	  Poland,	  the	  state	  didn’t	  own	   dairy	   processing	   plants	   directly	   as	   these	   belonged	   to	   farmer	   cooperatives,	  consequently,	   even	   though	   it	   had	   the	   legal	   capacity	   and	   option	   to	   dismantle	   the	  cooperatives	  by	  changing	  their	  legal	  form,	  it	  would	  have	  faced	  the	  ire	  of	  a	  well	  organized	  social	   group	   of	   48	   local	   dairy	   cooperative	   unions	   controlling	   10	   000	   collection	   points	  and	  owning	  directly	  700	  processing	  facilities	  (FAO,	  1994,	  p.8)	  –	  as	  well	  as	  the	  resistance	  of	  a	  strong	  Polish	  Peasant	  Party	  (PSL),	  led	  by	  Waldemar	  Pawlak.	  While	  foreign	  creditors	  emitted	  reserves	  over	  what	  they	  considered	  a	  slow	  and	  incomplete	  privatization	  of	  agri-­‐food	  sectors	  and	  urged	  the	  Polish	  state	  to	  privatize	  key	  food	  processing	  sectors	  such	  as	  dairy,	  public	  authorities	  chose	  instead	  to	  sanctify	  the	  cooperative	  format	  as	  a	  legitimate	  form	   of	   private	   property:	   soon,	   this	   form	   of	   benign	   neglect	   turned	   into	   a	   full-­‐fledged	  cooptation	  when	  the	  roadmap	  for	  the	  sector’s	  modernization	  was	  co-­‐drafted	  by	  the	  state	  and	  domestic	  cooperatives.	  	  	  	  From	   the	   perspective	   of	   dairy,	   the	   sectorial	   state	   in	   Hungary	  was	   represented	   by	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  which	  had	  a	  minimal	  stake	  in	  the	  sector’s	  long-­‐term	  developmental	  perspective,	   and	   saw	   no	   harm	   in	   fragmenting	   the	   sector	   by	   selling	   the	   processing	  segment	  to	  MNCs	  in	  order	  to	  finance	  the	  debt	  service.	  In	  Poland	  on	  the	  contrary,	  the	  key	  state	  administration	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  sector	  was	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture,	  which	  had	  neither	   the	   capacity	   nor	   a	   stake	   in	   dismantling	   integrated	   producer-­‐processor	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cooperatives.	  The	  capacities	  and	  resources	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  diverged	  accordingly:	   in	  Hungary,	   the	   combined	   privatization	   of	   processing	   plants	   to	   MNCs	   and	   the	  incapacitation	   of	   producer	   cooperatives	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	   poorly	   designed	   land	  privatization	   program	  managed	   by	   the	   Smallholders’	   Party	   single-­‐handedly	  weakened	  both	  the	  political	  representation	  of	  domestic	  actors	  and	  the	  property	  right	  regime	  of	  the	  sector.	  An	  exclusionary	  property	  right	  regime	  created	  an	  economically	  weakened	  class	  of	   farmers,	   divorced	   from	   the	  processing	   segment	   transferred	   into	   foreign	  ownership,	  while	   the	   political	   representation	   of	   farmers’	   interests	   gradually	   collapsed	   as	   the	  Smallholders’	   Party	   lost	   credibility	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   a	   disastrous	   land	   privatization	  agenda.	  In	  Poland	  on	  the	  contrary,	  the	  political	  representation	  of	  farmers	  by	  the	  Polish	  Peasant	   Party	   (PSL)	   throughout	   the	   1990s	   was	   mutually	   reinforced	   by	   a	   stable	   and	  inclusionary	   property	   right	   regime	   based	   on	   integrated	   producers’	   processing	  cooperatives	   (in	   dairy	   at	   least).	   As	   a	   consequence,	   while	   a	   developmental	   alliance	  between	   the	   sectorial	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors	   proved	   structurally	   impossible	   in	  Hungary,	   in	  Poland	  on	   the	  contrary	   the	  sector’s	   steady	  competitive	  upgrading	  was	  co-­‐produced	  precisely	  by	  a	  voluntaristic	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture	  (soon	  joined	  with	  a	  host	  of	  public	   developmental	   funds	   and	   regulatory	   organizations)	   and	   domestic	   farmers-­‐processors,	   who	   were	   coopted	   by	   the	   state	   and	   could	   actively	   serve	   the	   dual	  developmental	  role	  of	  providing	  an	  informational	  feedback	  loop	  to	  public	  officials	  and	  as	  active	  partners	  in	  policy	  implementation	  –two	  crucial	  roles	  underlined	  by	  Evans	  (2008).	  	  Overall,	  we	  believe	  that	  this	  framework	  inspired	  by	  Evans	  is	  able	  to	  explain	  both	  why	  the	  two	  developmental	  pathways	  coalesced	  in	   fundamentally	  different	  structures,	  and	  also	  
how	   the	   defining	   interest	   coalitions	   in	   the	   two	   countries	   embraced	   increasingly	  diverging	  policies	  in	  relation	  to	  (1)	  the	  sector’s	  capitalization,	  (2)	  the	  reform	  of	  property	  right	  institutions	  (privatization)	  and	  (3)	  the	  use	  of	  regulatory	  instruments.	  The	  different	  developmental	   pathways	   of	   Polish	   and	   Hungarian	   dairy	   sectors	   were	   thus	   not	   only	  determined	  by	  different	  domestic	  policy	  choices	  in	  managing	  the	  sector’s	  restructuring,	  but	  the	  state’s	  preference	  for	  a	  developmental	  strategy	  closely	  resembling	  20th	  century	  “autonomism”	   in	   Poland	   and	   an	   “integrationist”	   Hungarian	   model	   can	   only	   be	  understood	   in	   light	  of	  different	  actor	   coalitions	  and	  rationalities	  activated	  by	  different	  historical	   institutional	   legacies.	   In	  that	  sense,	  we	  consider	  that	  alongside	  divergence	  in	  Evans’	  three	  core	  variables	  of	  (1)	  state	  capacities	  and	  organization,	  (2)	  private	  capacities	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and	   organization,	   as	   well	   as	   (3)	   state-­‐society	   relations,	   the	   question	   of	   historical	  institutional	   legacies	   in	   the	   longue-­‐durée	   should	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   complementary	  scope	   condition	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	   two	   diverging	   developmental	   models,	   as	   it	   had	  indirect	  consequences	  both	  on	  which	  part	  of	   the	  state	  would	  be	   in	  charge,	  but	  also	  on	  the	   pre-­‐1989	   distribution	   of	   property	   between	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors.	   Even	   a	  preliminary	   glimpse	   at	   developmental	   outcomes	   (as	   mentioned	   in	   the	   preceding	  chapter)	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   two	   modes	   of	   transnationalization	   did	   not	   yield	  comparable	   developmental	   benefits:	   Poland’s	   autonomist	   strategy	   resulted	   in	   an	  increased	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  sector,	  where	  the	  primary	  beneficiaries	  were	  domestic	  dairy	  cooperatives	  owned	  by	  farmers.	  Hungary’s	  integrationist	  pathway	  resulted	  instead	  in	   collapsing	   competitiveness	   and	   (initially	   at	   least)	   a	   complete	   marginalization	   of	  domestic	  actors.	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Chapter	  3.	  	  	  
	  	  In	  the	  previous	  two	  chapters,	  we	  proposed	  a	  theoretical	   framework	  for	  capturing	  how	  different	   domestic	   policy	   choices	   might	   explain	   widely	   different	   developmental	  pathways	   in	  Polish	  and	  Hungarian	  dairy	  sectors	   throughout	   the	  post-­‐1989	  decades.	   In	  this	  chapter,	  we	  propose	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  case	  study.	  We	  argue	  that	  rather	  than	   building	   an	   institutional	   framework,	   which	   could	   have	   integrated	   the	   different	  domestic	  actors	  of	  the	  supply	  chain	  as	  happened	  in	  Poland,	  the	  Hungarian	  state	  played	  an	   active	   role	   in	   the	   disintegration	   of	   the	   sector	   in	   the	   course	   of	   early	   privatization:	  Firstly	   by	   subtracting	   the	   processing	   segment	   of	   the	   supply	   chain	  where	   it	   had	  direct	  ownership	  over	  processing	  plants,	  and	  selling	  them	  independently	  to	  foreign	  investors,	  the	   state	   foreclosed	   the	   very	   possibility	   of	   an	   inclusive	   developmental	   coalition	   with	  domestic	   actors	   and	   severed	   ties	   between	   farmers-­‐producers	   and	   processing	   firms.	  Second,	  by	   reshuffling	  property	   rights	   in	   the	  production	   segment,	   it	   atomized	   farmers	  and	   left	   them	  without	   an	   ability	   to	   mobilize	   or	   represent	   their	   interests.	   It	   is	   in	   this	  context	  of	  a	  fractured	  vertical	  supply	  chain,	  with	  weakened	  domestic	  actors	  that	  MNCs	  invested	   overwhelmingly	   in	   the	   processing	   and	   retail	   segments.	   Instead	   of	   playing	   a	  positive	   upgrading	   role	   by	   compensating	   for	   the	   lack	   of	   domestic	   capacities,	   MNCs	  instead	   depleted	   the	   remaining	   resources	   of	   the	   sector.	   The	   trajectory	   of	   the	   sector	  throughout	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s	  is	  unambiguously	  negative:	  domestic	  actors	  were	  largely	   marginalized	   in	   both	   the	   production	   and	   processing	   segments.	   Furthermore,	  predatory	   MNC	   strategies	   precipitated	   a	   value	   added	   downgrading	   of	   the	   sector	   and	  aggravating	   trade	  deficits.	  On	  that	  basis,	  a	  new	  era	  opened	  up	  with	   the	  2010s,	  when	  a	  coalition	  of	  domestically	  owned	  processors,	  the	  state	  and	  domestic	  retail	  chains	  sought	  ever	  more	  openly	  to	  force	  MNCs	  in	  processing	  and	  retail	  out	  from	  the	  domestic	  market.	  The	  re-­‐domestication	  of	   the	  market	   is	  a	  process	   legitimized	  by	  the	  defense	  of	  domestic	  actors	  against	  predatory	  MNCs:	  however,	  farmers	  remain	  conspicuously	  absent	  from	  the	  new	   interest	   coalition.	   In	   a	   first	   section,	   we	   present	   the	   sector’s	   downward	  developmental	   trajectory	  through	  a	  series	  of	   indicators.	  The	  second	  section	  provides	  a	  brief	  historical	  and	  institutional	  context	  to	  the	  sector’s	  restructuring	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  In	  a	  third	  section,	  we	  discuss	  the	  privatization	  of	  the	  sector	  and	  the	  ensuing	  strategies	  of	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MNCs	   and	   domestic	   firms	   in	   the	   market,	   to	   understand	   why	   MNCs	   didn’t	   play	   an	  upgrading	  developmental	  role.	  Finally,	  we	  examine	  the	  state’s	  role	   in	  re-­‐regulating	  the	  market	  in	  tandem	  with	  domestically	  owned	  processors	  and	  retail	  chains	  to	  explain	  the	  process	  we	  call	  re-­‐domestication.	  	  	  
Part	  1.	  Developmental	  Outcomes	  in	  the	  Hungarian	  dairy	  sector	  	  The	   Hungarian	   sector’s	   performance	   is	   largely	   negative	   both	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   overall	  competitiveness	   and	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   inclusiveness	   it	   afforded	   to	   domestic	   actors	   as	   a	  result	   of	   privatization	   policies,	   which	   left	   producers	   vulnerable	   and	   transferred	  processing	   plants	   to	   MNCs.	   Hungarian	   dairy	   typifies	   what	   Amsden	   called	   an	  integrationist	   developmental	   strategy:	   that	   is,	   a	   particular	   mode	   for	   integrating	  transnational	  markets	  through	  FDI	  and	  the	  supply	  chains	  of	  MNCs,	  which	  are	  expected	  to	   provide	   domestic	   actors	  with	   the	   financial	   capital	   and	   technology	   they	   lack.	   In	   this	  sector	  however,	  MNCs	   failed	   entirely	   at	   playing	   a	  positive	  upgrading	   role:	   contrary	   to	  the	  expectations	  of	  Swinnen	  et	  al.	  who	  consider	  FDI	  as	  a	  primary	  driver	  of	  competitive	  upgrading	   in	   CEE	   dairy	   sectors	   (Dries	   &	   Swinnen,	   2004),	   we	   show	   here	   that	   the	  Hungarian	   dairy	   sector	   experienced	   instead	   a	   steady	   process	   of	   competitive	  downgrading,	  accompanied	  by	  the	  marginalization	  of	  domestic	   farmers	  and-­‐	   	   (up	  until	  the	  2010s)	  of	  domestically-­‐owned	  processors.	  	  	  
Foreign	  and	  domestic	  ownership	  in	  the	  Hungarian	  dairy	  supply	  chain	  	  Until	  1989,	  only	  one	  central,	  state-­‐owned	  processing	  company	  existed:	  the	  Dairy	  Trust	  accounted	   for	   85%	   of	   dairy	   processing,	   producer-­‐processor	   cooperatives	   (processing	  plants	   legally	   owned	   by	   farmer-­‐producers)	   had	   a	   7%	   share	   and	   jointly-­‐owned	  processing	  plants	  by	  the	  state	  and	  by	  producer	  cooperatives	  accounted	  for	  8%	  (Jansik,	  2000b,	   p.121).	   Foreign	   capital	   participation	   was	   virtually	   non-­‐existent	   until	  privatization.	   The	   situation	   changed	   quickly	   after	   1990:	   Although	   the	   first	   brownfield	  investment	  only	  occurred	   in	  1992,	   the	  ownership	  structure	   in	   the	  processing	  segment	  was	  already	  widely	  different	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1993	  after	  the	  state	  had	  disbanded	  the	  Dairy	  Trust	  in	  1991	  and	  began	  selling	  the	  processing	  companies	  it	  had	  controlled	  through	  the	  National	   Asset	   Management	   Agency	   (ÁPÜ,	   later	   ÁV,	   later	   ÁPV	   Rt.)	   –	   essentially	   a	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privatization	  agency:	  In	  1993,	  state	  ownership	  in	  processing	  still	  represented	  43,7%,	  but	  foreign	  ownership	  increased	  to	  40%	  only	  a	  year	  after	  the	  first	  foreign	  investment,	  while	  domestic	  private	  ownership	  stood	  at	  4%	  and	  domestic	  cooperative	  ownership	  at	  5%	  (K.	  Szabó,	   2010,	   p.12).	   Throughout	   the	   1990s,	   the	   state’s	   direct	   ownership	   in	   dairy	  processing	   diminished	   further	   as	   foreign	   investors	   continued	   purchasing	   state-­‐owned	  processing	   plants.	   By	   2000,	   the	   state	   had	   no	   direct	   ownership	   left	   in	   the	   processing	  segment	  whatsoever.	  The	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s	  marked	  the	  zenith	  of	  foreign	   ownership	   in	   dairy	   processing:	   foreign	   capital	   participation	   in	   the	   sector’s	  registered	  capital	  accounted	  for	  58,9%	  in	  1997,	  80,5%	  in	  2000	  and	  87,4%	  by	  2004	  (AKI,	  2009;	   Szajner	   &	   Vőneki,	   2014a).	   In	   spite	   of	   this	   trend,	   MNCs	   began	   leaving	   the	  Hungarian	  market	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s.	  The	  reasons	  for	  this	  shift	  are	  discussed	  in	  a	  subsequent	  section	  on	  MNC	  strategies:	  this	  trend	  encouraged	  domestically	  owned	  dairy	  processors	   to	   strengthen	   their	  position	  by	   re-­‐purchasing	  processing	  plants	   left	  behind	  by	  MNCs.	  Today,	   the	   two	  biggest	  domestic	  processors,	   the	  SoleMizo	  group	  and	  Alföldi	  Milk	  –	  control	  50%	  of	  processing.	  	  	  Although	   food	   retail	   comprises	   a	   sector	   of	   its	   own,	   it	   is	   also	   functionally	   the	   third	  segment	   in	   the	   dairy	   supply	   chain.	   While	   a	   holistic	   overview	   of	   the	   retail	   sector’s	  transformation	  would	  largely	  overstretch	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis,	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  MNCs	  and	  domestic	  firms	  in	  the	  sector	  is	  necessary	  for	  understanding	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  domestic	  alliance	  largely	  hostile	  to	  foreign	  MNC	  retailers.	  Contrary	  to	  Poland,	  MNC	  retailers	  played	  an	  important	  role	   in	  Hungary	  by	  “helping”	  (indirectly)	  to	  establish	   a	   coalition	   of	   Hungarian	   public	   and	   private	   actors	   –	   directed	   against	   them.	  Contrary	   to	   dairy	   processing,	   the	   role	   of	   foreign	   investors	   in	   retail	   was	   more	  asymmetrical:	   MNCs	   first	   entered	   Hungarian	   retail	   in	   the	   1991-­‐1994	   period.	   They	  stabilized	   their	   position	   on	   the	   domestic	   market	   by	   introducing	   two	   distinct	   retail	  formats	   that	  had	  been	  unknown	  previously:	  British	  and	  French	   firms	   introduced	   large	  super-­‐	   and	   hypermarkets	   where	   economies	   of	   scale	   could	   be	   efficiently	   exploited.	  German	   firms	   on	   the	   contrary	   specialized	   in	   discount	   and	   cash	   and	   carry	   stores:	   this	  model	   utilizes	   smaller	   stores	   with	   minimal	   stocks,	   extremely	   rapid	   turnover	   and	   a	  central	  procurement	  system	  where	  the	  basic	  product	  types	  are	  largely	  sourced	  from	  the	  MNC’s	   home	   market	   –	   which	   allows	   these	   firms	   to	   have	   very	   aggressive	   pricing	  strategies.	   MNCs	   concentrated	   an	   increasing	   share	   of	   the	   retail	   sector’s	   capitalization	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and	  profits:	  by	  2003	  they	  accounted	  for	  82%	  of	  the	  sector’s	  capitalization	  (Tímár,	  2004).	  Concentration	   has	   been	   another	   defining	   feature	   in	   retail:	   the	   four	   biggest	   retailers	  controlled	   60%	  of	   food	   retail	   in	   2004.	   In	   spite	   of	   this	   trend,	  Hungarian	   retailers	   have	  never	   been	   entirely	  marginalized:	   three	   domestic	   retail	   chains	   (CBA,	   COOP	   and	   Real)	  emerged	  on	  the	  ruins	  of	  Socialist	  retail	  privatization	  in	  1991	  and	  adapted	  by	  specializing	  in	  small	  proximity	  grocery	  stores16.	  Although	  the	  profitability	  of	  Hungarian	  retailers	   is	  substantially	   lower	   than	  MNCs’	  due	   to	  a	   larger	  network	  of	   shops,	   these	   three	  retailers	  nonetheless	  control	  more	  than	  40%	  of	  the	  market	  today	  (see	  Table	  3.1),	  which	  leads	  to	  particular	  tensions	  between	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  firms	  in	  food	  retail.	  	  
Table	  3.1.	  Food	  Retail	  Chains	  in	  Hungary	  by	  Rank	  in	  2014	  
Rank	   Origin	  
Turnover	  (bn.	  




TESCO	   UK	   715	   209	   3,42	  
Hypermarket	  
(112)	  
Coop	   HU	   560	   5370	   0,10	  
Grocery	  
(4950)	  
CBA	   HU	   505,5	   2289	   0,22	  
Grocery	  
(1138)	  
Spar	   NL 473,7	   419	   1,13	  
Supermarket	  
(363)	  
Reál	   HU	   379	   2300	   0,16	  
Grocery	  
(1700)	  
Auchan	   FR	   326	   19	   17,16	  
Hypermarket
s	  (19)	  
Lidl	   GER	   311	   163	   1,91	  
Discount	  
(163)	  
Penny	  Market	   GER	   207,2	   197	   1,05	  
Discount	  
(197)	  





Standard	  compliance	  and	  qualitative	  upgrading	  	  A	   key	   argument	   of	   Swinnen	   et	   al.	   is	   that	   MNCs	   contributed	   substantially	   to	   the	  qualitative	   upgrading	   of	   the	   dairy	   sector	   throughout	   the	   CEE	   region,	   particularly	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  CBA	   has	   a	   rather	   different	   strategy:	   while	   COOP	   and	   Reál	   are	   overwhelmingly	   specialized	   in	   small	  proximity	  stores,	  CBA	  attempts	  to	  diversify	  in	  all	  formats	  –	  even	  super-­‐	  and	  hypermarket	  stores.	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upgrading	   the	   quality	   of	   fresh	  milk	   (Dries	  &	   Swinnen,	   2004;	  Dries	  &	   Swinnen,	   2005).	  This	   argument	   is	   based	   on	   the	   findings	   of	   a	   large	   scholarship	   we	   discussed	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter	   -­‐	  one	  which	  argues	   that	  MNCs	  can	  be	  powerful	  actors	  of	  competitive	  upgrading	  especially	  through	  vertical	  linkages	  vis	  a	  vis	  their	  own	  domestic	  suppliers:	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  buyer	  power,	  MNCs	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  enforce	  the	  adoption	  of	  stringent	  public	   or	   private	   product	   standards	   among	   their	   suppliers.	   From	   a	   developmental	  perspective,	   the	   adoption	   and	   diffusion	   of	   modern	   food	   safety	   standards	   such	   as	   ISO	  9000	   and	   HACCP	   (both	   of	   which	   are	   mandatory	   inside	   the	   EU)	   might	   open	   up	   new	  export	  markets,	  where	   these	  standards	   function	  as	  non-­‐tariff	  barriers	   to	   trade.	   In	   that	  regard,	  where	   food	   safety	   standard	   diffusion	   and	   compliance	   effectively	   improves	   the	  quality	   of	   the	   raw	   material	   (fresh	   milk),	   one	   might	   expect	   strengthened	   export	  competitiveness.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   MNCs	   have	   played	   an	   overwhelming	   role	   in	   the	  processing	  (and	  retail)	  segments	  of	  the	  sector	  after	  1990,	  Hungary	  offers	  an	  apt	  case	  for	  re-­‐assessing	  this	  argument.	  	  	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   adoption	   and	   diffusion	   of	   EU	   food	   safety	   norms	   indeed	   showed	  steady	   progress	   throughout	   the	   1990s	   to	   the	   point	  where	   by	   2004,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   EU	  accession,	   the	   overwhelming	  majority	   of	  milk	   produced	   in	  Hungary	   had	   already	   been	  compliant	  with	  the	  stringent	  standards	  of	  the	  EU	  (figure	  3.1.).	  
Figure	  3.1.	  Share	  of	  Milk	  Complying	  with	  EU	  Standards	  in	  Hungary	  
	  
Source:	  Hungarian	  Dairy	  Research	  Institute	  (Tejgazdasági	  Kisérleti	  Intézet)	  	  
40.2	   59.7	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However,	   two	   facets	  of	  qualitative	  upgrading	   through	  standards	   fundamentally	  qualify	  this	   picture:	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   standard	   adoption	   and	   compliance	   raise	   distributive	  problems,	   as	   farmers	   and	   processors	   unable	   to	   secure	   the	   capital	   necessary	   for	  technological	  modernization	  and	  standard	  compliance	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  sector	  if	  they	  can’t	  find	  buyers	  for	  their	  sub-­‐par	  products	  (Berdegue	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Dries	  &	  Swinnen,	  2004;	  Dunn,	  2003).	  In	  that	  regard,	  the	  positive	  gains	  in	  export	  competitiveness	  at	  the	  sector	  level	  have	  to	  be	  put	  in	  perspective	  with	  the	  degree	  of	  social	  exclusion	  that	  adjustment	  entails	  for	  domestic	  actors.	  The	  potentially	  negative	  developmental	  effect	  of	  standard	  adoption	  on	  social	   inclusiveness	  has	  been	  underlined	  by	  Lee	  et	  al.	  (Lee	  et	  al.,	  2010),	   while	   Bruszt	   and	   Langbein	   (2014)	   have	   specifically	   underscored	   that	   EU	   food	  standard	  adoption	  was	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  concentration	  and	  social	  exclusion	  of	  dairy	  producers	   in	  CEE17.	   In	  that	  regard,	   the	  Hungarian	  dairy	  sector’s	  steady	  and	  swift	  alignment	   to	  EU	  standards	   throughout	   the	  1990s	  –	  while	  certainly	  positive	   -­‐	  has	   to	  be	  qualified	  by	  the	  social	  cost	  it	  entailed	  –	  as	  discussed	  further	  below.	  	  	  Second,	  while	  the	  correlation	  between	  standard	  adoption	  and	  gains	  in	  competitiveness	  might	  be	  theoretically	  appealing,	  the	  Hungarian	  case	  shows	  a	  different	  picture:	  besides	  social	  costs,	   the	  qualitative	  upgrading	  of	   fresh	  milk	  cannot	  overshadow	  the	  fact	  that	  at	  the	  trade	  and	  production	  level,	  the	  Hungarian	  dairy	  sector	  in	  fact	  experienced	  a	  steady	  and	  grave	  process	  of	  value	  added	  downgrading	  and	  a	  collapse	  in	  export	  competitiveness	  -­‐	  in	  spite	  of	  satisfactory	  milk	  quality.	  	  
Trade	  performance:	  aggravating	  trade	  deficits	  and	  value	  added	  downgrading	  	  The	   competitiveness	   and	  profitability	  of	   the	  Hungarian	  dairy	  market	  has	   substantially	  eroded	  over	  the	   last	   two	  decades:	  The	  situation	   is	  so	  severe	  that	  the	  Milk	  Council	  (the	  only	  sector-­‐level	  organization	  in	  the	  sector)	  has	  commissioned	  the	  Hungarian	  Institute	  of	  Agricultural	  Economics	  (AKI)	  to	  produce	  an	  exhaustive	  overview	  of	  the	  sector	  in	  2014	  in	  order	   to	   identify	  policy	   alternatives	   for	   avoiding	   an	  overall	   collapse.	  The	  document	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  More	  precisely,	   standard	   compliance	   represents	  an	  objective	   cost,	  however	   the	  exclusion	  of	  domestic	  farmers	  and	  processors	  occurs	  when	  neither	  MNCs	  nor	  domestic	  public	  and	  private	  financial	  venues	  for	  accessing	   the	   capital	   necessary	   for	  modernization	   investments	  materialize.	   In	   that	   sense,	   the	   degree	   of	  social	   exclusion	   is	   always	   mediated	   by	   the	   existence	   or	   absence	   of	   foreign	   and	   domestic	   financial	  resources.	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painted	   a	   bleak	  picture:	   Production	  decreased	   from	  an	   average	  of	   2850	   tons	  between	  1986	   and	   1990	   to	   an	   average	   of	   1812	   tons	   in	   2012.	   Domestic	   consumption	   of	   dairy	  products	  per	  capita	  decreased	  from	  200kg	  per	  year	  in	  1987	  to	  150	  kg	  in	  2013.	  The	  trade	  balance	  of	  the	  sector	  went	  from	  a	  surplus	  of	  25	  million	  euros	  in	  2003	  to	  a	  deficit	  of	  140	  million	   in	   2010:	   The	   Milk	   Council	   remarked	   that	   this	   situation	   was	   all	   the	   more	  paradoxical	  given	   that	   the	  quantity	  of	  exported	  and	   imported	  milk	  and	  dairy	  products	  had	  been	  virtually	  equivalent	  in	  recent	  years	  (876	  000	  tons	  exported	  and	  787	  000	  tons	  imported	   in	  2011):	   in	  other	  words,	   the	  Hungarian	  market	   is	  potentially	   self-­‐sufficient,	  however	  its	  trade	  integration	  to	  transnational	  markets,	  chief	  of	  which	  the	  EU,	  and	  more	  specifically	  the	  CEE	  regional	  market,	  has	  proved	  financially	  disastrous	   	  (Terméktanács,	  2013,	  p.6).	  
Figure	  3.2.	  Hungary’s	  Trade	  Balance	  in	  Dairy	  Products	  2004-­‐2012	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consumers	   instead	   of	   introducing	   new,	   innovative	   products:	   the	   predominance	   of	  processed	  cheese	  is	  a	  notorious	  example18.	  	  	  	  After	   EU	   accession	   in	   2004,	   imports	   soared	   especially	   in	   the	   type	   of	   premium,	   higher	  value-­‐added	   products	   that	   didn’t	   have	   a	   counterpart	   on	   the	   domestic	   market.	   The	  competitive	  shock	  of	  EU	  accession	  was	  aggravated	  by	  the	  bottleneck	  on	  potential	  export	  markets	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  2007	  financial	  crisis:	  Hungarian	  milk	  and	  dairy	  products	  were	  in	  direct	  competition	  with	  all	  other	  CEE	  new	  member	  states	  for	  EU15	  markets	  at	  a	  time	  when	   the	   Hungarian	   sector	   didn’t	   have	   strong	   comparative	   advantages	   relative	   to	   its	  neighbors	  and	  when	  demand	  contracted	  severely	  on	  Western	  markets	  as	  well.	  	  	  Breaking	  down	  exports	  and	   imports	  by	  value	  added	  shows	  a	  clear	   trajectory	  since	   the	  early	  1990s,	  namely	  a	  steady	  collapse	  in	  the	  share	  of	  higher	  value	  added	  dairy	  products:	  by	  2013,	  76%	  of	  dairy	  exports	  were	  concentrated	  in	  fresh	  milk,	  cream	  and	  powder	  –	  the	  lowest	   value	   added	  products	   in	   the	   industry.	   Even	   in	   the	  1990s,	  when	   the	   sector	  was	  suffering	  from	  an	  overnight	  loss	  of	  traditional	  Socialist	  export	  markets,	  cheese	  and	  curd	  (higher	  value	  added	  goods)	  had	  still	  accounted	  for	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  total	  dairy	  exports	  (see	  Figure	  3.3.).	  
Figure	  3.3.	  Composition	  of	  Hungarian	  Dairy	  Exports	  by	  Product	  Category	  	  
	  
Source:	  UNCTAD	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Figures	  3.4	  and	  3.5	   capture	   the	  erosion	  of	   value-­‐added	  downgrading:	   it	   is	  particularly	  remarkable	   to	   observe	   that	   2004	   (EU	   accession)	  marks	   a	   turning	   point,	  which	   boosts	  manifold	   the	   negative	   trend	   that	   had	   been	   underway	   throughout	   the	   1990s:	   trade	  deficits	  in	  higher	  value	  added	  goods	  such	  as	  cheese,	  curd	  and	  butter	  soared	  immediately	  after	   EU	   accession,	   while	   the	   sector	   gradually	   specialized	   in	   the	   export	   of	   fresh	  milk,	  cream	  and	  powder.	  
Figure	  3.4.	  Hungary’s	  Trade	  Balance	  in	  Dairy	  Products	  by	  Product	  Category	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products	  and	  modest	  gains	   in	   the	  export	  of	   raw	  material	   (fresh	  milk)	  remains	  as	  seen	  below.	  	  
Figure	  3.5.	  Hungary’s	  Trade	  Balance	  in	  Dairy	  Products	  by	  Value	  Added	  Categories	  
	  
Source:	   own	   calculations	   based	  on	  KSH	  and	  UNCTAD	  data.	   (Higher	  VA	  products:	   cottage	   cheese,	  
kefir,	  cheese,	  yoghurt,	  sour	  cream,	  butter.	  Low	  VA	  products:	  whey,	  fresh	  milk,	  cream	  and	  powder)	  	  It	   is	  also	  worth	  examining	   the	  place	  of	   the	  Hungarian	  dairy	  sector	   in	   relation	   to	  other	  CEE	   markets:	   as	   noted	   during	   our	   interviews	   with	   experts19,	   Hungary	   occupies	   a	  peculiar	  place	  in	  the	  regional	  distribution	  strategies	  of	  retail	  and	  dairy	  processing	  MNCs:	  Hungary	  is	  a	  market	  where	  the	  surplus	  created	  in	  other	  EU15	  and	  CEE	  markets	  -­‐	  Poland	  notably	  –	  has	  been	  sold	  below	  Hungarian	  production	  costs20.	  	  	  Figure	  3.6	   illustrates	   the	  effects	  of	  EU	  accession	   (in	  2004)	  on	   trade	   relations	  between	  Hungary	  and	  Poland:	  what	  is	  surprising	  is	  not	  the	  trade	  deficit	  per	  se	  –	  an	  outcome	  of	  a	  disadvantageous	  low	  value-­‐added	  production	  structure	  as	  detailed	  above	  –	  but	  the	  fact	  that	   Hungary	   has	   become	   a	   net	   importer	   of	   Polish	   fresh	  milk	   and	   lower	   value	   added	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Interview	  with	  Dr.	  Fórián,	  Agrár	  Európa,	  12/11/2013	  	  20	  A	  practice	  later	  banned	  by	  new	  regulations	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  last	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  on	  the	  public	  re-­‐regulation	  of	  the	  dairy	  sector.	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dairy	  products	  as	  well	  (product	  category	  022).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  regional	  organization	  of	   dairy	   trade	   in	   CEE	   has	   established	   a	   pattern	   where	   the	   Hungarian	   market	   is	  predominantly	   not	   export-­‐oriented,	   but	   rather	   serves	   to	   supply	   domestic	   demand:	  however,	   in	  the	  face	  of	  new	  export	  powerhouses	  such	  as	  Poland,	  Hungarian	  producers	  and	   processors	   also	   lose	   their	   market	   share	   on	   their	   own	  market,	   even	   in	   the	   lower	  value	   added	   products	   such	   as	   fresh	   milk	   when	   the	   surplus	   created	   in	   regional	  competitors	  can	  be	  imported	  below	  Hungarian	  production	  costs.	  	  
Figure	  3.6.	  Hungary’s	  Trade	  Balance	  in	  Dairy	  Products	  with	  Poland	  by	  Category	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changes	  expected	  on	  EU	  dairy	  markets	  after	  the	  2015	  phasing	  out	  of	  national	  production	  quotas	   in	  place	  since	  1984,	   it	   is	  too	  soon	  to	  extrapolate	  from	  the	  trend	  of	  the	  past	  few	  years21.	  	  
Figure	  3.7.	  Hungary’s	  Dairy	  Exports	  to	  Italy	  	  	  
	  
Source:	  UNCTAD	  	  The	   competitive	   downgrading	   of	   Hungarian	   dairy	   trade	   singles	   out	   two	   notable	  patterns:	  Firstly,	   the	  gradual	  value	  added	  downgrading	  of	  Hungarian	  dairy	  production	  and	  exports.	  This	  trend	  is	  apparent	  in	  the	  individual	  strategies	  of	  MNCs	  throughout	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s:	   the	  primary	  aim	  of	  MNCs	  was	  to	  build	  a	  domestic	  demand	  for	  their	   products:	   in	   a	   subsequent	   section	   of	   this	   chapter,	   individual	   firm	   strategies	   are	  discussed	   in	   more	   detail	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   a	   general	   pattern	   in	   MNC	   strategies	   that	  primarily	   focused	  on	  building	  and	  sustaining	  demand	  on	  the	  domestic	  market:	  neither	  the	   establishment	   of	   a	   rational	   and	   financially	   sustainable	   production	   structure,	   nor	  exports	  figured	  among	  the	  primary	  goals	  of	  MNCs.	  What	  is	  more,	  chaotic	  acquisition	  and	  merger	   strategies	   also	   had	   a	   dramatic	   effect	   on	   both	   value	   added	   downgrading	   and	  disorganization	  within	  supply	  chains	  as	  discussed	  later.	  	  	  	  In	   the	   regional	   organization	   of	   dairy	   trade	   that	   emerged	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	   1990s,	  markets	  such	  as	  Poland	  became	  export	  powerhouses,	  while	  other	  such	  as	  Hungary	  were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Interview	  with	  Dr.	  Fórián,	  Agrár	  Európa,	  12/11/2013	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of	   interest	   to	   MNCs	   for	   capturing	   a	   small	   domestic	   market	   and	   stabilizing	   regional	  supply	   by	   playing	   the	   role	   of	   a	   dump	  market	  where	   excess	   production	   from	   regional	  competitors	  could	  be	  unloaded.	   In	   light	  of	   these,	  neither	  aggravating	  trade	  deficits	  nor	  value	  added	  downgrading	  are	  surprising	  outcomes.	  	  	  
Concentration	  and	  exclusion	  in	  the	  production	  segment:	  Gains	  in	  productivity	  at	  the	  
expense	  of	  small	  producers	  	  The	   collapse	   in	   export	   competitiveness	   is	   not	   an	   isolated	  weakness	   of	   the	   Hungarian	  sector	  but	  reflects	  instead	  a	  general	  pattern	  in	  CEE.	  The	  Hungarian	  dairy	  sector	  displays	  three	  main	  trends	  at	  the	  production	  level:	  (1)	  substantial	  concentration	  and	  exclusion	  of	  the	   smallest	   and	   least	   competitive	   domestic	   actors	   in	   the	   production	   segment,	   (2)	   a	  reduction	   in	   outputs	   produced,	   and	   (3)	   strong	   gains	   in	   productivity	   as	   a	   result	   of	  concentration.	  	  
Table	  3.2.	  Dairy	  Farms	  and	  Cow	  Herd	  in	  Hungary	  1989-­‐2002	  
	  
1989	   1995	   2000	   2002	  
Nr	  of	  Dairy	  Farms	   28930	   26310	   25986	   20806	  
Nr	  of	  Cows	  ('000)	   658	   423	   380	   367	  
Milk	  Production	  (mn.	  Liters)	   2779	   1920	   2081	   2068	  
Source:	  Milk	  Council	  	  Concentration	   at	   the	   production	   level	   has	   been	   a	   general	   phenomenon	   in	   CEE	  throughout	   the	   transition	  period,	   and	   is	   still	   underway.	  The	   restructuring	  of	   the	  dairy	  production	  segment	  had	  to	  face	  two	  fundamental	  shocks:	  the	  first	  consisted	  in	  the	  1989-­‐1991	  Communist	  collapse	  when	  land-­‐,	  processing-­‐	  and	  retail	  were	  largely	  privatized	  all	  the	  while	  CEE	   countries	   lost	   access	   to	   their	   traditional	  COMECON	  export	  markets	   and	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  sector	  level	  coordination	  as	  well	  as	  Socialist	  intervention	  policies	  were	  terminated.	  The	  second	  challenge	  was	  EU	  accession	   in	  2004,	  after	  which	  CEE	  markets	  faced	  fiercer	  competition	  on	  both	  domestic	  and	  export	  markets.	  	  	  At	   the	   production	   level,	  what	   is	   apparent	   is	   that	   the	   exclusion	   of	   domestic	   producers	  substantially	   accelerated	   in	  Hungary	   after	   EU	   accession.	   In	   other	  words,	   EU	   accession	  proved	   even	   more	   detrimental	   to	   dairy	   producers	   than	   the	   regime	   change	   in	   1989:	  While	   the	  number	  of	  dairy	   farms	  decreased	  by	  a	   third	   in	   the	   first	  decade	  of	   transition	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(Table	  3.2.),	  the	  number	  of	  registered	  dairy	  farms	  was	  further	  halved	  between	  2002	  and	  2012	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  3.3.	  	  
Table	  3.3.	  The	  Structure	  of	  Registered	  Dairy	  Farms	  by	  Cattle	  Size	  in	  Hungary	  
	  
2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	  
<	  50	  	   121	   109	   110	   85	   77	   70	   69	   60	   55	   52	   51	   60	  
51-­‐100	   116	   99	   86	   66	   69	   70	   65	   66	   60	   54	   52	   40	  
101-­‐300	   252	   248	   220	   211	   193	   181	   173	   163	   148	   138	   135	   131	  
301-­‐500	   195	   191	   192	   164	   153	   148	   145	   144	   125	   125	   116	   120	  
501-­‐600	   70	   56	   52	   56	   48	   56	   55	   56	   51	   41	   41	   42	  
601-­‐700	   26	   32	   34	   38	   37	   31	   28	   28	   22	   25	   26	   25	  
701-­‐800	   20	   25	   18	   17	   18	   13	   13	   11	   13	   17	   13	   13	  
801-­‐1000	   18	   16	   14	   15	   17	   18	   18	   21	   23	   21	   25	   21	  
>	  1000	   14	   14	   14	   13	   15	   15	   18	   17	   18	   16	   18	   23	  
Total	   832	   790	   740	   665	   627	   602	   584	   566	   515	   489	   477	   475	  
Average	   294	   300	   299	   317	   327	   328	   334	   340	   353	   354	   362	   369	  
Source:	  AKI	  
	  This	   process	  was	   also	   asymmetrical	   in	   as	  much	   as	   small	   producers	  were	   the	   primary	  victims	   of	   concentration,	   while	   the	   size	   of	   the	   average	   dairy	   farm	   grew	   steadily	   (see	  Figure	  3.8).	  
Figure	  3.8.	  Registered	  Dairy	  Farms	  by	  Cattle	  Size	  in	  Hungary	  
	  
Source:	  AKI,	  Hungarian	  Milk	  Council	  2013	  	  The	  specificity	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  pathway	  is	  best	  captured	  when	  put	  in	  perspective	  with	  other	  CEE	  countries,	  chief	  of	  which	  Poland.	  In	  the	  latter,	  the	  1990s	  were	  equally	  marked	  by	  the	  exclusion	  of	  dairy	  farmers,	  but	  this	  process	  was	  not	  as	  drastic	  as	  in	  Hungary.	  Two	  points	   stand	  out	   in	  particular:	   both	   the	  1990s	   and	   the	  post-­‐EU	  accession	  period	  were	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less	  exclusionary	  for	  dairy	  producers	  in	  Poland	  than	  in	  Hungary.	  Compared	  to	  Hungary,	  which	   lost	  a	   third	  of	   its	  dairy	   farms	   in	   the	   first	  decade	  after	  1989,	  Poland	  registered	  a	  decrease	  of	  “only”	  15%	  (although	  in	  absolute	  terms,	   this	  accounted	  for	  more	  than	  200	  000	  farms).	  	  	  
Table	  3.4.	  Evolution	  of	  Polish	  Dairy	  Farm	  Size	  Structure	  in	  the	  1990s	  (thousands	  of	  farms)	  
Cows/Farm 1987	   1996	   1997	   1998	   1999	   2000	  
1	  to	  2	   979	   910	   899	   863	   871	   866	  
3	  to	  5	   407	   250	   240	   247	   225	   211	  
6	  to	  10	   76	   127	   126	   136	   127	   125	  
›11	   7	   21	   26	   21	   33	   49	  
Total	   1468	   1307	   1290	   1266	   1256	   1251	  
Source:	  (Jongeneel	  &	  Longworth,	  2005,	  p.11)	  	  In	   the	  post-­‐EU	  accession	  period,	  Hungary	   experienced	   a	   similar	   trend	   to	   Slovakia	   and	  the	  Czech	  Republic,	  as	  in	  all	  three	  countries	  the	  elimination	  of	  less	  competitive	  smaller	  producers	   is	   a	   process	   still	   underway.	   The	   Czech	   Republic	   saw	   the	   number	   of	   its	  registered	   dairies	   halved	   (-­‐52%)	   only	   between	   2002	   and	   2010,	   Slovakia	   registered	   a	  decrease	  of	  -­‐44%	  and	  Hungary	  -­‐37%.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  tremendously	  fragmented	  nature	  of	  Polish	  agricultural	  land	  tenure,	  this	  decrease	  proved	  substantially	  less	   dramatic	   (-­‐13%)	   –	   which	   may	   seem	   counter-­‐intuitive:	   if	   the	   current	   trend	   of	  concentration	   was	   merely	   a	   “rational”	   answer	   of	   the	   market	   to	   eliminate	   the	   least	  productive	   dairy	   farms,	   Poland	   should	   have	   experienced	   the	   most	   dramatic	  concentration	  in	  the	  number	  of	  its	  farms.	  	  
Table	  3.5.	  Number	  of	  Registered	  Dairies	  in	  CEE	  (‘000)	  
	  	   2002	   2004	   2006	   2008	   2010	  
Hungary	   804	   691	   613	   578	   503	  
Poland	   22182	   19167	   18046	   19090	   19323	  
Slovakia	   1015	   849	   741	   717	   570	  
Czech	  R.	   3715	   3146	   2642	   2181	   1782	  
Source:	  International	  Committee	  for	  Animal	  Recording	  (ICAR)	  	  Secondly,	   the	  Hungarian	  trend	   in	  concentration	  actually	  proved	  most	  significant	   in	   the	  entire	  CEE	   region:	  Hungary	  has	   the	  most	   concentrated	  production	   segment	   among	   its	  regional	   competitors	   resulting	   from	   the	   elimination	   of	   small	   producers.	   Today,	   an	  average	  dairy	  farm	  in	  Hungary	  is	  tenfold	  the	  size	  of	  a	  Polish	  producer’s	  (Table	  3.6).	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Table	  3.6.	  Average	  Number	  of	  Cows	  Per	  Dairy	  Farm	  in	  CEE	  
	  	   2002	   2004	   2006	   2008	   2010	  
Hungary	   292	   310	   327	   338	   354	  
Poland	   20	   25	   29	   30	   31	  
Slovakia	   195	   201	   212	   207	   223	  
Czech	  R.	   124	   135	   154	   179	   201	  
Source:	  International	  Committee	  for	  Animal	  Recording	  (ICAR)	  
Figure	  3.9.	  Concentration	  of	  Dairy	  Farm	  Size	  in	  CEE	  
	  
Source:	  International	  Committee	  for	  Animal	  Recording	  (ICAR)	  	  The	  fact	  that	  Poland	  experienced	  an	  increase	   in	  competitiveness,	  while	  simultaneously	  conserving	  a	  large	  share	  of	  its	  extremely	  small	  dairy	  farms	  (as	  further	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter),	  all	  the	  while	  Hungary	  -­‐	  where	  the	  average	  size	  of	  farms	  is	  the	  biggest	  and	  productivity	   the	   highest	   in	   the	   Visegrad	   region	   -­‐	   continues	   to	   loose	   dairies	   at	   an	  alarming	   rate	   –	   all	   point	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   current	   transformation	  underway	   in	  CEE	  dairy	   sectors	   is	   not	   merely	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	   necessary	   adjustment	   to	   free	   market	  conditions:	   the	  divergence	  between	  Hungary	  and	  Poland	  shows	  on	   the	  contrary	   that	  a	  strong	   improvement	   in	   the	   quality	   of	   raw	  material	   (fresh	  milk),	   combined	  with	   large	  flows	  of	  FDI	  and	  a	  rapid	  concentration	  in	  production	  structures	  can	  also	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  a	  dramatic	  collapse	  of	  competitiveness	  and	  buyer-­‐supplier	  relations	  throughout	  the	  supply	  chain.	  Conversely,	  the	  Polish	  pathway	  underscores	  that	  social	  inclusiveness	  and	  improving	   export	   competitiveness	   can	   also	   accommodate	   a	   fragmented	   ownership	  structure,	  which	  is	  economically	  less	  rational	  and	  less	  productive	  at	  the	  individual	  farm	  level	   but	   socially	   more	   inclusive.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   differentiated	   trends	   of	   social	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exclusion	   among	   dairy	   farmers	   between	   Poland	   and	   Hungary	   reflect	   institutional	  differences	   in	   the	   defining	   property	   rights	   institutions	   of	   dairy	   production	   and	  processing.	  	  The	   elimination	   of	   small	   producers	   in	   Hungary	   was	   accompanied	   by	   a	   reduction	   in	  absolute	  milk	  production	  but	  also	  by	  substantial	  gains	  in	  productivity.	  While	  the	  entire	  CEE	   region	   had	   to	   confront	   similar	   challenges	   to	   Hungary	   (one	   can	   observe	   similarly	  decreasing	   trends	   in	   Slovakia	   and	   the	   Czech	   Republic),	   the	   reduction	   in	   absolute	  production	  has	  been	  most	  important	  in	  Hungary	  with	  a	  decrease	  of	  20%	  between	  2000	  and	  2010	  alone	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  3.7.	  
Table	  3.7.	  CEE	  Dairy	  Production	  in	  1000	  tons	  	  
	  	   2000	   2002	   2004	   2006	   2008	   2010	  
Hungary	   2143	   2130	   1900	   1849	   1846	   1690	  
Poland	   11889	   11873	   11822	   11982	   12425	   12279	  
Romania	   4301	   4637	   5053	   6011	   5468	   4411	  
Slovakia	   1067	   1198	   1079	   1092	   1057	   918	  
Czech	  R.	   2789	   2729	   2680	   2767	   2801	   2683	  
Source:	  AKI	  2014	  	  Gains	   in	  productivity	  have	  been	   strongest	   in	  Hungary	   in	   the	  CEE	   region	  over	   the	  past	  two	  decades,	  which	  owes	  much	   to	   the	  exclusion	  of	   small	  producers	   in	  particular,	  who	  couldn’t	   upgrade	   the	   genetic	   stock	   of	   their	   herd	   nor	   invest	   in	   modernizing	   their	  machinery	  and	  equipment.	  
Table	  3.8.	  Milk	  Yields	  in	  CEE	  after	  EU	  Accession	  (Average	  liter	  per	  cow	  per	  year)	  
	  	   2002	   2004	   2006	   2008	   2010	  
Hungary	   7449	   7753	   8122	   8554	   8660	  
Poland	   5712	   6152	   6664	   6817	   6980	  
Slovakia	   4940	   5724	   6267	   6759	   6739	  
Czech	  R.	   6285	   6662	   7155	   7537	   7726	  
Source:	  International	  Committee	  for	  Animal	  Recording	  (ICAR)	  	  One	  could	  think	  that	   the	  social	  cost	  of	  exclusion	  could	  be	  offset	  by	  the	  economic	  gains	  realized	  through	  gains	  in	  productivity,	  however	  this	  hypothesis	  is	  doubly	  contradicted:	  as	  we	  mentioned	   previously,	   the	   Polish	   pathway	   shows	   that	   lesser	   concentration	   can	  actually	  accommodate	  competitive	  upgrading.	  Second,	  Hungarian	  gains	   in	  productivity	  have	  not	  translated	  into	  a	  competitive	  upgrading	  of	  the	  sector:	  as	  the	  indicators	  on	  trade	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and	  value	  added	  show,	  the	  Hungarian	  sector	  on	  the	  contrary	  suffers	   from	  value	  added	  downgrading	  at	  the	  production	  and	  trade	  levels.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  on	  developmental	  indicators:	  Competitive	  downgrading	  and	  uneven	  
distribution	  of	  benefits	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  domestic	  actors	  	  	  In	   the	   first	   chapter,	   we	   defined	   developmental	   outcomes	   in	   dependent	   market	  economies	   alongside	   two	   dimensions:	   The	   first	   dimension	   concerns	   competitive	  upgrading,	  the	  second	  focuses	  on	  ownership	  structures	  in	  the	  domestic	  market	  and	  the	  power	  relations	  between	  domestically	  owned	  and	  foreign	  firms.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  indicators	  and	  data	  presented	  in	  this	  section,	  the	  developmental	  trajectory	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  dairy	  sector	   since	   1989	   can	   be	   characterized	   as	   following	   a	   trajectory	   of	   economic	  downgrading	  coupled	  with	  the	  exclusion	  of	  domestic	  actors.	  Surprisingly,	  the	  immediate	  shock	   in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  1989	  proved	  less	  dramatic	  than	  EU	  accession:	  2004	  marks	  a	  critical	   juncture	   after	   which	   trade	   competitiveness	   virtually	   collapses,	   while	   the	  exclusion	  of	  less	  competitive	  smaller	  farmers	  accelerates.	  	  	  	  In	  light	  of	  this	  negative	  downgrading	  trajectory,	  the	  remaining	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  attempt	   to	   clarify	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   why,	   instead	   of	   competitive	   upgrading	   and	   a	  consolidation	   in	   the	   vertical	   coordination	   of	   supply	   chains,	   MNC	   strategies	   actually	  resulted	  in	  competitive	  downgrading.	  On	  the	  other,	  the	  role	  of	  domestic	  agency	  will	  be	  scrutinized	   in	   relation	   to	   domestic	   actors	   and	  MNCs.	  We	   argue	   that	   domestic	   agency	  played	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   sector’s	   developmental	   trajectory:	   (1)	   By	   determining	   the	  level	  of	  FDI	  penetration	  in	  dairy	  processing,	  (2)	  by	  fragmenting	  the	  ownership	  structure	  of	  land	  without	  investing	  in	  the	  technological	  modernization	  of	  farmer-­‐producers,	  (3)	  by	  disintegrating	  the	  supply	  chain	  through	  the	  privatization	  of	  dairy	  processors	  owned	  by	  the	   state,	   and	   (4)	   by	   attempting	   to	   “re-­‐domesticate”	   the	   dairy	  market	   in	   tandem	  with	  Hungarian	  dairy	  processors	  and	  retailers.	  	  We	  argue	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  sector’s	  social	  and	  economic	  performance	  was	  conditioned	  by	   public	   policy	   choices	   that	   proved	   largely	   detrimental	   from	   a	   developmental	  perspective:	   The	   Hungarian	   state	   contributed	   to	   the	   disintegration	   of	   the	   sector	   by	  
	  	   95	  
separating	   the	   management	   of	   the	   production	   and	   processing	   segments:	   the	  privatization	   of	   land	   and	   the	   dismantling	   of	   cooperatives	   deeply	  weakened	   producers	  while	  simultaneously	  severing	  their	  linkages	  with	  processing	  firms	  transferred	  to	  MNCs	  in	  bulk.	  This	  ensured	  that	  the	  sector’s	  vertical	  coordination	  between	  different	  actors	  of	  the	   supply	   chain	   would	   be	   structurally	   weakened,	   all	   the	   while	   no	   developmental	  coalition	  between	  public	   and	  private	  actors	   could	  materialize	   in	  a	   situation	  where	   the	  state,	  processors	  and	  producers	  had	  fundamentally	  different	  interests.	  	  	  
Part	  2.	  Institutional	  legacies	  in	  the	  longue-­‐durée	  	  	  	  
The	  early	  20th	  century:	  a	  cooperative-­‐corporatist	  sector	  	  	  The	  Hungarian	   dairy	   sector	   showed	   a	   similar	   historical	   pattern	   to	  Western	   European	  and	  American	  dairy	  markets	  throughout	  the	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  century:	  even	  in	  “core”	  capitalist	  economies	  such	  as	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UK,	  milk	  and	  dairy	  markets	  have	  often	  been	  managed	   directly	   by	   the	   state	   through	   corporatist	   institutions	   sometimes	   until	   as	  recently	  as	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  (Schneiberg,	  2011).	  	  	  In	  Hungary,	  a	  National	  Dairy	  Cooperative	  Center	  was	  set	  up	  in	  1922	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture,	   the	   National	   Credit	   Cooperative,	   the	   national	   agricultural	   cooperative	  “Hangya”	   and	   the	   joint	   stock	   company	   “Futura”	   (Tóth,	   2014).	  Hungary,	   as	  many	  other	  European	  countries,	  had	  an	  early	  experience	  in	  the	  grassroots	  development	  of	  producer	  and	  marketing	   cooperatives	   throughout	   the	   19th	   century:	   “Hangya”	  was	   the	   largest	   of	  these	   cooperatives.	   The	   administrative	   disorganization	   that	   followed	   the	   territorial	  losses	   of	   the	   First	   World	   War	   provoked	   a	   need	   to	   reorganize	   the	   supply	   chains	   and	  coordination	  of	  the	  sector.	  Denmark,	  the	  leader	  in	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  would	  serve	  as	  the	  model	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  National	  Dairy	  Cooperative	  Center	  (NDCC).	  The	  NDCC	  represented	  a	   corporatist	   structure,	  progressively	   absorbing	   independent	   “grassroots”	  cooperatives	   into	   a	   national	   organization	   managed	   from	   the	   top	   by	   the	   state,	   which	  acted	  both	  as	  shareholder	  and	  creditor.	  The	  NDCC	  realized	  a	  form	  of	  vertical	  integration	  by	  tying	  together	  in	  a	  single	  organization	  the	  three	  separate	  production	  segments	  of	  the	  dairy	   supply	   chain:	   production,	   processing	   and	   retail	   were	   entirely	   integrated.	   At	   the	  production	  level,	   it	  had	  progressively	  absorbed	  270	  smaller	  cooperatives	  by	  the	  1930s	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and	  it	  gathered	  1042	  members	  by	  1942	  Tóth,	  2014).	  The	  regionally	  sourced	  fresh	  milk	  was	  processed	   in	   the	  NDCC’s	   central	  Budapest	  plant,	  while	   it	   also	  disposed	  of	   its	  own	  retail	  channel:	  it	  operated	  more	  than	  60	  selling	  points	  throughout	  the	  country	  and	  also	  supplied	   a	   further	   700	   retailers,	   many	   of	   which	   were	   operated	   by	   Hangya’s	   retailer	  cooperatives.	  The	  Center	  marketed	  dairy	  products	  both	  on	  the	  domestic	  market	  but	  also	  managed	   exports	   without	   intermediaries.	   Both	   production	   and	   export	   were	   heavily	  subsidized	  by	  the	  state,	  which	  continued	  to	  offer	  preferential	   loans	  to	  the	  organization	  in	   spite	   of	   recurrent	   deficits.	   Overall,	   the	   Hungarian	   dairy	   sector’s	   organizational	  structure	   closely	   matched	   the	   corporatist	   model	   of	   Western	   European	   counterparts	  (Schneiberg,	  2011).	  	  	  
Nationalizing	  dairy	  under	  state-­‐Socialism:	  State	  and	  collective	  ownership	  	  The	   first	   critical	   juncture	   occurred	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Second	  World	   War	   when	  agricultural	  land	  and	  processing	  plants	  were	  fully	  collectivized:	  the	  NDCC	  dissolved	  into	  the	  National	  Dairy	  Trust	  in	  1948.	  All	  assets	  owned	  by	  the	  NDCC	  became	  state	  property.	  Throughout	   the	   forty	   years	   of	   state	   Socialism,	   the	  Dairy	   Trust	   operated	   15	   regionally	  organized	  dairy	  companies	  in	  which	  fresh	  milk	  production	  and	  processing	  were	  locally	  integrated:	   exports	   virtually	   ceased	   until	   the	   1970s	   and	   production	   shifted	   almost	  exclusively	   to	   the	   domestic	   market.	   While	   policy	   instruments	   were	   similar,	   it	   is	  nonetheless	   difficult	   to	   compare	   public	   interventions	   in	   state	   Socialist	   and	   capitalist	  economies:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  public	  subsidization	  of	  production	  and	  consumer	  prices	  which	   typified	   Hungarian	   dairy	   under	   Socialism	   shows	   similarities	   to	   the	   Western	  European	   model.	   However,	   given	   the	   fact	   that	   prices	   didn’t	   reflect	   actual	   production	  costs	   and	   the	   absence	   of	   markets	   in	   a	   literal	   sense	   in	   a	   planned	   economy	  makes	   for	  difficult	  comparison:	  Ultimately,	  the	  Hungarian	  (Socialist)	  regulation	  of	  the	  market	  can	  be	  best	  typified	  by	  the	  firm	  integration	  of	  the	  supply	  chain-­‐	  (production,	  processing	  and	  retail)	   in	   regional	   production	   structures,	   the	   elimination	   of	   any	   competition	   between	  these	   regional	   dairies	   as	   well	   as	   a	   subsidization	   system	   which	   heavily	   supported	  production,	  exports	  and	  consumer	  prices.	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On	   the	   organizational	   level,	   collectivization	   produced	   specific	   consequences:	   at	   first	  sight	  the	  post-­‐1948	  model	  of	  sector-­‐level	  coordination	  through	  the	  Dairy	  Trust	  showed	  a	  continuity	  with	  the	  pre-­‐war	  corporatist	  management	  of	  the	  sector.	  After	  all,	  the	  state	  had	  already	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  managing	  the	  vertical	  coordination	  of	  the	  sector	  from	  producers	  to	  retail	  and	  export	  as	  well	  as	  public	  subsidies	  since	  the	  1920s.	  However,	  the	  1948	  collectivization	  and	  reorganization	  of	  the	  sector	  constituted	  a	  major	  turning	  point:	  even	  more	   important	   than	  the	  disappearance	  of	  private	  capital	  and	  the	  type	  of	  public-­‐private	   partnership	   which	   characterized	   the	   pre-­‐war	   NDCC,	   forced	   collectivization	  meant	  a	  lack	  of	  autonomy	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  the	  production	  chain,	  the	  disappearance	  of	  the	  profit	  motive,	  which	  had	   incentivized	   investments	  and	  the	  destruction	  of	  social	  capital	  and	  trust.	  	  The	  Dairy	  Trust	  cancelled	  out	  competition	  between	  the	  15	  regional	  dairies	  by	  drawing	   geographic	   boundaries	   between	   their	  markets:	   there	  was	   no	   competition	   for	  consumers	   between	   these	   state	   owned	   companies,	   no	   necessity	   for	   innovation	   and	  investments	   as	   the	   entire	   industry	   was	   heavily	   subsidized	   and	   subdued	   to	   the	  imperatives	  of	  the	  seven	  multi-­‐annual	  Plans	  between	  1950	  and	  1990.	  The	  dairy	  sector	  shifted	  from	  the	  production	  of	  a	  tradable	  good	  to	  an	  instrument	  of	  national	  food	  security	  in	  the	  post-­‐War	  decades.	  	  	  The	  most	  notable	  attempt	  at	  redressing	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  dairy	  sector	  came	  in	  the	   form	   of	   a	   national	   cattle-­‐breeding	   plan	   in	   1972.	   The	   program	   relied	   on	   public	  subsidies	   conditional	   on	   dairy	   cooperatives	   to	   propose	   a	   timeline	   and	   quantified	  objectives	   for	   increasing	   outputs,	   productivity	   and	   quality	   (fat	   content).	   However,	   the	  fundamental	  objective	  of	  the	  program	  was	  not	  to	  increase	  export	  competitiveness	  but	  to	  boost	  domestic	  consumption.	  Some	  argue	  that	  the	  program	  was	  a	  response	  to	  problems	  in	  the	  supply	  chain:	  dairy	  cooperatives	  sourced	  their	  fresh	  milk	  from	  small	  farms	  whose	  output	  couldn’t	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  urban	  demand	  for	  dairy	  products	  during	  the	  1960s:	  the	  1972	   program	   sought	   to	   remedy	   an	   unstable	   supply	   chain	   reliant	   on	   small	   cattle	  breeding	  farms	  with	  the	  intensification	  and	  modernization	  of	  production	  in	  larger	  farms	  with	  closer	  ties	  to	  processing	  cooperatives	  (Szalka,	  2002,	  p.17).	  Others	  suspect	  that	  the	  program	  was	  not	  driven	  by	  an	  increasing	  urban	  demand	  for	  dairy	  products	  and	  rather	  than	   a	   solution	   to	   supply	   chain	   problems,	   it	   was	   primarily	   an	   outcome	   of	   the	   sheer	  lobbying	   power	   of	   dairy	   processor	   management	   on	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Agriculture	   to	  increase	   the	   sector’s	   subsidization	   (K.	   Szabó,	   2010,	   p.19).	   Notwithstanding	   the	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underlying	  motives,	  and	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  inherent	  limitations	  of	  an	  inwardly	  expansionist	  strategy	  in	  a	  small	  market	  such	  as	  Hungary,	  the	  program	  proved	  successful	  in	  increasing	  productivity	  in	  the	  production	  and	  processing	  segments	  as	  well	  as	  expanding	  domestic	  consumption.	  	  Between	  1975	  and	  1990,	  the	  annual	  yield	  of	  milk	  per	  cow	  doubled	  from	  2500	  to	  4800	  liters,	  the	  consumption	  of	  dairy	  products	  between	  1972	  and	  1987	  doubled	  to	  200kg	  per	  capita	  per	  year	  (Szalka,	  2002).	  However,	  unlike	  the	  stringent	  monitoring	  and	  punish-­‐	  or-­‐reward	  system	  of	  conditional	  subsidization	  highlighted	  by	  Amsden	  (1989)	  in	  South-­‐East	  Asia	   ,	   the	   Hungarian	   model	   of	   subsidization	   was	   substantially	   looser:	   the	   purchasing	  price	   of	   milk	   at	   the	   farm	   gate	   was	   subsidized	   up	   to	   50%,	   as	   were	   infrastructural	  modernization	   investments	   for	   cattle	   breeding,	   export	   subsidies	   reached	   70%	   while	  consumption	  subsidies	  driving	  up	  demand	  reached	  7	  billion	  HUF	  in	  1987	  and	  amounted	  to	  35%	  of	   the	  consumer	  price	   (K.	  Szabó,	  2010).	  The	  rapid	  amelioration	   in	   the	  sector’s	  overall	  performance	  was	  entirely	  reliant	  on	  the	  public	  subsidization	  system	  but	  the	  later	  shocks	  experienced	  by	  Hungary	  throughout	  the	  1990s	  foreclosed	  this	  strategy:	  soaring	  public	   debt	   and	   structurally	   heavy	   current	   account	   deficits	   increasingly	   limited	   the	  margin	   of	  maneuver	   for	   the	   state,	   a	   process	   that	  was	   further	   accelerated	   in	   the	   post-­‐1989	  liberalization	  context	  where	  the	  domestic	  shortage	  of	  public	  capital	  in	  conjunction	  with	   transnational	   trade	   regulations	   banning	   state	   aid	   (such	   as	   the	   early	   Europe	  Agreements,	  and	  later	  the	  pre-­‐accession	  process)	  gradually	  dried	  the	  sources	  of	  public	  subsidies	  to	  the	  sector22.	  	  	  In	  the	  subsequent	  sections,	  the	  effects	  of	  privatization	  and	  the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  state	  in	  re-­‐regulating	   the	   dairy	  market	   throughout	   the	   1990s	   and	   2000s	   will	   be	   examined	   in	  more	  detail.	  However,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  transformations	  affecting	  the	  sector	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Socialist	  period,	  a	  number	  of	  further	  clarifications	  are	  necessary.	  The	  first	  concerns	  the	   sector’s	   vertical	   coordination	   along	   the	   supply	   chain	   in	   late	   Socialism	   and	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  It	   should	  be	   emphasized	   that	   this	   is	  not	   a	  particularity	  of	  Hungary	  or	   even	  post-­‐Communist	   regimes:	  very	  similar	  processes	  occured	  throughout	  Latin-­‐American	  and	  Asian	  semi-­‐peripheral	  regions	  throughout	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  debt	  crisis,	  which	  marked	  an	  abrupt	  end	  to	  autonomist	  developmental	  strategies.	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immediate	  aftermath	  of	  1989.	  The	  second	  point	  concerns	  the	  shock	  caused	  by	  1989	  in	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  support	  policies	  under	  state	  Socialism.	  	  	  	  We	   have	   already	   mentioned	   that	   the	   Dairy	   Trust	   acted	   as	   the	   state’s	   centralized	  coordinating	   agency	   under	   Socialism	   and	   that	   the	   sector	   was	   marked	   by	   a	   regional	  division	  between	  separate,	   integrated	  supply	  chains	  without	  any	  competition	  between	  them.	   In	   this	   mode	   of	   organization,	   the	   15	   distinct	   regional	   supply	   chains	   were	  organized	   around	   a	   number	   of	   central	   processing	   plants.	   The	   ownership	   structure	   of	  these	   plants	   showed	   some	   minor	   variation	   however:	   in	   1989,	   85%	   of	   processing	  occurred	   in	   plants	   that	   belonged	   directly	   to	   the	   Dairy	   Trust	   (in	   other	   words	   these	  constituted	  exclusive	  state	  property),	  7%	  were	  processing	  plants	  owned	  by	  producers’	  cooperatives,	  while	  another	  8%	  were	  jointly	  owned	  by	  the	  Trust	  and	  cooperatives.	  The	  production	   segment	   of	   dairy	   had	   in	   turn	   three	   components:	   in	   1989	   state	   farms	  represented	   21,2%,	   cooperatives	   55,5%	   and	   small,	   independent	   private	   farms	  accounted	   for	  23,4%	   (M.	   Szabó,	   1999).	  What	   it	  meant	   in	   effect	  was	   that	   two	  different	  types	   of	   property	   right	   institutions	   characterized	   processing	   and	   production:	   state	  monopoly	   in	   processing	   and	   state	   farms/cooperatives	   in	   production.	   State-­‐owned	  processors	  used	  fresh	  milk	  supplied	  at	  the	  regional	  level	  by	  extensive	  cooperative-­‐	  and	  state	   farms,	  while	  a	  minority	  of	   input	   came	   from	  small	  private	   farms	   (Gorton	  &	  Guba,	  2002).	   A	   specificity	   of	   Hungarian	   agriculture	   and	   agri-­‐food	   industries	   under	   late-­‐Socialism	  was	   the	   complex	   interdependency	  between	  public	   and	  private	  ownership:	   a	  1967	   law	  on	   land	  property	   formally	   tolerated	  smaller	  private	  property	  as	  a	  necessary	  evil,	  alongside	  state-­‐	  and	  cooperative-­‐	  ownership	  preferred	  by	  the	  regime.	  Cooperative	  members	  were	  thus	  entitled	  to	  keep	  private	  plots.	   In	  the	  subsequent	  decades,	  a	  highly	  complex	  interdependence	  emerged	  between	  state	  and	  cooperative	  property	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  private	  property	  on	  the	  other:	  however,	  instead	  of	  an	  equilibrium,	  it	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  frustrated	  class	  of	  farmers	  who	  were	  successful	  in	  their	  private	  plots	  but	  couldn’t	   buy	   machinery	   nor	   further	   land	   from	   cooperatives	   (Hann	   &	   Sárkány,	   2003;	  Harcsa,	  Kovács,	  &	  Szelényi,	  2003a,	  2003b;	  Varga,	  2007).	  Therefore,	  while	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  Dairy	  Trust	  represented	  a	   fully	  public	  actor	  with	  a	  monopoly	  on	   the	   intra-­‐sectoral	  organization	  of	  the	  15	  regional	  supply	  chains,	  the	  production	  and	  processing	  segments	  were	   complex	   assemblages	   of	   state-­‐,	   cooperative-­‐	   and	   private	   property:	   the	  restructuring	  process	  between	  1990	  and	  1993	  proved	  exceptionally	  challenging	  because	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while	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   the	   Dairy	   Trust	   as	   an	   agent	   of	   vertical	   coordination	   was	  disbanded	   in	   1991	   –	   land,	   cooperatives	   and	   processing	   plants	  were	   all	   independently	  (yet	   in	   parallel)	   transferred	   from	   collective	   to	   private	   ownership	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	  first	  privatization	  wave.	  	  	  The	   second	   point	   concerns	   the	   shift	   in	   the	   state’s	   support	   policies	   after	   1989.	   As	   we	  mentioned	  previously,	  in	  late	  Socialism,	  the	  public	  subsidization	  system	  supported	  both	  farmers’	  production	  costs	  but	  also	  consumer	  prices.	  However,	  by	  1988	  the	  government	  decided	   to	  phase	  out	   consumer	  price	  subsidies.	  Thus	   the	  key	  problem	  of	   the	  sector	   in	  1990-­‐91	   (besides	   the	   thorny	   question	   of	   privatization	   and	   property	   rights)	   was	   an	  overproduction	  crisis:	   in	  1991,	   the	  sector	  produced	  400	  million	  tons	  of	  milk	   in	  excess,	  which	  couldn’t	  be	  absorbed	  by	  domestic	  demand	  (inflation	  only	  aggravated	  rising	  prices	  after	  consumer	  price	  subsidies	  were	  removed)	  –	  nor	  offloaded	  on	  export	  markets:	   the	  traditional	   COMECON	   export	   markets	   were	   similarly	   depressed,	   while	   accessing	  Western	   markets	   was	   limited	   by	   tariffs	   and	   a	   lack	   of	   compliance	   with	  Western	   food	  standards.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  government	  improvised	  new	  tools	  for	  intervention	  aimed	  at	  resorbing	  overproduction:	  (1)	  a	  subsidy	  of	  10	  000	  HUF	  (138	  USD)	  was	  guaranteed	  after	  each	   slaughtered	   cow	   on	   the	   condition	   that	   the	   producer	   would	   further	   reduce	   milk	  quantities	   delivered	   to	  milk	   processors	   by	   4500	   liters	   for	   each	   killed	   cow.	   (2)	   Export	  subsidies	  were	  raised	  from	  30%	  to	  35%,	  (3)	  If	  producers	  accepted	  to	  reduce	  delivered	  milk	   quantities	   by	   15%,	   they	   could	   continue	   enjoying	   the	   purchasing	   price	   of	   the	  previous	  year	  by	  the	  processor	  notwithstanding	  the	  drop	  in	  quantities	  (Hingyi,	  2002).	  A	  first	  consequence	  of	  these	  measures	  was	  a	  reduction	  of	  the	  dairy	  herd	  by	  63	  000	  heads	  between	  1991	  and	  1992.	  However	   it	   is	   illustrative	  of	   the	   chaotic	   situation	   that	  during	  the	   same	   period	   (1990-­‐93),	   some	   processors	   were	   struggling	   on	   the	   contrary	   with	  insufficient	   local	   supply	   of	   fresh	   milk:	   Tolna	   Milk,	   the	   processor	   company	   of	   Tolna	  county	   thus	   offered	   in	   1993	   a	   non-­‐refundable	   premium	   of	   10	   000	   HUF	   to	   producers	  after	   each	   cow	   with	   calf!	   Briefly	   put,	   the	   public	   support	   system	   in	   place	   until	   1989	  entirely	  collapsed	  and	  left	  place	  for	  ad-­‐hoc,	  improvised	  intervention	  policies	  by	  the	  state,	  that	  were	   in	   turn	   rapidly	   phased	   out	   and	   replaced	  by	   a	   laissez-­‐faire	   approach:	   all	   the	  abovementioned	  intervention	  policies	  were	  scrapped	  by	  March	  1992	  (Hingyi,	  2002).	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Part	  3.	  Privatizing	  the	  Dairy	  Sector	  in	  Hungary	  	  
The	  Constraint	  of	  Debt	  	  Before	   looking	   at	   the	   strategies	   of	   public	   and	   private	   actors	   in	   the	   post-­‐Communist	  restructuring	   of	   the	   dairy	   sector,	   it	   seems	   important	   to	   briefly	   mention	   the	  macroeconomic	  context	  in	  which	  privatization	  occurred	  and	  position	  the	  present	  work	  in	  the	  broader	  debate	  over	  the	  interpretation	  of	  post-­‐Communist	  privatization.	  	  As	  in	  many	  other	  CEE	  countries,	  Hungary’s	  Socialist	  planned	  economy	  had	  accumulated	  increasing	  difficulties	  since	  the	  1960s.	   	   	  After	   the	  early	  phase	  of	   forced	  collectivization	  and	  the	  economy’s	  coerced	  Sovietization	   in	   the	  1948-­‐1956	  period,	   the	  new	  social	  pact	  emerging	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   1956	   anti-­‐Soviet	   revolt	   under	   János	   Kádár	   attempted	   to	  reconcile	  leapfrogging	  industrialization	  with	  an	  expansion	  of	  domestic	  consumption	  and	  wages23.	   Unlike	  most	   other	   Socialist	   states,	   it	   was	   perceived	   as	   vital	   for	   the	   regime’s	  legitimacy	   and	   stability	   that	   industrialization	  wouldn’t	   undermine	   living	   standards	   on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  that	  a	  collectivized	  agricultural	  sector	  would	  not	  undermine	  the	  cheap	  delivery	   of	   agricultural	   goods	   on	   the	   other	   (Harcsa	   et	   al.,	   2003a).	   The	   stability	   of	  domestic	  purchasing	  power	  and	  consumption	  were	  crucial	   for	   the	  regime’s	   legitimacy.	  However,	   this	  model	  proved	   increasingly	  difficult	   to	   sustain	   after	  1956:	   the	   structural	  dysfunctions	   of	   the	   planned	   economy	   were	   gradually	   uncovered	   by	   a	   generation	   of	  young	   economists	   (Kornai,	   1982,	   1994),	   but	   these	   structural	   problems	   were	   further	  aggravated	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  1973	  and	  1979	  oil	  shocks.	  Foreign	  debt	  began	  functioning	  at	   latest	   in	   the	   1960s	   as	   a	   buffer	   mechanism	   for	   financing	   public	   investments,	   trade	  balance	  deficits	  and	  stabilizing	  consumption	  (Mong,	  2012).	  	  	  Soaring	   levels	  of	   foreign	  public	  debt	   in	   turn	   led	   the	  nomenklatura24	  to	  open	  accession	  negotiations25	  with	   the	   IMF	  and	   the	  World	  Bank	   in	  view	  of	   securing	  a	   safety	  net	   since	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  In	   opposition	   to	   the	   Stalinist	   and	   Maoist	   experiences	   where	   industrialization	   occured	   through	   the	  compression	  of	  domestic	  wages	  and	  were	  financed	  in	  particular	  through	  the	  compression	  of	  agricultural	  revenues.	  	  24	  The	   position	   of	   the	   nomenklatura	   regarding	   Bretton	   Woods	   organizations	   was	   highly	   ambiguous:	   a	  young	   generation	   of	   economists	   actively	   lobbied	   in	   favor	   of	   integrating	   transnational	   financial	  markets	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financing	   the	   debt	   service	   from	   international	   capital	   markets	   proved	   increasingly	  difficult	   (Mong,	  2012).	   In	  spite	  of	   resistance	   from	  Moscow	  as	  well	  as	  hardliners	   in	   the	  Hungarian	  Central	  Committee,	  Hungary	  eventually	  joined	  the	  IMF	  on	  March	  16th	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  on	  May	  6th	  1982	  (Honvári	  &	  Torda,	  2009).	  Hungary	  received	  its	  first	  short	  term	   stabilization	   loan	   of	   475	   million	   special	   drawing	   rights	   (SDR)	   on	   December	   8th	  1982,	   complemented	   with	   a	   further	   extension	   of	   72	   million	   SDR	   on	   December	   15th,	  followed	  by	  a	  425	  million	  SDR	  loan	  on	  January	  13th	  1984.	  Further	  loans	  were	  accorded	  on	  May	  6th	  1988	  for	  265	  million	  SDR,	  May	  14th	  1990	  for	  159	  million	  SDR,	  January	  16th	  1991	   for	   265	  million	   SDR	   and	   a	   substantial	   three-­‐year	   loan	   for	   1,	   114	   billion	   SDR	   on	  February	   12th	   1991	   (Csáki,	   2013).	   However,	   as	   is	   evident	   from	   the	   below	   table	   on	  Hungary’s	   steadily	   soaring	   foreign	   debt	   throughout	   the	   1975-­‐1994	   period,	   new	   loans	  from	  the	  IMF	  and	  World	  Bank	  proved	  incapable	  to	  halt	  worsening	  public	  finances.	  
Figure	  3.10.	  Hungarian	  Gross	  Foreign	  Debt	  1980-­‐1994	  
	  
Source:	  (Kornai,	  1995)	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Figure	  3.11.	  Hungary’s	  Current	  Account	  Deficit	  1995-­‐2003	  
	  
Source:	  Eurostat	  	  The	   debt	   problem	   was	   aggravated	   by	   the	   difficulties	   of	   the	   regime	   in	   building	   a	  functional	  domestic	  capital	  market	   in	   the	  1980s.	  Paradoxically,	   the	  Hungarian	  banking	  system	   had	   been	   on	   the	   course	   to	   re-­‐establish	   the	   functional	   division	   between	   the	  Central	   Bank	   and	   independent	   commercial	   banks	   already	   during	   the	   last	   years	   of	   the	  Socialist	  regime:	  commercial	  banks	  had	  been	  legally	  (re-­‐)	  created	  in	  1987.	  However,	  the	  new	   commercial	   banks	   inherited	   from	   the	   Central	   Bank	   a	   portfolio	   of	   companies	  alongside	   their	   debts,	   which	   proved	   overwhelming	   as	   many	   were	   on	   the	   verge	   of	  bankruptcy.	   In	   fact,	   public	   actors	   foresee	   that	   a	   new	   1991	   Law	   on	   accounting	   would	  actually	  requalify	  many	  nascent	  company’s	  assets	  as	  outstanding	  debt	  –	  thus	  the	  state’s	  regulatory	  innovations	  “created”	  a	  private	  debt	  problem	  by	  1992	  (Stark	  &	  Bruszt,	  1998)	  The	  debt	  burden	  of	   commercial	  banks	  was	   so	   important	   that	   three	  consecutive	  public	  bailout	  programs	  were	  necessary	  until	  1993	  in	  order	  to	  consolidate	  the	  banking	  system.	  The	   capital	   crunch	  was	   twofold:	   the	   state	   had	   been	   short	   of	   liquidities	   and	  was	   only	  maintained	   afloat	  with	   the	   Bretton	  Woods	   stand-­‐by	   loans,	  while	   the	   new	   commercial	  banks’	   already	   poor	   capitalization	   couldn’t	   sustain	   the	   debt	   burden	   of	   their	   clients	  (conglomerates	  and	  companies	  such	  as	  the	  dairy	  processing	  plants	  owned	  by	  the	  state’s	  Dairy	  Trust).	  	  It	   was	   in	   this	   context	   that	   domestic	   public	   actors	   devised	   privatization	   strategies	   for	  restructuring	   the	   dairy	   sector.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   clearly	   spell	   out	   the	   competing	  interpretations	  of	   this	  process:	   In	   recent	  years,	   an	  emerging	   scholarship	  on	  Hungary’s	  transition	   largely	   influenced	   by	   Wallerstein’s	   World	   System	   Analysis,	   has	   put	   an	  increasingly	   heavy	   emphasis	   on	   a	   structuralist	   interpretation	   of	   privatization	   (Éber,	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2014;	   Éber,	   Gagyi,	   Gerőcs,	   Jelinek,	   &	   Pinkasz,	   2014).	   In	   this	   view,	   the	   transfer	   of	  ownership	   rights	   from	   the	   state	   to	   foreign	   investors	   (MNCs)	   was	   determined	   by	   the	  credit	  crunch	  resulting	  from	  an	  unbearable	  public	  debt	  burden	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  incapacity	  of	  the	  nascent	  commercial	  bank	  system	  to	  finance	  the	  investments	  that	  would	  have	  been	  necessary	   for	   the	  modernization	  of	   industrial	   conglomerates	   and	   industrial	  processing	   companies	   (such	   as	   the	   dairy	   processing	   plants)	   on	   the	   other.	   In	   this	  interpretation	   integrationism	   -­‐	  or	   transnationalization	   through	  FDI	  and	  the	   integration	  of	  existing	  domestic	  production	  capacities	  to	  the	  supply	  chains	  of	  MNCs	  was	  an	  attempt	  by	   the	  state	  and	  public	  actors	   to	  raise	   foreign	  capital	   for	   financing	   the	  debt	  service.	   In	  other	   words,	   the	   very	   process	   of	   privatization	   was	   entirely	   determined	   by-­‐	   and	  subordinate	   to-­‐	   the	   debt	   problem	   in	   this	   perspective.	   The	   argument	   goes,	   that	   after	  financing	   domestic	   debt	   from	   international	   capital	   markets	   up	   to	   the	   1980s,	   when	  private	   creditors’	   trust	   began	   to	   falter,	   Hungary	   first	   turned	   to	   the	   Bretton	   Woods	  organizations	  (the	  IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank)	  in	  the	  1980s.	  When	  even	  these	  adjustment	  loans	  proved	  incapable	  to	  stabilize	  the	  domestic	  account	  deficit,	  FDI	  proved	  yet	  another	  (desperate)	  strategy	  for	  raising	  foreign	  capital.	  	  	  We	   argue	   that	   the	   question	   of	   debt	   indeed	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   state’s	  privatization	  strategies	  at	  the	  onset	  of	  post-­‐Communist	  transition:	  we	  equally	  think	  that	  the	   state’s	   impetus	   for	   a	   fast	   and	   total	   privatization	   of	   the	   processing	   segment	   of	   the	  dairy	   chain	   in	   particular	   reflected	   an	   internal	   hierarchy	   within	   the	   state,	   where	   the	  concerns	  of	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  the	  National	  Asset	  Management	  Agency	  (ÁVÜ,	  later	  AV	   and	  AVP	  Rt.)	   regarding	   the	   gravity	   of	   the	   debt	   problem	  prevailed	   over	   other	  considerations.	  When	  the	  first	  democratic	  government	  entered	  in	  office	  in	  May	  1990,	  the	  state	  had	  foreign	  currency	  reserves	  of	  600	  million	  USD	  and	  a	  foreign	  debt	  of	  21	  billion	  USD	  (Kornai,	  1995).	  However,	  in	  spite	  of	  these	  objective	  constraints,	  we	  would	  argue	  in	  the	   footsteps	   of	   Cardoso	   and	   Faletto	   (1979)	   that	   while	   history	   sets	   conditions	   and	  constraints	   for	   agency,	   it	   doesn’t	   determine	   outcomes	   alone.	  We	   cannot	   explore	   here	  whether	   the	  state	  would	  have	  had	  alternative	  solutions	   in	  managing	   its	  debt	  problem.	  What	   is	   important	   from	   our	   perspective	   is	   that	   different	   public	   administrations	  represented	  different	  interests,	  which	  ultimately	  incapacitated	  the	  state	  in	  providing	  an	  integrated	   policy	   agenda,	   which	   would	   have	   combined	   the	   redistribution	   of	   property	  rights	   from	   public	   to	   private	   actors	   with	   a	   developmental	   agenda	   –	   as	   it	   occurred	   in	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Poland.	  Managing	  the	  restructuring	  of	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  supply	  chain	  fell	  to	  different	  public	  actors,	  who	  had	  different	  rationalities:	  restructuring	  the	  production	  segment	  was	  tied	   to	   the	   question	   of	   land	   and	   cooperative	   privatization	   under	   the	   authority	   of	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Agriculture.	   The	   dairy	   processing	   segment	   fell	   however	   under	   the	  competence	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  ÁVU,	  who	  had	  one	  short	  term	  goal:	  the	  swift	  privatization	  of	  assets	  such	  as	  dairy	  processing	  plants,	  that	  belonged	  exclusively	  to	  the	  state.	   The	   financial	   question	   of	   the	   state	   budget’s	   stability	  was	   thus	   entirely	   divorced	  from	  the	  problem	  of	  ensuring	   the	   long-­‐term	  viability	  and	  competitiveness	  of	  agri-­‐food	  sectors	  such	  as	  dairy.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  outcomes,	  one	  could	  conclude	  that	  the	  former	  (the	  Ministry	   of	   Finance	   and	   AVU)	   completely	   prevailed	   over	   the	   latter	   (the	   Ministry	   of	  Agriculture).	  The	  actual	  situation	  was	  even	  worse:	  	  the	  Independent	  Smallholders’	  Party	  (FKGP)	  which	   controlled	   the	  Ministry	   of	  Agriculture,	   in	   fact	   ended	  up	   legitimizing	   the	  dismantlement	  of	  agricultural	  producers’	  cooperatives	  –	  against	  its	  own	  better	  judgment	  -­‐	   because	   of	   complex	   political	   games	   with	   the	   ruling	   government’s	   majority	   party	   as	  discussed	  in	  the	  subsequent	  part.	   In	  a	  bitter	  irony,	  the	  part	  of	  the	  state,	  which	  claimed	  charge	  for	  defending	  farmers’	  interests	  thus	  contributed	  to	  their	  economic	  and	  political	  marginalization	   –	   while	   another	   public	   administration	   disintegrated	   the	   dairy	   supply	  chain	  by	  subtracting	  the	  processing	  segment	  from	  the	  supply	  chain.	  Briefly	  put,	  if	  foreign	  debt	  was	  as	  a	  powerful	  incentive	  structure	  for	  attracting	  FDI,	  the	  dairy	  sector’s	  ultimate	  restructuring	  owed	  as	  much	  to	  the	  functional	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  state	  itself,	  which	  not	  only	  precluded	  the	  emergence	  of	  developmental	  alliances	  between	  domestic	  public	  and	  private	  actors	  but	   rendered	   the	  state	   itself	   incapable	   to	  articulate	   the	  dual	  problem	  of	  raising	   revenues	   in	   the	   short	   run,	  while	   strengthening	   the	   competitive	   viability	   of	   the	  privatized	  sectors.	  	  In	   other	   words,	   the	   state’s	   privatization	   agenda,	   which	   deeply	   restructured	   the	   dairy	  sector,	   was	   an	   outcome	   of	   particular	   policy	   preferences	   within	   distinct	   public	  administrations	   where	   the	   debt	   question	   was	   indeed	   used	   as	   an	   explanation	   for	   the	  necessity	  of	   selling	   state	  assets	   such	  as	  processing	   firms	  –	  however,	  we	  would	   refrain	  from	  arguing	   that	   it	  was	   a	   “mechanical”	   outcome	  of	   the	   current	   account	   deficit	   alone.	  What	   remains	   particularly	   important	   from	   our	   perspective	   is	   that	   in	   managing	  privatization	  and	  overseeing	  directly	  the	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  rights	  to	  foreign	  private	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investors,	  the	  state	  –	  more	  precisely	  AVU	  –	  actively	  shaped	  FDI	  penetration	  in	  the	  dairy	  sector.	  	  	  	  
Land	  privatization:	  weakening	  cooperatives,	  obliterating	  farmers	  	  	  	  The	   privatization	   of	   agricultural	   land	   stands	   in	   sharp	   contrast	   to	   privatization	   in	  industrial	  and	  commercial	  sectors	  (such	  as	  the	  processing	  and	  retail	  segments	  discussed	  below):	   foreign	   investors	   were	   explicitly	   excluded	   from	   the	   potential	   beneficiaries	   of	  land	  redistribution.	  However,	  while	  foreign	  ownership	  was	  excluded,	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  coalition	   government	   comprised	   of	   a	   staunchly	   conservative	   Hungarian	   Democratic	  Forum	   (MDF)	   led	  by	  Prime	  Minister	   József	  Antall,	   and	   its	   right-­‐wing	  minority	  partner	  the	   Independent	   Smallholders’	   Party	   (FKGP)	   ultimately	   led	   to	   the	   destruction	   of	  producers’	  cooperatives	  and	  a	   fragmentation	  of	   land	  tenure,	  which	  not	  only	  weakened	  the	  production	  of	  raw	  milk	  by	  incapacitating	  producers’	  cooperatives	  in	  the	  dairy	  supply	  chain,	  but	  even	  more	  importantly	  led	  to	  the	  complete	  marginalization	  of	  farmers	  and	  the	  political	  representation	  of	  their	  interests.	  This	  in	  turn	  proved	  highly	  consequential	  as	  in	  the	   following	   decades	   farmers-­‐producers	   would	   be	   excluded	   from	   the	   subsequent	  interest	  coalitions	  that	  governed	  the	  dairy	  sector.	  	  	  A	   core	   actor	   in	   agricultural	   privatization	   was	   the	   Independent	   Smallholders’	   Party	  (FKGP)	  and	  its	  charismatic	  leader,	  József	  Torgyán.	  The	  FKGP	  was	  a	  nominal	  successor	  to	  a	  conservative	  agrarian	  party	  established	  in	  1908,	  which	  had	  operated	  until	  1948	  when	  it	   was	   ultimately	   dissolved	   and	   banned	   (alongside	   other	   democratic	   parties)	   by	   the	  Communist	   Party.	   As	   its	   critics	   noted	   during	   the	   campaign	   of	   the	   first	   democratic	  elections	  in	  1990,	  while	  the	  revived	  FKGP’s	  program	  was	  notoriously	  vague,	  it	  had	  only	  one	  easily	  identifiable	  goal:	  “re-­‐privatization”	  -­‐	  which	  proved	  sufficient	  to	  win	  a	  coalition	  seat	   in	   the	   first	   post-­‐Communist	   government	   alongside	   the	   conservative	   Hungarian	  Democratic	  Forum	  (MDF)	  and	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  (KDNP).	  	  The	   re-­‐privatization	   card	   was	   successful	   because	   it	   could	   mobilize	   a	   vast	   electorate	  stretching	   well	   beyond	   farmers:	   the	   early	   optimism	   regarding	   market	   economy	   was	  partly	   motivated	   by	   the	   hope	   of	   retributions	   and	   compensations	   for	   expropriations	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incurred	  during	   the	   forced	  nationalization	  and	  collectivization	  programs	  of	   the	  1950s.	  Since	  the	  potential	  beneficiaries	  of	  re-­‐privatization	  encompassed	  a	  heterogeneous	  group	  ranging	  from	  former	  aristocrats,	  churches	  and	  rural	  bourgeoisie	  to	  smallholders	  whose	  parcels,	  tools	  and	  machinery	  had	  been	  collectivized	  –	  the	  FKGP’s	  re-­‐privatization	  slogan	  thus	   promised	   material	   gains	   to	   a	   substantial	   part	   of	   society	   comprised	   of	   the	   self-­‐identified	  losers	  of	  state	  Socialism	  when	  liberal	  parties	  campaigned	  with	  vague	  promises	  of	   democratic	   rights	   and	   freedoms.	   The	   FKGP’s	   programmatic	   aim	   was	   the	   re-­‐establishment	   of	   the	   pre-­‐Communist	   property	   rights	   structure	   and	   the	   material	  restitution	  of	  forcibly	  collectivized	  assets.	   In	  spite	  of	  the	  FKGP’s	  early	  electoral	  success	  and	   the	   popularity	   of	   its	   re-­‐privatization	   agenda,	   the	   reform	   of	   agricultural	   property	  rights	  which	  was	  ultimately	  adopted	  not	  only	  left	  deep	  scars	  on	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  domestic	  farmers	  and	  firms	  in	  the	  dairy	  sector	  but	  on	  the	  entire	  agro-­‐food	  complex	  just	  as	  it	  precipitated	  one	  the	  most	  severe	  political	  crises	  of	  the	  post-­‐1989	  years.	  	  The	   FKGP’s	   rhetoric	   combined	   three	   contradictory	   objectives.	   (1)	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	  proposed	  as	  early	  as	  May	  1989	  the	  so-­‐called	  1947	  principle,	  which	  meant	  to	  formally	  re-­‐establish	  the	  1947	  property	  rights	  structure	  in	  agriculture26,	  that	  is	  redistributing	  seized	  assets	  in	  nature	  to	  the	  original	  owners	  or	  their	  progeny.	  (2)	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  FKGP	  didn’t	  want	  to	  destroy	  the	  Socialist	  cooperatives	  nor	  agro-­‐industrial	  conglomerates	  and	  FKGP	  leaders	  were	  conscious	  that	  redistribution	  would	  only	  be	  viable	  if	  it	  didn’t	  lead	  to	  a	  fragmentation	  of	  agricultural	  land,	  which	  would	  threaten	  the	  economic	  viability	  of	  the	  sector.	  (3)	  Thirdly,	  the	  party	  equally	  sought	  to	  create	  a	  modern	  entrepreneurial	  class	  of	  rural	  capitalists	  virtually	  from	  scratch	  by	  empowering	  them	  as	  the	  targeted	  beneficiaries	  of	   land	   privatization.	   Quite	   clearly,	   these	   goals	   stood	   in	   tension	   with	   one	   another:	  reparatory	   redistribution	   could	   only	   happen	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   existing	   agricultural	  cooperatives,	  while	   returning	   agricultural	   assets	   to	   their	   original	   owners	   entailed	   the	  risk	   of	   creating	   a	   new	   class	   of	   rentiers	   instead	   of	   strengthening	   an	   entrepreneurial	  bourgeoisie27.	  While	  compensation	  and	  redistribution	  seemed	  consensual,	  the	  dilemma	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26 	  The	   reference	   year	   was	   selected	   to	   be	   1947	   as	   the	   latest	   pre-­‐collectivization	   date	   for	   which	  administrative	  data	  on	  land	  tenure	  was	  available.	  	  27	  These	  contradictions	  are	  captured	  in	  the	  declarations	  of	  FKGP	  leaders	   in	  the	  1989-­‐1990	  period.	  Vince	  Vörös,	  president	  of	  FKPG	  between	   June	  1989	  and	  May	  1990	   thus	  said	   in	  an	   interview	  dated	   June	  1989:	  „Private	  property	  and	  the	  possibility	  to	  trade	  land	  have	  to	  be	  reestablished.	  This	  of	  course	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  
well-­‐functioning	  public	  estates	  and	  cooperatives	  should	  be	  dismantled.	  These	  should	  continue	  to	  operate	  but	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for	  FKGP	  was	  to	  decide	  which	  social	  group	  should	  be	  empowered	  in	  the	  process:	  From	  this	  perspective,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   “re-­‐privatization”	   could	   either	   serve	   reparatory	  justice,	   the	   empowerment	   of	   specific	   social	   classes	   (whether	   the	   historically	  marginalized	   class	   of	   rural	   smallholders	   or	   the	   envisioned	   rural	   bourgeoisie	   to	   be	  created	  ex	  nihilo)	  or	  an	  economic	  modernization	  agenda	  for	  which	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  domestic	  agricultural	  and	  agri-­‐food	  sectors	  would	  have	  been	  central.	  	  However,	  it	  could	  not	  serve	  all	  of	  these	  goals	  at	  the	  same	  time	  (Cseszka	  &	  Schlett,	  2009).	  	  These	   contradictions	   were	   not	   apparent	   to	   the	   electorate	   until	   the	   newly	   formed	  government	  where	  FKGP	  controlled	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture	  began	  drafting	   the	  bill	  on	   “re-­‐privatization”.	   The	   party	  was	   torn	   between	   two	   options:	   sticking	   to	   the	   “1947	  principle”	  and	  effective	  material	  redistribution	  of	  public	  land	  and	  agricultural	  assets	  to	  the	   original	   owners	   or	   only	   offering	   financial	   compensation,	   necessitating	   a	  standardized	   system	   for	   assessing	   the	   value	   of	   expropriated	   land	   and	   property.	   A	  conservative	   faction	   of	   the	   party	   headed	   by	   József	   Torgyán	   defended	   the	   first	   option,	  while	   a	   pragmatic	   faction	   favored	   financial	   compensation.	   Not	   only	   was	   the	   FKGP	  internally	  split	  on	  the	   issue	  but	   it	  became	  apparent	  already	   in	   the	  course	  of	  1990	  that	  the	   coalition’s	  majority	   party,	   the	  MDF	   -­‐	   chief	   of	  which	  Prime	  Minister	   József	  Antall	   –	  was	  fundamentally	  opposed	  to	  redistribution	  in	  nature:	  Antall	  and	  the	  MDF	  considered	  that	  a	  wide-­‐scale	  redistribution	  of	  land	  would	  destroy	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  agriculture	  and	  agri-­‐food	  sectors.	  Antall	  convinced	  the	  FKGP	  (Torgyán	   included),	   that	   in	  exchange	  for	  their	  support	  on	  a	  bill	  regarding	  the	  privatization	  of	  catering	  establishments	  through	  auctions,	   the	  MDF	  would	   be	  willing	   to	   accept	   a	   limited	   re-­‐distribution	   of	   agricultural	  land	  and	  property	  in	  nature:	  FKGP	  accepted	  the	  deal.	  What	  the	  FKGP	  leadership	  failed	  to	  understand	  was	  that	  selling	  catering	  establishments	  through	  auctions	  –	  in	  disregard	  of	  the	  original	  owners	  –	  created	  a	  precedent	  for	  the	  Constitutional	  Court:	  It	  was	  impossible	  for	  the	  Court	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  primacy	  of	  original	  ownership	  in	  a	  sector	  and	  ignore	  it	  in	   another.	   In	  other	  words,	  Torgyán	  only	  understood	  after	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   seemingly	  subsidiary	   question	   of	   catering	   establishments’	   privatization	   legally	   foreclosed	   the	  possibility	   for	   material	   compensation	   in	   agricultural	   land.	   After	   securing	   the	   FKGP’s	  support	  for	  auctioning	  restaurants,	  Antall	  sent	  two	  questions	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the	  ownership	  of	   land	  has	  to	  return	  to	  the	  peasant.	  We	  don’t	  want	  a	  new	  distribution	  of	   land,	  which	  would	  
lead	  to	  a	  disaster.”	  (quoted	  in	  Cseszka	  &	  Schlett,	  2009).	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for	   a	   preliminary	   constitutionality	   review,	   enquiring	   over	   the	   legality	   of	   material	  compensation	   regarding	   agricultural	   land	   and	   property:	   as	   expected,	   the	   Court	   made	  clear	  (1)	  that	  no	  discrimination	  was	  acceptable	  between	  the	  compensation	  mechanisms	  of	  different	  sectors,	  and	  (2)	  that	  the	  land	  and	  property	  of	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  could	  not	   be	   expropriated	   for	   compensating	   their	   original	   owners.	   Torgyán’s	   clique	   felt	  betrayed:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   they	   had	   to	   face	   the	   opposition	   of	   the	  National	   Council	   of	  Agricultural	  Cooperatives	  (MOSZ)	  to	  the	  “1947	  principle”,	  while	  Antall,	  the	  MDF	  and	  the	  Constitutional	   Court	   barred	   any	   further	   route	   to	   material	   compensation28	  (Cseszka	   &	  Schlett,	  2009).	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	   these	  complex	  political	  games,	   the	  option	  of	   financial	  compensation	  was	  eventually	   adopted	   by	   the	   pragmatic	   faction	   of	   the	   FKGP	   under	   increasingly	   strong	  pressures	   from	  the	  MDF:	   the	   law	  was	   finally	  adopted	  on	  April	  24th	  1991.	  The	  selected	  method	   was	   privatization	   through	   public	   auctions	   with	   vouchers:	   the	   value	   of	  expropriated	  land	  was	  fixed	  in	  “golden	  crowns”,	  a	  measure	  integrating	  not	  only	  the	  size	  of	   seized	   land	   and	   assets	   but	   also	   their	   agricultural	   productivity.	   The	   claimants	  were	  entitled	  to	  vouchers	  denominated	  in	  golden	  crowns	  (guaranteed	  by	  the	  state)	  in	  relation	  to	   the	   value	   of	   their	   expropriated	  property.	   These	   vouchers	   could	   in	   turn	  be	  used	   for	  purchasing	  agricultural	  land	  at	  public	  auctions.	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  ironically,	  while	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  had	  previously	  deemed	  the	   material	   redistribution	   of	   cooperative	   assets	   unconstitutional,	   the	   financial	  compensation	  mechanism	  nonetheless	   forced	  cooperatives	   to	   sell	   a	   substantial	  part	  of	  the	   land	   they	   controlled:	   cooperatives	   had	   an	   obligation	   to	   divide	   their	   land	   in	   four	  categories:	   land	   in	   collective	   ownership	   and	   collective	   use,	   cooperative	   land	   in	   state	  ownership,	   land	   in	   collective	   ownership	   but	   privately	   used	   and	   land	   in	   “mixed”	  ownership	   between	   the	   cooperative	   and	   its	   private	   owners29.	   The	   stock	   of	   land	   to	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  The	   tension	  between	  the	   two	  men	  became	  so	  severe	   that	  Torgyán	  began	  to	  publically	  call	   for	  Antall’s	  resignation,	  while	  Antal	  leaked	  confidential	  documents	  allegedly	  proving	  Torgyán’s	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Communist	   secret	   services	  during	  and	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	   the	  1956	   revolution.	  The	  FKGP	  was	  not	  only	  ideologically	   divided	   but	   formally	   split	   in	   two	   when	   Torgyán’s	   faction	   and	   those	   loyal	   to	   the	   coalition	  government	  mutually	  expelled	  one	  another	  from	  the	  party.	  	  29	  The	   questions	   of	   “fuzzy”,	   or	   „recombinant”	   property,	   the	   integration	   of	   state	   farms,	   cooperatives	   and	  private	   property,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   increasing	   importance	   of	   a	   grey	   economy	   in	   the	   1980s	  were	   of	   central	  
	  	   110	  
auctioned	  derived	  for	  one	  part	  from	  cooperative	  property,	  while	  the	  other	  was	  provided	  by	  the	  state:	  after	  dividing	  their	  land	  in	  the	  abovementioned	  four	  categories,	  agricultural	  cooperatives	   had	   to	   isolate	   within	   the	   category	   of	   “collective	   ownership	   and	   use”	   a	  portion	  destined	  for	  sale.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  state	  contributed	  with	  20%	  of	  its	  own	  land	   estates	   to	   the	   land	   fund30.	   	   A	   provision	   of	   the	   law	   further	   stipulated	   that	   if	  individual	  members	   of	   agricultural	   cooperatives	   didn’t	   dispose	   of	   vouchers	   (that	   is,	   if	  they	  were	  not	  legal	  claimants	  or	  heirs	  to	  seized	  land),	  they	  nonetheless	  were	  entitled	  to	  30	   golden	   crowns	  worth	   of	   land	   for	   cooperative	  members	   and	   20	   golden	   crowns	   for	  employees	  thereof31.	  Another	  provision	  fixed	  a	  cap	  for	  the	  transactions	  at	  a	  maximum	  of	  300	   hectares	   or	   600	   golden	   crowns	   for	   natural	   persons:	   this	   was	   an	   attempt	   (albeit	  largely	   inefficient)	   to	   avoid	   speculation	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   vast	   personal	   estates32.	  Finally,	   only	   the	  members	   of	   agricultural	   cooperatives,	   the	   original	   owners	   or	   natural	  persons	   residing	   in	   the	   same	   locality	   could	   bid	   for	   cooperative	   land:	   other	   claimants	  could	  only	  bid	   for	   state-­‐owned	  non-­‐cooperative	   land33.	  The	  MDF’s	  preferred	  option	  of	  financial	   compensation	   (instead	   of	   direct	  material	   redistribution)	   had	   been	  motivated	  by	  the	  fear	  of	  incapacitating	  agro-­‐industries	  with	  an	  unviable	  property	  rights	  structure:	  However,	   the	   effects	   of	   what	   was	   thought	   to	   be	   a	   limited	   compensation	   mechanism	  proved	   sufficient	   to	   radically	   modify	   the	   existing	   property	   rights	   regime	   and	   create	  precisely	  the	  type	  of	  dual	  market	  both	  the	  MDF	  and	  the	  FKGP	  originally	  sought	  to	  avoid.	  Table	  3.9	  shows	  the	  breakdown	  of	  these	  transactions:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  interest	   to	   the	   students	   of	   late-­‐Socialist	   and	   post-­‐Socialist	   property	   rights	   (Harcsa	   et	   al.,	   2003a;	   Stark,	  1996;	  Verdery,	  2004).	  	  30	  It	   should	  be	  noted	  here	   that	   the	  category	  of	   „land”	  was	  broader	   than	  agriculturally	  productive	  assets:	  forests	  were	   included	   just	   as	   arable	  plough	   land.	  The	   rationale	  was	   that	   the	   common	  metric	   in	   „golden	  crowns”	   as	   an	   integrated	   measure	   of	   size	   and	   productivity	   would	   assign	   a	   different	   market	   value	   to	  productive	  and	  unproductive	  estates.	  	  31	  The	  aim	  was	  to	  reduce	  potential	  tensions	  between	  cooperative	  members	  and	  the	  new	  buyers	  by	  offering	  a	  „safety	  net”	  of	  compensations	  for	  the	  cooperative	  workforce.	  	  	  32 	  However,	   the	   law	   only	   concerned	   the	   maximum	   amount	   that	   could	   be	   purchased	   under	   the	  privatization	  scheme:	  where	  legal	  persons	  already	  disposed	  of	  estates	  in	  excess	  of	  300	  hectares	  and/or	  a	  value	  superior	  to	  600	  golden	  crowns,	   they	  were	  not	  obliged	  to	  sell	   the	  exceeding	  part	  of	   their	  property.	  This	   also	   proved	   a	   weakness	   for	   the	   purported	   egalitarian	   goal	   of	   privatization,	   since	   the	   early,	  unregulated	   phase	   of	   „spontaneous	   privatization”	   that	   had	   preceded	   1989	   had	   already	   created	   larger	  estates.	  	  	  33	  Since	   the	   land	   of	   agricultural	   cooperatives	  was	   of	   higher	   value	   (as	   it	   was	   arable	   plough	   land,	   unlike	  much	  of	  the	  poorly	  used	  land	  offered	  by	  the	  state),	  the	  above	  restriction	  meant	  that	  cooperative	  members	  generally	  received	  the	  most	  expensive	  and	  higher	  quality	  plots.	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Table	  3.9.	  Privatization	  of	  Agricultural	  Land	  in	  Hungary	  
 
Land from 
Cooperatives Land from State 
Total 
 
Area (ha.) 1 975 458 165 987 2 141 445 
Distribution (%) 92,3 7,7 100 
Value in Golden Crowns 37 496 169 1 759 767 39 255 936 
Average area size (ha.) 2,3 0,8 2 
Average Value in Golden Crowns 44 8,5 37 
Number of Beneficiaries 612 010 147 777 759 787 
Total Number of Transactions 21 345 5 412 26 757 
Source:	  (Dorgai,	  2004)	  	  This	   table	   summarizes	   a	   number	   of	   defining	   weaknesses	   in	   the	   process:	   First,	   the	  imbalance	   between	   cooperative	   (92,3%)	   and	   state-­‐owned	   land	   (7,7%)	   shows	   that	   in	  spite	   of	   its	   alleged	   goal	   as	   a	   retribution	   mechanism	   that	   wasn’t	   meant	   to	   cripple	  cooperatives,	   the	  compensation	  or	  re-­‐privatization	  process	  overwhelmingly	  concerned	  cooperative	   land.	   Second,	   while	   the	   process	   was	   meant	   to	   be	   restricted	   in	   scope,	   it	  actually	   concerned	   close	   to	   2	   million	   hectares,	   that	   is	   a	   third	   of	   Hungary’s	   total	  agricultural	  land.	  Third,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  transactions	  concerned	  small	  plots	  ranging	  from	   one	   to	   two	   hectares,	   which	   resulted	   in	   the	   dreaded	   fragmentation	   of	   land	   that	  policy	  makers	  explicitly	  wanted	  to	  avoid.	  Finally,	  claimants	  could	  seldom	  acquire	  larger	  contiguous	  plots,	  which	  meant	   that	   the	  new	   landowners	   ended	  up	  with	   small	   plots	   of	  land	  scattered	  throughout	  the	  country.	  The	  consequences	  of	  geographic	  dispersion	  were	  just	   as	   negative	   as	   fragmentation:	   the	   two	   phenomena	   created	   a	   situation	   where	   a	  majority	   of	   smallholders	   couldn’t	   profitably	   use	   these	   plots	   for	   agricultural	   and	   agro-­‐industrial	  activities,	  while	  the	  remaining	  cooperatives	  who	  could	  have	  used	  them	  were	  forced	   to	   rent	   land	   from	   a	   plurality	   of	   new	   owners	   (often	   their	   own	   membership)	  through	  leasing	  contracts,	  most	  of	  which	  were	  soon	  terminated	  by	  one	  of	  the	  contracting	  parties34.	  	  	  The	  1991	  law	  on	  the	  “re-­‐privatization”	  of	  land	  had	  three	  fundamental	  consequences	  for	  the	   dairy	   sector:	   (1)	   As	   cooperatives	   were	   eventually	   forced	   to	   sell	   off	   their	   land	   for	  “compensating”	  original	  owners,	   it	   led	  to	  the	  rapid	  marginalization	  of	  dairy	  producers’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  The	   Hungarian	   Institute	   for	   Agricultural	   Research	   (AKI)	   conducted	   a	   study	   in	   1998	   to	   examine	   the	  durability	  of	  contractual	  relations	  in	  leasing	  contracts	  that	  resulted	  from	  the	  new	  property	  structure.	  The	  study	   found	   that	   80%	   of	   the	   contracts	   had	   been	   terminated	   by	   one	   of	   the	   contracting	   parties	   (Herbst,	  2000).	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cooperatives	  which	  had	  played	  a	  substantial	  role	  not	  only	  in	  the	  production	  of	  fresh	  milk	  but	  also	  as	   joint	  owners	  of	  processing	  plants	  (see	  previous	  section	  on	  the	   institutional	  structure	   of	   the	   dairy	   sector	   under	   Socialism),	   (2)	   The	   small	   size	   and	   geographic	  dispersion	   of	   land	   plots	   ensured	   that	   the	   new	   private	   owners	   of	   redistributed	   land	  would	   be	   economically	   unviable:	   farmer-­‐producers	   who	   benefited	   from	   the	   re-­‐privatization	  of	  (mostly)	  cooperative	  land	  were	  anything	  but	  empowered	  by	  their	  newly	  secured	   private	   property.	   On	   the	   contrary	   they	   formed	   the	   bulk	   of	   agricultural	  workforce	   (notably	  smallholder	  cattle	  breeders)	  who	  were	  gradually	   forced	  out	  of	   the	  market	  throughout	  the	  1990s	  as	  they	  couldn’t	  secure	  the	  necessary	  capital	  for	  investing	  in	   technological	   upgrading	   (Gorton	   &	   Guba,	   2002).	   (3)	   The	   active	   role	   of	   the	  Smallholders’	   Party	   in	   the	   erratic	   and	   self-­‐defeating	   privatization	   of	   land	   greatly	  participated	  in	  the	  party’s	  loss	  of	  legitimacy.	  They	  managed	  to	  secure	  a	  second	  minority	  coalition	  partner	   status	   in	   the	   first	  Orban	  government	  of	   1998	  but	   they	  were	   entirely	  marginalized	   from	   party	   politics	   in	   later	   elections.	   Thus,	   not	   only	   did	   the	   only	   large	  political	   party	   representing	   farmers’	   interest	   loose	   the	   support	   of	   the	   very	   class	   it	  allegedly	   sought	   to	   represent,	   but	   the	   re-­‐privatization	   it	   left	   as	   a	   legacy	   ensured	   a	  fragmentation	   of	   property	   rights	   among	   producers	   that	   left	   them	   atomized,	   without	  viable	   assets,	   without	   institutional	   structures	   guaranteeing	   access	   to	   capital	   and	  productive	   assets	   to	   a	   “large	   cross-­‐section”	   of	   farmers,	   namely	   cooperatives–	   and	  without	  any	  political	  representation.	  	  The	  marginalization	  of	  farmers	  in	  the	  dairy	  sector	  throughout	   the	  1990s	  accelerated	  as	  producer	  cooperatives	  were	  disbanded:	  by	  1997,	  farmer	  cooperatives	  only	  represented	  3%	  (697	  million	  HUF)	  in	  the	  capitalization	  of	  the	  overall	  dairy	  sector,	  which	  stood	  at	  23,4	  billion	  HU	  (M.	  Szabó,	  1999).	  	  	  	  	  Ultimately,	   the	   unfavorable	   fragmentation	   of	   the	   new	   property	   right	   regime	   stripped	  farmers	   from	   the	   mobilizational	   capacity	   that	   would	   have	   been	   necessary	   for	  participating	   in	   the	   re-­‐regulation	   of	   agri-­‐food	   sectors	   such	   as	   dairy.	   The	   long-­‐term	  exclusion	  of	  farmers	  from	  the	  defining	  coalitions	  that	  shaped	  the	  sector’s	  transformation	  throughout	   the	   1990s	   and	   2000s	   can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   the	   mismanagement	   of	   land	  privatization.	   This,	   in	   combination	   with	   the	   overproduction	   crisis	   that	   resulted	   from	  scraping	  consumer	  price	  subsidies	  for	  dairy	  products	  and	  the	  incentives	  for	  a	  reduction	  of	  production	  capacities	   that	  we	  discussed	  earlier,	  has	   led	   to	  a	  drop	   in	   the	  cattle	  herd	  size	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  regime	  change,	  as	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  3.12	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Figure	  3.12.	  Hungary’s	  Beef	  and	  Milking	  Cow	  Herd	  1950-­‐2000	  
	  
Source:	  Hungarian	  National	  Statistical	  Office	  (KSH)	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Each	   of	   these	   regional	   processing	   companies	   had	   been	   composed	   of	   a	   network	   of	  processing	  plants:	  the	  first	  step	  to	  privatization	  entailed	  breaking	  up	  the	  15	  companies	  into	   36	   new,	   independent	   dairy	   processors	   (Gorton	  &	   Guba,	   2002).	   The	   second	   stage	  was	   their	   sale	   through	   the	   privatization	   agency	   to	   new	   investors.	   Contrary	   to	   land	  privatization	   where	   sale	   to	   foreign	   physical	   and	   moral	   persons	   was	   legally	   banned,	  MNCs	  played	  the	  leading	  role	  in	  buying	  these	  processing	  plants.	  The	  first	  MNCs	  to	  enter	  the	  processing	   sector	   through	  brownfield	   investments	  purchasing	   from	   the	  pool	  of	  26	  individual	  processing	  plants	  were	  Italian	  Parmalat	  and	  Irish	  Avonmore	  in	  1992.	  	  These	  firms	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  an	  accelerating	  process	  of	  MNC	  expansion	  in	  dairy	  processing:	  Bongrain,	  Nutricia,	  Danone,	  ERU	  were	  quick	  to	  follow.	  By	  1996,	  MNCs	  controlled	  60%	  of	  processing,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  this	  figure	  reached	  85%	  (Szajner	  &	  Vőneki,	  2014a),	  however,	   in	   the	  mid	   2000s,	   these	   very	  MNCs	   began	   leaving	   the	  Hungarian	   sector	   one	  after	   another	   leading	   to	   a	   re-­‐domestication	   of	   the	   market.	   In	   the	   following,	   we	   will	  review	  the	  strategies	  of	  some	  of	  the	  most	  illustrative	  firms	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  why	  the	  prevalence	  of	  MNCs	  didn’t	  lead	  to	  economic	  upgrading	  and	  how	  domestic	  firms	  and	  the	  state	  reacted	  to	  MNC	  strategies.	  
Parmalat	  	  In	   1992,	   Parmalat	   purchased	   the	   second	   biggest	   Hungarian	   dairy	   	   -­‐	   the	   Fejér	   and	  Komárom	   Counties	   Dairy	   Company	   -­‐	   located	   60	   kilometers	   West	   of	   Budapest	   in	  Székesfehérvár.	   Parmalat	   was	   pioneering	   in	   the	   implementation	   of	   new	  management	  techniques:	   it	   established	   its	   own	   transport	   and	   distribution	   network	   throughout	   the	  country,	   set	   up	   8	   depot	   centers	   and	   equipped	   its	   collecting	   cooling	   trucks	   with	  computers	  that	  could	  monitor	  orders	  in	  real	  time	  (M.	  Szabó,	  1996).	  In	  spite	  of	  increasing	  complaints	  from	  suppliers	  that	  Parmalat	  systematically	  delayed	  payments,	  the	  company	  grew	   steadily	   throughout	   the	   1990s	   and	   by	   2002,	   it	   controlled	   8%	   of	   the	   domestic	  market,	  with	  a	  specialization	  in	  fresh	  milk	  and	  fruit	  yoghurts	  (Tímár,	  2004).	  However,	  a	  scandal	  revealed	  in	  2003	  that	  Parmalat	  Hungary’s	  parent	  company,	  the	  Parmalat	  group	  controlled	  by	  the	  Tanzi	  family,	  had	  used	  the	  services	  of	  Bank	  of	  America’s	  Italian	  chief	  of	  corporate	   finances	   to	   forge	   the	   publically	   traded	   company’s	   accounting:	   the	  investigations	  revealed	  that	  Parmalat	  had	  kept	  a	  lid	  on	  14,3	  billion	  USD	  debt	  (Chalkidou,	  2011).	  When	  the	  investigations	  began	  in	  Italy,	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  Parmalat	  Hungary	  had	  equally	  followed	  questionable	  business	  practices.	  Parmalat	  Hungary’s	  management	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failed	   to	   communicate	   to	   its	   Italian	  parent	   company	   the	  debts	   it	   had	   accumulated:	  By	  2003,	  it	  owed	  720	  million	  HUF	  to	  its	  suppliers35.	  	  When	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  financial	  situation	  of	  the	  company	  was	  untenable,	  the	  management	  had	  to	  face	  the	  pressure	  of	  its	  suppliers,	  its	  employees	  and	  the	  National	  Milk	  Council	  (the	  only	  regulatory	  body	  at	  the	  sector	  level),	  which	  had	  lent	  500	  million	  HUF	  to	  Parmalat.	  The	  Head	  of	  Parmalat’s	  union	  of	   employees,	  Ms.	   Bocs,	   sided	  with	   the	   suppliers	   as	   she	   argued	   that	   the	  management	  purposely	  delayed	  payments	  until	  it	  could	  apply	  for	  bankruptcy	  protection,	  which	  would	  threaten	  450	  local	   jobs.	  As	  suppliers	  and	  employees	  understood	  it,	   if	   they	  let	  Parmalat	  Hungary	   benefit	   from	   bankruptcy	   status,	   the	   company	   would	   be	   legally	   protected	   in	  withholding	   payments	   to	   suppliers,	   and	   potentially	   wages	   too	   (Bihari,	   2004)	   The	  management	   offered	   to	   convert	   the	   outstanding	   debt	   to	   its	   suppliers	   into	   company	  shares,	   an	   option	   refused	   by	   the	   suppliers.	   Parmalat’s	   suppliers	   filed	   for	   a	   liquidation	  procedure	  against	   the	   firm,	  while	   the	  management	  requested	  bankruptcy	  protection36:	  the	   tribunal	   sided	  with	   the	   suppliers	   and	   Parmalat	   was	   forced	   to	   resume	   its	   delayed	  payments	  (Kitta,	  2004).	  The	  difficult	  settlement	  negotiations	  aside,	  Parmalat’s	  main	  goal	  was	   to	   terminate	   its	   operations	   and	   leave	   the	   Hungarian	   market:	   Eventually,	   the	  Székesfehérvár	   plant	   was	   bought	   by	   the	   only	   domestically	   owned	   heavyweight	   dairy	  cooperative,	  Alföldi	  Milk	  in	  2005:	  although	  Alföldi	  Milk	  didn’t	  have	  sufficient	  liquidities,	  the	   cooperative	   benefitted	   from	   a	   preferential	   loan	   by	   the	   Hungarian	   Development	  Bank37	  to	  purchase	  the	  plant	  (Voszka,	  2009).	  	  	  
Avonmore	  	  Just	   as	   Parmalat,	   Avonmore 38 	  entered	   the	   market	   in	   1992:	   by	   then	   the	   Central	  Hungarian	  Dairy	  Company	  (KTV),	  one	  of	  the	  original	  15	  Socialist	  dairy	  firms,	  was	  on	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  The	  debt	  was	  a	  consequence	  of	  delayed	  payments	  to	  farmers,	  which	  are	  a	  typical	  consequence	  of	  the	  the	  types	  of	  contracts	  between	  MNC	  processors	  and	  small	  producers,	  where	  MNCs	  exonerate	  themselves	  from	  paying	  on	  delivery.	  	  36	  The	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   procedures	   is	   the	   primacy	   afforded	   to	   the	   company	   or	   its	   creditors:	  liquidation	  prioritizes	  the	  claims	  of	  creditors,	  while	  bankruptcy	  protection	  protects	  the	  company’s	  capital	  in	  spite	  of	  outstanding	  debt.	  	  37	  Although	  this	  type	  of	  support	  for	  stabilizing	  food	  processing	  companies	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  bankruptcy	  was	  a	  relative	  novelty	  in	  2005,	  this	  form	  of	  intervention	  later	  spread	  to	  other	  agri-­‐food	  sectors	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  (Voszka,	  2009).	  	  38	  Note:	  Avonmore	  has	  since	  changed	  its	  name	  to	  Glanbia.	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verge	  of	  bankruptcy.	  Instead	  of	  buying	  the	  entire	  company,	  Avonmore	  only	  bought	  one	  of	  KTV’s	  processing	  plants	  in	  Pásztó	  (80	  km	  North	  East	  of	  Budapest)	  (M.	  Szabó,	  1996).	  The	  specificity	  of	  Avonmore	  compared	  with	  other	  MNCs	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  cooperative	  of	  Irish	  farmers,	   which	   operates	   as	   an	   MNC	   abroad:	   a	   recent	   research	   on	   the	   behavior	   of	  Avonmore	  and	  similar	   transnational	  dairy	  cooperatives	  showed	   that	  while	   these	   firms	  have	   a	   strong	   cooperative	   identity	   in	   their	   home	   countries,	   they	   operate	   as	   classical	  MNCs	   in	   their	  external	  operations	  (Bijman,	  Pykkönen,	  &	  Petri,	  2012).	  This	   insight	  was	  confirmed	   in	   the	   Hungarian	   market,	   where	   Avonmore	   adopted	   an	   aggressive	  expansionist	  strategy	  selling	  below	  procurement	  prices:	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  firm	  was	  to	  quickly	  capture	  a	  substantial	  share	  of	  the	  domestic	  market	  in	  order	  to	  realize	  economies	  of	  scale.	  However,	  the	  investment	  in	  Pásztó	  soon	  turned	  against	  Avonmore:	  the	  firm	  was	  specialized	  in	  high	  quality	  fresh	  milk,	  which	  needed	  a	  steady	  supply	  of	  premium	  quality	  raw	  milk.	  Pásztó	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  is	  a	  small	  village	  of	  10	  000	  inhabitants,	  with	  average	  transport	   infrastructure,	   geographically	   isolated	   from	   the	   traditional	   cattle	   breeding	  regions	  of	   the	  Southern	  and	  Western	  plains.	  The	  poor	   choice	  of	   location	   coupled	  with	  the	   structural	   problems	   of	   land	   fragmentation	   and	   poorly	   regulated	   leasing	   contracts	  (resulting	   from	   the	   1991	   privatization	   law)	   made	   Avonmore’s	   aggressive	   pricing	  strategy	  increasingly	  unviable.	  The	  firm	  operated	  with	  a	  loss	  in	  excess	  of	  2	  billion	  HUF	  (Tímár,	   2004).	   By	   1997,	   the	   home	   company	  was	   confronted	  with	   the	   choice	   of	   either	  selling	   the	  Pásztó	  plant	   to	   competitors	   or	   raising	  new	   capital:	   the	  management	  began	  negotiations	  with	  two	  venture	  capital	  firms,	  Euroventures	  and	  Equinox,	  which	  invested	  2	  million	  euros39.	  The	  investment	  funds	  secured	  two	  seats	  out	  of	  three	  in	  the	  new	  Board,	  and	  alongside	  the	  capital	  they	  injected,	  they	  encouraged	  the	  management	  to	  introduce	  a	  new	  product	  on	   the	  market:	  a	   type	  of	  sour	  cream	  in	  which	  milk	   fat	  was	  replaced	  with	  vegetable	   oil.	   The	   investment	   proved	   successful	   from	   a	   financial	   perspective:	   sales	  doubled	   to	   45	  million	   euros.	   This	  was	   precisely	   the	  moment	   that	   Avonmore	   chose	   to	  leave	   the	  Hungarian	  market	   and	   sell	   the	   Pásztó	   plant	   to	   Sole,	   a	   competitor	   owned	   by	  Italian	  investor	  Gala	  Italia.	   It	   is	  telling	  that	  the	  operation	  still	   figures	  on	  the	  Hungarian	  Private	   Equity	   and	   Venture	   Capital	   Association’s	   website	   under	   the	   “success	   stories”	  heading	   although	   Sole	   actually	   closed	   down	   the	   Pásztó	   plant	   in	   2004,	   the	   300	   local	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Source:	  http://www.hvca.hu/pevc-­‐explained/private-­‐equity/pe-­‐success-­‐stories/avonmore-­‐p%C3%A1szt%C3%B3-­‐by-­‐euroventures-­‐and-­‐equinox/	  accessed	  17/04/2014	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employees	  were	  fired	  and	  the	  technically	  well-­‐equipped	  plant	  which	  had	  processed	  200	  million	  tons	  of	  milk	  yearly	  has	  been	  left	  to	  rot40.	  	  	  	  
Danone	  	  	  French	  Danone	  is	  another	  major	  MNC	  that	  entered	  the	  Hungarian	  market	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	   the	   1990s.	   The	   trajectory	   of	   the	   company’s	   operation	   in	   Hungary	   in	   many	   ways	  reflects	  the	  experience	  of	  Parmalat	  and	  Avonmore.	  The	  Budapest	  Dairy	  Company	  (BTV)	  was	  one	  of	  the	  Socialist	  dairy	  companies	  created	  in	  1964	  through	  the	  merger	  of	  pre-­‐war	  Budapest	  dairy	  processing	  plants.	  At	  the	  onset	  of	  privatization	  and	  market	  liberalization,	  BTV	   first	   entered	   a	   licensing	   deal	  with	  Danone	   in	   1991:	  BTV	  produced	   and	  marketed	  Danone	  yoghurts	   for	   the	  domestic	  market.	  The	  second	  step	  was	   the	  creation	  of	  a	   joint	  stock	   company	   between	   Danone	   and	   BTV,	   which	   was	   ultimately	   disbanded	   when	  Danone	   bought	   out	   BTV’s	   share	   and	   the	   Budapest	   processing	   plant	   became	   Danone’s	  sole	  property	   in	  1994	  (M.	  Szabó,	  1996).	   In	  1995,	  Danone	  made	  a	   lesser	   investment	  by	  buying	   a	   small	   processing	   plant	   in	  Marcali	   (Wetsern	  Hungary,	   south	   of	   lake	   Balaton),	  where	   it	   produced	   “Túró	   Rudi”,	   a	   specifically	   Hungarian	   chocolate	   and	   cheese	   bar.	   In	  Budapest,	  Danone	  reduced	   the	  plant’s	  product	  portfolio,	   stopped	  producing	   fresh	  milk	  and	   flavored	  milk	   products	   to	   focus	   entirely	   on	   higher	   value	   added	   products	   such	   as	  yoghurts,	   desserts,	   sour	   cream	   and	   kefir.	   Danone’s	   Hungarian	   operation	   was	  coordinated	   with	   a	   larger	   Central	   European	   investment	   plan	   as	   the	   firm	   invested	  simultaneously	   in	   Poland,	   the	   Czech	  Republic,	   Romania,	   Bulgaria	   and	   even	  Ukraine	   in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  1990s.	  In	  a	  first	  period,	  Danone	  favored	  national	  specialization:	  fruit	  yoghurts	  were	   imported	   from	  the	  Czech	  Republic	  while	  puddings	  were	  exported	   from	  Hungary	   to	   other	   CEE	   markets,	   however	   after	   1995,	   the	   products	   destined	   to	   the	  Hungarian	  market	  were	  all	  produced	  at	  the	  Budapest	  plant.	  By	  2004,	  Danone	  controlled	  63%	   of	   the	   yoghurt	   market	   and	   37%	   of	   desserts	   (Tímár,	   2004).	   	   The	   firm	   invested	  massively	   in	   upgrading	   technology	   and	   enforcing	   up	   to	   date	   food	   safety	   standards:	  between	  1991	  and	  2001,	   it	   invested	  more	   than	  10	  billion	  HUF	   in	   the	  Budapest	  plant’s	  modernization.	  The	  registered	  capital	  grew	  from	  10	  million	  HUF	  in	  1991	  to	  2,	  5	  billion	  by	  1996.	  The	  last	  major	  investment	  occurred	  in	  2003	  when	  Danone	  bought	  state	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Source:	  www.palyazat.gov.hu/download/933/Pásztó.doc	  accessed	  17/04/2014	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art	  machinery	  for	  producing	  desserts	  for	  600	  million	  HUF.	  In	  2001,	  Danone’s	  revenues	  amounted	   to	   20	   billion	   HUF	   and	   the	   net	   profit	   exceeded	   1	   billion	   HUF	   (Neuberger,	  2014).	   The	   early	   2000s	   marked	   the	   zenith	   in	   Danone’s	   expansion:	   the	   company	  attempted	   to	   diversify	   beyond	  dairy,	   notably	   in	   the	   biscuit	  market	   and	  purchased	   the	  Győr	   Biscuit	   Company	   (Győri	   Keksz)	   in	   2000	   from	   United	   Biscuits.	   Throughout	   the	  2000s	   however,	   the	   firm	   gradually	   retreated	   from	   the	   market.	   A	   major	   PR	   problem	  occurred	   in	   2001,	   when	   internal	   plans	   to	   close	   the	   Győr	   biscuit	   plant	   leaked	   and	  mobilized	  an	  online	  petition	  and	  consumer	  boycott	  movement	  to	  defend	  local	  jobs	  and	  the	   survival	   of	   the	   plant:	   under	   the	   pressure	   of	   public	   opinion	   and	   the	   Hungarian	  government,	  Danone	  chose	  to	  keep	  the	  plant	  but	  fired	  300	  employees.	  Danone’s	  public	  image	  was	   deeply	   stained	   in	   the	   process41.	   In	   2009,	  Danone	   sold	   the	  Marcali	   plant	   to	  Sole-­‐Mizo	  but	  the	  erosion	  in	  competitiveness	  accelerated	  after	  2010:	  profits	  decreased	  from	  1,	  2	  billion	  HUF	  in	  2010	  to	  merely	  82	  million	  in	  201242.	  In	  2013,	  Danone	  unveiled	  a	  new	  regional	  reorganization	  of	   its	  CEE	  activities	  with	  Budapest	  as	  the	  new	  managerial	  and	  distribution	  hub	  for	  the	  region.	  Yet	  in	  June	  2014,	  Danone	  announced	  the	  liquidation	  of	   the	   Budapest	   plant	   scheduled	   for	   2015,	   terminating	   all	   processing	   activities	   in	  Hungary:	  Danone	  products	  would	  be	  sourced	  from	  Poland	  and	  Romania	  in	  the	  future.	  At	  present	   it	   remains	   uncertain	  whether	   the	   Budapest	   plant	   will	   be	   sold	   or	   simply	   shut	  down.	  
Nutricia/Friesland	  Campina	  	  The	   restructuring	   process	   caused	   by	   Dutch	   MNC	   Nutricia	   is	   another	   paradigmatic	  example	   of	   MNCs’	   role	   in	   the	   Hungarian	   dairy	   sector.	   Numico	   Internationel	   B.V.	   is	   a	  Dutch	   firm	   founded	   in	   1901	   specialized	   in	   baby	   food.	   The	   Nutricia	   Dairy	   and	   Drinks	  Group	  was	  a	  division	  of	  Numico	  until	  1997	  when	   it	  became	  an	  autonomous	  company.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  The	  anonymously	  written	  online	  petition	  resurfaced	  periodically	  on	  the	  Hungarian	  web	  in	  2003,	  2005,	  2007	  and	  it	  allegedly	  led	  to	  a	  10%	  loss	  in	  Danone’s	  sales.	  	  Eventually,	  Danone	  sold	  the	  Győr	  biscuit	  plant	  to	  Kraft	  Foods	   in	  2007,	  which	  has	  kept	   the	  plant	   in	  operation	  since.	   In	  spite	  of	   this,	   for	   the	  public	  opinion	  Danone	  came	  to	  examplify	  the	  archetypal	  predatory	  MNC	  that	  seeks	  to	  buy	  and	  close	  any	  competitor	  to	  its	  market	  share	  in	  Hungary.	  	  Source:	  http://tudatosvasarlo.hu/attachment/file/36/Tudatos_vasarlok_bojkott_kezikonyve.pdf	  accessed	  01/07/2015	  	  42	  However,	   this	   decrease	   in	   revenues	   and	   profitability	   probably	  wasn’t	   only	   an	   outcome	   of	   decreasing	  demand	  and/or	  the	  financial	  crisis	  as	   it	  was	  also	  preceded	  by	  a	  steady	  reduction	  of	  Danone’s	  registered	  capital	  in	  Hungary,	  which	  had	  decreased	  from	  a	  1996	  maximum	  of	  2,5	  billion	  to	  1	  billion	  by	  2004.	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Nutricia	   entered	   the	  Hungarian	  market	   through	   the	  pharmaceutical	   sector:	   in	  1993,	   it	  established	   a	   joint-­‐stock	   company	   with	   the	   century-­‐old	   Hungarian	   pharmaceutical	  company	  Egis:	  Egis-­‐Nutricia	  Kft.	  The	  new	  company	  marketed	  Nutricia’s	  baby	   food	  and	  nutrition	   complements	   in	   Hungary.	   In	   1995,	   Nutricia	   ventured	   in	   the	   dairy	   sector	   by	  purchasing	   22,5%	   of	   Hajdú	   Milk,	   a	   dairy	   plant	   located	   in	   Debrecen	   (close	   to	   the	  Romanian	   border	   in	   the	   South-­‐East)	   and	   owned	   by	   the	  National	   Privatization	   Agency	  since	   1993.	   By	   1996,	   Nutricia	   increased	   the	   capitalization	   to	   96,7%	   and	   replaced	   the	  Hungarian	  management	  with	   Dutch	   personnel.	   In	   the	   following	   years,	   Nutricia’s	   used	  Hajdú	   Milk	   as	   a	   Trojan	   horse	   in	   the	   dairy	   sector	   in	   order	   to	   purchase	   a	   number	   of	  smaller	   processing	   plants,	   which	   were	   gradually	   integrated	   to	   Hajdú	   Milk’s	  infrastructure:	  Hajdú	  purchased	  Sárrét	  Milk	  and	  Zalka	  Milk	  in	  1997,	  followed	  by	  Balmaz	  Milk	   in	   1998,	   Szabolcs	  Milk	   in	   1999	   and	   finally	  Mátra	  Milk	   and	   Gyöngy	  Milk	   in	   2000	  (GVH,	   2000)	  43.	   Nutricia	   invested	   heavily	   in	   the	   technological	   upgrading	   of	   the	   new	  facilities	  it	  acquired:	  in	  1998,	  it	  didn’t	  pay	  dividends	  to	  shareholders	  and	  reinvested	  276	  million	   HUF	   (Pecze	   &	   Soczó,	   2002).	   By	   2000,	   the	   Nutricia	   group	   owned	   26%	   of	  Hungarian	   dairy	   processing.	   Nominal	   changes	   in	   ownership	   occurred	   when	   Nutricia	  Hungary’s	   parent	   company,	   the	   Nutricia	   Group	   was	   purchased	   by	   Dutch	   dairy	  cooperative	  Friesland	  in	  2001	  and	  later	  when	  Friesland	  in	  turn	  merged	  with	  Dutch	  dairy	  Campina	   in	   2007	   (the	   new	   FrieslandCampina	   group	   is	   the	   biggest	   dairy	   MNC	   with	   a	  cooperative	  structure	  and	   the	   fifth	  biggest	  global	  dairy	  processor)	   -­‐	  yet	   these	  mergers	  didn’t	   affect	   the	   group’s	   Hungarian	   operations 44 .	   The	   negative	   impact	   of	  Nutricia/FrieslandCampina’s	   extremely	   rapid	   merger	   and	   acquisition	   strategy	   only	  materialized	  over	  time:	  The	  newly	  purchased	  facilities	  were	  systematically	  scaled	  down	  and	   only	   those	   operations	   were	   kept,	   which	   could	   compliment	   Hajdú	   Milk’s	   original	  infrastructure.	   However,	   this	   form	   of	   production	   rationalization	   went	   beyond	   mere	  restructuring:	   Nutricia	   closed	   down	   the	   smaller	   processing	   units	   one	   after	   the	   other.	  Between	   2004	   and	   2007,	   Nutricia	   closed	   down	   six	   processing	   plants	   and	   fired	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Although	   the	   National	   Competition	   Agency	   authorized	   these	   mergers,	   it	   is	   also	   clear	   that	   the	   rapid	  growth	  of	   the	  Nutricia-­‐Hajdú	  Milk	  group	  was	  preoccupying.	  The	  Competition	  Agency’s	  Vj-­‐159/2000/16	  resultion,	   which	   authorized	   the	   purchase	   of	   Mátra	   Milk	   and	   Gyöngy	   Milk,	   argued	   somewhat	  unconvincingly	  that	  due	  to	  the	  group’s	  geographic	  concentration	  in	  the	  South	  East,	  Nutricia	  didn’t	  pose	  a	  threat	   to	   free	   competition	   at	   the	   national	   level	   since	   they	   “only”	   controlled	   40%	   of	   the	   South	   Eastern	  regional	  market.	  	  	  	  44	  The	  Nutricia-­‐Friesland	  merger	  was	  only	  problematic	  in	  Hungary	  because	  Friesland	  had	  independently	  invested	  in	  another	  Hungarian	  dairy	  brand,	  Mizo:	  the	  Competition	  Authority	  only	  prevented	  the	  Friesland	  group	  from	  increasing	  its	  capitalization	  in	  Mizo	  above	  33%	  (GVH,	  2000).	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thousand	  employees.	  In	  the	  1998-­‐2004	  period,	  Nutricia	  first	  rationalized	  the	  production	  structure	   by	   specializing	   each	   processing	   plant	   in	   a	   particular	   product	   (prior	   to	   the	  takeovers,	  these	  units	  had	  a	  similar	  profile	  and	  produced	  a	  variety	  of	  products):	  Hajdú	  Milk	   as	   the	   flagship	   plant	   was	   specialized	   in	   more	   complex	   and	   higher	   value	   added	  cottage	   cheese,	   sour	   cream	   and	   yoghurts,	   while	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   plants	   produced	  milk	  powder	  and	  fresh	  milk.	  In	  the	  second,	  2004-­‐2007	  period,	  Nutricia	  nonetheless	  closed	  all	  smaller	  units	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  Debrecen	  Hajdú	  plant	  and	  the	  “Dotted”	  (Pöttyös)	  brand	  of	  cottage	  cheese	  filled	  chocolate	  bars	  in	  Mátészalka	  (Easternmost	  Hungary).	  The	  rationale	   for	   this	   strategy	   was	   a	   repositioning	   of	   the	   product	   portfolio	   towards	   the	  higher	  value	  added	  product	  range,	  especially	  since	  the	  2004	  EU	  accession	  threatened	  to	  flood	   the	   domestic	   market	   with	   cheap	   fresh	  milk	   products	   from	   foreign	   competitors.	  Nutricia/FrieslandCampina	  consistently	  argued	  that	  closing	  down	  the	  processing	  plants	  it	   had	   recently	   acquired	   became	   necessary	   because	   production	   capacities	   were	  structurally	  underutilized45:	  an	  argument	  that	  is	  difficult	  to	  accept	  since	  underutilization	  was	   a	   direct	   consequence	   of	   the	   management’s	   strategy	   in	   reducing	   the	   product	  portfolio.	   This	   trend	   in	   downscaling	   culminated	   in	   2015,	   when	   FrieslandCampina	  announced	   that	   it	  would	   sell	   the	   flagship	  Debrecen	  plant	   to	  domestically	  owned	  dairy	  cooperative	  Alföldi	  Milk	  (which	  had	  previously	  purchased	  Parmalat’s	  processing	  plant	  in	  2005	  after	  the	  Italian	  firm	  went	  bankrupt).	  
Bongrain	  	  Another	   notable	   MNC	   in	   dairy	   processing	   is	   French	   Bongrain,	   a	   family	   company	   that	  began	  its	  expansion	  outside	  of	  France	  in	  CEE	  during	  the	  1990s.	  Bongrain	  offered	  thrice	  the	   reference	   price	   for	   purchasing	   Veszprém	   Milk	   (Western	   Hungary)	   in	   1994,	   after	  which	  it	  also	  bought	  the	  Répcelak	  Cheese	  Company	  in	  1995	  (North	  West	  Hungary)	  and	  Zala	  Milk	   in	  1997:	   the	   latter	   two	  were	  united	   in	   the	  new	  Pannon	  Milk	   company	  while	  Bongrain	   operated	   Veszprém	   Milk	   independently	   in	   parallel.	   Bongrain	   is	   entirely	  specialized	   in	   cheese	  and	   the	   firm	  seems	   to	   follow	  a	   similar	  pattern	   to	  other	  MNCs	   in	  dairy	  processing,	  that	  is	  a	  gradual	  exit	  from	  the	  Hungarian	  market,	  although	  the	  shift	  is	  less	  spectacular:	  while	   its	  revenues	  rebounded	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  crisis	   from	  12	  to	  18	  billion	   HUF	   between	   2010	   and	   2013,	   the	   net	   balance	   after	   taxes	   worsened	   from	   -­‐41	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Source:	  http://mno.hu/migr_1834/elbocsatasok-­‐utan-­‐koncentracio-­‐423627	  accessed	  30/04/2014	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million	   to	   -­‐555	   million	   HUF	   over	   the	   same	   period46.	   Market	   analysts	   also	   noted	   that	  Bongrain	   relocated	   the	   production	   of	   some	   Hungarian	   cheese	   brands	   destined	   to	   the	  domestic	  market	  to	  Poland	  and	  the	  Czech	  Republic,	  thus	  worsening	  the	  domestic	  trade	  balance47.	  According	   to	   the	  Hungarian	  Milk	  Council’s	  estimates,	   the	  combined	  share	  of	  Bongrain,	  Danone	  and	  FrieslandCampina’s	  purchase	  of	  milk	  from	  Hungarian	  producers	  only	  amounted	  to	  10%	  of	  total	  volumes	  in	  2013	  (Terméktanács,	  2013).	  	  
Strategies	  of	  Hungarian	  Processors	  	  Domestically	  owned	  processing	  firms	  offer	  a	  symmetrical	  mirror	  image	  to	  MNCs:	  while	  the	  1990s	  marked	   their	   complete	  marginalization,	   the	  unexpected	   re-­‐domestication	  of	  the	  market	  began	  gradually	   in	   the	  early	  2000s,	   just	   as	  MNCs	   started	   leaving	  Hungary.	  Two	  firms	  stand	  out	  in	  particular:	  the	  Alföldi	  Milk	  producer-­‐processing	  cooperative	  and	  the	  SoleMizo	  group.	  	  
Alföldi	  Tej	  	  Alföldi	  Milk	  has	  a	  peculiar	  position	   in	  Hungarian	  agri-­‐food:	   it	   is	   the	  only	  commercially	  successful	  large-­‐scale	  producers’	  cooperative	  that	  emerged	  since	  1989.	  The	  cooperative	  model	  still	  faces	  a	  severe	  legitimacy	  crisis	  in	  Hungary:	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  privatization	  in	  the	  1990s	  contributed	  to	  undermining	  the	  cooperative	  form	  of	  production.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   the	   very	   property	   rights	   structure	   resulting	   from	   privatization	   left	   domestic	  producers	  and	  processors	  extremely	  weak	  in	  the	  face	  of	  competition	  from	  MNCs.	  In	  this	  landscape,	   Alföldi	   Milk	   is	   the	   first	   successful	   example	   at	   re-­‐instituting	   collective	  organization	  among	  domestic	  producers:	  albeit	   its	  members	  are	  mostly	  big	  farms	  with	  strong	   capitalization48.	   The	   cooperative	   was	   set	   up	   by	   54	   members	   in	   2003	   in	   the	  vicinity	   of	  Debrecen	  where	  Nutricia/FrieslandCampina	   operated.	   	   In	   a	   first	   phase,	   the	  cooperative	   supplied	   the	   Friesland	   processing	   plant	   as	  well	   as	   Sole,	   an	   Italian-­‐owned	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Source:	  http://www.vg.hu/vallalati-­‐adatok/pannontej-­‐zrt	  accessed	  19/04/2014	  	  47 Source:http://www.tejtermek.hu/attachments/article/394/Sajt%C3%B3szemle%202014%20j%C3%BAnius.pdf	  	  accessed	  06/07/2014	  	  48	  Interview	  with	  Tibor	  Mélykuti,	  01/12/2013	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processor	   in	   Győr	   (Southern	   Hungary).	   Alföldi	   Milk	   benefitted	   from	   Parmalat’s	  bankruptcy	   in	   2003:	   	   the	   Italian	   management	   sought	   to	   sell	   the	   processing	   plant	   in	  Székesfehérvár,	   which	   matched	   with	   Alföldi’s	   strategy	   of	   autonomization	   from	  processors	  Sole	  and	  Friesland.	  The	  acquisition	  of	  a	  processing	  plant	  had	  been	  one	  of	  the	  original	  objectives	  for	  Alföldi	  Milk.	  Eventually,	   the	  1,8	  billion	  HUF	  purchasing	  price	  for	  the	  processing	  plant	  allowed	  Parmalat	  to	  compensate	  its	  suppliers	  and	  creditors	  during	  the	   liquidation	   procedure,	   while	   it	   secured	   Alföldi’s	   autonomy	   as	   an	   integrated	  producers’	   processor	   group.	   The	   operation	   was	   supported	   by	   the	   state	   and	   financed	  with	  a	  4	  billion	  HUF	  loan	  from	  the	  Hungarian	  Development	  Bank	  (Gazdaság-­‐MFB,	  2009).	  Alföldi	   not	   only	   inherited	   the	   processing	   plant	   but	   also	   Parmalat	   Hungary’s	   Italian	  export	  market:	  unlike	  MNCs	  that	  primarily	  sought	  to	  produce	  for	  the	  domestic	  market,	  Alföldi	  became	  a	  prime	  exporter	  of	  Hungarian	  dairy	  products,	  although	  essentially	  whey	  and	  milk	  powder	   to	   Italy	   (that	   is	   low	  value	   added	  produtcts).	   This	   is	   notable	  because	  Italy	  became	  the	  primary	  export	  destination	  for	  Hungarian	  dairy	  products	  at	  the	  entire	  sector	   level.	   Alföldi’s	   cooperative	   structure	   means	   that	   unlike	   all	   its	   competitors,	  whether	   smaller	   domestically	   owned	   processors	   or	   larger	   MNCs	   such	   as	   Danone,	  Friesland	  or	  Bongrain,	  production	  and	  processing	  are	  firmly	  integrated,	  which	  stabilizes	  the	   supply	   chain.	   Alföldi’s	   2015	   investment	   in	   Debrecen	   symbolically	   crowned	   the	  management’s	  successful	  strategy:	  when	  FrieslandCampina	  (former	  Nutricia)	  sought	  to	  disinvest	  and	  sell	  even	  its	  flagship	  plant	  in	  Debrecen	  (formerly	  Hajdú	  Milk),	  Alföldi	  could	  rely	  on	  its	  previous	  experience	  in	  buying	  out	  Parmalat’s	  plant	  in	  2005.	  In	  the	  framework	  of	   GVC	   theory,	   Alföldi	   Milk	   is	   a	   prime	   example	   of	   functional	   upgrading,	   as	   the	   firm	  climbed	   up	   the	   value	   chain	   by	   turning	   from	   a	   supplier	   into	   a	   sizeable	   processor	  (Humphrey	  &	  Memedovic,	  2006).	  	  
Baranyatej/Mizo/Sole	  	  Alongside	   Alföldi	   Milk,	   the	   second	   important	   domestically	   owned	   group	   is	   Sole-­‐Mizo,	  controlled	  by	  János	  Csányi49,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  Hungarian	  tycoons.	  Contrary	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Csányi	  is	  notably	  the	  CEO	  of	  Hungarian	  bank	  OTP,	  also	  present	  in	  sports	  (he	  is	  heading	  the	  Hungarian	  Football	   Association).	   The	   agricultural	   part	   of	   his	   empire	   is	   called	   the	   Bonafarm	   Group,	   regrouping	   a	  dozen	  processing	  firms	  in	  meat	  (Pick),	  cereals	  (Bábolna),	  wine	  (Csanyi)	  and	  dairy	  (Sole-­‐Mizo).	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Alföldi	  Milk,	  Sole-­‐Mizo	  is	  not	  a	  cooperative	  but	  a	  purely	  private	  company.	  The	  group	  was	  born	  from	  the	  merger	  of	  two	  firms	  (Sole	  and	  Mizo).	  	  	  Mizo	   was	   the	   heir	   of	   Baranya	   Milk,	   a	   processor	   based	   in	   Pécs	   (South	   of	   Hungary),	  privatized	  in	  1993	  by	  the	  National	  Privatization	  Agency.	  The	  ownership	  structure	  of	  the	  new	   company	   was	   unclear	   but	   many	   suspect	   that	   Dutch	   bank	   ABN	   Ambro	   held	   an	  indirect	  majority	  stake	  through	  a	  Hungarian	  proxy50.	  An	  important	  change	  occurred	  in	  1997	   when	   two	   Hungarian	   investors	   (Miklos	   Jederan	   and	   Zoltán	   Bajczi)	   purchased	   a	  majority	  share	  in	  Baranyatej,	  and	  oversaw	  the	  firm’s	  expansion,	  mirroring	  the	  strategy	  of	  MNCs:	   in	  December	   1998,	   Baranyatej	   acquired	   smaller	   processors	   Győr	  Milk,	   Class	  Milk	  and	  Bács	  Milk	  and	  re-­‐branded	  the	  group	  as	  “Mizo”.	  However,	  Mizo	  accumulated	  a	  deficit	   of	   900	   million	   HUF	   in	   1998	   and	   stopped	   paying	   its	   suppliers	   (due	   to	   the	  commonality	  of	  delayed	  payments	  in	  the	  dairy	  sector,	  the	  cessation	  of	  payments	  meant	  that	  Mizo	  effectively	  refused	  to	  pay	  farmers	  retroactively	  for	  milk	  it	  had	  already	  utilized)	  after	   the	  processor’s	   creditor	   banks	   stopped	   financing	   it.	   The	   two	  owners	   blamed	   the	  banks	  (Raiffeisen	  and	  the	  Hungarian	  Commercial	  and	  Credit	  Bank),	  while	  farmers	  set	  up	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	  “consortium”	  (the	  Consortium	  of	  Milk	  Producers	  of	  Baranya	  County)	  in	  order	  to	  reclaim	  Mizo’s	  outstanding	  debt.	  The	  motivations	  behind	  the	  banks’	  sudden	  refusal	  to	  continue	  financing	  Mizo	  are	  controversial:	  although	  the	  owners	  had	  effectively	  indebted	  the	  company	  through	  major	  loans	  in	  1998	  (by	  1999,	  Mizo	  had	  a	  debt	  over	  6	  billion	  HUF),	  Mizo’s	   commercial	   operation	   was	   nonetheless	   profitable	   by	   1999.	   However,	   short	   of	  capital,	   Mizo	   couldn’t	   finance	   its	   daily	   costs	   nor	   repay	   its	   suppliers.	  When	   the	   public	  outrage	   among	   dairy	   suppliers	   eventually	   forced	   public	   authorities	   to	   intervene,	   the	  state’s	   reaction	  was	  equally	  peculiar:	   instead	  of	  extending	  an	  emergency	  credit	   line	   to	  Mizo,	  or	  alternatively	  to	  offer	  the	  same	  credit	  to	  the	  Consortium	  of	  suppliers	  for	  them	  to	  purchase	  the	  processing	  plant	  and	  thus	  become	  actual	  owners	  of	  the	  company	  (the	  two	  options	  seemed	  realistic	  at	   the	   time	  and	   the	   latter	  effectively	  occurred	  when	   the	  state	  offered	   a	   preferential	   loan	   to	   Parmalat’s	   suppliers	   in	   order	   to	   purchase	   a	   processing	  plant	  in	  2005	  as	  mentioned	  above),	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture	  instead	  chose	  to	  liquidate	  Mizo	  and	  only	  offer	  a	  preferential	  loan	  to	  the	  suppliers	  worth	  500	  million	  HUF	  -­‐	  not	  for	  purchasing	  Mizo	  but	  merely	   as	   compensation.	  After	   the	   bankruptcy	  procedure,	  Mizo’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Source:	  http://fn.hir24.hu/gazdasag/1997/02/12/tejipar_privatiz_ci_ut/	  accessed	  05/05/2014	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assets	   were	   bougt	   by	   agricultural	   joint-­‐stock	   company	   Almand	   Ltd.	   in	   2002	   (itself	  controversially	  privatized	  in	  2001	  under	  the	  first	  Orban	  government)51	  and	  re-­‐branded	  as	  “New	  Mizo”	  (Új	  Mizo).	  Eventually,	  Csányi	  acquired	  Almand	  Ltd.	  in	  2003,	  and	  through	  Almand,	   New	   Mizo	   as	   well	   in	   2003,	   which	   raises	   the	   suspicion	   that	   Mizo’s	   financial	  ordeal	  might	  not	  have	  been	  entirely	   independent	   from	  Csányi’s	   long-­‐term	  objective	  of	  building	  an	  agricultural	  empire	  in	  the	  early	  2000s.	  	  	  Sole’s	   trajectory	   is	   similar	   to	  Mizo:	  The	  Regional	  Dairy	  Processor	  of	  Csongrád	  County,	  established	   in	   1955,	   first	   transformed	   into	   a	   private	   company	   in	   1991.	   Under	   this	  restructuring,	   only	   three	   processing	   plants	   were	   kept	   from	   the	   regional	   processing	  structure,	  chief	  of	  which	  a	  plant	  in	  Szeged	  (South	  East).	  The	  company	  was	  privatized	  in	  1997	  to	  Sicilian	  company	  Gala	   Italia,	   the	  monopolistic	  processor	  of	  Sicilian	  dairy	  since	  the	   1960s.	   Gala	   Italia	   first	   entered	   the	   Hungarian	   market	   in	   1997	   and	   acquired	   a	  majority	  share	  in	  Szombathely	  Dairy	  Ltd.:	  The	  latter	  was	  a	  secondary	  processor,	  which	  belonged	  to	  the	  workers	  and	  the	  management	  since	  its	  1993	  privatization.	  In	  1999,	  Gala	  Italia	  went	  further	  and	  purchased	  the	  Pásztó	  plant	  left	  behind	  by	  Avonmore	  as	  described	  previously	  (later	  closing	  down	  the	  plant	  in	  2004).	  Finally,	  in	  2000,	  Gala	  reorganized	  its	  three	   Hungarian	   operations	   around	   the	   central	   plant	   in	   Szeged	   (South	   East)	   and	   re-­‐labeled	   its	   brand	   to	   Sole	   Hungaria.	   However,	   Sole’s	   operation	   in	   Hungary	   was	  compromised	   as	   a	   result	   of	   external	   and	   local	   factors:	   Sole	   had	   equally	   entered	   the	  Slovak	   market	   in	   2001	   and	   acquired	   a	   majority	   share	   in	   four	   processors	   but	   the	  operations	   of	   the	   Slovak	   subsidiary	   (Sole	   Slovakia)	   turned	   to	   a	   loss	   by	   2003	   and	   the	  Italian	  parent	  company	  sought	  to	  deleverage	  its	  foreign	  operations.	  As	  a	  result,	  Sole	  left	  both	  Slovakia	  and	  Hungary	  in	  2003	  and	  2005	  respectively.	  The	  Italian	  owners	  explained	  that	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  subsidy	  on	  feta	  cheese	  in	  2004	  also	  played	  an	  important	  part	  in	  their	  decision	  to	  leave	  the	  Hungarian	  market.	  Ultimately,	  Csányi	  bought	  Sole	  Hungaria	  in	  2006	  and	  integrated	  it	  to	  his	  multi-­‐sectoral	  agri-­‐food	  empire	  Bonafarm	  by	  creating	  the	  Sole-­‐Mizo	  brand.	  After	  the	  merger,	  Sole-­‐Mizo	  instantly	  became	  the	  biggest	  processor	  in	  Hungary,	  with	  a	  31.7%	  market	  share	  and	  relegated	  FrieslandCampina	  to	  the	  third	  place	  behind	  Alföldi	  Milk.	  The	  latter	  controlled	  20%	  of	  the	  market	  in	  2013:	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Dalmand	   Zrt.	   Later	   figured	   prominently	   in	   the	   press	   as	   one	   of	   the	   „Green	   Landlords”	   –	   a	   group	   of	  agricultural	  and	  agrifood	  firms	  suspected	  of	   forming	  a	  clientele	  to	  the	  Conservative	  Fidesz	  Party	  headed	  by	  Viktor	  Orban.	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two	  big	  Hungarian	  dairy	  processors	  represent	  today	  half	  of	  the	  market	  together,	  which	  is	   a	   fundamental	   change	   compared	   to	   the	   1990s.	   We	   call	   this	   process	   the	   re-­‐domestication	  of	  the	  dairy	  sector.	  	  
Privatizing	  Retail	  	  The	   trajectory	   of	   retail	   far	   overstretches	   the	   confines	   of	   the	   present	   thesis	   as	   it	  comprises	   a	   sector	   of	   its	   own,	   yet	   food	   processing	   such	   as	   dairy	   is	   integrated	   to	   the	  supply	  chains	  of	  food	  retailers.	  We	  cannot	  offer	  here	  an	  extensive	  overview	  of	  the	  retail	  sector’s	   complex	   re-­‐organization,	   therefore	   we	   would	   only	   concentrate	   on	   the	   key	  aspects	   that	  affected	   the	  dairy	  sector.	  We	  would	  single	  out	   three	  aspects	   in	  particular,	  which	   had	   a	   direct	   consequence	   on	   dairy:	   (1)	   The	   privatization	   of	   retail	   not	   only	  transformed	  ownership	  structures	  but	  strengthened	  new	  marketing	  formats	  previously	  inexistent	   on	   the	  market.	  MNCs	   played	   the	   leading	   role	   in	   the	   diffusion	   of	   super-­‐	   and	  hypermarket	   formats.	   (2)	  Contrary	  to	  other	  sectors,	  such	  as	   food	  processing,	  domestic	  firms	   proved	  more	   resilient	   from	   the	   onset	   of	   retail	   privatization,	   (3)	   In	   light	   of	   their	  buying	  power	   in	   the	   food	   supply	   chain,	   retailers	  were	   increasingly	  pointed	  out	   as	   the	  prime	  enemies	  of	  domestic	  producers	  in	  the	  2000s:	  however	  instead	  of	  farmers,	  it	  was	  the	  domestically	  owned	  fringe	  of	  dairy	  processors	  that	  initiated	  a	  lobbying	  effort	  against	  (foreign)	  retailers.	  This	  strategy	  led	  to	  the	  consolidation	  of	  an	  alliance	  between	  domestic	  dairy	  processors,	  the	  state	  and	  even	  domestically	  owned	  food	  retail	  chains	  against	  MNC	  retailers.	   While	   the	   defense	   of	   farmers’	   interests	   served	   as	   the	   leitmotiv	   of	   this	   new	  coalition,	   the	   latter	   remain	   conspicuously	   absent	   and	   without	   representative	  organizations.	  	  	  	  In	  1989,	  60%	  of	  retail	  was	  controlled	  by	  the	  state,	  30%	  by	  marketing	  cooperatives	  and	  10%	  by	  smaller	  private	  retailers	  (Karsai,	  2000).	  The	  Socialist	  organization	  of	  the	  sector	  reflected	   a	   similar	   regional	   monopoly	   structure	   than	   discussed	   in	   relation	   to	   dairy	  processing.	   The	   privatization	   process	   was	   differentiated	   and	   prolonged	   in	   time:	  differences	   between	   the	   legal	   statuses	   of	   marketing	   cooperatives,	   state-­‐owned	   food	  stores,	   rural	   food	   retail	   networks	   and	   a	   specific	   status	   for	   the	  Budapest	   retail	  market	  resulted	  in	  differentiated	  privatization.	  The	  first	  stores	  to	  be	  privatized	  were	  small	  units	  employing	  less	  than	  10	  people	  under	  the	  so-­‐called	  “pre-­‐privatization”	  law	  of	  1990.	  Only	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Hungarian	  nationals	  could	  purchase	  these	  stores	  (although	  they	  were	  later	  often	  re-­‐sold	  to	  MNCs	  during	  the	  1990s	  in	  a	  process	  called	  “re-­‐privatization”).	  This	  process	  concerned	  approximately	   10	   000	   units,	   which	   had	   previously	   belonged	   to	   400	   retail	   companies	  (Karsai,	   2000).	   In	   1994,	   the	   privatization	   of	   rural	   (non-­‐Budapest)	   food	   retailers	   was	  opened	   to	   foreign	   investors	   as	  well:	   In	   rural	   areas,	   the	   privatization	   of	   these	   regional	  networks	  occurred	   in	  bulk	  –foreign	  MNCs	   first	  entered	   the	  market	   in	   such	  brownfield	  investments	  where	  they	  purchased	  regionally	  distinct	  networks	  of	  stores:	   	   for	  instance	  the	  Komárom	   county	   retailers	  were	   bought	   by	   the	  Austrian	   Spar	   group,	  while	   British	  Tesco	  acquired	  Sopron	  county’s	  food	  retail	  stores	  (Bauer	  &	  Agárdi,	  2000).	  By	  the	  mid-­‐	  to	  late	  1990s,	   two	  new	  phenomena	  marked	   the	  market.	   The	   first	  was	   the	  penetration	  of	  MNCs.	   The	   second	   was	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	   marketing	   format:	   super-­‐	   and	  hypermarkets	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  discounts	  on	  the	  other.	  British	  (Tesco)	  and	  French	  (Auchan,	   Cora)	   retailers	   introduced	   the	   super-­‐	   and	   hypermarket	   store	   formats	   on	   the	  Hungarian	   retail	   market.	   In	   this	   model,	   a	   relatively	   small	   number	   of	   extremely	   large	  stores	  allows	  for	  realizing	  substantial	  profits	  through	  economies	  of	  scale.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   German	   (Metro.	   Lidl,	   DM,	   Penny	   Market,	   Tegelman,	   Rossman,	   etc.)	   and	   Dutch	  (Spar)	  retailers	  specialized	  in	  smaller	  stores	  in	  a	  discount	  format	  (and	  cash	  and	  carry	  to	  a	   lesser	   extent).	   The	   managerial	   logic	   in	   this	   format	   is	   very	   different:	   it	   relies	   on	   a	  centralized	   procurement	   system,	   extremely	   fast	   replacement	   rates	   and	   keeping	   a	  minimal	  stock	  of	  products	  on	  shelves,	  which	  enable	  these	  firms	  to	  offer	  consumer	  prices	  below	  competitors.	  	  	  MNCs	   were	   pioneers	   in	   the	   diffusion	   of	   both	   of	   these	   two	   new	   models	   of	   retail	  management,	   which	   hadn’t	   have	   equivalents	   in	   Hungary	   previously.	   From	   brownfield	  investments,	   MNCs	   increasingly	   turned	   to	   greenfield	   projects	   in	   order	   to	   establish	   a	  national	  network.	  MNCs’	  share	  in	  the	  sector’s	  turnover	  quickly	  rose	  from	  25%	  in	  1995	  to	  45%	   by	   1998	   (Gorton	   &	   Guba,	   2002).	   Consumption	   behaviors	   favored	   in	   particular	  larger	   stores,	   which	   strengthened	   the	   position	   of	   British	   and	   French	  MNCs:	   by	   2000,	  stores	  with	  an	  area	  superior	  to	  800	  m2	  accounted	  for	  60%	  of	  the	  sector’s	  turnover	  (AKI,	  2009).	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In	   spite	   of	   these	   changes,	   one	  might	   be	   surprised	   to	   observe	   that	   while	   profits	   were	  increasingly	   captured	   by	   foreign	   retail	   chains	   specialized	   in	   super	   and	   hypermarket	  formats,	   domestic	   retailers	   didn’t	   disappear	   from	   the	   market.	   Two	   different	   types	   of	  domestic	  retailers	  managed	  to	  survive:	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  members	  of	  a	  national	  alliance	  of	  marketing	  cooperatives	  (ÁFEOSZ)	  operating	  smaller	  retail	  stores	  continued	  to	  control	  a	  large	  share	  of	  the	  market.	  We	  lack	  the	  space	  here	  to	  provide	  an	  in-­‐depth	  overview	  of	  retail	   cooperatives	   in	   Hungary,	   but	   contrary	   to	   agricultural	   producer	   and	   processor	  cooperatives,	   they	   weathered	   the	   transition	   comparably	   better:	   the	   1989	   law	   on	  cooperatives	  gave	   them	  a	  new	   legal	   status	  classifying	   them	  as	  private	  property,	  which	  saved	  them	  from	  being	  transferred	  to	  the	  national	  privatization	  agency	  (Karsai,	  2000).	  	  They	  accounted	  for	  7524	  stores	  by	  1998	  and	  their	  combined	  turnover	  was	  second	  only	  to	   German	   market	   leader	   Metro	   (Bauer	   &	   Agárdi,	   2000).	   In	   2001,	   ÁFEOSZ	   fully	  transformed	  from	  a	  representative	  body	  of	  retail	  cooperatives	  into	  a	  commercial	  group	  of	   retailers	   called	   COOP,	   working	   in	   a	   franchise	   license-­‐	   and	   a	   common	   procurement	  system.	  Although	  its	  decentralized	  organization	  is	  markedly	  different	  from	  other	  firms,	  the	   COOP	   group’s	   5441	   stores	   are	   the	   fourth	   biggest	   in	   the	   sector	  with	   a	   turnover	   in	  excess	  of	  510	  billion	  HUF	  today	  (Dobos,	  2009).	  The	  other	  notable	  domestic	  owned	  retail	  group	   is	   CBA:	   unlike	   COOP	   which	   inherited	   the	   pre-­‐existing	   Socialist	   marketing	  cooperatives,	  CBA	  is	  a	  commercial	  group	  set	  up	  by	  11	  investors	  in	  1991	  who	  purchased	  smaller	  retail	  stores	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  1990	  law	  on	  retail	  privatization	  (Bauer	  &	  Agárdi,	  2000).	  Contrary	  to	  COOP,	  which	  is	  specialized	  in	  small	  proximity	  stores,	  CBA	  diversified	  in	   all	   market	   segments	   ranging	   from	   hypermarkets	   to	   small	   units.	   With	   a	   yearly	  turnover	   of	   547.5	   billion	   HUF	   and	   a	   network	   of	   3225	   shops,	   it	   is	   today	   the	   second	  retailer	  behind	  market	  leader	  Tesco.	  	  CBA	  and	  COOP	  sought	  to	  strengthen	  their	  position	  by	   establishing	   a	   joint	   procurement	   system	   in	   2009	   at	   the	   national	   level	   –	   although	  individual	  stores	  enjoy	  a	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  in	  the	  selection	  of	  their	  products.	  A	  third	  domestically-­‐owned	  retail	  network	  is	  Reál,	  a	  heterogeneous	  group	  of	  retail	  stores	  set	  up	  in	   2001,	   whose	   ambitions	   at	   extending	   in	   the	   super-­‐	   and	   hypermarket	   format	   are	  currently	  checked	  by	  a	  ban	  on	  further	  expansive	  retail	  store	  constructions	  called	  “Mall	  Stop”.	  Nonetheless,	  with	  its	  existing	  network	  of	  600	  supermarkets	  and	  1300	  proximity	  food	   retail	   units,	   Reál	   is	   the	   fifth	   biggest	   player	   in	   food	   retail	  with	   a	   turnover	   of	   370	  billion	   HUF	   in	   2012.	   Briefly	   put,	   although	   only	   these	   three	   retailers	   are	   domestically	  owned	   among	   the	   13	   biggest	   retail	   chains	   in	   Hungary,	   and	   while	   they	   are	   not	   as	  
	  	   128	  
profitable	   as	   MNCs	   that	   operate	   with	   substantially	   less	   units,	   their	   combined	  market	  share	  still	  accounts	  for	  half	  of	  the	  market.	  This	  in	  turn	  led	  to	  tensions	  between	  domestic	  and	   foreign	   retail	   chains,	   which	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   new	  alliance	  between	  domestic	  dairy	  processors,	  the	  state	  and	  domestic	  retailers.	  	  
Towards	  an	  alliance	  between	  the	  state,	  domestic	  dairy	  processors	  and	  domestic	  retail	  
chains	  against	  MNC	  retailers	  	  The	  role	  of	  food	  retail	  chains	  received	  increasingly	  vocal	  criticism	  from	  domestic	  dairy	  processors	  in	  the	  early	  2000s.	  Food	  retail	  chains	  were	  primarily	  accused	  of	  two	  things:	  setting	  unfair	  contractual	  clauses	  to	  their	  suppliers	  and	  aggravating	  the	  trade	  deficit	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  dairy	   sector	  by	   selling	   imported	  dairy	  products	   (essentially	   fresh	  milk)	  under	  Hungarian	   production	   prices	   (Györe,	   Popp,	   Stauder,	  &	  Nechay,	   2009;	  M.	   Szabó,	  1996;	  Versenyhivatal,	  2011).	  The	  Hungarian	  Milk	  Council	  -­‐	  which	  transformed	  into	  the	  central	   regulatory	   body	   of	   the	   dairy	   sector	   and	   is	   now	   controlled	   by	  Hungarian	   dairy	  processors	  –	  played	  a	  central	  role	   in	   lobbying	  the	  state	  for	  new,	  restrictive	  regulations	  on	  food	  retailers.	  The	  first	  mobilization	  of	  the	  Milk	  Council	  in	  that	  direction	  materialized	  in	  2007,	  when	  they	  managed	  to	  enlist	  domestically	  owned	  food	  processors	   from	  other	  sectors,	  established	  alliances	  with	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture	  and	  sought	  to	  enforce	  an	  “Ethical	  Codex”	  with	  national	  quota	  requirements	  on	  food	  retailers52.	  While	  the	  project	  was	  eventually	   rejected	  by	   the	  National	  Competition	  Authority,	   the	  government’s	  own	  regulatory	   objectives	   aligned	   with	   the	   Milk	   Council	   after	   2010:	   the	   state’s	   regulatory	  policy	   towards	  MNC	   retailers	   is	   discussed	   in	   the	   next	   part	   in	   greater	   length.	  What	   is	  remarkable	   is	   that	   the	  domestically	  owned	   food	  retailers	  CBA,	  COOP	  and	  Reál	  entered	  the	  emerging	  coalition	  between	  the	  Milk	  Council	  and	  the	  state:	  in	  2014,	  all	  four	  became	  formal	  members	   of	   the	  Milk	   Council.	   Even	  more	   importantly,	   while	   public	   regulation	  between	   2013	   and	   2015	   has	   adopted	   increasingly	   aggressive	   measures	   against	  hypermarkets	   where	  MNC	   retailers	   are	   dominant	   –	   chief	   of	   which	   Tesco,	   the	  market	  leader	  –	  Hungarian	   food	  retailers	  were	   largely	   shielded	   from	   these	  as	   they	  are	  mostly	  specialized	   in	   smaller	   units.	   Far	   from	   a	   coincidence,	   this	   alignment	   marks	   the	  consolidation	   of	   an	   interest	   coalition	   dominated	   today	   by	   domestic	   dairy	   processors	  who	  control	  the	  Milk	  Council	  –	  Tibor	  Mélykuti,	  the	  Head	  of	  the	  Milk	  Council	   is	  also	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Interview	  with	  Ms.	  Folláth,	  ÉFOSZ,	  22/11/2013	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CEO	   of	   Alföldi	   Milk	   –	   with	   allies	   both	   in	   the	   ministries	   and	   among	   domestic	   food	  retailers.	  	  
The	  shape	  of	  the	  new	  market	  	  What	  is	  striking	  is	  that	  MNCs	  –	  especially	  in	  the	  processing	  segment	  -­‐	  didn’t	  play	  the	  sort	  of	  positive	  upgrading	  role	  that	  the	  literature	  on	  dairy	  restructuring	  in	  CEE	  would	  have	  expected.	   Swinnen,	   Gow	   et	   al.	   argue	   that	   MNCs	   helped	   to	   implement	   a	   new,	   post-­‐Socialist	  vertical	  coordination	  in	  CEE,	  which	  stabilized	  the	  relations	  between	  producers,	  processors	  and	  the	  retail	  sector	  (H.	  Gow	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  The	  Hungarian	  case	  shows	  on	  the	  contrary	   that	   MNCs	   didn’t	   stabilize	   the	   production	   segment	   and	   didn’t	   develop	   long-­‐term,	  stable	  relations	  with	  Hungarian	  producers.	  	  	  The	  problem	  was	  not	  only	   that	  MNCs	   failed	   to	  build	   strong	  alliances	  down	   the	   supply	  chain,	   which	   could	   have	   stabilized	   suppliers’	   expectations,	   but	   the	   very	   corporate	  strategies	  of	  dairy	  MNCs	  in	  Hungary	  were	  short-­‐sighted	  and	  retrenched	  production	  onto	  the	  domestic	  market,	  one	  which	  they	  ultimately	  even	  abandoned	  one	  after	  the	  other	  in	  the	  early	  2000s.	  	  MNC	  strategies	  contributed	  to	  downgrading	  both	  domestic	  productive	  capacities	   as	   well	   as	   the	   sector’s	   overall	   trade	   performance.	   The	   type	   of	   frenetic	  acquisition-­‐and-­‐merger	   strategy	   best	   exemplified	   by	   the	   Nutricia	   group	   proved	  detrimental:	  acquiring	  a	  large	  number	  of	  processing	  plants	  entailed	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  product	  portfolio	  in	  each	  individual	  plant,	  which	  led	  in	  turn	  to	  redundant	  capacities	  and	  new	   problems	   for	   coordinating	   a	   network	   of	   independent	   facilities,	   an	   argument	   that	  was	  systematically	  used	  by	  firms	  such	  as	  Danone	  or	  Nutricia	  to	  later	  shut	  down	  most	  of	  the	   plants	   they	   had	   acquired.	   A	   common	   suspicion	   among	   public	   officials	   and	  domestically	   owned	   firms	   is	   that	   MNCs	   consciously	   implemented	   a	   “scorched	   earth”	  strategy	   in	   order	   to	   physically	   dismantle	   their	   potential	   competition53.	   The	   pattern	   in	  MNC	   penetration	   is	   strikingly	   similar	   between	   very	   different	   firms:	   an	   expansionist	  strategy	  in	  the	  1990s	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  gradual	  retreat	  from	  the	  market	   in	  the	  2000s,	  resulting	  in	  a	  “re-­‐domestication”	  of	  the	  sector.	  	  From	  a	  commercial	  perspective,	  it	  is	  also	  clear	  that	  MNCs	  were	  primarily	  interested	  in	  exploiting	  the	  Hungarian	  domestic	  market,	  not	   in	   using	   Hungary	   as	   a	   production	   base	   for	   exporting	   to	   CEE	   or	  Western	   Europe.	  While	  MNCs	  supplied	  the	  domestic	  market	  with	  higher	  value	  added	  products,	  they	  didn’t	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Interview	  with	  László	  Lukács,	  Hungarian	  Milk	  Council,	  13/10/2013	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aim	  at	  exporting	  them.	  The	  trend	  in	  exports	  shows	  an	  exponentially	  worsening	  position:	  A	   trade	   deficit	   in	   higher	   value-­‐added	   products	   and	   an	   increasing	   specialization	   of	  Hungarian	  exports	   in	   lower	  value	  added	  goods	  (fresh	  milk,	  milk	  powder).	   It	   is	  striking	  that	   that	   the	   relative	   rebound	   in	   external	   competitiveness	   corresponds	   to	   the	   period	  when	  MNCs	  leave	  the	  domestic	  market	  in	  the	  post-­‐2010	  period	  and	  domestic	  actors	  re-­‐purchase	   the	   plants	   left	   by	   MNCs.	   However,	   currently	   the	   rebound	   in	   exports	   is	   still	  fuelled	  by	  low	  value	  added	  goods	  (essentially	  fresh	  milk)	  and	  there	  are	  only	  timid	  signs	  of	  value	  added	  upgrading.	  	  Second,	  when	  MNC	  processors	   began	   leaving	   the	  market	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1990s,	   the	  state	   entered	   a	   coalition	   with	   Hungarian	   dairy	   processors	   (and	   retailers)	   which	  encourages	  ever	  more	  aggressively	  the	  market	  exit	  of	  MNCs:	  although	  processing	  MNCs	  leave	  largely	  on	  their	  own,	  the	  2010s	  are	  marked	  by	  the	  efforts	  of	  this	  domestic	  coalition	  to	  force	  MNC	  retailers	  also	  out	  of	  the	  market.	  This	  process	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  	  	  Briefly	   put,	   the	   question	   of	   competitive	   upgrading	   in	   developing	   economies	   can	   be	  traced	  back	  to	  a	  scarcity	  of	  domestic	  capital	  and	  technology:	  at	  the	  theoretical	  level,	  both	  public	   and	   private	   actors	   can	   play	   an	   active	   role	   in	   engineering	   domestic	   upgrading.	  Private	   actors	   such	   as	   MNCs	   can	   theoretically	   provide	   both	   capital	   and	   technology	   –	  although	  the	  extant	  scholarship	  shows	  that	  a	  tangible	  glass	  ceiling	  exists,	  beyond	  which	  MNCs	   are	  not	  motivated	   to	   empower	   their	   domestic	   suppliers.	   The	   state	   on	   the	  other	  hand	  has	  an	  active	  role	  in	  shaping	  property	  rights	  institutions	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  while	  it	  can	  also	  organize	  the	  targeted	  channeling	  of	  available	  foreign	  capital	  to	  the	  technological	  modernization	  of	  domestic	  actors.	  In	  the	  Hungarian	  case,	  the	  state	  created	  a	  chaotic	  and	  fragmented	   property	   rights	   structure,	   without	   a	   coherent	   long-­‐term	   strategy	   for	  upgrading	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   domestic	   firms.	   Instead,	   when	   the	   competitive	  downgrading	  of	  the	  sector	  became	  obvious,	  it	  joined	  an	  interest	  coalition	  with	  domestic	  processors	   and	   retailers	   to	   force	   MNCs	   out	   of	   the	   market:	   this	   is	   a	   low-­‐cost	  developmental	   strategy	  where	   the	  negative	  developmental	  outcomes	  of	   integrationism	  are	  mitigated	  with	  protectionist	   regulation	   instead	  of	   large	  scale	   investments	  destined	  to	  the	  least	  competitive	  segments	  of	  a	  domestic	  sector.	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Part	  4.	  Re-­‐regulating	  the	  Market	  	  
From	  laissez-­‐faire	  to	  the	  first	  protectionist	  experiences:	  public	  regulation	  between	  1990	  
and	  2003	  	  The	   public	   institutional	   actors	   that	   regulated	   the	   dairy	  market	   throughout	   the	   1990s	  were	   few	   in	   number	   and	   weak	   in	   competence:	   the	   Hungarian	   Privatization	   Agency	  (ÁVÜ/ÁPV	  Zrt.)	  oversaw	  the	  privatization	  of	  the	  26	  pre-­‐selected	  dairy	  processing	  plants.	  At	  the	  sector	  level	  only	  one	  central	  organization	  was	  established	  for	  regulating	  the	  dairy	  market:	  the	  National	  Milk	  Council,	  set	  up	  in	  1992.	  This	  organization	  was	  established	  out	  of	   necessity,	   in	   view	   of	   EU	   accession,	   in	   order	   to	   implement	   the	   quota	   system	   of	  production,	  which	  had	  been	  in	  place	  in	  the	  EU	  since	  1984	  as	  discussed	  below.	  However,	  outside	   of	   this	   administrative	   role,	   the	   Milk	   Council,	   although	   formally	   gathering	   all	  major	  processors	  (MNCs	  and	  domestic)	  as	  well	  as	  dairy	  producers,	  had	  no	  real	  political	  or	  regulatory	  role	  before	  2013.	  	  The	   specificity	   of	   the	   Hungarian	   dairy	   sector	   was	   that	   organizations	   of	   interest	  representation	  and	  coordination	  for	  the	  different	  actors	  of	  the	  supply	  chain	  were	  scarce,	  weak	  and	   their	   inter-­‐institutional	   coordination	  almost	   absent.	  Dairy	  processors	   joined	  the	   National	   Association	   of	   Food	   Processors	   (ÉFOSZ),	   while	   they	   were	   equally	  represented	  in	  the	  Milk	  Council.	  Producers	  (farmers)	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  proved	  unable	  to	   establish	   strong	   representative	   organizations:	   although	   producers	   were	   also	  members	   in	   the	  Milk	   Council,	   since	   the	   latter	   played	   no	   formal	   role	   in	  managing	   the	  vertical	   coordination	   of	   the	   dairy	   supply	   chain	   between	   retailers,	   processors	   and	  producers,	  the	  voice	  and	  interest	  of	  farmers	  was	  largely	  underrepresented.	  As	  discussed	  previously,	   this	   was	   also	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   land	   privatization,	   which	   destroyed	  cooperatives	  and	  fragmented	  farmers’	  property.	  Tellingly,	  the	  plight	  of	  dairy	  farmers	  has	  been	  a	  key	  argument	  in	  the	  lobbying	  efforts	  of	  Hungarian	  dairy	  processors	  against	  food	  retailers:	  however	  autonomous	  farmers’	  organizations	  are	  inexistent.	  In	  fact,	  a	  National	  Union	  of	  Dairy	  Producers	  (MTOE)	  was	  set	  up	  in	  2004	  by	  none	  other	  than	  domestic	  milk	  processing	  cooperative	  Alföldi	  Milk	   (Mélykuti,	  2004):	   since	   then,	   this	  organization	  has	  been	  entirely	  inactive.	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  Throughout	  the	  1990s,	  the	  state	  didn’t	  implement	  any	  coherent	  national	  developmental	  program	  in	  the	  dairy	  sector:	  We	  have	  already	  mentioned	  the	  erratic	  and	  poorly	  designed	  interventions	  of	   the	  state	   in	   the	  earliest	  years	  of	   the	   transition:	  when	   the	  state	  put	  an	  end	  to	  subsidizing	  the	  consumer	  prices	  of	  milk	  products	  in	  1991,	  the	  direct	  consequence	  was	  an	  overproduction	  crisis	  where	  the	  state	  was	  forced	  to	  step	  in	  again	  –	  this	  time	  for	  subsidizing	   producers	   to	   limit	   production	   and	   slaughter	   cows.	   Far	   from	   solving	   the	  problem,	  this	  in	  turn	  led	  to	  major	  disruptions	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  fresh	  milk	  to	  processors	  so	  that	   the	   government	   eventually	   backtracked	   and	   scrapped	   these	   subsidies	   entirely	   in	  1992.	  The	  public	  subsidization	  of	  production	  costs	  played	  a	  minor	  role	  throughout	  the	  1990s:	  while	  in	  1991,	  dairy	  exports	  benefitted	  from	  35%	  subsidization,	  by	  1996	  export	  subsidies	  only	  concerned	  cheese	  (20	  HUF/kg)	  and	  even	  these	  were	  disbanded	  in	  1997	  (K.	  Szabó,	  2010,	  p.16)	  -­‐	  which	  is	  understandable,	  since	  MNCs	  controlled	  overwhelmingly	  the	  processing	  sector	  at	  the	  time	  and	  they	  targeted	  primarily	  the	  domestic	  market.	  	  The	   state’s	   regulatory	   role	   in	   dairy	  markets	  was	   largely	   limited	   to	   the	   distribution	   of	  property	   rights	   in	   the	   course	   of	   privatization,	   and	   after	   1992,	   to	   implementing	   the	  European	   quota	   system	   of	   production	   through	   the	   Milk	   Council.	   In	   spite	   of	   the	  availability	   of	   pre-­‐accession	   funds,	   the	   dairy	   sector	   didn’t	   enjoy	   any	   targeted	  developmental	   effort:	   in	   other	   words,	   the	   state	   had	   neither	   a	   coherent	   vision	   for	  strengthening	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   its	   dairy	   sector,	   nor	   strategies	   for	   compensating	  the	   losers	   of	   the	   transition	   process	   –	   that	   is	   the	   vast	   masses	   of	   smallholder	   milk	  producers	   who	   were	   gradually	   excluded	   from	   the	   market	   throughout	   the	   1990s.	  Similarly,	   the	  public	   regulation	  of	   the	   sector	  was	   limited	   to	   the	  uttermost	  minimum	  –	  that	   is	   conformity	   with	   the	   EU	   quotas	   of	   national	   production	   caps.	   Briefly	   put,	  throughout	  the	  integrationist	  phase	  of	  its	  post-­‐Communist	  restructuring,	  it	  was	  precisely	  when	  MNCs	  overwhelmingly	  controlled	  the	  sector	  that	  public	  regulation	  did	  the	  least	  for	  strengthening	  capacities,	  or	  improving	  competitiveness.	  The	  vertical	  coordination	  of	  the	  dairy	  sector	  was	  extremely	  weak,	  as	  both	  processors	  and	  suppliers	  mutually	  distrusted	  one	  another	  and	  routinely	  broke	  contracts:	  the	  state	  had	  outsourced	  the	  developmental	  role	  of	  providing	   the	   sector	  with	   capital	   and	   technology	   to	  MNCs	  and	  watched	   from	  a	  distance	  as	  the	  sector	  gradually	  collapsed.	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The	  end	  of	  this	  “laissez-­‐faire”	  period	  occurred	  in	  2003-­‐2005,	  when	  tensions	  in	  agri-­‐food	  supply	  chains	  eventually	   forced	  public	  authorities	   to	   intervene.	   In	  2003,	  a	  new	   law	  on	  Agricultural	  Market	  Regulations	  was	  adopted,	  followed	  by	  a	  revision	  of	  the	  Commercial	  Act	  in	  2005.	  The	  two	  new	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  sought	  to	  regulate	  the	  relations	  between	  suppliers	   and	   buyers:	   authorized	   delays	   in	   payment	   were	   maximized	   at	   30	   days	   (a	  widespread	  problem	   in	   dairy	   had	   been	   that	   since	  milk	   is	   perishable,	   it	   has	   to	   be	   sold	  quickly	  –	  yet	  retail	  chains	  and	  processors	  alike	  often	  delayed	  payments	  to	  producers	  for	  months):	   the	   pricing	   of	   dairy	   products	   under	   production	   costs	  was	   banned	   in	   2005	   –	  which	  sought	   to	  remedy	   the	   increasingly	  worrisome	   trade	  deficit,	   as	  milk	  produced	   in	  excess	   in	  Poland	  was	  routinely	  sold	  by	  retail	  chains	   in	  Hungary	  under	  both	  Polish	  and	  Hungarian	  production	  prices,	  “unfair	  contractual	  clauses”	  between	  suppliers	  and	  buyers	  were	  banned	  as	  well	   as	   the	  mandatory	  payments	  of	  unsolicited	   fees	  by	   suppliers.	  The	  amended	   2005	   Commercial	   Act	   targeted	   supermarkets	   –	   MNCs	   in	   fact	   -­‐	   since	   the	  regulation	   applied	   specifically	   to	   entities	   with	   “significant	   buyer	   power”.	   This	  “significance”	  was	  defined	  as:	  (1)	  a	  net	  turnover	  in	  excess	  of	  100	  billion	  HUF,	  and	  (2)	  “a	  
one-­‐sidedly	   favorable	   position	   vis	   a	   vis	   suppliers	   in	   light	   of	   entry	   barriers,	  market	   share	  
and	  the	  size	  of	  its	  network54”.	  Because	  these	  criteria	  remained	  vague,	  the	  regulation	  was	  clearly	   intended	  to	  hit	   foreign-­‐owned	  retail	  chains,	  and	  was	  perceived	  as	  such	  both	  by	  the	   legislator	   and	  MNCs	   themselves55.	   The	   legislation	   also	  mandated	   the	   Competition	  Authority	   to	   conduct	  proceedings	  against	   retailers	  using	  unfair	  business	  practices	  and	  unfair	  contractual	  clauses	  vis	  a	  vis	  their	  suppliers56.	  The	  effect	  of	  these	  new	  regulations	  proved	   relative	   at	   best:	   a	   study	   commissioned	   by	   the	  National	   Competition	   Authority	  singled	  out	  that	  buyers	  creatively	  circumvented	  the	  legislation:	  Next	  to	  an	  “official”,	  legal	  contract	  that	  formally	  respected	  the	  30	  day	  payment	  limit,	  they	  also	  forced	  suppliers	  to	  sign	  a	  secret	  contract	  in	  which	  this	  provision	  was	  effectively	  cancelled	  and	  60	  to	  70	  day	  payment	   delays	   were	   bilaterally	   recognized	   between	   buyers	   and	   suppliers	   (Dobos,	  2009).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Source:	  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/05_2011/hu_food.pdf	  accessed	  03/11/2014	  	  55	  In	  fact	  between	  2005	  and	  2011,	  the	  second,	  market-­‐specific	  criteria	  defining	  market	  power	  were	  used	  by	   the	   Competition	  Authority	   only	   once,	   and	   even	   then,	   the	   test	   applied	  was	   not	   explicited.	   In	   practice	  therefore,	   the	   first,	   revenue-­‐based	   criteria	   is	   considered	   sufficient	   for	   determing	   „significant	   buyer	  power”.	  Source:	  Ibid.	  	  56	  Ibid.	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The	  legislative	  apparatus	  for	  targeting	  MNC	  retail	  chains	  was	  further	  strengthened	  when	  the	   Parliament	   adopted	   Act	   XCV/2009	   on	   “Unfair	   Trade	   Practices	   in	   relation	   to	  Agricultural	  and	  Food	  Products”.	  The	  2009	  law	  largely	  reiterated	  the	  same	  provisions	  as	  the	  2005	  Act,	  with	  one	  crucial	  difference:	  the	  new	  act	  didn’t	  include	  any	  reference	  to	  the	  complex	   market	   variables	   for	   determining	   significant	   buyer	   power,	   which	   meant	   in	  effect	   that	   the	   Competition	   Authority	   could	   use	   it	   against	   virtually	   any	   retailer,	  irrespective	  of	  size	  or	  location.	  This	  added	  further	  latitude	  for	  threatening	  foreign	  MNCs	  while	  making	   sure	   that	  Hungarian-­‐owned	   retail	   chains	   could	   be	   potentially	   exempted	  from	  this	  scrutiny.	  	  	  In	   parallel	   to	   the	   actual	   acts	   adopted,	   another	   initiative	   that	  was	   eventually	   scrapped	  nonetheless	   marked	   an	   important	   symbolical	   turning	   point	   in	   2007:	   key	   Hungarian	  processors	  from	  the	  National	  Milk	  Council	  mounted	  a	  coalition	  with	  other	  domestically-­‐owned	   food	  processors	   and	   received	   the	   backing	   of	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Agriculture.	   Their	  aim	  was	  a	  new	  piece	  of	  legislation	  called	  the	  “Ethical	  Codex”	  –	  a	  self-­‐regulatory	  standard	  regulating	  buyer-­‐supplier	  relations	  in	  agri-­‐food	  supply	  chains57.	  However,	  the	  proposed	  legislation	  went	  well	  beyond	  the	  type	  of	  self-­‐regulatory	  code	  that	  is	  widespread	  in	  agri-­‐food	   sectors:	   specifically,	   the	   bill	   would	   have	   forced	   retailers	   to	   comply	   with	   a	   fixed	  quota	   of	   nationally	   produced	   processed	   goods.	   Although	   the	   coalition	   between	  Hungarian	   food	   processors	   and	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Agriculture	   seemed	   solid,	   the	  Competition	  Authority	  eventually	  rejected	  the	  proposal,	  arguing	  that	  it	  stood	  in	  blatant	  infringement	   to	   the	   principles	   of	   free	   competition	   and	   non-­‐discrimination.	   The	  Authority	  argued	  that	  even	  if	  adopted,	  such	  a	  law	  would	  be	  immediately	  repelled	  by	  the	  ECJ	  since	  it	  ran	  counter	  to	  the	  basic	  rules	  of	  the	  Common	  Market	  (Versenyhivatal,	  2009).	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  failure,	  the	  Ethical	  Codex	  was	  a	  clear	  indication	  that	  new	  coalitions	  were	  emerging	   in	   Hungarian	   agri-­‐food	   sectors	   and	   that	   the	   efforts	   of	   Hungarian	   food	  processors	  to	  enlist	  public	  actors	  in	  order	  to	  enforce	  protectionist	  measures	  to	  fend	  off	  the	   buyer	   power	   of	   MNCs	   –	   most	   notably	   retail	   chains	   –	   were	   also	   received	  sympathetically	  by	  the	  state.	  The	  period	  between	  2005	  and	  2010	  marked	  the	  first	  visible	  shift	   in	  the	  state’s	  regulatory	  preferences,	   foreclosing	  two	  decades	  of	  relative	  passivity	  towards	  the	  struggles	  between	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  firms	  in	  the	  Hungarian	  market.	  It	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Interview	  with	  Ms.	  Folláth,	  ÉFOSZ	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also	  crucial	  to	  mention	  that	  this	  occurred	  under	  a	  Socialist-­‐Liberal	  coalition	  government:	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  public	  actors	  in	  place	  at	  the	  time	  were	  not	  typical	  of	  the	  nationalist	  tradition	  embodied	  by	  right	  wing	  parties.	  	  	  In	   effect,	   the	   2005-­‐2010	   period	  marked	   the	   first	   phase	   in	   the	   publically	   regulated	   re-­‐domestication	   of	   agri-­‐food	   markets:	   the	   attempt	   at	   enforcing	   an	   Ethical	   Codex	   with	  national	   quota	   requirements	  might	   have	   been	   ultimately	   scrapped	   –	   however,	   it	   also	  emboldened	   Hungarian	   dairy	   processors:	   it	   showed	   them	   that	   they	   could	   mobilize	  domestically-­‐owned	   firms	   in	   other	   agri-­‐food	   sectors	   and	   find	   allies	   in	   the	  Ministry	   of	  Agriculture.	   With	   the	   electoral	   victory	   of	   the	   Fidesz	   government	   in	   2010,	   which	   had	  capitalized	   on	   staunchly	   nationalist	   narratives,	   the	   alliance	   between	   domestic	   dairy	  processors	   and	   the	   state	   would	   become	   ever	   stronger:	   the	   designated	   enemies	   were	  MNCs	   and	  while	   processing	  MNCs	   had	   already	   began	   leaving	   the	  market,	   the	   retailer	  MNCs	  left	  on	  the	  market	  continued	  to	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  domestic	  dairies	  since	  they	  could	  use	  their	  buyer	  power	  in	  depressing	  purchasing	  prices	  from	  Hungarian	  dairy	  processors	  without	   translating	   them	  to	  consumer	  prices.	  The	  strategy	   followed	  by	  domestic	  dairy	  processors	   was	   to	   force	   retailers	   to	   change	   their	   procurement	   strategies	   and	   buy	   a	  larger	  share	  of	  domestically	  produced	  dairy	  products	  as	  well	  as	   to	  prohibit	   the	  sale	  of	  imported	  goods	  below	  Hungarian	  production	  costs.	  This	  aligned	  perfectly	  well	  with	  the	  strategy	  of	  the	  Fidesz	  government	  to	  reduce	  MNC	  market	  shares	  in	  designated	  markets.	  Furthermore,	   it	  also	   found	  strong	  support	  among	  Hungarian	   food	  retailers	  who	  hoped	  that	  they	  would	  inherit	  market	  shares	  from	  retailer	  MNCs	  if	  these	  were	  forced	  out	  of	  the	  domestic	  market.	  	  	  
The	  Effects	  of	  EU	  Regulation	  on	  Organization	  of	  Hungarian	  Dairy	  
	  
The	  Quota	  System	  	  The	  EU	  regulation	  of	  dairy	  markets	  had	  direct	  consequences	  on	  the	  bargaining	  position	  of	  domestic	  actors	   in	  Hungary,	   especially	  as	   the	  predominance	  of	  domestic	  ownership	  increased	  over	  the	  past	  few	  years	  in	  the	  course	  of	  re-­‐domestication.	  The	  EU’s	  regulatory	  instruments	  and	  strategies	  also	  changed	  importantly	  over	  the	  past	  decade.	  The	  need	  for	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regulating	   dairy	  markets	  materialized	   in	   the	   1970s	  when	   the	   EU	  market	  was	   flooded	  with	  milk,	  which	  pulled	  prices	  down:	  given	  that	  most	  of	  the	  member	  states	  had	  national	  provisions	  for	  intervention	  prices	  under	  which	  they	  would	  compensate	  dairy	  producers,	  the	   low	  market	   prices	   forced	   a	   costly	   subsidization	   practice	   at	   the	   national	   level.	   The	  solution	   found	   to	   this	   collective	   action	   problem	   was	   the	   creation	   at	   the	   EU	   level	   of	  national	  production	  quotas,	  which	  would	  prevent	   future	  crises	  of	  overproduction.	  The	  quota	  system	  was	  thus	  established	  in	  1984.	  	  	  However,	  during	  the	  1970s,	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  important	  changes	  also	  occurred	  in	  food	  supply	  chains	  at	  the	  global	  level,	  which	  also	  affected	  Europe:	  Berdegué	  and	  Reardon	  call	  it	  the	  “supermarket	  revolution”	  (T.	  Reardon	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  The	  international	  expansion	  of	  supermarket	  MNCs	  also	  accelerated	  concentration	  in	  the	  retail	  segment,	  which	  directly	  affected	   dairy	   producers	   and	   processors	   since	   close	   to	   80%	   of	   food	   and	   grocery	  distribution	   occurs	   today	   through	   retail	   chains	   in	   Hungary58.	   The	   combination	   of	   a	  regulatory	   framework	   which	   encouraged	   market	   concentration,	   combined	   with	   the	  expansion	   of	   supermarkets	   resulted	   in	   dairy	   supply	   chains	   where	   farmer-­‐producers	  were	  faced	  with	  increasingly	  powerful	  and	  concentrated	  processing	  and	  retail	  segments:	  concentration	   meant	   that	   buyers	   such	   as	   dairy	   processing	   factories	   or	   supermarkets	  could	   use	   their	   oligopsonistic	   buyer	   powerto	   drive	   purchasing	   prices	   down,	   without	  translating	   these	   economies	   towards	   the	   final	   consumers.	   In	   other	  words,	   retailers	   in	  particular	  became	  the	  clear	  winners	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  profit	  and	  value	  added	  in	  the	  supply	  chains.	  The	  shift	  in	  bargaining	  power	  from	  producers	  to	  retailers	  is	  also	  a	  global	  phenomenon,	   equally	  affecting	   rich	  and	  developing	  economies	   (T.	  Reardon	  &	  Timmer,	  2012;	   T.	   Reardon	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   The	   current	   literature	   on	   agricultural	   development	  considers	   that	   a	   remedy	   to	   this	   problem	   lies	   with	   the	   establishment	   of	   inclusive	  property	  rights	  institutions	  such	  as	  cooperatives	  and	  sector-­‐level	  unions	  which	  level	  the	  playing	  field	  vis	  a	  vis	  retailers	  and	  processors	  (T.	  Reardon	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  This	  view	  came	  to	  inform	  the	  EU’s	  new	  regulatory	  agenda	  in	  the	  dairy	  sector	  after	  2008.	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The	  Milk	  Package	  	  The	  shift	  in	  the	  EU’s	  preferences	  and	  modes	  of	  intervention	  in	  the	  dairy	  market	  occurred	  in	  the	  2008-­‐2012	  period,	  notably	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  negative	  externalities	  produced	  by	  the	  quota	  system	  itself:	  The	  immediate	  concern	  stemmed	  from	  important	  fluctuations	  in	  global	  milk	  prices	  over	  the	  2007-­‐2009	  period,	  however,	  the	  problems	  in	  dairy	  supply	  chains	   ran	   deeper:	   a	   new	   concern	   was	   the	   overall	   erosion	   of	   producers’	   bargaining	  power,	   an	   issue	   first	  voiced	  by	   the	  European	  Parliament	   (most	  notably	  French	   farmer	  activist	   José	   Bové)	   which	   commissioned	   a	   study	   in	   2008	   to	   assess	   the	   potential	  legislative	  and	  regulatory	  measures	   that	   could	  address	   this	   situation.	  The	  Commission	  took	  further	  initiatives:	   it	  set	  up	  two	  High	  Level	  Groups	  –	  the	  High	  Level	  Expert	  Group	  on	  Milk	  and	  the	  High	  Level	  Forum	  for	  a	  Better	  Functioning	  Food	  Supply	  Chain	  in	  200959.	  The	   mandate	   of	   both	   organizations	   was	   to	   produce	   a	   holistic	   overview	   of	   agri-­‐food	  supply	  chain	  structures	  in	  a	  consultative	  format,	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  a	  list	  of	  legislative	  recommendations	   for	   new	   forms	   of	   EU	   regulation	   in	   these	   markets.	   In	   both	  organizations,	   the	   key	   goal	  was	   to	   find	   new	   policy	  mechanisms	   for	   strengthening	   the	  bargaining	   power	   of	   smaller	   actors	   (typically	   domestic	   producers	   and	   smaller	  processors)	  vis	  a	  vis	  MNCs	  (typically	  retail	  chains).	  	  	  	  What	  followed	  was	  a	   lengthy	  consultative	  process	  with	  the	  stakeholders	  of	  the	  supply	  chains	  as	  well	  as	  public	  representatives	  in	  each	  member	  state,	  but	  since	  the	  process	  was	  not	   mandatory,	   and	   many	   remained	   skeptical	   over	   the	   EP’s	   capacity	   and	   the	  Commission’s	   willingness	   to	   adopt	   more	   stringent	   regulations	   vis	   a	   vis	   the	   powerful	  MNCs	  that	  governed	  dairy	  supply	  chains,	  participation	  was	  uneven:	  as	  Dr.	  Tóth,	  one	  of	  the	   Hungarian	   participant	   experts	   from	   a	   private	   agri-­‐food	   consultancy	   noted,	   the	  Hungarian	  government	   for	   instance	   seldom	  delegated	   senior	  officials	   and	   showed	   low	  investment	  in	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  Milk	  Group60.	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The	   recommendations	   of	   the	   Milk	   Group	   were	   summarized	   in	   a	   White	   Paper,	   which	  proposed	   new	   legislative	   measures	   in	   three	   key	   areas:	   (1)	   The	   public	   regulation	   of	  private	   contractual	   relations	   between	   producers	   and	   buyers,	   (2)	   strengthening	  cooperatives	  and	  (3)	  establishing	  sector-­‐specific	  organizations	  with	  sufficient	  legitimacy	  to	   self-­‐regulate	   the	   dairy	   market	   without	   further	   need	   for	   hard	   law	   interventions61.	  These	   three	   themes	   eventually	   led	   to	   three	   new	   pieces	   of	   EU	   legislation	   in	   2012,	  collectively	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   Milk	   Package:	   Regulation	   511/2012	   on	   “interbranch	  organizations”	   in	   the	   dairy	   sector,	   Regulation	   880/2012	   on	   transnational	   producer	  groups	  and	  Regulation	  261/2012	  on	  contractual	  relations	  in	  the	  dairy	  sector.	  The	  three	  objectives	  of	  the	  Milk	  Package	  were	  respectively:	  (1)	  to	  ban	  unfair	  business	  practices	  in	  the	  dairy	  supply	  chain,	  typically	  involving	  the	  use	  of	  buyer	  power	  by	  retailers	  and	  larger	  processors	   such	   as	   delayed	   payments	   and	   unjustified	   costs	   for	   producers,	   (2)	  strengthening	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  the	  weakest	  segment	  in	  the	  supply	  chain,	  namely	  producers,	  by	  incentivizing	  the	  creation	  of	  producer	  cooperatives,	  and	  (3)	  creating	  new	  institutions	   for	   interest	   representation	   and	   coordination	   at	   the	   sector	   level.	   From	   the	  Hungarian	   perspective	   especially,	   the	  most	   consequential	   regulation	  was	   the	   last:	   not	  only	   does	   the	   EU	   encourage	   member	   states	   to	   establish	   what	   it	   calls	   “interbranch	  organizations”,	  but	   the	  Milk	  Package	  specifically	  mandates	   these	  new	   institutions	  with	  the	   capacity	   to	   regulate	   private	   contracts	   in	   the	   sector.	   In	   practice,	   the	   Milk	   Council	  became	   the	   official	   interbranch	   organization	   of	   the	   sector	   in	   201362.	   It	   published	   a	  standard	   	   “fair	   contract”	   in	  April	   2014,	  which	   serves	   as	   a	  model	   for	   the	   entire	   sector,	  while	   since	   June	   2014,	   it	   has	   also	   published	   a	   monthly	   recommended	   reference	  purchase	   price	   for	   two	   key	   products	   (UHT	   milk	   and	   processed	   cheese).	   Somewhat	  confirming	   the	   expectations	   of	   the	   skeptics,	   the	  most	   aggressive	   forms	   of	   public	   legal	  intervention	   in	   the	   private	   contractual	   relations	   between	   retailers,	   processors	   and	  producers	  were	  eventually	  scrapped	  at	  the	  EU	  level.	  The	  interventions	  chosen	  sought	  a	  more	   conciliatory	   strategy	   by	   strengthening	   producer	   capacities	   instead	   of	   punishing	  MNCs.	   However,	   these	   new	   regulatory	   tools,	   oscillating	   between	   soft	   and	   hard	   law	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instruments	  nonetheless	  offered	  a	  new	  boost	  for	  domestic	  Hungarian	  public	  and	  private	  actors	  in	  their	  attempt	  to	  re-­‐regulate	  the	  supply	  chain.	  	  	  
Re-­‐Domesticating	  the	  Dairy	  Sector	  	  In	   line	   with	   the	   EU	   Milk	   Package,	   The	   Hungarian	   Milk	   Council	   acquired	   the	   new	   EU	  status	  of	  official	   “interbranch	  organization”.	  Up	  until	  2013,	   the	  organization	  -­‐	  although	  regrouping	  all	  the	  important	  actors,	  MNCs	  and	  domestic	  firms	  and	  producers	  alike	  –	  had	  virtually	   no	   regulatory	   mandate.	   Its	   role	   had	   been	   limited	   to	   the	   allocation	   of	   milk	  quotas	   between	   the	   various	   firms	   operating	   in	   Hungary.	   It	   is	   noteworthy	   that	  rebranding	  the	  Council	  as	  an	  “interbranch	  organization”,	  participated	  in	  maintaining	  the	  illusion	   of	   a	   genuine	   grassroots	   organization	   –	   which	   it	   had	   never	   been.	   It	   is	   also	  illustrative	  of	  the	  poor	  self-­‐organization	  capacity	  of	  the	  sector	  that	  the	  Milk	  Council	  was	  an	  easy	   candidate	   for	   the	   title	  because	   in	   spite	  of	   its	  weak	  mandate	  until	  2013,	   it	  had	  been	  virtually	  the	  only	  sector-­‐specific	  organization	  in	  place.	  It	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  other	   countries	   saw	   the	   ex-­‐ante	   creation	   or	   the	   re-­‐labeling	   of	   existing	   institutions	   as	  “interbranch	   organizations”	   as	   unnecessary	   given	   the	   extant	   thick	   institutional	  landscape	   in	   grassroots	   producer-­‐	   and	   processor-­‐	   organizations:	   Poland	   notably	  considered	   that	   there	   was	   no	   need	   for	   yet	   another	   representative	   body.	   In	   the	  Commission’s	   mind,	   setting	   up	   interbranch	   organizations	   in	   national	   dairy	   markets	  genuinely	   serves	   the	   vertical	   coordination	   of	   the	   supply	   chains	   and	   favors	   consensual	  self-­‐regulation	  (thus	  limiting	  potential	  conflicts	  and	  crises	  between	  the	  different	  actors,	  which	   would	   require	   an	   intervention	   by	   the	   member	   state	   or	   the	   EU	   itself):	   the	   key	  criterion	   for	   recognizing	   an	   interbranch	   organization	   is	   the	   representativeness	   it	  guarantees	   to	   all	   stakeholders	   in	   the	   supply	   chain.	   In	   Hungary	   for	   instance,	   the	   Milk	  Council	   thus	   regroups	   3750	   producers,	   40	   processors	   and	   6	   retailers63.	   However,	  beyond	  this	  apparent	  democratic	  character,	  membership	  is	  actually	  reflective	  of	  the	  new	  power	   relations	   favored	   by	   the	   dominant	   public	   and	   private	   actors:	   as	   soon	   as	   the	  Council	   transformed	   into	   an	   interbranch	  organization,	   and	  as	   it	   became	  apparent	   that	  the	  new	  organization	  would	  have	   regulatory	   capacities,	   all	   the	  major	   processor	  MNCs	  left	   the	   Council.	   The	   deputy-­‐director	   of	   the	   Council	   openly	   recognized	   during	   our	  interview	   that	   the	   new	   legal	   status	   of	   the	   organization	   actually	   revealed	   the	   vastly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Interview	  with	  Mr.	  Lukács,	  Hungarian	  Milk	  Council	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different	   interests	   of	   the	   stakeholder:	   “It	   was	   clear	   after	   2013	   that	   multinational	  
companies	   didn’t	   share	   the	   same	   objectives	   as	   us:	   they	   left	   the	   Milk	   Council	   one	   after	  
another	  when	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  we	  were	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  period	  and	  that	  the	  
Milk	   Council	   would	   defend	   strong	   new	   protections	   for	   Hungarian	   milk	   producers	   and	  
processors	   (…)	   It	   is	   not	   surprising	   because	   they	   have	   an	   interest	   in	   no	   regulation	  
whatsoever,	  whereas	  we	   are	   here	   to	   defend	  Hungarian	   interests64.”	   The	   new	   Council	   is	  governed	  by	   a	  Directory	  Board	   comprised	  of	   twenty-­‐one	  delegates,	   nineteen	  of	  which	  represent	   Hungarian-­‐owned	   processing	   firms65.	   The	   two	   exceptions	   are	  Mrs.	   Posztos,	  marketing	  director	  at	  Tetra-­‐Pak	  Hungary,	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  the	  Swedish	  multinational	  that	  produces	   packaging	   for	   virtually	   all	   milk	   and	   dairy	   brands,	   and	   Mr.	   Carlo	   Volpe,	   the	  Italian	   CEO	   of	   Óvár	   Milk,	   a	   secondary	   processor	   recently	   acquired	   by	   smaller	   Italian	  family-­‐owned	   processor	   company	   Valcolatte,	   which	   specializes	   in	   ricotta	   and	  mozzarella.	   The	   Head	   of	   the	   Board	   is	   at	   present	   Tibor	   Mélykúti,	   who	   is	   also	   CEO	   of	  Alföldi	   Milk,	   the	   vast	   domestic	   cooperative	   that	   purchased	   the	   processing	   plants	   left	  behind	   by	   Parmalat	   and	   Sole.	   What	   is	   more	   surprising	   is	   that	   producers,	   especially	  smallholders	   equally	   lack	   representation	   in	   the	   newly	   created	   official	   self-­‐regulatory	  body.	   In	   actual	   fact,	   this	   heavily	   unbalanced	   management	   structure	   reveals	   a	   new	  alignment	  of	  interests,	  which	  is	  characteristic	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  dairy	  sector	  in	  its	  phase	  of	  re-­‐domestication	  in	  the	  post-­‐2010	  period.	  	  	  The	  transformation	   in	  membership	  reflects	  deeper	  changes	   in	  the	  Council’s	  objectives:	  the	  shared	  goal	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Fidesz	  government	  elected	  in	  2010	  (later	  reelected	  in	  2014)	  and	  Hungarian	  processors	  was	  to	  accelerate	  the	  dairy	  sector’s	  re-­‐domestication,	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  encourage	  the	  remaining	  MNCs	  in	  the	  processing	  segment	  to	  leave	  the	  market	  and	   to	  put	  new	  constraints	  on	   retail	  MNCs	   in	   the	  distribution	  of	  profits	   in	   the	  supply	  chain.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  this	  goal	  was	  not	  new:	  the	  first	  attempts	  in	  this	  direction	   had	   emerged	   already	   in	   2003-­‐2005	   under	   a	   Socialist-­‐Liberal	   coalition	  government,	   however	   by	   2010	   the	   situation	   had	   changed.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   exit	  strategies	   of	   MNCs	   accelerated	   after	   2010	   independently	   from	   the	   incumbent	  governments’	  efforts,	  yet	   the	  crisis	  of	  dairy	  supply	  chains	   identified	  by	   the	  EP	  and	   the	  subsequent	  Milk	  Package	  gave	  a	  boost	  to	  this	  effort.	  A	  new	  coalition	  emerged	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Ibid.	  	  65	  Source:	  http://www.tejtermek.hu/magunkrol/elnokseg	  accessed	  10/05/2015	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Hungarian	  cooperative	  Alföldi	  Milk,	  tycoons	  in	  the	  agri-­‐food	  sector	  such	  as	  Mr.	  Csányi	  at	  the	  head	  of	   Sole-­‐Mizo	   (and	  more	   largely	  his	  Bonafarm	  empire),	  domestic	   retail	   chains	  CBA,	  COOP	  and	  Reál	  as	  well	  as	  a	  government	  elected	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  breaking	  away	  from	   the	   national	   economy’s	   dependency	   on	   MNCs.	   National	   preference	   and	  encroachments	  to	  free	  market	  principles	  such	  as	  non-­‐discrimination	  became	  acceptable:	  neither	  the	  government	  nor	  the	  Milk	  Council	  felt	  that	  they	  needed	  to	  hide	  their	  objective,	  namely	  a	  re-­‐allocation	  of	  market	  shares	   from	  multinationals	   to	  Hungarian	   firms,	  using	  various	  regulatory	  incentives	  and	  disincentives.	  	  	  The	   timing	   also	   played	   an	   important	   factor	   in	   facilitating	   this	   endeavor:	   the	   2007	  financial	   crisis	   left	   Hungary	   on	   the	   brink	   of	   bankruptcy	   by	   2009,	   and	   as	   negotiations	  with	  the	  IMF	  began,	  it	  seemed	  that	  the	  country	  was	  bound	  to	  undergo	  a	  lengthy	  phase	  of	  austerity	  measures	  to	  redress	  budgetary	  deficits	  and	  public	  debt.	  It	  was	  in	  this	  context	  that	   the	   Fidesz	   government	   won	   the	   2010	   elections	   with	   the	   promise	   of	   refusing	  austerity	   but	   instead	   fundamentally	   reforming	   Hungary’s	   integration	   to	   transnational	  markets	  –	  chief	  of	  which	  the	  EU	  –	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  dependency	  on	  foreign	  capital.	  The	  fundamental	  objective	  of	  the	  Fidesz	  government	  was	  to	  stabilize	  public	  expenditure	  by	  increasing	   revenues	   through	   “unorthodox	   measures”	   such	   as	   the	   nationalization	   of	  private	   pension	   funds	   in	   2011	   and	   the	   implementation	   of	   “extra	   taxes”	   on	  MNCs.	   The	  stormy	  context	  of	  the	  Eurozone	  crisis	  left	  the	  EU	  more	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  contagion	  among	  the	  predominantly	  Southern	  economies	  (the	  so-­‐called	   “PIIGS”	   group)	   than	  with	  Hungary,	  which	   gave	   the	   government	   a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  implementing	  policies	  that	  would	  have	  otherwise	  likely	  been	  impeached	  by	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   ECJ.	   The	   government	   used	   different	   narratives	   for	  legitimizing	   its	   programs:	   outright	   nationalism	   was	   a	   key	   component	   in	   a	   dramatic	  macroeconomic	   context	   when	   difficulties	   were	   blamed	   on	   exaggerated	   external	  dependency	   and	   a	   colonization	   of	   the	   national	   economy	   by	   MNCs,	   which	   failed	   to	  upgrade	  productivity,	  domestic	  value	  added	  contribution	  and	  wages.	  At	  the	  level	  of	  the	  dairy	   sector	   however,	   this	   nationalist	   stance	   was	   also	   complemented	   with	   a	   more	  managerial	  and	  technical	  discourse	  on	  the	  necessity	  for	  stabilizing	  volatile	  supply	  chain	  relations	  in	  a	  market	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  collapse.	  That	  is	  how	  the	  policy	  recommendations	  of	   the	   EU	  Milk	   Package	   offered	   an	   unexpected	   help	   to	   advance	   re-­‐domestication:	   the	  interests	  of	  an	  openly	  nationalist	  government,	  domestic	  dairy	  processors	  and	   the	  new	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objectives	  of	  the	  Commission	  and	  EP	  to	  strengthen	  domestic	  actors	  vis	  a	  vis	  MNCs	  were	  thus	  aligned.	  Contrary	  to	  other	  sectors	  and	  policy	  areas	  where	  the	  Fidesz	  government’s	  nationalist	  program	  found	  staunch	  enemies	  in	  Brussels	  and	  EU15	  countries,	  at	  the	  level	  of	   the	  dairy	   sector	   the	  new	  objectives	  of	  EU	   regulation	   laid	  down	   in	   the	  Milk	  Package	  actually	  empowered	  domestic	  public	  and	  private	  actors	  in	  re-­‐domesticating	  the	  market	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  defending	  domestic	  SME	  interests	  against	  powerful	  MNCs.	  	  Thus,	   the	   Milk	   Council,	   putatively	   a	   representative	   body	   of	   all	   major	   stakeholders,	  represents	   today	   the	   interests	   of	   a	   distinct	   group	   of	   actors:	   Hungarian-­‐owned	   dairy	  processors.	   As	   our	   interviews	   with	   the	   organization	   revealed,	   this	   group	   has	   clearly	  identified	  allies	  (the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture,	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  government	  as	  well	  as	  domestic	  retailers)	  and	  enemies	  (processing	  and	  retail	  MNCs).	  It	   is	   important	  to	  stress	  that	  while	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  organization	  consistently	  speaks	  of	  defending	  “national”	  or	   “Hungarian”	   interests,	   the	   question	   of	   smallholders	   and	   small	   milk	   producers	   is	  absent	  from	  this	  discourse.	  Our	  interviews	  with	  the	  management	  also	  revealed	  that	  the	  regulatory	   ambitions	   of	   the	  Milk	   Council	   far	   outstretch	   its	   legal	  mandate,	   and	   that	   in	  practice,	   the	  Hungarian	  processors	   it	  represents	  work	   in	  tandem	  with	  the	  government	  and	   various	   public	   bodies	   for	   achieving	   a	   key	   goal:	   restraining	   the	   market	   power	   of	  MNCs.	   In	   practice,	   not	   only	   is	   there	   an	   objective	   alignment	   of	   interests	   between	   a	  nationalist	   government	   and	  domestic	   dairy	  processors	   for	   redistributing	   the	  domestic	  dairy	   market,	   but	   the	   Milk	   Council,	   by	   its	   own	   account,	   acts	   a	   strong	   lobbying	  organization,	  which	  aims	  at	  adopting	  new	  legislation	  in	  the	  Parliament	  against	  MNCs.	  In	  October	  2013	  when	  our	  interviews	  took	  place	  in	  their	  offices,	  the	  deputy-­‐director	  thus	  admitted	  that	   the	   long-­‐term	  goal	  of	   the	  Council	  was	  to	  encourage	  the	  adoption	  of	  new	  regulation	   on	  mandatory	   national	   product	   quotas	   in	   retail	   chains	   and	   restraining	   the	  value	  added	  capture	  by	  retail	  MNCs	  in	  the	  supply	  chain,	  an	  objective	  equally	  shared	  with	  their	   partners	   in	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Agriculture	   and	   even	   the	   new	   management	   of	   the	  National	  Competition	  Authority:	  “We	  already	  tried	  to	  implement	  a	  quota	  system	  in	  2007,	  
which	  was	  unfortunately	  eventually	  abandoned.	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  I	  can	  proudly	  say	  that	  us,	  
Hungarian	  dairy	  processors,	  we	  were	  the	  real	  initiators	  of	  this	  project	  at	  the	  time.	  Our	  new	  
strategy	  is	  different	  today:	  contrary	  to	  2007,	  we	  are	  not	  trying	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  other	  
food	   processing	   sectors,	   we	   concentrate	   on	   pushing	   efforts	   specifically	   for	   dairy.	   I	   am	  
confident	   that	   we	   can	   achieve	   our	   goals	   today	   because	   we	   have	   very	   good	   working	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relations	  with	   the	  Ministry	   (of	  Agriculture)	   (…)	   contrary	   to	  2007,	   I	   know	   that	   today	   the	  
new	  people	  at	   the	  Competition	  Authority	  will	   not	   rebuff	   our	  proposals	  because	   this	   time	  
they	  are	  on	  our	  side66.”	  	  	  In	  light	  of	  these,	  the	  role	  of	  Hungarian	  dairy	  processors	  has	  to	  be	  re-­‐assessed:	  they	  are	  not	   only	   the	   key	   group,	  which	   now	   controls	   the	   official	   regulatory	   body	   of	   the	   entire	  sector,	   but	   through	   personal	   connections,	   affinities	   and	   an	   objective	   alignment	   of	  interests,	   they	  also	  work	  as	  a	   less	  visible	   lobby,	  encouraging	   the	  government	   to	  adopt	  ever	  more	  stringent	  regulations	  against	  their	  prime	  enemies	  –	  MNC	  retail	  chains	  (given	  that	  MNC	  processors	  have	  gradually	  deserted	  the	  Hungarian	  market).	  In	  that	  endeavor,	  domestic	  retail	  chains	  proved	  natural	  allies.	  	  	  In	  the	  2010-­‐2015	  period,	  the	  Fidesz	  governments	  adopted	  a	  series	  of	  acts,	  which	  clearly	  sought	  to	  incapacitate	  MNC	  retail	  chains,	  curb	  their	  market	  share	  and/or	  force	  them	  out	  of	   the	   country.	  The	   first	   of	   these	  was	   the	   introduction	  of	   a	   special	   tax	  on	   larger	   retail	  companies	  in	  2010:	  This	  new	  tax	  was	  part	  of	  a	  series	  of	  new	  levies	  that	  the	  government	  called	   “special	   taxes”.	   In	  2010,	  as	   the	  country	  was	  badly	  hit	  by	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   the	  Eurocrisis	   and	   a	   specifically	   domestic	   problem	   rooted	   in	   large-­‐scale	   household	   debt	  denominated	   in	   foreign	   currency	   (while	   inflation	   rose	   sharply).	   The	   introduction	   of	  “special	  taxes”	  was	  predicated	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  MNCs	  operating	  in	  Hungary	  should	  also	  contribute	  proportionally	  to	  their	  profits	  in	  extraordinary	  times.	  Among	  a	  series	  of	  other	  taxes,	  the	  government	  introduced	  a	  “special	  tax”	  on	  retail	  chains:	  it	  targeted	  specifically	  firms	  with	   a	   turnover	   in	   excess	   of	   500	  million	   HUF	  with	   a	   progressive	   rate	   between	  0,1%	  and	  0,4%	  until	  1	  billion	  HUF	  and	  2,5%	  beyond.	  The	  specificity	  of	  the	  tax	  was	  also	  that	  the	  turnover	  considered	  was	  not	  based	  on	  the	  operations	  of	  individual	  companies:	  where	   the	   firm	  belonged	  to	  a	   larger	  group	  of	  companies,	   the	   turnover	  considered	  was	  the	   total	   registered	  by	   the	  group	  as	  such.	  Although	  the	   tax	  was	   later	  phased	  out,	   it	  hit	  foreign	  retail	  chains	  particularly	  hardly	  –	  yet	  the	  ECJ	  left	  it	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  Hungarian	  courts	  to	  determine	  whether	  it	  had	  actually	  discriminated	  against	  foreign	  companies.	  A	  second	  regulation	  came	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  law	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  “Mall-­‐Stop	  Act”:	  this	  law	  adopted	  in	  2011	  banned	  the	  construction	  of	  new	  retail	  facilities	  above	  300	  sq.	  and	  forced	  the	  construction	  of	  new	  retail	  facilities	  to	  seek	  the	  preliminary	  approval	  of	  a	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special	  committee	  composed	  of	  representatives	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Economy.	  A	  third	  piece	  of	  regulation	  affecting	  retailers	  was	  adopted	  in	  2013,	  when	  the	  concessions	  on	  tobacco	  sales	  were	  unilaterally	  nationalized	  and	  re-­‐distributed	  in	   tenders	   supervised	   by	   the	   government.	   Finally,	   2014	   saw	   the	   introduction	   of	   even	  more	  aggressive	  regulations:	  In	  November	  2014,	  the	  Minister	  for	  the	  National	  Economy,	  Mihály	   Varga,	   introduced	   a	   bill	   that	   sought	   to	   add	   new	   modifications	   to	   the	   2005	  Commercial	   Act.	   The	   bill	   contained	   an	   extraordinary	   provision:	   the	   forced	   closure	   of	  retail	  facilities	  above	  400	  sq.	  if	  they	  failed	  to	  show	  net	  profits	  in	  two	  consecutive	  years.	  The	  Ministry	  knew	  full	  well	  that	  in	  the	  2012	  and	  2013	  commercial	  years,	  retail	  MNCs	  all	  accumulated	   important	   losses:	   the	   aim	   was	   clearly	   to	   devise	   a	   legal	   instrument	   that	  could	  not	  only	  restrict	  their	  market	  share	  but	  simply	  force	  MNCs	  out	  of	  Hungary67.	  	  It	  is	  especially	  telling	  that	  the	  bill	  argues	  that	  new	  regulation	  is	  necessary	  for	  defending	  the	  interests	  of	  Hungarian	  SMEs,	  who	  are	  often	  victims	  of	  retail	  chains’	  unfair	  business	  practices 68 :	   “In	   Hungary,	   unified	   rules	   apply	   to	   hypermarkets,	   large	   supermarkets,	  
discounts	   and	   small	   family	   owned	   proximity	   retail	   stores.	   However,	   in	   this	   entirely	   free	  
competition,	   the	   strongly	  capitalized	  retail	   chains	  continue	   to	  expand,	  while	   small	   stores	  
are	  forced	  to	  close.	  In	  parallel,	  unemployment	  continues	  to	  grow,	  because	  large	  discounts	  
and	   hypermarkets	   operate	   with	   higher	   productivity	   and	   they	   are	   less	   labor-­‐intensive	   in	  
light	  of	  the	  lower	  quality	  of	  services	  provided	  (sic).	   	  The	  retail	  sector	  is	  not	  characterized	  
anymore	   by	   the	   competition	   between	   firms	   with	   a	   similar	   profile,	   but	   a	   competition	  
between	  different	  marketing	  models.	  A	  family	  owned	  store	  is	  facing	  the	  competition	  from	  a	  
discount	   company	   that	   cheaply	   sources	   its	   supplies	   from	   the	   whole	   of	   Europe	   or	   the	  
hypermarket	   chain	   that	   sets	   up	   bus	   transportation	   for	   customers	   to	   reach	   its	   stores.	  
Regulation	  doesn’t	  provide	  sufficient	  protection	  because	  the	  same	  rules	  apply	  to	  all	  retail	  
facilities.	  If	  we	  are	  to	  protect	  national	  SMEs	  while	  complying	  with	  EU	  regulations,	  we	  have	  
to	   formulate	  different	   rules	   for	   different	   retail	   formats.	   The	   experience	   of	   the	  past	   years	  
shows	  that	  large	  retailers	  are	  not	  big	  employers.	  Only	  the	  strengthening	  and	  development	  
of	  SMEs	  can	  guarantee	  long-­‐term	  employment.	  We	  have	  to	  step	  in	  to	  defend	  the	  interests	  of	  
national	  SMEs	  and	  consumers.	  The	  strongly	  capitalized	  retail	  chains	  can	  afford	  to	  operate	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at	  a	   loss	  with	  dumping	  prices,	   thus	   they	   force	  out	  of	   the	  market	   those	   firms	  which	   can’t	  
compete	  with	  (such)	  prices,	  since	  they	  depend	  on	  profits.69”	  	  Although	  President	  János	  Áder	  refused	  to	  sign	  the	  bill	  and	  sent	  it	  back	  to	  the	  Parliament,	  the	   law	  was	  eventually	   adopted	  after	  modifications.	   Finally,	   in	  December	  2014,	   a	  new	  law	  regulating	  opening	  hours	  in	  the	  retail	  sector	  banned	  shops	  larger	  than	  400	  sq.	  from	  remaining	  open	  on	  Sundays70.	  	  	  The	   new,	   aggressively	   adversarial	   stance	   on	   the	   part	   of	   public	   authorities	   took	   retail	  chains	  off-­‐guard.	  Tesco	  Hungary	  is	  not	  only	  the	  market	  leader	  in	  food	  retail	  but	  also	  the	  country’s	  single	  biggest	  private	  employer	  with	  40	  000	  employees,	  and	  is	  also	  the	  market	  leader	   in	   grocery	   and	   food	   retail.	   As	   the	   most	   prominent	   of	   the	   retail	   MNCs,	   it	   also	  received	  the	  most	  criticism	  for	  its	  pricing-­‐	  and	  contractual	  practices:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  contributed	   actively	   to	   the	   import	   of	   Slovak	   and	  Polish	  milk	   priced	   in	  Hungary	  below	  national	  production	  prices,	  which	  played	  a	  key	   role	   in	  deteriorating	   the	   sector’s	   trade	  balance.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  was	  also	  accused	  repeatedly	  of	  offsetting	  unfair	  costs	  onto	  its	   suppliers.	   However,	   the	   company’s	   management	   understood	   that	   they	   were	   too	  exposed	  as	  early	  as	  2007,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Ethical	  Codex	  proposal.	  As	  a	  reaction,	  Tesco	  implemented	   an	   unprecedented	   program	   called	   “national	   supplier	   development”	   in	  2009.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  program	  was	  to	  upgrade	  small	  producers	  hand-­‐picked	  at	  regional	  fairs	   so	   that	   Hungarian	   SMEs	   could	   gradually	   grow	   to	   supply	   increasingly	   bigger	  markets	   through	   Tesco’s	   network	   of	   supermarkets.	   The	   program	   is	   meant	   to	   offer	   a	  four-­‐year	  upgrading	  platform:	  in	  the	  first	  year,	  the	  supplier	  serves	  a	  municipal	  network	  of	   shops,	   the	   second	   year	   comes	   the	   regional	   level,	   the	   third	   is	   national,	   after	   which	  comes	   the	   export	  market.	   Tesco	   claims	   that	   there	   is	   a	   constant	   transfer	   of	   know-­‐how	  through	   standard-­‐	   and	   marketing	   trainings	   destined	   for	   the	   suppliers,	   who	   are	   also	  offered	  preferential	  treatment	  and	  considerably	  longer	  contracts	  (yearly	  contracts)	  than	  others.	   	   By	   2013,	   100	   small	   producers	   had	   participated	   in	   the	   program	   with	   500	  different	   products	   among	  which	  milk	   and	   cottage	   cheese.	   The	   revenues	   generated	  2,2	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billion	   HUF	   in	   2012	   and	   3	   billion	   HUF	   in	   201371.	   	   The	   launch	   of	   the	   program	  was	   a	  rational	  reaction	  to	  mounting	  criticism	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  public	  regulatory	  intervention,	  and	  given	  the	  very	  small	  size	  of	  participants,	  it	  is	  equally	  obvious	  that	  it	  was	  barely	  more	  than	   a	   preemptive	   PR	   attempt	   by	   Tesco	   Hungary	   to	   avoid	   further	   sanctions.	   This	  strategy	   proved	   ultimately	   a	   failure:	   in	   spite	   of	   a	   symbolic	   contract	   of	   “strategic	  partnership”	  signed	  between	  Tesco	  and	  the	  government	  in	  2012,	  the	  company	  was	  the	  primary	   target	   of	   the	   successive	   regulations	   adopted	   between	   2011	   and	   2015,	   which	  openly	   aimed	   at	   reducing	   its	   market	   share.	   Ádám	   Lendvai,	   the	   responsible	   for	   the	  national	   supplier	   program	   summarized	   the	   position	   of	   the	   company	   on	   what	   he	  perceived	   as	   the	   government’s	   hypocrisy	   in	   punishing	   retail	   MNCs	   while	   avoiding	  upgrading	  investments	  in	  the	  production	  segment	  of	  agri-­‐food	  supply	  chains	  such	  as	  the	  dairy	  sector:	  “While	  there	  has	  been	  a	  lot	  of	  unfair	  finger	  pointing	  in	  our	  direction,	  it	  has	  to	  
be	  said	  that	  neither	  the	  government	  nor	  any	  other	  company	  invested	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  
upgrading	  program	  for	  small	  producers	  such	  as	  the	  one	  we	  implemented	  here72.”	  	  	  	  
Conclusion:	  The	  Developmental	  Failure	  of	  Integrationism	  	  	  The	   pathway	   of	   the	   Hungarian	   dairy	   sector	   offers	   an	   interesting	   case	   study	   for	  understanding	   how	   domestic	   agency	   shaped	   developmental	   strategies,	   how	   these	  preferences	   changed	   over	   time	   and	   how	   they	   ultimately	   affected	   developmental	  outcomes	   for	   the	   sector.	   A	   clear	   feature	   in	   the	   post-­‐1989	   period	   is	   periodicity:	   a	   first	  long	   period	   between	   1989	   and	   the	   early	   2000s	   corresponds	   to	   an	   integrationist	  developmental	   model	   as	   described	   by	   Amsden	   (2001).	   In	   this	   period,	   the	   state	  restructures	   property	   rights	   –	   all	   the	  while	   domestic	   public	   actors	   don’t	   have	   a	   clear	  vision	  of	  long-­‐term	  developmental	  goals.	  They	  transfer	  dairy	  processing	  to	  MNCs	  while	  they	  leave	  producers	  deeply	  fragmented	  without	  economically	  viable	  plots	  and	  without	  cooperatives	  that	  could	  pool	  their	  resources.	  Domestic	  actors	  are	  weak	  and	  disorganized	  in	   dairy	   production	   and	   processing.	   Instead	   of	   providing	   capital	   and	   technology	   for	  domestic	  actors	  through	  spillovers,	  direct	  and	  indirect	  linkages	  –	  MNC	  strategies	  deplete	  the	   remaining	   resources	   and	   precipitate	   competitive	   downgrading.	   Public	   agency	  was	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also	  shaped	  by	  a	  particular	  opportunity	  structure	  resulting	  from	  historical	  institutional	  legacies:	  among	  these,	  the	  combination	  of	  high	  levels	  of	  foreign	  debt	  accumulated	  since	  the	   1960s	   and	   a	   successful	   nationalization	   of	   productive	   assets	   in	   the	   dairy	   sector	   in	  1948	   contributed	   to	   the	   state’s	   preference	   for	   an	   integrationist	   strategy,	   which	   could	  raise	   foreign	   capital	   for	   financing	   the	   debt	   service	   by	   selling	   state-­‐owned	   assets	   as	  quickly	   as	   possible.	   Thereafter,	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   sector’s	   developmental	   upgrading	  was	   outsourced	   to	   MNCs.	   A	   consequence	   of	   this	   disintegration	   between	   an	   atomized	  production	   segment,	   and	   processors	   transferred	   to	   MNCs	   was	   that	   the	   state	   actually	  foreclosed	   the	   emergence	   of	   any	   potential	   domestic	   developmental	   coalition	   between	  the	  various	  actors	  of	  the	  supply	  chain	  –	  a	  model,	  which	  did	  materialize	  in	  Poland.	  	  	  MNC	  processors’	  choice	  to	  leave	  Hungary	  altogether	  by	  the	  early	  2000s	  shows	  that	  their	  investments	  in	  the	  mid	  1990s	  were	  more	  of	  a	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  experiment	  in	  which	  they	  took	  over	  an	  entire	  market	  before	  realizing	  that	  domestic	  consumption	  was	  not	  strong	  enough	   to	   justify	   further	   investments,	   while	   they	   didn’t	   use	   existing	   production	  capacities	   for	  utilizing	  Hungary	  as	  an	  export	  base	   in	   light	  of	   the	   stronger	   comparative	  advantages	   of	   bigger	   CEE	   dairy	   sectors	   such	   as	   Poland.	   When	   they	   exit,	   they	   leave	  behind	  a	  market	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  collapse.	  	  	  By	   contrast,	   a	   second	   phase	   is	   characterized	   by	   the	   re-­‐domestication	   of	   the	   dairy	  market:	   a	   process	  which	   owes	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   to	   the	   decision	   of	   processor	  MNCs	   to	  leave	   Hungary	   and	   re-­‐allocate	   resources	   to	   neighboring	   countries,	   but	   also	   to	   a	   new	  developmental	  model,	  which	  is	  a	  direct	  reaction	  to	  the	  perceived	  negative	  outcomes	  of	  the	   preceding	   integrationist	   phase.	   In	   this	   latter	   period,	   a	   new	   coalition	   emerges	  between	  domestic	  firms	  and	  the	  state,	  which	  seeks	  to	  limit	  on	  the	  contrary	  the	  market	  penetration	   of	   MNCs,	   or	   alternatively	   to	   incentivize	   and	   accelerate	   their	   exit.	   The	  primary	   goal	   in	   this	   second	   period	   is	   the	   re-­‐allocation	   of	   property	   rights	   back	   to	  domestic	  actors.	  	  	  What	  the	  Hungarian	  case	  study	  shows,	  is	  that	  very	  different	  rationales	  prevailed	  in	  these	  two	  moments:	  the	  management	  of	  privatization	  by	  the	  state	  instituted	  a	  market	  largely	  controlled	  by	  MNCs	  and	  a	  minimal	  state	  while	  the	  post-­‐2010	  period	  saw	  an	  aggressive	  re-­‐regulation	  of	  the	  market	  that	  actively	  sought	  to	  exclude	  MNCs.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	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stress	   that	   the	  regulation	  of	  relations	  between	  domestic	  and	   foreign	  actors	  could	  have	  taken	   on	   other	   shapes:	   an	   alternative	  method	   for	   improving	   the	   bargaining	   power	   of	  domestic	   actors	   would	   have	   involved	   massive	   national	   developmental	   programs	  targeted	   at	   Hungarian	   milk	   producers	   and	   dairy	   processors.	   The	   Polish	   pathway	  examined	   in	   the	   next	   chapter	   shows	   that	   such	   as	   strategy	   was	   indeed	   possible	  elsewhere.	   A	   particularity	   of	   the	   Hungarian	   pathway	   is	   that	   investments	   in	   the	  competitive	  upgrading	  of	  domestic	  actors	  failed	  to	  materialize	  even	  in	  the	  most	  overtly	  protectionist	  phase	  of	  re-­‐domestication:	  in	  other	  words,	  rather	  than	  upgrading	  domestic	  actors,	  public	  actors	  chose	  the	  less	  costly	  option	  of	  pushing	  MNCs	  out.	  	  After	  MNCs	   leave-­‐	   or	   are	   forced	   to	   leave	   the	  market,	   the	   trade	   competitiveness	  of	   the	  sector	  does	  improve	  –	  albeit	  timidly.	  There	  is	  however	  a	  fundamental	  caveat:	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  seemingly	  radical	  shift	   from	  an	  integrationist	  to	  a	  more	  autonomist	  developmental	  strategy,	   what	   remained	   constant	   in	   Hungary	   was	   the	   absolute	   marginalization	   of	  farmers	   and	   smallholders,	   who	   remained	   consistently	   excluded	   from	   the	   defining	  interest	   coalitions	   that	   governed	   the	   sector.	   If	   integrationism	   reflected	   an	   objective	  alliance	  between	   the	   state	   and	  MNCs,	   the	   re-­‐domestication	  of	   the	  2000s	   is	   an	  alliance	  between	   the	   state,	   domestic	   processors	   and	   retailers:	   in	   both	   periods,	   farmers	   are	  merely	  spectators.	  Without	  capital	  and	  without	  voice,	   they	  are	   the	  consistent	   losers	  of	  the	   post-­‐1989	   process	   of	   restructuring.	   Nonetheless,	   there	   are	   some	   signs	   that	  cooperation	   and	   collective	  mobilization	  might	   gradually	   take	   hold	   at	   least	   among	   the	  bigger	   survivors:	   the	   case	   of	   Alföldi	   Milk,	   once	   a	   self-­‐organized	   collective	   of	   MNC	  suppliers	  and	  now	  one	  of	  the	  flagship	  processors	  of	  the	  sector,	  allows	  for	  some	  optimism	  in	  that	  regard.	  	  	  In	  the	  second	  chapter,	  we	  argued	  that	  domestic	  public	  agency	  can	  shape	  developmental	  trajectories	   in	   at	   least	   three	   dimensions:	   (1)	   by	   solving	   the	   problem	   of	   capital	   and	  technology	   needs	   of	   domestic	   firms,	   (2)	   by	   modifying	   property	   rights	   and	   (3)	   by	  regulating	  relations	  between	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  actors.	  In	  Hungary,	  the	  state	  chose	  to	  outsource	  capital	  and	  technology	  provision	  to	  MNCs	  –	  thus	  opting	  for	  an	  integrationist	  model	   for	  the	  sector’s	   insertion	  in	  transnational	  markets.	   It	  also	  restructured	  property	  rights	  extensively	   in	  the	  course	  of	   land-­‐	  and	  processing	  privatization:	  however	   in	  both	  cases,	  domestic	  actors	  were	  excluded	  rather	  than	   integrated	   in	  the	  new	  property	  right	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institutions.	   Finally,	   the	   state	   became	   highly	   active	   in	   re-­‐regulating	   MNC-­‐domestic	  relations	   in	   the	   post-­‐2010	   period:	   largely	   as	   a	   compensation	   for	   the	   developmental	  failures	  of	  integrationism.	  	  Although	   it	   is	   illusory	   to	   derive	   far-­‐reaching	   conclusions	   for	   the	   entire	   Hungarian	  economy	   based	   on	   the	   relatively	  marginal	   experience	   of	   its	   dairy	   sector,	   we	   contend	  nonetheless	   that	   the	   trajectory	   experienced	   at	   this	   level	   convincingly	  mirrors	  macro-­‐phenomena,	  which	   affected	   the	   entire	   national	   economy	   in	   the	   post-­‐1989	  period.	   The	  shift	  from	  integrationism	  to	  re-­‐domestication	  is	  not	  a	  peculiarity	  of	  the	  dairy	  sector,	  but	  a	   defining	   feature	   in	   a	   country	   which	   twice	   elected	   a	   government	   that	   promised	   to	  liberate	   it	   from	   the	   yoke	   of	   multinationals	   and	   promised	   instead	   an	   autonomous,	  “national”	  developmental	  pathway.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  gap	  between	  this	  proclaimed	  goal	  and	  actual	  processes,	  we	  see	  peculiar	  similarities	  between	  the	  micro-­‐level	   in	  dairy	  and	  the	  national	   macro	   level:	   in	   both	   cases,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   on	   closer	   scrutiny	   that	   what	   is	  effectively	   happening	   is	   not	   so	   much	   a	   shift	   from	   a	   developmentally	   inefficient,	  dependent	  mode	  of	   integration	   to	   transnational	  markets	   –	   to	   a	  more	   ambitious,	  more	  inclusive	  and	  economically	  more	  efficient	  model	  -­‐	  but	  a	  redistribution	  of	  property	  rights	  from	  a	  small	  circle	  of	  MNCs	  to	  a	  similarly	  small	  circle	  of	  domestic	  firms.	  In	  that	  regard,	  the	  modest	  story	  of	  Hungarian	  dairy	  restructuring	  might	  also	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  a	  self-­‐declared	  illiberal	  democracy.	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Chapter	  4.	  	  The	   structural	   problems	   of	   Polish	   and	   Hungarian	   dairy	   sectors	   were	   very	   similar	   in	  1989	  as	  both	  countries	  had	  to	  overcome	  a	  dual	  challenge	  –	  competitive	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  organizational	  on	   the	  other.	   	  Prior	   to	  1989	   the	  Polish	  dairy	  sector	  had	  been	  protected	  from	  competition	  as	  much	  as	  from	  consumer	  preferences:	  obsolete	  technology,	  patently	  low	  productivity,	  a	  virtual	  lack	  of	  food	  safety	  standards	  were	  not	  problematic	  as	  long	  as	  subsidized	   domestic	   production	   and	   consumption,	   guaranteed	   export	   markets	   under	  COMECON	  and	   legal	   safeguards	   against	   competition	  were	   in	   place.	  Under	   free	  market	  conditions	  however,	  these	  glaring	  competitive	  disadvantages	  reasserted	  themselves:	  the	  dairy	  sector	  urgently	  needed	  massive	  upgrading	   investments	   to	  adapt	  and	  survive.	  On	  the	   organizational	   level,	   new	   modes	   of	   coordination	   between	   the	   state	   and	   private	  actors	   had	   to	   be	   invented.	   While	   these	   challenges	   were	   equally	   present	   in	   Hungary,	  Poland	   embarked	   on	   a	   very	   different	   trajectory:	   in	   twenty-­‐five	   years,	   a	   sector	  overwhelmingly	   dominated	   by	   domestically	   owned	   cooperatives	   inherited	   from	  Communism	  became	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  dairy	  exporters	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  state’s	  agency	  in	  shaping	  the	  sector’s	  restructuring	  throughout	  the	  1990s	  proved	  vital:	  since	  the	  early	  1990s,	   the	   Polish	   state	   has	   implemented	   long-­‐term	   upgrading	   investment	   programs	  financed	  with	  foreign	  capital	  secured	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  sources	  (bilateral	  aid,	  adjustment	  loans,	   EU	   funds)	   and	   has	   established	   a	   host	   of	   new	   public	   regulatory	   and	   financial	  organizations	  tasked	  with	  the	  modernization	  of	  agri-­‐food	  sectors.	  Instead	  of	  getting	  rid	  of	  obsolete	  cooperatives,	  the	  state	  coopted	  them	  in	  shaping	  a	  modernization	  agenda	  for	  the	  sector.	  The	  success	  of	   this	  strategy	  became	  evident	   in	   the	  wake	  of	  EU	  accession	   in	  2004:	  while	  many	  feared	  that	  increased	  competition	  might	  marginalize	  domestic	  actors,	  the	  competitive	  position	  of	  Polish	  dairy	  in	  transnational	  markets	  improved	  dramatically	  instead,	  while	  domestically	  owned	  Polish	  dairies	  maintained	  their	  dominant	  position	  in	  their	  home	  market.	  The	  Polish	  trajectory	  differs	  from	  the	  Hungarian	  case	  not	  only	  in	  the	  developmental	   outcomes	   it	   attained	   but	   the	   very	   mode	   of	   transnationalization:	   the	  integration	   of	   the	   Polish	   sector	   to	   transnational	  markets	   showing	   a	   lot	   of	   similarities	  with	  “traditional”	  autonomist	  developmentalism	  -­‐	  when	  Hungary	  by	  contrast	  embraced	  an	  integrationist	  pathway.	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In	   a	   first	   section,	   the	   trajectory	   of	   the	  Polish	   sector	   is	   described	   in	   light	   of	   indicators,	  which	   testify	  of	  a	  surprisingly	  robust	  competitive	  upgrading	  process.	  A	  second	  section	  discusses	  the	  sector’s	  institutional	  history	  in	  the	  longue	  durée:	  long-­‐term	  legacies	  shaped	  in	   Poland	   a	   different	   privatization	   agenda	   than	   in	   Hungary.	   In	   a	   third	   section,	   we	  examine	  upgrading	  policies	  implemented	  by	  a	  developmental	  alliance	  between	  the	  state	  and	   dairy	   cooperatives.	   Finally,	   we	   discuss	   some	   of	   the	   competitive	   constraints	   and	  opportunities	  inherent	  to	  different	  strategies	  adopted	  by	  Polish	  dairies73.	  	  	  
Part	  1.	  Developmental	  outcomes	  in	  the	  Polish	  dairy	  sector	  	  
Outcomes	  for	  domestic	  actors	  	  As	   in	   Hungary,	   restructuring	   entailed	   important	   social	   costs	   in	   Poland,	   with	   a	   large	  number	  of	  small	  producers	  forced	  out	  of	  business:	  between	  1995	  and	  2005,	  almost	  half	  of	  dairy	  producers	  left	  the	  sector	  (Table	  4.1.).	  	  
Table	  4.1.	  Dairy	  Producers	  in	  Poland	  1996-­‐2005	  
	   1996	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	  
Nr.	  Producers	  (‘000)	   1309	   876	   810	   735	   712	  
%	  Producers	  compared	  
to	  base	  year	  1990	  




560	   376	   356	   312	   294	  
In	  %	  of	  total	  producers	   42,78	   42,92	   43,95	   42,45	   41,29	  
Source:	  (Wilkin,	  Milczarek-­‐Andrzejewska,	  Malak-­‐Rawlikowska,	  &	  Falkowski,	  2006)	  	  While	   significant,	   it	   has	   to	   be	   reminded	   that	   in	   Hungary	   this	   process	  was	   even	  more	  pronounced:	  Bakucs	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  estimate	  the	  decrease	  at	  60%	  over	  the	  same	  period	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  The	   organizational	   difference	   with	   the	   preceding	   chapter	   reflects	   the	   temporal	   difference	   between	  Poland	   and	   Hungary:	   In	   Hungary,	   public	   interventionism	   occured	   after	   competitive	   downgrade.	   In	  Poland,	  the	  state	  retreats	  after	  EU	  accession.	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Hungary.	   The	   social	   costs	   of	   restructuring	   were	   (logically)	   spread	   unevenly,	   as	   the	  smallest	   farmers	   were	   the	   most	   affected.	   The	   production	   segment	   thus	   underwent	  concentration:	  the	  average	  number	  of	  cows	  per	  farm	  gradually	   increased	  as	  a	  result	  of	  small-­‐scale	  farmer	  elimination.	  The	  smallest	  category	  of	  dairy	  farms	  owning	  between	  1	  and	  2	  cows	  accounted	  for	  two	  thirds	  of	  all	   farms	  in	  1987,	  but	  only	  5,8%	  by	  2010.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  average	  number	  of	  cow	  per	  farm	  increased	  to	  31	  by	  2010	  (Figure	  3.6).	  
Figure	  4.1.	  Dairy	  Farms	  by	  Number	  of	  Cows	  in	  Poland	  in	  2010	  
	  
Source:	  CLAL	  	  However,	   it	  has	   to	  be	   reminded	   that	  Polish	   levels	  of	   concentration	  are	  below	  EU15	  or	  even	   CEE	   levels	   by	   orders	   of	   magnitude:	   as	   we	   showed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	  Hungarian	   farms	   had	   354	   cows	   on	   average	   in	   2010.	   From	   that	   perspective,	  while	   the	  loss	   of	   the	   smallest	   producers	   has	   been	   important,	   the	   structure	   of	   Polish	   dairy	  production	  still	  reflects	  an	  extremely	  fragmented	  ownership	  structure.	  	  	  Lower	   levels	   of	   concentration	   than	   in	   Hungary	   not	   only	   characterize	   production	   but	  dairy	   processing	   and	   the	   retail	   sector	   as	  well:	   Bakucs	   et	   al.	   (2012)	   find	   a	   decrease	   of	  30%	  in	  processing	  firms	  between	  1997	  and	  2007	  in	  Poland	  for	  a	  total	  of	  232	  “survivors”.	  In	   Hungary,	   only	   58	   processing	   firms	   remained	   by	   2007	   for	   170	   in	   1996.	   	   As	   a	  consequence,	   in	   2006,	   the	   C4	   concentration	   ratio	   of	   the	   four	   largest	   processors	  amounted	  to	  only	  22%	  of	  total	  raw	  milk	  production	  in	  Poland	  while	  it	  had	  stood	  at	  60%	  in	   Hungary	   already	   by	   2001.	   A	   fundamental	   particularity	   of	   the	   Polish	   sector	   is	   that	  
24620	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domestically-­‐owned	  processors	  accounted	  for	  80%	  of	  market	  shares	  and	  foreign	  MNCs	  only	   10%	   in	   2004	   (Seremak-­‐Bulge,	   2005):	   this	   constitutes	   a	   crucial	   difference	   with	  Hungary	  where	   these	  proportions	  were	  symmetrically	   inverted	  with	  MNCs	  controlling	  80%	  of	  the	  sector	  by	  200074.	  	  The	  cooperative	  format	  has	  another	  implication:	  farmers-­‐producers	  own	  processing	  facilities	  –	  as	  such,	  production	  and	  processing	  are	  integrated	  within	   the	   same	   firms.	   This	   is	   a	   crucial	   difference	  with	   Hungary,	   where	   cooperatives	  never	  owned	  a	  majority	  of	  processing	  plants	  (not	  even	  under	  state	  Socialism):	  therefore	  in	   Poland,	   the	   functional	   differenciation	   between	   the	   production	   and	   processing	  segments	   of	   the	  market	   is	   less	   important	   than	   in	   Hungary,	   where	   data	   on	   these	   two	  segments	  speak	  of	  completely	  different	  actors.	  	  	  The	  Polish	  and	  Hungarian	  food	  retail	  sectors	  are	  very	  different:	  the	  Hungarian	  sector	  is	  highly	   concentrated	  and	  MNC	  specializing	   in	  hyper-­‐	   and	   supermarket	   formats	   such	  as	  Tesco,	   and	  German	  discount	   chains	  with	  high	  profitability	   compete	  with	   a	  network	  of	  domestic	   retailers	   that	   specialize	   in	   smaller	   proximity	   stores	   operating	   with	   lower	  profitability	   (see	   chapter	   3).	   In	   Poland	   by	   contrast,	   the	   retail	   segment	   is	   substantially	  less	   concentrated	  with	  a	  CR5	   ratio	  of	  20%	  -­‐	   compared	  with	  70%	   in	  Hungary	   (Bakucs,	  Falkowski,	  &	  Fertő,	  2012)	  –	  which	  might	   in	   turn	  explain,	  why,	  MNC	  retailers	  have	  not	  become	  as	  central	  to	  the	  sector’s	  restrucuring	  as	  in	  Hungary.	  	  	  
Value-­‐Added	  Upgrading	  in	  Production	  	  What	  is	  striking	  in	  the	  Polish	  case	  is	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  a	  relatively	  stable	  position	  of	   the	   milk	   and	   dairy	   sector	   within	   the	   national	   agricultural	   and	   agri-­‐food	   economy,	  while	  the	  revenues	  generated	  by	  the	  sector	  show	  tremendous	  improvement,	  particularly	  accelerating	   after	  EU	   accession	   in	  2004:	   	   for	   instance,	  while	   the	   share	   of	  milk	   in	   total	  agricultural	  output	  modestly	  rose	  from	  13%	  to	  16%	  between	  1998	  and	  2007,	  revenues	  almost	  doubled	  in	  the	  same	  decade	  from	  6	  to	  11	  billion	  PLN	  (see	  Figure	  4.2).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Naturally,	  this	  has	  to	  be	  put	  in	  perspective	  with	  the	  later	  re-­‐domestication	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  processing	  segment	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  where	  even	  after	  MNC	  exit,	  the	  two	  dominant	  domestically	  owned	  processors	  control	  today	  50%	  of	  the	  market.	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Figure	  4.2.	  The	  Share	  of	  Milk	  in	  Total	  Agricultural	  Output	  and	  in	  Value	  in	  Poland	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Figure	  4.3.	  Cow	  Herd	  and	  Milk	  Production	  in	  Poland	  1995-­‐2011	  	  
	  
Source:	  AKI,	  GUS	  	  That	   assumption	   is	   confirmed	   in	   all	   available	   datasets:	   The	   Polish	   dairy	   sector	   did	   in	  effect	  display	  steady	  gains	  in	  productivity	  throughout	  the	  transition	  period	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	   2000s.	   In	   the	   dairy	   sector,	   the	   generic	   indicator	   of	   productivity	   is	   the	  milk	   yield	  (measured	  in	  liters/cow/year)	  –	  which	  increased	  by	  70%	  in	  23	  years.	  	  
Table	  4.2.	  Polish	  milk	  yields	  1990-­‐2011	  	  
	   1990	   1995	   2000	   2005	   2007	   2011	   2013	  
Milk	  Yields	   3246	   3255	   3778	   4271	   4400	   5001	   5532	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At	  first	  sight,	  these	  improvements	  might	  seem	  impressive,	  but	  in	  comparison	  with	  EU15	  averages	   and	   even	   regional	   CEE	   competitors,	  while	   notable,	   they	   are	  more	  measured:	  relative	  gains	  in	  productivity	  were	  also	  substantially	  stronger	  in	  Hungary	  than	  in	  Poland	  as	  shown	  below	  in	  Table	  4.3.	  below.	  
Table	  4.3.	  Variation	  of	  Milk	  Yields	  in	  CEE	  2000-­‐2010	  
Milk	  Yield	  Variation	  2010/2000	  
Czech	  Republic	   +21,1%	  
Hungary	   +36,3%	  
Poland	   +19,3%	  
Slovakia	   +6,9%	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Table	  4.4.	  Production	  of	  Dairy	  Products	  by	  Main	  Categories	  1990-­‐2011	  (‘000	  tons)	  
	  
1990	   1995	   2000	   2005	   2011	  
Butter	   290	   123	   139	   179	   171	  
Hard	  Cheese	   130	   122	   148	   239	   285	  
Curd	   295	   198	   262	   295	   382	  
Milk	  Powder	   226	   169	   158	   192	   148	  
Yoghurt, Drinks 	   150	   345	   510	   739	  
Milk	   2037	   1260	   1363	   2294	   2812	  
Cream	   335	   175	   198	   313	   340	  
Source	   based	   on	   Szajner	   (2009),	   GUS,	   (Szajner	   &	   Vőneki,	   2014a),	   (Szajner	   &	   Vőneki,	  
2014b)	  	  Polish	   dairy	   processors	   (domestically	   owned	   cooperatives	   in	   the	   vast	   majority)	  strengthened	  their	  market	  position	  in	  two	  specific	  segments:	  fresh	  milk	  and	  higher	  value	  added	   processed	   goods	   such	   as	   cheese,	   yoghurt	   and	   curd	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   fresh	  milk	   on	   the	   other.	   	   Production	   initially	   suffered	   an	   abrupt	   drop	   following	   1989:	   the	  production	   of	   fresh	  milk	   was	   halved	   in	   only	   five	   years	   between	   1990	   and	   1995.	   The	  early	   challenges	   in	   restructuring	   were	   overwhelming:	   domestic	   demand	   and	  consumption	  of	  dairy	  products	  faltered	  as	  inflation	  rates	  soared	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Balcerowicz	   reforms,	   traditional	   Socialist	   export	  markets	  were	   themselves	   depressed,	  the	  Socialist	   subsidy	  system	  of	  dairy	  production	  was	   replaced	  with	  new,	  experimental	  forms	   of	   support,	   the	   vertical	   coordination	   of	   the	   sector	   by	   the	   state	   collapsed,	  while	  new	   legislation	   transformed	   the	   legal	   status	   and	   ownership	   structure	   in	   dairy	  cooperatives.	   In	   spite	   of	   these	   challenges,	   the	   sector	   adapted	   and	   consolidated	  surprisingly	  quickly:	  the	  rebound	  in	  production	  levels	  was	  already	  apparent	  by	  1995.	  In	  most	  product	  categories,	   the	  1990	  output	   levels	  were	  matched	  with	  by	  2000.	  Notably,	  EU	  accession	   in	  2004	  had	  dramatically	  different	   impacts	   than	   in	   the	  Hungarian	   sector	  where	  it	  reflects	  a	  critical	  juncture	  after	  which	  production	  and	  exports	  rapidly	  collapse.	  In	   Poland	   on	   the	   contrary,	   EU	   accession	   didn’t	   hinder	   the	   post-­‐Socialist	   rebound	   in	  outputs:	  by	  2011,	  quantities	  of	   fresh	  milk	  were	  40%	  superior	   to	  1990	   levels.	   In	  other	  words,	  at	   the	  production	   level,	  one	  can	  see	  an	  uninterrupted	   trend	  of	  expansion	  since	  1995.	  Furthermore,	  the	  two	  decades	  following	  the	  transition	  were	  not	  only	  marked	  by	  an	   increase	   in	   output	   volumes	   but	   also	   by	   a	   rapid	   expansion	   in	   higher	   value	   added	  product	  types	  in	  particular.	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  4.4,	  value-­‐added	  upgrading	  is	  apparent	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throughout	   the	   1990s	   and	   2000s.	   By	   2011,	   higher	   value	   added	   products	   represented	  twice	  and	  a	  half	  the	  volume	  of	  the	  low	  point	  experienced	  in	  1995.	  	  
Figure	  4.	  4.	  Production	  of	  Fresh	  Milk	  and	  Higher	  Value	  Added	  Dairy	  Products	  
	  
Source:	  own	  calculations	  based	  on	  GUS,	  AKI	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   stress	   that	   the	   Polish	   sector’s	   success,	   especially	   in	   the	   two	   key	  product	   categories	   of	   fresh	   milk	   and	   higher	   value	   added	   goods	   is	   particularly	  remarkable	  considering	  the	  serious	  structural	  problems	  faced	  by	  the	  Polish	  sector	  in	  the	  early	   1990s:	   At	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   transition	   process,	   it	   was	   more	   than	   dubious	  whether	   Polish	   dairy	   could	   adapt	   and	   even	   survive	   in	   a	   free	  market	   environment.	   As	  discussed	   further	   below,	   the	   structural	   problems	   hindering	   adaptation	   seemed	  overwhelming:	   a	   highly	   fragmented	   ownership	   structure,	   outdated	   technologies,	   poor	  genetic	   stock,	   the	   inability	   to	   comply	  with	   basic	   food	   safety	   standards,	   extremely	   low	  productivity,	   a	   lack	   of	   capital	   necessary	   for	   modernization	   –	   all	   coupled	   with	   the	  prospect	   of	   new,	   Western	   competitors	   entering	   the	   market,	   against	   whom	   Polish	  cooperatives	  were	  utterly	  uncompetitive.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  fundamental	  problems,	  Polish	  dairy	  should	  have	  rapidly	  succumbed	  to	  the	  stress	  of	  free	  market	  competition	  as	  many	  other	   industrial	   sectors	   in	   post-­‐Communist	   CEE	   that	   were	   deemed	   outdated	   and	  uncompetitive:	  indeed,	  our	  respondents	  also	  confirmed	  that	  both	  public	  authorities	  and	  farmers	  feared	  a	  general	  collapse	  of	  the	  sector	  even	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  EU	  accession75.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Interview	  National	  Union	  of	  Dairy	  Cooperatives	  (KZSM),	  11/02/2014	  
1050	   768	   1092	   1536	  
1917	  2037	   1260	   1363	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Table	  4.5.Poland’s	  Primary	  Dairy	  Trade	  Partners	  1995-­‐2007	  
1995	   2000	   2007	  
Exports	  in	  %	  
Netherlands	   32,2	   Mexico	   16,4	   Germany	   23,8	  
Russia	   11,2	   Algeria	   14,1	   Netherlands	   8,4	  
USA	   10,9	   Netherlands	   7,2	   Czech	  Rep.	   7,3	  
Germany	   8,4	   USA	   7	   Italy	   6,8	  
Vietnam	   7,3	   Czech	  Rep.	   6,2	   Algeria	   5,5	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Figure	  4.5.	  Share	  of	  Milk	  Complying	  with	  EU	  Standards	  in	  Poland	  
	  
Source:	  Izba	  Mleka	  	  The	   second	  product	   type	  where	   the	  Polish	   sector	   proved	  highly	   successful	  was	   in	   the	  higher	   value	   added	   segment	   of	   processed	   goods:	   for	   this	   category	   of	   products,	   the	  challenge	  lay	  not	  only	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  stringent	  SPS	  standards	  but	  with	  the	  volume	  of	   capital	   and	   investments	   necessary	   for	   upgrading	   existing	   machinery	   and	   related	  services	   such	   as	   packaging,	  marketing	   etc.	   	   Technological	  modernization	   necessitated	  investments,	   which	   a	   heavily	   indebted	   Polish	   state,	   struggling	   with	   soaring	   levels	   of	  inflation	   and	   collapsing	   domestic	   purchasing	   power	   could	   only	   finance	   with	   foreign	  capital.	  However,	  unlike	  Hungary,	  the	  primary	  source	  of	   investments	  didn’t	  come	  from	  FDI	   and	   MNCs	   through	   large	   scale	   privatization,	   but	   from	   foreign	   aid	   and	   technical	  assistance	   providers	   –	   chief	   of	   which	   the	  World	   Bank	   and	   the	   European	   Community	  (later	  EU),	  as	  discussed	  in	  a	  subsequent	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  success	  of	   competitive	   upgrading	   in	   the	   value	   chain	   was	   far	   from	   evident	   or	   mechanical:	   we	  argue	  that	  more	  than	  a	  success	  of	  externally	  steered	  upgrading,	   it	  most	   fundamentally	  reflects	  the	  capacity	  of	  Polish	  public	  authorities	  to	  establish	  an	  institutional	  framework	  for	  the	  regulation,	  technical	  assistance	  and	  financing	  of	  the	  dairy	  sector.	  In	  other	  words,	  while	   the	  primary	   source	  of	   capital	   came	   from	   transnational	   actors,	   it	  was	   efficient	   in	  competitive	   upgrading	   only	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   state,	   ministries	   and	   public	  administrations,	   regulatory	   agencies	   and	   scientific	   inspectorates	   proved	   capable	   of	  securing	   and	   coordinating	   a	   steady	   supply	   of	   foreign	   capital	   and	   build	  complementarities	   between	   programs	   often	   financed	   from	   different	   sources	   (bilateral	  aid,	   structural	   adjustment	   loans	   and	   the	   EU’s	   pre-­‐accession	   funds)	   as	   discussed	   in	  greater	  detail	  further	  below.	  
27	   37.9	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  The	   Polish	   sector	   embarked	   on	   transitioning	   to	   a	   market	   economy	   with	   severe	  disadvantages,	   and	   yet,	   the	   competitiveness	   and	   trade	   integration	   of	   Polish	   dairy	  products	   reflects	   the	   same	   continuous	   upgrading	   trend	   as	   exemplified	   at	   production	  level.	  Even	   in	   the	   immediate	  aftermath	  of	  regime	  change	  when	   it	  experienced	   its	  most	  severe	   setbacks,	   Poland	   never	   became	   a	   net	   importer	   of	   milk	   and	   dairy	   products.	  Examining	   the	   trade	  balance	  of	   the	   sector	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	  EU	   accession	   in	  2004	  represented	   a	   critical	   juncture	  with	   an	   instantaneous	   surge	   in	   revenues	   from	  exports.	  Throughout	  the	  pre-­‐accession	  phase,	  Polish	  dairies	  were	  concerned	  that	  EU	  integration	  might	  turn	  the	  domestic	  market	  into	  a	  net	  importer	  due	  to	  stronger	  competitiveness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  EU15	  dairies.	   It	  has	   to	  be	  reminded	  that	   these	   fears	  seemed	  rational	  at	   the	  time:	  in	  the	  Hungarian	  case,	  EU	  accession	  in	  effect	  led	  to	  a	  collapsing	  trade	  balance	  and	  the	  Polish	   trend	   seemed	   equally	   preoccupying	   immediately	   prior	   to	   EU	   integration	   as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  4.6.	  The	  year	  1999	  marked	  the	  absolute	  low	  for	  Polish	  dairy	  trade	  with	  a	  positive	  balance	  of	  91	  million	  USD,	  but	  even	  in	  2003,	  only	  a	  year	  before	  entering	  the	  EU	  market,	  trade	  in	  the	  sector	  only	  generated	  a	  surplus	  of	  308	  million	  USD	  –	  which	  pales	  in	   comparison	  with	   the	   1,4	   billion	   USD	   of	   2008	   (a	   year	   before	   the	   financial	   crisis	   hit	  consumer	  markets	  in	  the	  EU).	  This	  initial	  bottleneck	  on	  Polish	  dairy	  exports	  was	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  the	  1997	  export	  ban	  imposed	  by	  the	  EU	  as	  explained	  above.	  	  	  	  After	   2004	   however,	   the	   explosion	   of	   revenues	   from	   trade	   in	   dairy	   is	   all	   the	   more	  surprising	  that,	  in	  spite	  of	  an	  equally	  positive	  trend	  in	  production	  capacities,	  increase	  in	  milk	  production	  augmented	  substantially	  more	  modestly:	  	  Poland	  produced	  11,4	  million	  tons	   of	   milk	   in	   2004,	   compared	   with	   12,6	   million	   tons	   in	   2011.	   In	   the	   same	   period	  however,	   trade	  balance	  doubled	   from	  a	   surplus	   of	   613	  million	  USD	   to	   1,2	   billion	  USD	  (Figure	   4.6.).	   The	   discrepancy	   between	   the	   two	   trends	   shows	   that	   the	   soaring	  profitability	  of	   the	  sector	  didn’t	  so	  much	  reflect	  a	  surge	   in	  production	  capacities	  but	   is	  better	  explained	  by	  the	  higher	  profitability	  and	  improving	  value	  added	  competitiveness	  of	  Polish	  dairy	  products	  on	  export	  markets.	  This	   lends	  some	  credit	   to	   the	  suspicion	  of	  Polish	   farmers	   and	   processors	   who	   believe	   that	   their	   exports	   to	   the	   EU	   had	   been	  artificially	  delayed:	  EU15	  dairies	  might	  have	  gauged	  Polish	  competitiveness	  better	  than	  Polish	  actors	  themselves,	  who	  feared	  a	  competitive	  collapse.	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Figure	  4.6.	  Dairy	  Trade	  Balance	  in	  Poland	  1995-­‐2014	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Figure	  4.7.	  Dairy	  Exports	  by	  Value	  Added	  Product	  Type	  in	  Poland	  
	  
Source:	  own	  calculations	  based	  on	  UNCTAD	  	  In	  other	  words,	  Poland	  didn’t	  flood	  the	  EU	  market	  only	  with	  fresh	  milk	  and	  lower	  quality	  products	   but	   its	   success	   in	   the	   Common	   Market	   is	   also	   explained	   by	   an	   increasing	  specialization	   in	  more	   complex	   processed	   goods,	   drawing	  more	   revenue,	   and	   that	   are	  appreciated	  by	  Western	  European	  customers:	  for	  instance	  cheese	  only	  represented	  12%	  of	  exports	  in	  1995	  but	  its	  relative	  share	  tripled	  to	  35%	  by	  2014	  (Figure	  4.8.).	  	  	  
Figure	  4.8.	  Polish	  Dairy	  Exports	  by	  Three	  Main	  Product	  Types	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These	  figures	  indicate	  a	  close	  correlation	  between	  the	  process	  of	  value-­‐added	  upgrading	  that	   occurred	   gradually	   at	   the	   production	   level	   throughout	   the	   1990s	   and	   2000s	   and	  increasingly	  profitable	  revenues	  generated	  through	  trade,	  which	  ultimately	  skyrocketed	  after	   EU	   accession.	   However	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   point	   out	   that	   value	   added	   upgrading	   in	  production	  was	  not	  primarily	  steered	  by	  export	  markets:	  Poland’s	  success	  as	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  EU	  dairy	  exporters	  only	  occurred	  relatively	  recently	  after	  all	  restrictions	  on	  its	  access	   to	   EU15	   markets	   were	   lifted	   after	   2006.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   was	   not	   Poland’s	  integration	   into	   transnational	   markets	   (specifically	   the	   EU)	   that	   steered	   value	   added	  upgrading	   in	   the	   production	   segment	   (a	   recurrent	   argument	   in	   the	   World	   Systems	  Analysis	   literature,	   which	   derives	   an	   economy’s	   specialization	   from	   its	   relative	   place	  within	   transnational	   trade	   flows	   and	   supply	   chains	   –	   but	   rather,	   the	   gains	   from	   trade	  that	  Poland	  went	  on	  to	  realize	  in	  open	  markets	  are	  better	  explained	  by	  the	  continuous	  efforts	   invested	   in	   upgrading	   the	   sector	   throughout	   the	   1990s	   when	   the	   sector	   was	  relatively	   more	   protected.	   Trade	   competitiveness	   was	   an	   outcome	   of	   production	  upgrading,	   not	   the	   opposite.	   In	   that	   sense,	   the	   pathway	   of	   Polish	   dairy	   mirrors	   the	  arguments	  of	  Ha-­‐Joon	  Chang	  on	   the	  competitive	  upgrading	  myth	  of	   free	  markets	   (H.-­‐J.	  Chang,	   2008):	   while	   Polish	   dairies’	   exports	   were	   severely	   constrained	   (most	   notably	  because	  of	  poor	  milk	  quality	  and	  a	   lack	  of	  compliance	  with	  EU	   food	  safety	  standards),	  this	  decade	  also	  let	  the	  Polish	  state	  use	  tariffs,	  subsidies	  and	  support	  mechanisms,	  which	  would	   not	   have	   been	   possible	   inside	   the	   EU.	   Ultimately,	   the	   explosion	   in	   export	  competitiveness	  realized	  after	  2004	  is	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  upgrading	  realized	  throughout	  the	  1990s:	  as	  such,	  this	  decade	  functionally	  played	  the	  role	  of	  infant	  industry	  nurturing	  in	  Poland.	  	  
Conclusion	  on	  indicators:	  	  The	   developmental	   trajectory	   of	   the	   Polish	   dairy	   sector	   displays	   an	   entirely	   different	  model	   compared	   with	   the	   Hungarian	   case:	   the	   distinctive	   feature	   is	   a	   surprising	   and	  robust	   improvement	  of	  the	  sector’s	  overall	  competitiveness,	  which	  translates	   in	  a	  very	  strong	   position	   on	   export	  markets.	   The	   second	   distinctive	   feature	   is	   that	   competitive	  upgrading	  was	  not	  realized	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  domestic	  actors:	  on	  the	  contrary,	  the	  sector	  continues	  to	  be	  controlled	  by	  domestically	  owned	  firms	  in	  the	  range	  of	  80%	  (Seremak-­‐Bulge,	  2005).	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  More	   specifically,	   these	   are	   dairy	   cooperatives	   inherited	   from	   the	   Socialist	   era,	  where	  farmer-­‐producers	   own	   processing	   facilities:	   thus,	   the	   production	   and	   processing	  segments	  of	  the	  supply	  chain	  are	  firmly	  integrated	  within	  these	  firms.	  This	  institutional	  structure	   is	   fundamentally	   different	   from	   the	   organization	   of	   the	   Hungarian	   sector	  where	  production	  and	  processing	  have	  been	  disingtegrated	  -­‐	  split	  between	  a	  handful	  of	  processing	  firms	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  a	  host	  of	  producers	  ranging	  from	  smallholders	  to	  vast	   estates	   on	   the	   other.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   the	   social	   costs	   of	   post-­‐Socialist	  restructuring	  were	   easy	   to	   swallow	   in	   Poland:	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   smallest	   producers	  have	  been	  clearly	  forced	  out	  of	  the	  market.	  However,	  from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  domestic	  actors,	   the	  Polish	   trajectory	  nonetheless	  represents	  a	  more	   inclusive	   trajectory,	  where	  gradual	   concentration	   did	   not	   result	   in	   the	   outright	   marginalization	   of	   all	   domestic	  actors	  in	  the	  supply	  chain	  –	  as	  it	  happened	  in	  Hungary.	  	  	  The	   Polish	   sector’s	   competitive	   success	   was	   far	   from	   predictable:	   the	   structural	  problems	  of	  the	  sector	  (low	  productivity,	  low	  quality,	  low	  capitalization	  –	  coupled	  with	  an	  extraordinarily	  fragmented	  land	  ownership	  structure)	  could	  have	  easily	  explained	  a	  competitive	   collapse	   in	   the	   1990s,	   or	   at	   latest	   after	   EU	   accession.	   As	   a	  matter	   of	   fact,	  even	  as	   late	  as	  2004,	   some	  argued	   that	   the	   failure	  of	  Poland’s	   food	  processing	  sectors	  was	  not	  only	  predictable	  but	  over-­‐determined:	  “The	  average	  size	  of	  a	  Polish	  farm	  is	  about	  
7	   hectares	   (approximately	   17	   acres),	   less	   than	   half	   the	   EU	   average	   of	   16	   hectares.	   The	  
state-­‐socialist	   legacy	   is	   also	   evident	   in	   quality	   produced.	   Poland’s	   farmers	   and	   food-­‐
processing	   industry	  often	  do	  not	   reach	   the	  quality	   level	  of	   imports,	  which	  Poles	   can	  now	  
afford	  and	  easily	  obtain.	  Uncompetitive	   farms	  will	  not	  survive	   long	   inside	   the	  Union;	   this	  
means	   that	  many	   farmers	  will	   join	   the	   sizable	   ranks	   of	   the	   unemployed	   in	   Polish	   cities,	  
where	   unemployment	   is	   already	   higher	   than	   in	   most	   European	   countries	   (nearly	   20	  
percent	   in	  2004).	  The	  prospects	  of	   these	   impoverished	  sectors	  are	   likely	  to	  remain	  dim.	   ”	  (Seleny,	  2006,	  p.265)	  It	  is	  clear	  in	  retrospect	  that	  this	  gloom	  was	  unwarranted	  as	  Polish	  dairy	  became	  on	  the	  contrary	  one	  of	  the	  very	  few	  genuine	  industrial	  success	  stories	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Enlargement	  from	  a	  developmental	  perspective.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  economic	  upgrading	   is	   as	   much	   conditional	   on	   financial	   and	   human	   capital	   as	   on	   stable	   and	  inclusive	   property	   right	   regimes	   as	   discussed	   in	   the	   second	   chapter	   –	   it	   is	   clear	   that	  Polish	   actors	   did	   things	   very	   differently	   from	   their	   Hungarian	   colleagues:	   it	   is	   thus	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logical	   to	   assume	   that	   the	   patent	   divergence	   in	   developmental	   outcomes	   rested	   on	   a	  different	  mode	  of	  transnationalization	  where	  access	  to	  capital	  and	  institutional	  reforms	  were	  solved	  differently	  –	  and	  from	  a	  developmental	  perspective,	  more	  efficiently.	  	  	  
Part	  2.	  Restructuring	  the	  sector	  	  	  Before	  examining	  the	  role	  and	  strategies	  of	  public	  and	  private	  actors	  in	  restructuring	  the	  sector,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   highlight	   how	   long-­‐term	   institutional	   legacies	   affected	   the	  opportunity	   structure	   for	  domestic	   agency.	  The	   fundamental	   challenges	  of	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	   both	   at	   the	   sector-­‐	   and	   the	  macroeconomic	   level	   were	   essentially	   similar	   in	  1989:	   state	   budgets	   incapacitated	   by	   punitive	   levels	   of	   foreign	   debt,	   and	   an	   agri-­‐food	  sector	   lacking	   capital,	   technology	   and	   knowledge	   that	   nonetheless	   necessitated	  immediate	  investments	  for	  surviving	  under	  free	  market	  conditions.	  	  Different	  modes	  of	  transnationalization	   in	   the	   two	   countries	   constituted	   different	   policy	   answers	   to	   the	  same	   problems	   circumscribed	   by	   different	   institutional	   legacies,	   which	   delimited	   a	  different	  policy	  space	  for	  agency.	  	  
Polish	  dairy	  cooperatives	  before	  Independence	  and	  under	  State-­‐Socialism	  	  The	  history	  of	  Poland’s	  dairy	  sector	  in	  the	  19th	  and	  20th	  century	  was	  characterized	  by	  the	  central	   role	   of	   agricultural	   production	   cooperatives,	   yet	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	  cooperative	  movement	  was	  somewhat	  distinct	  from	  comparable	  experiences	  in	  Western	  Europe	   or	   even	   in	   CEE:	   throughout	   the	   19th	   century,	   Poland	   was	   entirely	   occupied	   –	  what	  is	  more,	  divided	  -­‐	  between	  two	  competing	  regional	  powers,	  namely	  Russia	  in	  the	  East	  and	  Prussia	  in	  the	  West	  (later	  Austria	  in	  the	  South).	  These	  conservative,	  absolutist	  monarchies	   used	   the	   pretext	   of	   Jacobin	   inclinations	   in	   the	   Polish-­‐Lithuanian	  Commonwealth	   to	  militarily	  occupy	  and	  divide	  Poland	   in	   three	   consecutive	  partitions,	  which	   in	   spite	   of	   armed	   resistance	  movements,	   eventually	   split	   the	   country	   in	   two	  by	  1795:	   Polish	   independence	   and	   statehood	   was	   delayed	   until	   the	   20th	   century.	   The	  emergence	  of	  credit	  cooperatives,	  agricultural	  producer-­‐	  and	  marketing	  cooperatives	  in	  the	   19th	   century	  were	   answers	   to	   increasing	  market	   pressure	   from	   imports	   just	   as	   in	  industrialized	   countries:	   agricultural	   and	   dairy	   cooperatives	   represented	   a	   similar	  institutional	  answer	  to	  competitive	  challenges	  even	  in	  the	  US	  (Schneiberg,	  2011).	  But	  in	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occupied	   Poland,	   cooperatives	   were	   just	   as	   much	   tied	   to	   an	   anti-­‐colonial	   resistance	  movement	   against	   German	   and	   Russian	   gentries	   (Bartkowski,	   2013).	   The	   Polish	  experience	  in	  dairy	  cooperative	  development	  resembled	  the	  Danish	  pathway	  (a	  pioneer	  of	   agricultural	   cooperatives),	   a	   country	   equally	   colonized	   by	   Germany	   in	   the	   19th	  century.	   In	   both	   cases,	   cooperatives	   built	   social	   capital	   among	   farmers:	   in	   both	   cases	  also,	  dairy	  cooperatives	  were	  generally	  not	  set	  up	  by	  enlightened	  agricultural	  landlords	  but	   were	   genuine	   grassroots	   organizations	   established	   by	   farmers	   (Chloupkova,	  Svendsen,	   &	   Svendsen,	   2003;	   Chlupkova,	   2002).	   In	   Poland,	   the	   establishment	   of	  agricultural	  cooperatives	  preceded	  self-­‐determination:	  cooperatives	  thus	   functioned	  as	  the	   first	   building	   blocks	   of	   a	   nation-­‐building	   project	   even	   before	   statehood	   could	   be	  secured77.	  This	  historical	  particularity	  had	  long-­‐term	  consequences:	  the	  symbolic	  charge	  of	  cooperatives	  as	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  nation	  building	  and	  the	  social	  capital	   (trust)	   that	  these	   organizations	   helped	   accumulate	   created	   considerable	   resources	   for	   farmers	   to	  resist	  forceful	  attempts	  by	  the	  state	  to	  change	  existing	  property	  rights	  institutions	  both	  under	  state	  Socialism	  and	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  1989	  restructuring.	  	  	  As	  a	  sign	  of	  their	  resilience,	  dairy	  cooperatives	  were	  rapidly	  re-­‐established	  after	  the	  war	  in	  1947,	  yet	  the	  consolidation	  of	  a	  Communist	  government	  in	  1948	  represented	  a	  new	  challenge	  to	  the	  cooperative	  model.	  In	  the	  period	  between	  full	  Communist	  take-­‐over	  in	  1948	   to	   de-­‐Stalinization	   in	   1956	   –	   marked	   by	   Gomulka’s	   return	   to	   power	   –	   the	   new	  leadership	   embarked	   on	   a	   policy	   of	   forceful	   Sovietization.	   In	   agriculture,	   this	   meant	  collectivization	   following	   the	   Soviet	   model,	   which	   accepted	   two	   legitimate	   forms	   of	  ownership:	   kolkhozes	   (collective	   cooperative	   ownership)	   and	   sovkhozes	   (state	  ownership)	   –	   or	   in	   the	   Polish	   context,	   Farmers’	   Cooperative	   Teams	   (RZS)	   and	   State	  Agricultural	  Farms	  (PGR).	  Unlike	  other	  food	  sectors	  where	  linkages	  between	  producers	  and	  processors	  were	   looser,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  dairy	  sector	  had	  been	   structured	  around	  cooperatives	  already	  in	  the	  pre-­‐Socialist	  era	  could	  have	  fuelled	  hopes	  that	  the	  transition	  would	   be	   less	   disruptive:	   however,	   the	   sector’s	   organization	   was	   fundamentally	  challenged	   in	   1951	  when	   the	   state	   dissolved	   dairy	   cooperatives	   and	   nationalized	   the	  entire	   sector	   (World_Bank,	   1991).	   Ultimately	   however,	   this	   approach	   failed	   due	   to	  passive	  and	  active	  forms	  of	  resistance	  among	  the	  peasantry.	  This	  was	  not	  a	  specificity	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Ironically,	   Ukrainians	   living	   under	   Polish	   rule	   in	   Galicia	   after	   1918	   imitated	   the	   same	   strategy:	  agricultural	   cooperatives,	   notably	   dairy	   producer	   cooperatives	   -­‐	   were	   bastions	   of	   Western	   Ukrainian	  nationalism	  directed	  against	  Polish	  occupiers	  (Sorokowski,	  1991).	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the	   dairy	   sector:	   instead,	   the	   regime’s	   entire	   agricultural	   collectivization	   agenda	  collapsed.	  The	  failure	  of	  agricultural	  collectivization	  in	  Poland	  constituted	  a	  singularity,	  which	  set	  Poland	  apart	  from	  other	  Socialist	  regimes:	  the	  nomenklatura	  was	  forced	  into	  retreat	  by	  a	  peasantry	  that	  threatened	  to	  destabilize	  the	  entire	  regime	  (Jarosz).	  In	  1956,	  the	  state	  officially	  gave	  in	  and	  backtracked:	  Gomulka’s	  return	  to	  power	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  collectivization	  of	  agriculture.	  In	  other	  sectors,	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  regime	  accepted	  the	  dissolution	  of	  cooperatives	  set	  up	  under	  physical	  threat	  –	  in	  the	  dairy	  sector	  however,	  it	  led	  to	  a	  return	  from	  state	  ownership	  to	  the	  cooperative	  format:	  in	  1958,	  the	  dairy	  sector	  was	   de-­‐nationalized	   and	   cooperatives	   were	   reestablished	   (World_Bank,	   1991).	  Furthermore	  a	  national-­‐level	  Union	  of	  Dairy	  Cooperatives	  was	  set	  up	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  In	   1975,	   the	   state	   tried	   again	   to	   transfer	   dairy	   cooperatives	   under	   another	   umbrella	  organization,	  the	  Central	  Agricultural	  Union	  of	  Peasant	  Self-­‐Aid,	  however	  this	  proved	  yet	  another	  failure	  and	  in	  1981,	  their	  autonomy	  as	  well	  as	  the	  national	  Union	  were	  revived	  (World_Bank,	   1991).	   From	   our	   perspective,	   these	   processes	   enshrined	   a	   fundamental	  difference	   compared	  with	   Hungary:	   the	   Socialist	   state	   did	   not	   legally	   own	   productive	  assets	   directly	   in	   the	   dairy	   sector	   as	   these	   belonged	   to	   cooperatives.	   Under	   state	  Socialism,	   this	   wasn’t	   consequential	   as	   cooperatives	   hardly	   enjoyed	   any	   effective	  autonomy,	   after	   1989	   however,	   differences	   between	   “effective”	   public	   ownership	   and	  cooperative	  property	  set	  different	  constraints	  on	  what	   the	  state	  could	  single-­‐handedly	  do	  with	  collective	  assets	  during	  privatization.	  	  	  	  	  
Debt	  and	  privatization	  in	  Poland	  	  Different	  experiences	  of	  collectivization	  in	  Poland	  and	  in	  Hungary	  in	  the	  1940s	  and	  50s	  proved	   consequential	   in	   the	   two	   countries’	   management	   of	   agricultural	   privatization	  after	  1989:	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  we	  detailed	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  state’s	  disintegrative	  role	   in	   the	   dairy	   sector	   was	   a	   consequence	   of	   its	   peculiar	   privatization	   agenda:	   the	  privatization	   of	   processing	   plants	   was	   largely	   hijacked	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Finance	   in	  Hungary,	  which	   had	   a	   clear	   objective	   –	   to	   raise	   as	  much	   foreign	   capital	   as	   quickly	   as	  possible	  for	  financing	  a	  foreign	  debt	  service,	  which	  suffocated	  the	  state	  budget.	   In	  that	  context,	   the	  dairy	  processing	  plants	  owned	  by	   the	  national	  Dairy	  Trust	   fell	   in	   the	   first	  group	  of	  assets,	  which	   the	  state	  could	  sell	  swiftly,	  without	  substantial	  opposition	   from	  farmers.	  All	  other	  considerations	  regarding	  the	  sector’s	  long-­‐term	  competitive	  prospects	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became	   secondary:	   the	   negative	   effect	   of	   severing	   ties	   between	   undercapitalized	  farmers-­‐producers	   and	   a	   processing	   sector	   transferred	   to	   multinational	   companies	  proved	  marginal	   to	  stabilizing	  the	  state	  budget.	   In	  parallel,	   the	  re-­‐privatization	  of	   land	  became	  a	  politicized	  issue	  with	  a	  reparatory	  function:	  a	  consequence	  of	  re-­‐privatization	  was	   the	   incapacitation	   of	   producer	   cooperatives,	  which	   lost	   a	   substantial	   share	   of	   the	  land	  they	  had	  owned.	  In	  Poland,	  the	  question	  of	  land	  privatization	  was	  substantially	  less	  dramatic:	  one	  reason	  was	  that	  state	  farms	  only	  accounted	  for	  20%	  of	  agricultural	   land	  (Table	  4.6).	  Furthermore,	  due	  to	  the	  regime’s	  halted	  collectivization	  agenda	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Gomulka’s	  return	  to	  power	  in	  1956,	  the	  regime	  had	  also	  tolerated	  the	  dissolution	  of	  cooperatives	   that	   had	   been	   forcibly	   set	   up	   between	  1944	   and	   1956.	   As	   a	   result,	   state	  property	  and	  cooperative	  ownership	  combined	  only	  ever	  represented	  a	  quarter	  of	  total	  agricultural	   land,	   while	   three	   quarters	   were	   privately	   owned.	   By	   comparison,	   these	  proportions	  were	   inverted	   in	   Socialist	   Hungary	  where	   private	   property	   only	   stood	   at	  15%.	  	  
Table	  4.6.	  Land	  Tenure	  by	  Ownership	  Before	  Post-­‐Socialist	  Reforms	  in	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  
	   Hungary	   Poland	  
State	  	   14	   20	  
Cooperative	   70	   3-­‐5	  
Private	   15	   75-­‐77	  
Source:	  (World_Bank,	  1995)	  	  The	  de-­‐collectivization	  of	  land	  was	  therefore	  less	  painful	  in	  Poland	  where	  collective-­‐	  and	  state	   ownership	   had	   remained	   relatively	  marginal.	   A	   further	   difference	  with	  Hungary	  was	   that	   land	  privatization	   in	  Poland	  was	  equally	  divorced	   from	   the	  highly	  politicized	  and	  contentious	  issue	  of	  reparatory	  justice:	  farmers	  didn’t	  have	  to	  be	  compensated	  since	  they	   hadn’t	   been	   expropriated	   by	   the	   state	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   The	   only	   potential	  beneficiaries	   of	   reparatory	   justice	   would	   have	   been	   the	   big	   landowners	   of	   latifundia,	  which	  had	  been	  divided	  in	  1944,	  creating	  the	  post-­‐war	  class	  of	  Polish	  small	  peasantry:	  however,	  no	  political	  party	  advocated	  a	  return	  to	  pre-­‐war	   latifundia	  after	  1989.	  Briefly	  put,	  in	  Poland	  the	  privatization	  of	  land	  did	  not	  jeopardize	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  distribution	  of	  ownership	  rights,	  nor	  did	  it	  pose	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  viability	  of	  cooperatives	  	  (per	  se)	  as	  it	  did	  in	  Hungary.	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Unlike	   in	   Hungary,	   the	   debt	   problem	   didn’t	   determine	   privatization	   strategies	   in	   the	  dairy	  sector.	  In	  Poland,	  the	  question	  of	  debt	  was	  equally	  pressing	  after	  1989	  for	  similar	  reasons	   as	   in	   Hungary	   and	   other	   Socialist	   economies,	   where	   it	   had	   played	   an	  increasingly	   central	   role	   as	   a	   buffer	   for	   state	   budgets	   after	   the	   1960s.	   The	   level	   of	  indebtedness	  in	  proportion	  to	  GDP	  was	  also	  very	  similar	  to	  Hungary.	  	  
Figure	  4.9.	  Total	  Government	  Debt	  in	  %	  of	  GDP	  in	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  1991-­‐2010	  
	  




Total	  Government	  Debt	  %	  of	  GDP	  	  
Poland	  and	  Hungary	  1991-­‐2010	  
Hungary	  72,3	  Poland	  ..	  
	  	   173	  
also	   gave	   substantially	   better	   organizational	   capacities	   for	   dairy	   producers	   to	   play	   an	  active	  role	  in	  shaping	  restructuring	  –	  unlike	  in	  Hungary.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  state	  was	  not	  the	   primary	   owner	   of	   productive	   assets	   also	   helped	   avoiding	   a	   “Hungarian	   scenario”.	  Finally,	   the	   pressure	   of	   foreign	   debt	   further	   eased	   as	   Poland,	   contrary	   to	   Hungary,	  managed	   to	   negotiate	   two	   consecutive	   debt-­‐restructuring	   programs	   with	   its	   foreign	  creditors	  in	  1991	  and	  1994	  (Bjork,	  1995).	  	  	  However,	   the	  survival	  of	  Polish	  producer	  cooperatives	  was	  not	  pre-­‐determined	  either:	  The	   legal	   status	   of	   cooperatives	   needed	   to	   be	   amended.	   The	   first	   discussions	   about	  privatization	  options	  took	  place	  in	  1988	  at	  a	  Conference	  held	  in	  Warsaw	  by	  the	  Central	  School	  of	  Planning	  and	  Statistics,	  while	  a	  Plenipotentiary	  for	  Ownership	  Transformation	  was	   set	   up	   by	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Finance	   in	   1989	   (Gomulka	  &	   Jasinski,	   1994).	   However,	  discussions	   centered	  mainly	   on	   the	   question	   of	   large	   public	   firms	   and	   conglomerates:	  agri-­‐food	  cooperatives	  constituted	  a	  somewhat	  different	  challenge.	  In	  this	  context,	  new	  legislative	   amendments	   to	   the	   1982	  Cooperative	   Law	  were	   passed	   in	   1990	   and	  1991.	  The	  severely	  negative	  component	  of	  these	  reforms	  was	  the	  dissolution	  of	  all	  cooperative	  unions	   –	   national,	   regional	   as	  well	   as	   sector-­‐level	   unions	  were	  disbanded:	   the	  Central	  Union	   of	   Dairy	   Cooperatives	   fell	   prey	   to	   this	   agenda	   along	   with	   regional	   dairy	  cooperative	  unions	   (Kowalak,	  1993).	   	  The	   law	  stipulated	   that	  new	  cooperative	  unions	  could	   only	   be	   re-­‐established	   after	   1991:	   the	   state	   didn’t	   so	  much	  want	   to	   destroy	   the	  cooperative	  union	  system	  as	  to	  remold	  cooperatives	   in	  a	  new,	  democratic	   format.	  Still,	  the	   1991	   law	   stipulated	   that	   enterprises	   owned	   by	   cooperative	   unions	   had	   a	   choice	  between	  either	  transforming	  into	  workers’	  cooperatives	  or	  into	  stock	  companies,	  while	  the	  Ministry	  of	   Finance	   sent	   liquidators	   to	   supervise	   the	  process	   (World_Bank,	   1991).	  The	   aim	   of	   the	   Solidarity	   government	   led	   by	   Mazowiecki	   was	   to	   encourage	   a	   dual	  process:	  First,	  democratization	  at	  the	  cooperative	  level	  -­‐	  in	  order	  to	  eliminate	  the	  grip	  of	  local	  Communist	  elites	  on	  cooperatives.	  New	  elections	  had	  to	  be	  held	  within	  two	  months	  at	  the	  level	  of	  primary	  cooperatives:	  it	  has	  to	  be	  noted	  here	  that	  in	  light	  of	  the	  sector’s	  later	   pathway,	   this	   attempt	   by	   the	   state	   at	   replacing	   management	   largely	   failed	   as	  trustworthy	  leaders	  (or	  those	  commanding	  sufficient	  social	  capital)	  were	  systematically	  re-­‐elected.	  In	  fact,	  the	  top	  management	  remained	  largely	  stable	  at	  the	  head	  of	  the	  biggest	  dairy	   cooperatives	   well	   into	   the	   2000s	   The	   second	   aim	   was	   the	   transformation	   of	  cooperatives	   into	   “real”	   capitalist	   companies:	   in	   this	   field,	   competing	   rationalities	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prevented	   swift	   reforms.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   there	   existed	   domestic	   and	   external	  pressures	   for	   disbanding	   cooperatives	   altogether:	   Balcerowicz’	   shock	   therapy	   agenda	  would	   have	   been	   sympathetic	   to	   re-­‐privatizing	   cooperatives	   and	   creating	   limited	  liability	   companies	   on	   their	   remains.	   As	   discussed	   later	   in	   this	   chapter,	   certain	  departments	  at	  the	  World	  Bank	  -­‐	  a	  major	  creditor	  of	  Poland	  -­‐	  also	  shared	  these	  views78.	  In	  light	  of	  resistance	  to	  this	  pathway	  both	  inside	  the	  Solidarity	  leadership	  and	  among	  co-­‐operators	   themselves,	   the	  state	  eventually	  passed	  a	  Law	  on	  Cooperatives	   in	  1992	  –	   in	  tandem	  with	  cooperative	   leaders,	  who	  participated	   in	   its	  elaboration	   -­‐	  which	  declared	  cooperative	  ownership	  a	  capitalist-­‐compatible,	   legitimate	  form	  of	  private	  property:	  the	  1992	  Law	  on	  Cooperatives	  considered	  cooperatives	  a	  form	  of	  private	  property	  based	  on	  that	  of	  their	  individual	  members	  (FAO,	  1994).	  In	  1994,	  it	  seemed	  still	  possible	  that	  the	  state	  would	  implement	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  reforms	  regarding	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  cooperatives	  (Jasinski,	  1996,	  p.238).	  By	  then	  however,	  dairy	  cooperatives	  had	  managed	  to	  strengthen	  their	  position,	  which	  effectively	  prevented	  any	  further	  attempt	  at	  re-­‐privatization:	  while	  the	  National	  Union	  of	  Dairy	  Cooperatives	  had	  been	  disbanded	  in	  1990,	  the	  membership	  didn’t	   accept	   this	   situation	   and	   sought	   continuity:	   the	   1990	   Law	  on	   Cooperatives	   had	  also	  allowed	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  new,	  (“democratic”)	  cooperative	  unions	  after	  1991.	  In	  effect,	  the	  national	  Union	  was	  re-­‐created	  as	  such	  in	  1992.	  Overall,	  the	  state’s	  attempt	  at	   “purging”	   both	   primary	   cooperatives	   and	   national	   cooperative	   unions	   from	  “suspicious	   elements”	   proved	   a	   failure:	   in	   both	   cases,	   cooperative	   members	   clearly	  preferred	   continuity	   both	   in	   organizational	   structures	   as	   in	   leadership	   (World_Bank,	  1991).	  The	  new	  shape	  of	   the	  dairy	   cooperative	   sector	  after	  1992	  was	  hardly	  different	  from	   the	   Socialist	   period	   –	   in	   spite	   of	   a	   change	   in	   legal	   status,	   new	   elections,	   and	   the	  creation	  of	  a	  “new”	  cooperative	  union.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Part	  3.	  Re-­‐Governing	  the	  Market	  	  Although	   historical-­‐institutional	   legacies	   can	   explain	   why	   the	   Polish	   pathway	   didn’t	  replicate	   the	   Hungarian	   sector’s	   integrationist	   strategy,	   they	   don’t	   offer	   sufficient	  explanations	   as	   to	   how	   the	   Polish	   sector	   managed	   to	   improve	   both	   its	   competitive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  The	  position	  of	   the	  World	  Bank	  on	  cooperative	  privatization	   is	  complex:	  Bruszt	  and	  Langbein	   	  (2014)	  found	  evidence	  that	  other	  departments	  within	  the	  Bank	  advized	  the	  Polish	  government	  precisely	  against	  the	  dangers	  of	   cooperative	   reprivatization.	  The	  Bank	  was	   seemingly	   just	   as	   split	  on	   the	  question	  as	   the	  Polish	  state	  itself.	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position	  on	  transnational	  markets	  while	  simultaneously	  protecting	  the	  market	  shares	  of	  domestic	   actors.	   In	   other	  words,	   while	   the	   state	   didn’t	   forcibly	   disintegrate	   the	   dairy	  supply	   chains,	   it	   still	   had	   to	   find	  new	   solutions	   for	   satisfying	   the	   investment	   needs	   of	  domestic	  dairy	  cooperatives:	  short	  of	  a	  stable	  access	  to	  financial	  capital	  and	  technology,	  Polish	  dairies	  would	  have	  quickly	  been	  eliminated.	  Unlike	  the	  Hungarian	  integrationist	  plan,	   which	   primarily	   relied	   on	   MNCs	   as	   sources	   of	   capital,	   technology	   and	   potential	  spillovers	   to	  domestic	   firms	   (which	   failed	   to	  materialize),	   in	  Poland	   the	  state	  played	  a	  crucial	   role	   in	  solving	  access	   to	  capital.	   In	   that	   regard,	   the	  Polish	  pathway	  reads	  as	  an	  illustration	  of	  a	  co-­‐evolutionary	  developmental	  alliance	  between	  the	  state	  and	  domestic	  dairies,	  where	  upgrading	  was	  ultimately	  co-­‐produced.	  While	  in	  Hungary	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	   in	  re-­‐governing	  the	  market	   lay	   in	   the	  use	  of	  protectionist	  regulatory	   instruments	  (in	  the	  2000s	  –after	  a	  period	  of	  relative	  laissez-­‐faire),	  the	  Polish	  state	  by	  contrast	  played	  a	   central	   role	   in	   pooling	   foreign	   capital	   from	   different	   sources	   and	   implementing	   a	  lengthy	  and	  complex	  developmental	  agenda	  in	  coordination	  with	  domestic	  cooperatives.	  This	   effort	  was	   not	   only	   financially	   costly,	   but	   it	   also	   tested	   the	   state’s	   administrative	  capacities	   as	   it	   entailed	   the	   creation	   of	   public	   agencies	   enabling	   coordination	   among	  public	  and	  private	  actors	  as	  well	  as	  new	   forms	  of	  public	   interventionism	  at	   the	  sector	  level.	  Furthermore,	  as	  the	  Polish	  state’s	  financial	  stability	  was	  equally	  weak	  –	  in	  spite	  of	  foreign	  debt	  restructuring	  –	  and	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  it	  didn’t	  have	  the	  necessary	  resources	  for	   financing	   this	   roadmap	   alone.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   state	   used	   different	   sources	   of	  foreign	   capital:	   bilateral	   aid	   programs	   contracted	   with	   individual	   EU15	   governments,	  loans	   from	   IFIs	   such	   as	   the	   IMF	   and	   the	  World	   Bank,	   and	   increasingly	   after	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	   when	   EU	   accession	   became	   a	   realistic	   prospect	   –	   pre-­‐accession	   funds.	   Polish	  public	  actors	  had	  to	   learn	  coordinating	  the	  resources	  pooled	  from	  multiple	  bodies	  and	  integrating	   them	   into	   coherent	   developmental	   plans	   translated	   into	   operational	  programs	  and	  projects	   in	  conjunction	  with	  domestic	  beneficiaries.	   Just	  as	   importantly,	  they	  had	  to	  learn	  navigating	  the	  explicit	  and	  implicit	  priorities	  of	  donors	  themselves	  for	  advancing	  their	  own	  objectives.	  In	  spite	  of	  inherent	  challenges	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  material	  and	   immaterial	   investment,	   the	   Polish	   strategy	   paid	   off:	   Polish	   domestic	   actors	   in	   the	  dairy	   sector	   not	   only	   survived	   post-­‐Communist	   transition	   and	   EU	   accession	   but	   they	  became	   one	   of	   the	   primary	   beneficiaries	   of	   market	   integration	   –	   once	   their	  competitiveness	  had	  been	  strengthened	  enough	  to	  “withstand	  competitive	  pressure”	  in	  open	  markets.	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The	  state	  and	  cooperatives:	  the	  co-­‐evolution	  of	  public	  and	  private	  capacities	  	  The	  emerging	  developmental	  coalition	  in	  Poland	  relied	  on	  two	  actors.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  resilience	  and	  mobilization	  of	  domestic	  dairy	  cooperatives	  exerted	  pressure	  on	  the	  state.	  Short	  of	  cooperatives’	  resistance,	  the	  Polish	  state	  would	  have	  likely	  implemented	  a	  more	  radical	  plan	  for	  restructuring	  the	  sector.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Polish	  state	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  by	  pooling	  foreign	  capital	  and	  channeling	  it	   into	  coherent	  developmental	  programs	  meant	  at	  increasing	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  domestic	  actors.	  As	  such,	  one	  can	  speak	  of	  a	  co-­‐evolution	  of	  public	  and	  private	  developmental	  agency,	  which	  successfully	  combined	  in	  the	  co-­‐production	  of	  a	  developmental	  public	  good	  -­‐	  competitive	  upgrading	  –	  once	  the	  state	  co-­‐opted	  cooperatives	  in	  its	  own	  developmental	  agenda.	  	  The	  State’s	  early	  attempts	  at	   reforming	   the	  cooperative	  sector	   in	  1990	  proved	   to	  be	  a	  failure:	   in	  spite	  of	  new	  elections,	  cooperatives	  chose	  continuity	   in	  their	   leadership	  and	  actively	   resisted	   the	   dissolution	   of	   the	   national	   Union.	   Resistance	   sometimes	   took	   on	  very	  concrete	   forms:	   for	   instance,	  as	  Bruszt	  and	  Langbein	  (2014)	  also	  related	   it,	  when	  the	  Central	  Union	  was	  dissolved	  in	  1990,	  the	  membership	  forcefully	  occupied	  the	  locales	  at	  the	  Warsaw	  headquarters.	  In	  spite	  of	  affinities	  with	  the	  emerging	  Polish	  Peasant	  Party	  (PSL),	   the	   mobilization	   of	   farmers/cooperative	   members	   was	   spontaneous	   as	   they	  organized	   a	   series	   of	   protests	   between	   1990	   and	   1992,	   culminating	   in	   the	   re-­‐establishment	  of	  the	  Union	  of	  Cooperatives79.	  Ultimately,	  since	  the	  1990	  law	  authorized	  the	   re-­‐establishment	   of	   cooperative	   unions	   after	   1991,	   the	   sector’s	   organizational	  structure	  was	  hardly	  different	  by	  1992	  compared	  with	  the	  Socialist	  period.	  The	  period	  between	  1989	  and	  1990	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  fleeting	  moment	  of	  uncertainty,	  when	  the	  radical	  reformist	  objectives	  of	   the	  Balcerowicz	  reforms	  momentarily	   stood	  at	  odds	  with	  dairy	  cooperatives’	   long-­‐term	   interests.	   However,	   dairy	   cooperatives’	   resistance	   and	   more	  cautious	  voices	  in	  the	  Solidarity	  government	  soon	  turned	  the	  tide.	  Throughout	  the	  year	  1990,	   as	   the	   administration	   was	   putting	   new	   institutions	   in	   place	   for	   managing	  	  privatization,	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   dairy	   cooperatives	  would	   be	   spared:	   	   A	  Ministry	   of	  Ownership	  Transformation	   (MOOT)	  was	   set	  up	   in	  September	  1990	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  “Privatization	   Law	   for	   State-­‐Owned	   Enterprises”	   adopted	   in	   July	   1990.	   An	   Anti-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Interview	  at	  the	  Polish	  Association	  of	  Dairy	  Cooperatives	  (KZSM)	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Monopoly	  Office	  (AMO)	  was	  equally	  established	  in	  March	  1990	  to	  work	  in	  cooperation	  with	   MOOT	   during	   the	   privatization	   phase:	   MOOT	   was	   responsible	   for	   privatization,	  AMO	  for	  de-­‐monopolization	  and	  anti-­‐trust	  policy,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture	  (MAFE)	  for	  agricultural	   policy.	   The	   government	   created	   an	   Inter-­‐ministerial	   Commission	   for	   the	  Privatization	  of	  Agriculture	  comprised	  of	  representatives	  of	  MAFE,	  MOOT,	  AMO	  and	  the	  Ministry	   of	   Finance	   (MOF)	   for	   coordinating	   privatization	   in	   agri-­‐food.	   However,	   the	  dairy	  industry	  enjoyed	  a	  separate	  status:	  MAFE	  set	  up	  a	  “Governmental	  Committee	  for	  Improving	   the	   Competitiveness	   of	   the	   Dairy	   Sector”,	   followed	   by	   the	   creation	   of	   an	  “Office	  of	  the	  Plenipotentiary	  (of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture)	  for	  the	  Dairy	  Sector:	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  1990,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  instead	  of	  dismantling	  existing	  cooperatives,	  the	  state	  would	  participate	  actively	  in	  financing	  their	  capitalization	  (FAPA,	  1991).	  	  	  	  The	   resistance	   and	   lobbying	   activity	   of	   dairy	   cooperatives	   had	   a	   deep	   effect	   on	   the	  state’s	  developmental	  strategy	  for	  the	  sector:	  the	  National	  Union	  of	  Dairy	  Cooperatives	  drafted	  a	  document	  called	   “Development	  Strategy	   for	  Polish	  Dairy”	   in	  August	  1994.	   In	  effect,	  this	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  template	  for	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture’s	  own	  “Program	  for	  Restructuring	   and	   Modernizing	   Dairy”	   adopted	   in	   August	   1994.	   In	   other	   words,	  cooperatives	   were	   coopted	   by	   the	   state	   as	   the	   national	   sector-­‐level	   developmental	  strategy	  directly	  translated	  the	  objectives	   laid	  out	  by	  dairy	  cooperatives’	  management.	  	  The	  main	  objectives	  of	  the	  program	  were	  the	  following:	  (1)	  advancing	  concentration	  in	  the	   milk	   production	   segment,	   (2)	   improving	   the	   genetics	   of	   the	   cattle	   stock	   by	  introducing	   new,	   more	   productive	   breeds,	   (3)	   reorganizing	   producer-­‐processor	  relationships	  keeping	  the	  cooperative	  structure,	  (4)	  stabilizing	  production	  prices	  against	  market	   fluctuations	   by	   guaranteeing	   intervention	  prices,	   (5)	   introducing	  modern	   food	  safety	   and	   environmental	   standards.	   Between	   1994	   and	   1997,	   the	   milk	   production	  segmented	  received	  a	  total	  of	  355	  million	  zlotys	  for	  9284	  individual	  contracts,	  with	  an	  average	   of	   38	   000	   zlotys	   per	   application	   (FAPA,	   2000).	   The	  milk	   processing	   segment	  received	   300	   million	   zlotys	   in	   362	   projects	   for	   an	   average	   of	   829	   000	   zlotys	   per	  application.	  Furthermore,	   it	   should	  be	  stressed	   that	   in	  a	  cooperative	  structure	  such	  as	  the	   one	   that	   characterizes	   Polish	   dairy,	   production	   and	   processing	   are	   integrated:	  therefore	   the	   beneficiaries	   in	   both	   production	   and	   processing	   segments	   often	  overlapped	   as	   they	   belonged	   to	   a	   single	   cooperative.	   Besides	   direct	   access	   to	   capital,	  public	  agencies	  also	  offered	  intervention	  prices	  	  (see	  Table	  4.7.).	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Table	  4.7.	  Intervention	  Prices	  on	  the	  Polish	  Dairy	  Market	  1993-­‐1997	  
	   1993/94	   1994/95	   1995/96	   1996/97	  
Minimal	  price	  for	  milk	  purchase	   0.23	   0.25	   0.40	   0.50	  
Intervention	  purchase	  of	  butter	  (in	  tons)	   21.4	   8.6	   19.2	   8.4	  
Intervention	  purchase	  of	  milk	  powder	  (in	  tons)	   24	   8	   0.17	   23.2	  
Intervention	  sale	  of	  butter	  in	  tender	  system	  (in	  
tons)	  
13.5	   	   5.7	   8.4	  
Source:	  (FAPA,	  2000)	  	  Differentiated	  import	  duties	  by	  product	  segment	  were	  equally	  introduced:	  70%	  for	  milk	  powder,	   40%	   for	   butter,	   35%	   for	   yoghurt	   and	   cheese	   (FAPA,	   2000).	   In	   effect,	   import	  duties	   seemed	   necessary	   by	   1992	   as	   foreign	   MNCs	   entered	   the	   market	   and	   began	  importing	   ready-­‐made	   dairy	   products	   en	  masse:	   this	   point	   is	   further	   discussed	   in	   the	  section	   on	   individual	   firm	   strategies.	   As	   mentioned	   in	   an	   official	   document	   by	   the	  Foundation	   for	   Assistance	   Programs	   for	   Agriculture	   (FAPA),	   the	   use	   of	   protectionist	  tariffs	   was	   considered	   an	   acceptable	   bargaining	   chip	   in	   negotiating	   gradual	  liberalization	  with	  GATT	  and	  the	  EEC:	  “In	  trade	  negotiations	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  use	  the	  
reciprocity	  principle,	  i.e.	  to	  make	  concessions	  only	  if	  the	  other	  side	  is	  making	  concessions	  as	  
well.	   In	   this	   situation,	   one	   could	   think	   that	   it	   is	   useful	   for	   Poland	   to	   have	   high	   trade	  
barriers	  at	   the	   start,	   in	  order	   to	  negotiate	   them	  down	   in	  exchange	   for	   trade	  concessions	  
(…)	  Negotiations	  on	  an	  Association	  Agreement	  with	  the	  EC	  are	  probably	  the	  most	  sensitive	  
issue,	  and	  it	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  tactical	  use	  of	  high	  initial	  tariffs	  is	  most	  
often	  mentioned	  (…)	  However,	  the	  reverse	  preferences	  which	  such	  an	  arrangement	  would	  
involve	  may	  be	  of	  higher	   interest	   to	  Poland	   than	   they	  are	   to	   the	  EC.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  
reciprocity,	  which	  Poland	  is	  prepared	  to	  offer	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  sought	  by	  the	  EC.	  If	  
that	  is	  true,	  any	  tariff	  reductions	  which	  Poland	  could	  offer	  may	  not	  provide	  much	  leverage	  
to	  Poland”	  (FAPA,	  1991).	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  The	   state’s	   role	  was	   twofold:	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	   pooled	   foreign	   capital	   from	   various	  sources	   and	   channeled	   these	   funds	   into	   upgrading	   investment	   programs	   destined	   at	  improving	  the	  dairy	  sector’s	  competitiveness	  (while	  shielding	  off	  foreign	  competition	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  import	  duties	  would	  allow	  it).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  also	  established	  new	  public	   organizations	   tasked	   with	   the	   implementation	   of	   this	   modernization	   agenda.	  There	  was	  a	  necessary	  complementarity	  between	  the	  two	  processes	  as	  the	  coordination	  and	   implementation	   of	   upgrading	   investment	   programs	   required	   an	   expansion	   and	  modernization	  of	  public	  administrative	  capacities.	  This	  was	  also	  a	  learning	  process:	  the	  initial	  lack	  of	  direction	  was	  gradually	  replaced	  with	  a	  coherent	  and	  centralized	  system	  of	  coordination.	  	  	  
Bilateral	  aid	  	  One	  can	  distinguish	  between	  different	  phases	  in	  this	  process:	  in	  a	  first	  period,	  bi-­‐lateral	  pilot	   projects	   constituted	   a	   badly	   needed	   source	   of	   foreign	   capital	   necessary	   for	  modernizing	  the	  sector.	  In	  a	  second	  period,	  the	  state	  used	  capital	  from	  IFIs	  to	  implement	  new	   upgrading	   programs,	   which	   necessitated	   the	   creation	   of	   new	   regulatory	   public	  agencies.	  These	   funds	  would	   in	   turn	  be	  complemented	  with	  additional	   resources	   from	  the	  EEC/EU	  and	  upgrading	  programs	  initiated	  with	  IFI	  funding	  would	  gradually	  merge	  with	  EU	  pre-­‐accession	  instruments.	  	  In	   the	   earliest	   phase,	   the	   key	   sources	   of	   foreign	   capital	  were	  EU15	   governments	  who	  invested	   in	   targeted	   pilot	   projects.	   The	   motivations	   for	   Western	   European	   actors’	  involvement	   were	   complex:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   they	   actually	   extended	   to	   CEE	   the	  experience	  in	  foreign	  aid,	  cooperation	  and	  technical	  assistance,	  which	  they	  had	  gained	  in	  the	   global	   South.	   Scholars	   such	   as	   Lavenex	   (2009)	   consider	   the	   Eastern	   European	  accession	   process	   in	   that	   regard	   as	   an	   offshoot	   of	   Western	   Europe’s	   pre-­‐existing	  institutionalized	  foreign	  aid	  and	  assistance	  programs.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  was	  equally	  clear	   that	  CEE	   states	   represented	   tangible	  new	  markets	   and	   investment	  opportunities	  for	  Western	  European	   firms:	   thus,	   the	  earliest	  bilateral	  pilot	  projects	  equally	   served	  a	  prospective	   function	   for	   investment	   opportunities	   in	   the	   terra	   incognita	   of	   post-­‐Communist	  industries.	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  One	  of	  the	  notable	  early	  bilateral	  projects	  in	  agri-­‐food	  modernization	  was	  a	  pilot	  project	  in	  dairy	  initiated	  by	  the	  Netherlands,	  as	  early	  as	  1989.	  The	  “Turosl	  Dairy	  Development	  Project”	   singled	   out	   the	   commune	   of	   Turosl	   (northeast	   of	   Poland,	   a	   traditional	   dairy	  producing	  region):	   the	  project	   sought	   to	  establish	  a	   “model	   farm”	  surrounded	  with	  15	  “master	   farms”.	   In	   retrospect,	   the	   project’s	   ambition	   seems	   quite	   unrealistic:	   “The	  
project	   was	   designed	   to	   meet	   national	   objectives,	   including	   the	   development	   of	   private	  
farming,	  the	  intensification	  of	  production	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  dairying	  on	  the	  grassland	  
areas.	  The	  immediate	  project	  objectives	  were	  clear,	  i.e.	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  Dutch	  model	  of	  
dairy	  farming	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  farms	  with	  clearly	  specified	  production	  targets	  (FAPA,	  
1992).	  The	  expectation	  was	  that,	  with	  substantial	  foreign	  capital	  channeled	  into	  a	  cluster	  of	   demonstration	   farms	   equipped	   with	   modern	   Western	   technology,	   the	   sheer	  demonstration	  effect	  would	  somehow	  lead	  to	  modernization	  spillovers	  in	  the	  region	  and	  beyond	  -­‐	  as	   if	   the	  problem	  of	  Polish	  competitiveness	  in	  dairy	  had	  not	  been	  rooted	  in	  a	  lack	   of	   capital	   but	   rather	   a	   lack	   of	   motivation	   or	   proper	   understanding	   of	   Western	  European	  agricultural	  models.	  This	  seemingly	  naïve	  inconsistency	  was	  even	  singled	  out	  by	   the	  British	   consultants	  who	   carried	   out	   the	   ex-­‐post	   evaluations80.	  Notwithstanding	  this	   apparent	   lack	   of	   realism,	   the	   Turosl	   project	   is	   interesting	   in	   as	   much	   as	   it	  demonstrates	   the	   progressive	   shift	   from	   poorly	   thought-­‐through	   targeted	   bilateral	  projects	   to	   a	   more	   systematic	   and	   centralized	   management	   of	   upgrading	   policies	  encompassing	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  public	  and	  private	  actors.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  also	  illustrative	   of	   relatively	   transparent	   ulterior	  motives	   lurking	   behind	   foreign	   technical	  assistance.	  	  The	  first	  phase	  of	  the	  Turosl	  project	  ran	  between	  1989	  and	  1991	  and	  was	  financed	  with	  Dutch	  capital	   and	   inputs.	  However,	   after	  1991,	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  Europe	  Agreements	  signed	  between	  Poland	  and	  the	  EC	  as	  well	  as	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  PHARE	  program,	  the	   EC	   became	   the	   third	   partner	   alongside	   the	   Polish	   and	  Dutch	   governments.	   By	   the	  end	   of	   1991,	   EC	   funding	   represented	   0.7	  million	   ECU,	  while	   the	  Netherlands	   invested	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  „It	   is	   less	  clear	  what	  the	  broader	  development	  objective	  was	   intended	  to	  be	  –	  was	   it	   to	  promote	  an	   ideal	  
technical	  model	  which	  might	  be	  adapted	  to	  local	  realities,	  or	  to	  develop	  a	  practical	  model	  of	  dairy	  farming	  
for	  Polish	  conditions?	  (...)	  The	  initial	  emphasis	  on	  the	  model	  farm	  and	  the	  transfer,	  rather	  than	  development,	  
of	  technology	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  objective	  was	  rather	  to	  provide	  a	  demonstration	  of	  one	  model	  ”	  (FAPA,	  1992).	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0.65	  million	  ECU.	  The	  Dutch	  funds	  were	  earmarked	  for	  technical	  assistance	  and	  the	  EC	  funds	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  machinery	  and	  equipment.	  The	  Polish	  government	  agreed	  to	  commit	   36	  million	   zlotys	   to	   the	   project	   for	   infrastructural	  modernization.	   The	  project	  was	   operated	   by	   a	   Dutch-­‐Polish	   steering	   committee.	   The	   Polish	   secretariat	   was	  established	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Agriculture,	   however	   it	   is	   significant	   that	   the	   actual	  organization	  was	  entirely	  delegated	  to	  the	  Union	  of	  Cattle	  Breeders	  (FAPA,	  1992).	  The	  Dutch/EC	   side	   of	   the	   steering	   committee	   was	   handled	   by	   a	   private	   consultancy.	   The	  suspicion	  that	  a	  supplementary	  motivation	  to	  the	  project	  on	  the	  Dutch	  side	  lay	  with	  the	  potential	  for	  increasing	  exports	  to	  the	  nascent	  Polish	  market	  is	  difficult	  to	  cast	  away:	  the	  Turosl	  project	  was	  fundamentally	  structured	  around	  machinery	  modernization,	  and	  the	  30	   local	   farmers	   targeted	   by	   the	   project	   not	   only	   received	   direct	   training	   but	   most	  importantly	  preferential	  loans	  for	  investing	  precisely	  in	  modern	  milking	  machinery.	  Put	  simply,	   the	   Dutch	   and	   EC	   funds	   were	   used	   for	   subsidizing	   loans	   earmarked	   for	  purchasing	  Western	  European	  (Dutch)	  milking	  machinery.	  	  Somewhat	  predictably,	  the	  Turosl	  project	  failed	  entirely	  at	  entrenching	  a	  “Dutch	  model”	  of	   dairy	   organization	   in	   Poland,	   however	   it	   created	   a	   strong	   local	   discrepancy	   among	  local	  farmers	  between	  “insiders”	  and	  “outsiders”	  to	  the	  project.	  	  A	  sign	  of	  the	  program’s	  “success”	   was	   that	   the	   local	   beneficiaries	   lobbied	   for	   a	   long-­‐term	   extension	   of	   the	  project,	   which	   the	   Dutch/EC	   partners	   were	   happy	   to	   extend:	   thus	   the	   initial	   project	  undertaken	  in	  1989	  actually	  lasted	  until	  1996	  and	  came	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  EU	  pre-­‐accession	   instrument	   PHARE.	   From	   the	   available	   archival	   material,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	  expectation	   on	   the	   Dutch	   side	   was	   that	   subsidizing	   the	   adoption	   of	   modern	   (Dutch)	  milking	  machinery	   in	  a	  restricted	  pool	  of	  Polish	  model	   farms	  would	  raise	  productivity	  sufficiently	  to	  motivate	  surrounding	  farmers	  initially	  excluded	  from	  the	  project	  to	  invest	  in	  similar	  equipment	  using	  other	  sources	  of	  capital.	  Thus,	  the	  Turosl	  project,	  under	  the	  guise	   of	   technical	   assistance,	   was	   in	   reality	   little	   more	   than	   a	   commercial	   exhibit	  organized	  in	  Potemkin	  farms	  where	  the	  Dutch	  creditors	  hoped	  to	  spark	  local	  demand	  for	  Dutch	  equipment.	  However,	   the	  principal	  bottleneck	  of	   the	  project	  was	   that	   it	   ignored	  the	  core	  problem	  of	  developing	  and	  transition	  economies,	  namely	  restricted	  capabilities	  for	  accessing	  capital.	  The	  neighboring	  farmers	  who	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  project	  and	  thus	  didn’t	  benefit	  from	  preferential	  loans	  proved	  unable	  to	  replicate	  the	  “Turosl	  model”	  –	   which	   incidentally	   also	   put	   a	   natural	   barrier	   to	   the	   Dutch	   hopes	   about	   an	   boosted	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Polish	  demand	  for	  machinery:	  “There	  is	  considerable	  interest	  in	  the	  project	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
advisory	   service	   and	   neighboring	   farmers.	   The	   latter	   are	   adopting	   at	   least	   some	   of	   the	  
innovations	  introduced,	  e.g.	  25	  farms	  outside	  the	  project	  made	  silage	  last	  year.	  However,	  it	  
is	   difficult	   for	   farmers	   to	   adopt	   the	   total	   package	  because	   of	   its	   relatively	   high	   cost	   and	  
commercial	  interest	  rates	  exceeding	  50%	  per	  annum.	  The	  project	  also	  relied	  very	  much	  on	  
imported	  machinery	  (sic),	  while	  other	  farms	  would	  not	  have	  access	  to	  such	  machinery	  at	  
reasonable	  prices	  and	  credit	  terms.”	  Finally,	  even	  for	  the	  beneficiaries,	  while	  an	  increase	  in	   output	   of	   milk	   produced	   was	   indeed	   noticed,	   the	   financial	   viability	   of	   the	   project	  turned	  increasingly	  burdensome	  since	  even	  the	  subsidized	  credit	  scheme	  was	  difficult	  to	  finance	  in	  view	  of	  low	  purchasing	  prices	  for	  milk	  and	  high	  fixed	  costs:	  “Thus,	  production	  
costs	  are	  estimated	  at	  2	  200	  PLN	  to	  2	  4000	  PLN,	  but	  these	  are	  heavily	  subsidized	  through	  
preferential	  interest	  rates.	  Each	  additional	  1%	  of	  interest	  rates	  would	  add	  over	  30	  PLN	  per	  
liter	  to	  production	  costs.	  These	   figures	  must	  be	  compared	  with	  current	  milk	  prices	   in	  the	  
area	  which	  do	  not	  exceed	  2	  100	  PLN,	  even	  for	  the	  best	  quality.	  The	  inevitable	  conclusion	  is	  
that	  dairy	  farmers	  would	  not	  be	  justified	  in	  investing	  heavily,	  even	  at	  preferential	  interest	  
rates	  (10%),	  unless	  a	  higher	  value	  outlet	  was	  available	  for	  their	  milk	  (FAPA,	  1992).”	  The	  conclusion	  was	  difficult	  to	  escape:	  the	  project	  could	  neither	  realistically	  be	  expected	  to	  fuel	  private	  investments	  by	  dairy	  farmers	  beyond	  the	  original	  beneficiaries	  only	  due	  to	  the	   demonstration	   effect	   of	   the	   “Potemkin	   farms”	   –	   nor	   could	   it	   actually	   constitute	   a	  financially	   sustainable	   model	   in	   which	   subsidized	   loans	   could	   finance	   technology	  imports	  in	  light	  of	  lower	  revenues	  and	  higher	  fixed	  costs	  than	  in	  the	  Netherlands:	  “The	  
general	   conclusion	   of	   this	   evaluation	   is	   that	   the	   initial	   project	   has	   developed	   a	   good	  
technical	  model	  for	  improved	  dairy	  production	  but	  that	  this	  model	  will	  have	  to	  be	  adapted	  
further	  before	  it	  can	  be	  replicated	  widely	   in	  Poland.	  The	  basic	  problems	  are	  that	   it	   is	  too	  
expensive	  and	  relies	  too	  much	  on	  imported	  machinery	  and	  equipment	  (FAPA,	  1992)”,	  	  As	  exemplified	  by	  Turosl,	   the	   first,	   somewhat	  chaotic	  bilateral	  projects	  were	  gradually	  replaced,	   complemented	  with-­‐	   and	   often	   retroactively	   integrated	   into-­‐	   the	   EC’s	   (later	  EU’s)	   aid	   and	   pre-­‐accession	   instruments,	   chief	   of	   which	   PHARE.	   However,	   what	   is	  surprising	  is	  that	  a	  loan	  financed	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  proved	  even	  more	  fundamental	  to	  the	  sector’s	  restructuring,	  competitive	  upgrading	  but	  also	  to	  the	  development	  of	  Polish	  public	  developmental	  and	  regulatory	  capacities:	  this	  program	  was	  called	  ASAL.	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Using	  the	  World	  Bank	  to	  build	  state	  capacities	  and	  save	  cooperatives	  	  Upon	   integrating	   the	   Bretton	  Woods	   organizations	   -­‐	   the	   IMF	   and	   the	  World	   Bank	   in	  1986,	  Poland	  was	  undoubtedly	  motivated	  by	  the	  prospect	  of	  accessing	  a	  new	  source	  of	  foreign	   capital	   in	   a	   very	   similar	   situation	   to	   Hungary’s	   macroeconomic	   problems,	  namely	   unsustainable	   levels	   of	   foreign	  debt.	  On	  May	  4	   1993,	   the	  World	  Bank	   and	   the	  Polish	  government	  agreed	  to	  an	  Agricultural	  Sector	  Adjustment	  Program	  (ASAP),	  which	  established	  a	  cooperation	  framework	  for	  an	  investment	  program	  financed	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  called	  Agricultural	  Sector	  Adjustment	  Loan	  (ASAL).	  ASAL	  represented	  330	  million	  USD,	   a	   substantially	  bigger	   sum	   than	  any	  of	   the	  previous	  bilateral	   aid	   and	   investment	  projects.	  ASAL	  was	  not	  only	  important	  for	  the	  size	  of	  the	  loan	  involved	  but	  also	  because	  it	   invigorated	   the	   state	   to	   design	   and	   implement	   an	   extremely	   wide-­‐ranging	   and	  complex	  set	  of	  reforms,	  which	  necessitated	   the	  creation	  of	  new	  public	  agencies:	  Seven	  objectives	   were	   broken	   down	   to	   78	   monitorable	   actions	   and	   33	   operational	   projects	  (MAFE,	  1995).	  ASAL	  was	  not	  only	  a	  loan	  program	  financing	  targeted	  technical	  assistance	  projects:	   it	   provided	   the	   framework	   for	   an	   administrative	   aggiornamento	   of	   public	  regulatory	   organizations	   in	   agriculture,	   agri-­‐food	   and	   rural	   development.	   The	  Foundation	  of	  Assistance	  Programs	  for	  Agriculture	  (FAPA),	  an	  organization	  in	  charge	  of	  overseeing	  all	  infrastructural	  modernization	  projects	  as	  well	  as	  credit	  programs	  was	  set	  up	  as	  an	  implementing	  organization	  to	  ASAL.	  Similarly,	  the	  Agency	  for	  Restructuring	  and	  Modernization	  of	  Agriculture	   (ARMA),	   the	   chief	   credit	   agency,	  was	   also	   created	  under	  ASAL	   (MAFE,	   1991).	   The	   public	   agency	   in	   charge	   of	   privatizing	   agricultural	   land	   and	  Socialist	   agri-­‐food	   companies	   and	   cooperatives,	   the	   Agency	   for	   Agricultural	   Property	  (AAP),	  was	  also	  created	  for	  implementing	  one	  of	  the	  key	  objectives	  of	  ASAL.	  Finally,	  the	  Foundation	   for	   Rural	   Development	   (FRD),	   another	   fund	   created	   for	   financing	  modernization	   investments,	   was	   also	   equally	   established	   under	   ASAL	   (MAFE,	   1991).	  What	   is	   remarkable	   is	   that	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	   the	   Polish	   state	   had	   different	  perceptions	  of	  ASAL,	  which	  spurred	  real	  tensions.	  The	  World	  Bank	  saw	  the	  adjustment	  loan	  primarily	   as	   a	  program	  meant	   to	  de-­‐nationalize	   agriculture	  and	  agri-­‐food	   sectors	  and	   create	   the	   foundations	   of	   a	   modern,	   competitive	   and	   profit-­‐oriented	   agricultural	  markets.	  Polish	  authorities	  however	  perceived	  ASAL	  as	  a	  public	  developmental	  toolkit,	  whereby	  the	  state	  could	  regulate	  and	  upgrade	  its	  economy.	  As	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  ex-­‐post	  evaluation	  drafted	  by	   the	  World	  Bank:	   “The	  borrower	  regards	  the	  co-­‐financing	  of	  rural	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infrastructure	  as	  the	  first	  objective	  of	  the	  program,	  market	  oriented	  transformations	  as	  the	  
second.	  The	  Bank	  sees	  an	  ASAL	  primarily	  as	  a	  structural	  adjustment	  mechanism;	  the	  rural	  
investment	   component	   as	   incidental”	   (World_Bank,	   1997).	   Polish	   public	   actors	   proved	  able	   to	   use	   the	   opportunities	   offered	   by	   ASAL	   “creatively”,	   for	   advancing	   their	   own	  priorities,	  which	  didn’t	  stop	  at	  privatization.	  	  	  The	  construction	  of	  ASAL	  was	  peculiar:	  although	  primarily	  financed	  by	  the	  World	  Bank,	  the	   33	   individual	   projects	  were	   also	   often	   co-­‐financed	   by	   specific	  Western	   public	   and	  private	   partners.	   Out	   of	   the	   33	   projects,	   project	   nr.	   8	   concerned	   specifically	   the	   dairy	  sector	   under	   the	   title	   “Pilot	   Programs	   on	   Quality	   Management	   in	   the	   Dairy	   Sector”	  (MAFE,	  1995).	  The	  project	  was	  funded	  by	  the	  government	  of	  Switzerland	  with	  1	  million	  Swiss	  francs,	  the	  UK	  government	  contributed	  215	  000	  GBP	  and	  the	  EC’s	  PHARE	  program	  invested	  700	  000	  ECU.	  It	  was	  comprised	  of	  four	  “phases”,	  with	  a	  dominant	  contribution	  by	   one	   of	   the	   external	   assistance	  providers	   in	   each:	   in	   the	   first	   phase	  which	  began	   in	  January	  1993,	  the	  main	  actor	  was	  the	  Swiss	  government.	  Four	  Polish	  dairy	  cooperatives	  took	  part	   in	   the	  project,	   first	   building	   a	   traceable	  database	   among	   their	   suppliers	   and	  implementing	   systematic	   milk	   sample	   analyses,	   the	   results	   of	   which	   were	   kept	   in	   a	  computerized	  database.	  In	  a	  second	  phase,	  a	  three-­‐week	  training	  tour	  was	  organized	  for	  Polish	  dairy	  cooperative	  management	  to	  Switzerland	  for	  studying	  food	  safety	  and	  milk	  quality	  traceability	  and	  analysis	  systems,	  and	  180	  000	  Swiss	  francs	  were	  earmarked	  for	  buying	   modern	   equipment	   which	   enabled	   the	   collection	   of	   milk	   twice	   a	   day	   in	   the	  collection	   centers.	   	   In	   the	   third	   phase,	   which	   began	   in	   March	   1994,	   it	   was	   the	   UK	  government	   that	   played	   the	   leading	   role:	   225	   people	   received	   training	   regarding	  traceability	  and	  milk	  quality	  systems	  as	  well	  as	  on	  food	  safety	  standards	  ISO	  9000	  and	  HACCP.	  Eleven	  dairy	  cooperatives	  were	  selected	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  new	  quality	  systems,	  while	  the	  program	  also	  provided	  training	  for	  technical	  specialists	  in	  the	  Dairy	  Technological	   Institute	   of	   Agricultural	   Academy	   at	   Olsztyn	   and	   the	   Dairy	   Institute	   in	  Warsaw:	   this	  part	  of	   the	  project	   sought	   to	  build	  up	   technical	   expertise	   in	   the	   two	  key	  scientific	  institutes	  in	  order	  to	  monitor	  milk	  quality	  consistently	  and	  more	  importantly	  for	  enforcing	  and	  monitoring	   the	   ISO	  9000	  and	  HACCP	   food	  safety	  standards	  amongst	  the	  11	  dairy	  cooperatives	  that	  took	  part	  in	  the	  project.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  third	  phase,	  a	  further	   training	   was	   provided	   specifically	   for	   dairy	   processing	   plant	   managers	   for	  refining	   quality	   control	   systems	   at	   the	   plant	   level.	   Finally,	   700	   000	   ECU	   originally	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earmarked	  by	  PHARE	  for	  technical	  assistance	  in	  the	  dairy	  sector	  already	  in	  1993	  –	  were	  eventually	  used	  in	  the	  last	  phase	  of	  the	  project	  in	  1995-­‐1996	  for	  accrediting	  laboratories	  and	  the	  two	  dairy	  institutes	  and	  provide	  further,	   larger-­‐scale	  trainings	  to	  both	  farmers	  and	  dairy	  processing	  plant	  management	  regarding	  food	  safety	  standards	  (MAFE,	  1995).	  	  	  Two	   points	   are	   worth	   mentioning:	   Project	   nr.8	   (just	   like	   the	   remaining	   32	   others)	  actually	   served	   as	   a	   bridge	   between	   the	   early	   bi-­‐lateral	   aid	   and	   technical	   assistance	  projects	  financed	  by	  foreign	  public	  donors	  and	  later	  multilateral	  investment	  and	  credit	  programs	  supervised	  and	  financed	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  EC	  up	  until	  the	  late	  1990s.	  More	  fundamentally,	  the	  Polish	  state	  and	  the	  beneficiaries	  (dairy	  cooperatives)	  were	  far	  more	  than	  passive	  rule	  takers:	  ASAL	  notably	  enabled	  the	  state	  to	  extend	  its	  regulatory	  capacities	  by	  setting	  up	  key	  agencies	  such	  as	  FAPA	  and	  ARMA,	  which	  were	  necessary	  for	  implementation	   and	   monitoring.	   An	   important	   disagreement	   grew	   increasingly	   clear	  between	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  Polish	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors:	  while	  the	  former	  urged	  Poland	   to	   get	   rid	   of	   cooperatives,	   Polish	   actors	   on	   the	   contrary	   used	   these	   funds	   for	  saving	  and	  upgrading	   them.	  Most	  of	  ASAL	  objectives	  didn’t	   stir	  disagreement	  between	  the	   donors	   and	   Polish	   beneficiaries:	   administrative	   capacity	   building,	   infrastructural	  investments	  and	  modernization,	  the	  introduction	  of	  modern	  food	  safety	  standards	  were	  commonly	  shared	  objectives.	  However,	  the	  issue	  of	  privatization	  was	  more	  contentious	  when	  it	  came	  to	  dairy:	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture	  (MAFE)	  alongside	  the	  newly	  created	  FAPA	  managed	   to	   take	   dairy	   off	   the	   list	   of	   targeted	   sectors	   for	  massive	   privatization	  even	   when	   donors	   expressly	   pushed	   in	   that	   direction	   (World_Bank,	   1997).	   Instead,	  Polish	  public	  actors	  decoupled	  ASAL	  objectives:	  specific	  sectors,	  such	  as	  sugar	  would	  be	  prime	   examples	   of	   privatization,	   following	   a	   similar	   pathway	   to	   Hungarian	   dairy:	   By	  2010	  only	  4	   sugar	  producers	   remained	  on	   the	  market,	   3	  of	   them	  were	   foreign-­‐owned	  (Judzinska,	  2012).	  However,	  Polish	   implementing	  agencies	  used	   the	   funds	  under	  ASAL	  and	  PHARE	  to	  invest	  in	  upgrading	  dairy	  cooperatives,	  even	  effectively	  bailing	  out	  those	  that	  were	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  bankruptcy	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  In	  July	  1990,	  800	  billion	  zlotys	  were	   allocated	   to	   restructuring	   the	   dairy	   sector,	   out	   of	   which	   250	   billions	   were	  earmarked	   for	  credits:	  by	  1991,	   this	  credit	   line	  had	  been	  already	  exhausted	  but	   it	  had	  served	  to	  save	  260	  dairy	  cooperatives,	  which	  had	  been	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  bankruptcy	  and	  liquidation	  (MAFE,	  1991).	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Rejoined	  upgrading	  efforts	  on	  the	  way	  to	  EU	  accession	  	  By	  the	  time	  ASAL	  was	  completed	  in	  1996,	  the	  landscape	  had	  changed	  entirely	  compared	  with	   the	   disorganization	   and	   initial	   lack	   of	   trust	   between	   the	   state	   and	   cooperatives,	  which	   had	   prevailed	   in	   1989-­‐1990.	   By	   the	   mid-­‐1990s,	   the	   elements	   of	   a	   stable	  developmental	  alliance	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  were	  in	  place	  –	  the	  scenario	  of	   a	   re-­‐privatization	   of	   cooperatives	   had	   been	   abandoned	   while	   an	   extended	   public	  administrative	  apparatus	  comprised	  of	  modernization	  program	  implementing	  agencies	  and	  credit	  purveyors	  such	  as	  FAPA	  and	  ARMA	  had	  accumulated	  substantial	  experience	  in	  project	  management	  and	  the	  centralization	  of	   foreign	  capital	  sourced	  from	  different	  transnational	   partners.	   Dairy	   cooperatives	   had	   benefitted	   from	   a	   steady	   stream	   of	  capital	   since	   1990,	   which	   enabled	   them	   to	   overcome	   the	   first	   basic	   challenges	   in	  adapting	   to	   a	   new	   competitive	   environment.	   Subsequent	   modernization	   investment	  programs	  pursued	   in	   advancing	   the	  objectives	   layed	  out	   in	   the	  1993	  ASAL	  program	  –	  most	  importantly	  upgrading	  the	  quality	  of	  fresh	  milk,	  which	  was	  still	  unsatisfactory	  by	  EU	   standards.	   The	   PHARE	   program	   “Quality	   Management	   in	   the	   Dairy	   Sector”,	  implemented	  between	  1996	  and	  1998	  was	   in	   fact	  a	  direct	  offshoot	  of	  ASAL	  –	  only	   the	  funding	   source	   changed	   as	   EU	   funds	   replaced	   the	  World	   Bank:	   trainings	   in	   ISO	   9000	  quality	   monitoring	   was	   delivered	   to	   a	   group	   of	   195	   people	   representing	   key	   dairy	  cooperatives	   located	   in	  Gora	  Slaska,	  Lubawa,	  Mragowo,	  Nowy	  Tomsyc,	  Raciaz,	  Radzyn	  Podlaski	   and	   Sieradz	   Public	   laboratories	   and	   veterinary	   services	   equally	   received	  trainings	   as	  well	   as	   new	  machinery	   down	   to	   the	   regional	   level	   in	  Opole,	  Malbork	   and	  Koszalin	  (FAPA,	  1996).	  	  	  There	   were	   also	   setbacks:	   in	   1997,	   the	   EU’s	   Food	   and	   Veterinary	   Office	   Inspectorate	  banned	  Polish	  exports	  to	  the	  EU	  arguing	  that	  food	  safety	  standard	  compliance	  was	  not	  satisfactory	  (Judzinska,	  2012).	  It	  remains	  somewhat	  doubtful	  whether	  the	  decision	  was	  justified	   or	   if	   it	   was	   an	   attempt	   at	   protecting	   EU15	   dairies	   from	   the	   comparative	  advantage	   of	   low	   cost	   Polish	   exports,	   which,	   eventually,	   did	   flood	   the	   EU	   market.	  Although	   Polish	   dairy	   cooperatives	   certainly	   lagged	   behind	   in	   ISO	   9000	   and	   HACCP	  certification	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  overall	  quality	  of	  fresh	  milk	  as	  described	  in	  the	  section	  on	  indicators,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  that	  food	  safety	  standards	  are	  regularly	  used	  as	  non-­‐tariff	   trade	   barriers	   and	   bargaining	   chips	   in	   international	   trade	   liberalization	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agreements.	  If	  anything,	  the	  1997	  ban	  actually	  reinforced	  cooperation	  between	  the	  state	  and	  dairy	  cooperatives:	  	  the	  same	  year,	  a	  program	  called	  “Aid	  for	  ISO	  9000	  Certification”	  officially	  certified	  for	  the	  first	  time	  a	  group	  of	  large	  and	  middle-­‐sized	  dairy	  cooperatives	  as	  ISO	  9000	  and	  HACCP	  compliant:	  Spomlek,	  Piatnica,	  Gora,	  Sertop	  Tychy,	  Gora,	  Lubawa,	  Sieradz,	   Kolno	   and	   Radzyn	   Podlaski	   were	   the	   beneficiary	   cooperatives.	   Laggards	  received	   further	   help	   in	   a	   program	   called	   “Quality	   Improvement	   in	   Polish	   Dairy	   and	  Fisheries”,	   which	   ran	   between	   November	   1999	   and	   December	   2000:	   a	   further	   17	  cooperatives	  received	  help	  in	  view	  of	  HACCP	  certification,	  while	  another	  3	  were	  brought	  to	   ISO	   9000	   compliance.	   The	   direct	   result	   of	   this	   program	   was	   that,	   eventually,	   25	  cooperatives	  received	  an	  export	  certification	  to	  the	  EU	  by	  2002	  (while	  only	  4	  officially	  complied	  with	  ISO	  9000	  in	  1997)81.	  	  	  In	  1999,	  Poland	  adopted	  the	  EU’s	  classification	  system	  of	  milk	  quality	  in	  3	  classes	  –	  thus	  dairies	  had	  to	  test	  their	  products	  for	  various	  indicators	  (such	  as	  germ	  count,	  fat	  content	  etc.)	  and	  disclose	  that	  information.	  In	  2000,	  Poland	  passed	  a	  new	  law,	  which	  prohibited	  processors	  from	  buying	  “third	  class”	  (lowest	  quality)	  milk	  (thus	  restricting	  this	  type	  of	  milk	   to	   household	   consumption	   or	   sale	   in	   local	  wetmarkets)	   (Dries	  &	   Swinnen,	   2007,	  p.426).	  By	  2003,	  processors	  couldn’t	  accept	  second-­‐class	  milk	  either:	  the	  objective	  was	  to	  upgrade	  all	  processed	  milk	  to	   first	  class	   level	  by	  EU	  accession	   in	  2004.	  The	  “carrot”	  was	   an	   incentive	   subsidy	   paid	   for	   first	   class	   milk	   between	   2002	   and	   2004	   (Malak-­‐Rawlikowska,	  2006).	  Overall,	  the	  qualitative	  upgrading	  of	  milk	  proved	  successful	  as	  first	  class	  milk	  purchases	  increased	  by	  33%	  between	  2002	  and	  2003,	  and	  thus	  85%	  of	  milk	  complied	   with	   EU	   criteria	   by	   2003.	   However,	   Poland	   obtained	   a	   further	   safeguard	  during	   EU	   accession	   negotiations:	   the	   EU	   Commission	   accepted	   that	   Poland	   continue	  financing	  dairy	  upgrading	  programs	  even	  after	  accession	  alongside	  the	  objectives	  fixed	  in	   the	   1994	   document	   “Development	   Strategy	   for	   Polish	   Dairy”	   co-­‐produced	   with	  cooperatives	  –	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  these	  differ	  from	  the	  criteria	  of	  EU	  structural	  fund	  support:	  this	  proved	  equally	  important	  as	  it	  allowed	  ARMA	  to	  finance	  14,8	  million	  euros	  on	  preferential	   credits	   in	  2003	   (compared	   to	  6	  million	   in	  1995)	   (Malak-­‐Rawlikowska,	  2006).	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  and	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Conclusion	  on	  public	  policies	  	  In	   spite	  of	  hesitations	   in	  1989,	   the	  Polish	   state	   eventually	   chose	   to	  preserve	  domestic	  dairy	   cooperatives	   inherited	   from	   the	   Socialist	   era.	   The	   alluring	   sirens	   of	   radical	  restructuring,	  re-­‐privatization	  and	  modernization	  through	  FDI	  were	  quickly	  repelled	  as	  it	  became	  clear	   that	   farmers	  were	  determined	  at	  keeping	   the	  organizational	  structure,	  which	   they	   had	  managed	   to	   safeguard	   for	   over	   a	   century	   –	   even	   against	   the	   Stalinist	  project	  of	  nationalization.	   Instead	  of	   fighting	   them,	   the	  Polish	  state	  ended	  up	  coopting	  cooperatives	  as	  co-­‐managers	  of	  their	  own	  modernization:	  the	  state	  and	  cooperatives	  co-­‐produced	  the	  1994	  template	  for	  restructuring	  the	  sector.	  Compared	  with	  the	  fast-­‐track	  access	   to	   capital	   afforded	   by	   the	  Hungarian	   integrationist	   strategy	   via	   FDI,	   the	   Polish	  state	  thus	  embarked	  on	  a	  more	  difficult	  journey:	  it	  was	  financially	  costly,	  it	  necessitated	  institutional	   innovations	  and	   it	   required	  a	   lengthy	   learning	  curve.	  What	   is	  particularly	  striking	   is	   that	   the	   Polish	   state’s	   role	   in	   restructuring	   the	   dairy	   sector	   mirrored	   the	  “classical”	   pathway	   of	   autonomist	   developmentalism	   among	   20th	   century	   late-­‐industrializers,	   which	   shows	   that	   even	   in	   post-­‐Socialist	   CEE,	   modes	   of	  transnationalization	   varied	   considerably	   at	   the	   sector	   level	   between	   countries	  confronted	  with	  similar	  problems.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  competitive	  position	  that	  Polish	  dairy	  producers	   eventually	   attained	   in	   the	   EU	   market,	   the	   Polish	   pathway	   performed	  objectively	   better	   than	   the	   Hungarian	   model.	   In	   fact,	   after	   a	   decade	   of	   continuous	  upgrading	   programs,	   Polish	   dairies	   thrived	   in	   open	   markets:	   after	   EU	   accession,	   the	  state	  actually	  retreated	  from	  pro-­‐active	  interventionism	  –	  unlike	  Hungary	  where	  it	  was	  coerced	   into	   action	   because	   of	   collapsing	   competitiveness.	   In	   2012,	   when	   the	   EU	  Commission	   proposed	   a	   new	   set	   of	   regulatory	   tools	   to	   member	   states	   in	   the	   “Milk	  Package”,	  neither	   the	  Polish	  state	  nor	  Polish	  dairy	  cooperatives	   took	  advantage	  of	   this	  opportunity:	  by	   the	   time	   the	  EU	  began	  encouraging	  member	   states	   to	   establish	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  organizations	  at	  the	  sector	  level	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  defend	  the	  interests	  of	  domestic	  dairy	  producers,	  Poland	  had	  already	  accumulated	  twenty	  years	  of	  experience	  in	  running	  a	  thickly	  institutionalized	  developmental	  coalition,	  which	  had	  not	  only	  saved	  “obsolete”	  Socialist	   cooperatives,	   but	   transformed	  Poland	   in	   one	   of	   the	   big	   global	   producers	   and	  exporters	  of	  dairy	  products.	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Part	  4.	  Firm	  Strategies	  	  
Large	  domestic	  cooperatives	  	  Although	   the	   developmental	   pathway	   of	   the	   Polish	   dairy	   sector	   proved	   largely	  successful	  both	  in	  the	  sector’s	  improving	  competitive	  position	  on	  transnational	  markets	  and	   in	   terms	  of	   the	   inclusiveness	   it	   offered	   to	  domestic	   actors,	  differences	   in	   size	   and	  strategies	  among	  Polish	  dairies	  reveal	  different	  opportunities	  and	  constraints.	  While	  the	  market	   is	  substantially	   less	  concentrated	   in	  Poland	  than	   in	  Hungary,	   there	  are	  marked	  differences	  between	  a	  handful	  of	  market	  leaders	  and	  a	  large	  number	  of	  smaller	  dairies,	  which	   often	   try	   to	   specialize	   in	   niche	   markets.	   Two	   flagship	   companies	   stand	   out	   in	  particular	   –	   Mlekpol	   and	  Mlekovita,	   respectively	   first	   and	   second	   in	   terms	   of	   market	  share	  with	   approximately	  13%	  each	  and	  yearly	   revenues	   in	   excess	  of	  3	  bn	  PLN	   	   (710	  million	  euros)	  (Janiuk,	  2014).	   	  The	  trajectory	  of	  both	  firms	  is	  remarkably	  similar:	  both	  are	  domestically	  owned	  cooperatives,	  whose	  origins	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  early	  20th	  century.	  They	  were	  both	  nationalized	  in	  1951,	  and	  re-­‐instituted	  as	  cooperatives	  in	  1957,	  while	  both	  have	  weathered	  out	  the	  transition	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  directors	  who	  had	  already	  been	  at	   the	  helm	  of	   the	  cooperatives	  under	  Socialism:	  a	  member	  of	   the	  Polish	  Peasant	  Party,	  Edmund	  Borawski	  has	  been	  Head	  of	  Mlekpol	   since	  1982	  while	  Dariusz	  Sapinski	  became	  the	  Head	  of	  Mlekovita	  in	  198582.	  Borawski	  is	  also	  an	  active	  politician	  in	  the	  Polish	  parliament	  (Sejm),	  where	  he	  has	  been	  working	   in	  the	  Special	  Committee	  on	  Cooperative	  Law	  since	  2011:	   it	   is	  not	   coincidental	   that	   two	  of	  his	   assistants	   there	   are	  former	   members	   of	   Mlekpol83.	   The	   successful	   trajectory	   of	   both	   companies	   followed	  similar	  landmarks:	  The	  first	  phase	  was	  the	  introduction	  of	  premium	  UHT	  fresh	  milk	  on	  the	  domestic	  market	  in	  1995.	  By	  EU	  accession	  in	  2004,	  both	  cooperatives	  complied	  with	  EU	  food	  standards	  mandatory	  in	  the	  dairy	  sector	  –	  ISO	  9000	  and	  HACCP.	  Furthermore,	  Mlekpol	   also	   made	   separate	   investments	   for	   complying	   with	   the	   UK’s	   very	   own	   BRC	  standard:	  Mlekpol’s	   products	   can	   thus	   be	   exported	   to	   the	   UK	  market	   through	   British	  retail	   chain	   Tesco.	   The	   1990s	   were	   marked	   by	   a	   rapid	   expansive	   strategy	   for	   both	  Mlekpol	  and	  Mlekovita	  –	  the	  two	  companies	  acquired	  a	  number	  of	  processing	  facilities	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Source:	  http://stara.wysokiemazowieckie.pl/37.php	  accessed	  23/03/2014	  	  83	  Source:	  http://www.mlekpol.com.pl/	  accessed	  01/03/2013	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and	  smaller	  cooperatives	  throughout	  the	  country:	  while	  Mlekovita	  is	  originally	  based	  in	  Eastern	   Poland	   (Wysokie	   Mazowieckie),	   its	   collection	   and	   distribution	   centers	   cover	  today	  the	  entire	  country	  –	  which	  reflects	  how	  the	  production	  and	  distribution	  facilities	  of	  smaller	  dairies	  were	  gradually	  integrated	  into	  a	  complementary	  national	  network	  of	  14	   distribution	   centers84.	   Mlekpol	   followed	   a	   similar	   pathway:	   the	   cooperative	   was	  based	   in	  Grajewo,	  also	   in	  Eastern	  Poland,	  but	   it	  went	  on	  to	  absorb	  11	  dairies	  between	  1995	  and	  2005	  spread	  across	  Poland.	  Mlekpol	  represents	  today	  14	  000	  farmers-­‐owners	  while	  the	  cooperative	  employs	  a	  further	  2300	  people.	  It	  purchases	  13%	  of	  all	  milk	  that	  is	  produced	   in	   Poland	   and	   one	   third	   of	   its	   production	   is	   destined	   for	   exports	   to	   the	   EU	  market,	   predominantly	   in	   EU15	   countries85.	   Although	   Mlekpol’s	   exports	   to	   the	   EU	  market	   are	   still	   concentrated	   in	   the	   lower	   value	   added	  milk	  powder	  product	   segment	  (64%	  of	   its	  exports),	   it	   is	  present	  on	  the	  domestic	  market	   in	  all	  value	  added	  segments	  with	  500	  different	  products	  and	  it	   is	  the	  only	  Polish	  dairy	  company	  which	  operates	  its	  own	  RD	  department.	  Mlekovita	  is	  equally	  diversified	  with	  a	  range	  of	  400	  products,	  and	  it	  also	   exports	   30%	   of	   its	   production.	   Mlekovita’s	   export	   strategy	   is	   particularly	  innovative:	   It	   is	   the	   first	  Polish	  dairy	   company,	  which	  opened	  production	   subsidiaries	  abroad.	  In	  2009,	  Mlekovita	  entered	  the	  Russian	  market	  by	  building	  a	  processing	  plant	  in	  the	  Russian	  exclave	  of	  Kaliningrad,	  close	  to	  the	  Polish	  border86.	  It	  targeted	  the	  Russian	  market	  in	  the	  high	  value-­‐added	  segment	  by	  focusing	  specifically	  on	  mozzarella	  and	  feta	  cheese	  produced	   in	  Kaliningrad	   from	   local	   fresh	  milk	   supplies87:	   instead	  of	   relying	  on	  smallholders	   however,	   Mlekovita	   built	   two	   large	   scale	   farms	   with	   more	   than	   1000	  cows88.	  It	  also	  opened	  its	  own	  distribution	  channels	  operating	  ten	  stores	  in	  Kaliningrad	  and	  two	  stores	  directly	  in	  Moscow.	  On	  the	  domestic	  market,	  Mlekovita	  also	  innovated	  by	  building	   a	   Cash	   and	   Carry	   retail	   store	   near	   Warsaw	   in	   2013,	   where	   it	   acts	   as	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  This	  is	  also	  interesting	  because	  in	  the	  Hungarian	  context,	  MNCs	  pursued	  a	  similar	  expansionist	  strategy	  in	   the	   1990s	   –	   however,	   they	   largely	   failed	   at	   building	   complementarities	   between	   different	   regional	  production	  facilities.	  Source:	  http://www.mlekpol.com.pl/	  accessed	  01/03/2013	  	  85	  Source:	  http://www.bialystokonline.pl/mlekpol-­‐zarabia-­‐i-­‐inwestuje-­‐w-­‐swoje-­‐zaklady,artykul,11230,4,66.html	  accessed	  01/03/2013	  	  86	  Interview	  with	  Ms.	  Agnieszka	  Maliszewska,	  Polska	  Izba	  Mleka	  	  87	  Source:	  http://www.podlaskie.strefabiznesu.pl/artykul/mlekovita-­‐najwieksza-­‐fabryka-­‐swiata-­‐44124.html	  accessed	  16/06/2014	  	  88	  Source:	  http://www.forbes.pl/mlekovita-­‐dariusza-­‐sapinskiego-­‐sukces-­‐mlekiem-­‐plynacy,artykuly,176958,1,1.html	  accessed	  19/06/2014	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wholesaler:	   in	   conjunction	   with	   its	   Russian	   operation,	   Mlekovita’s	   business	   model	   is	  particularly	  surprising	  as	  the	  company	  is	  not	  merely	  attempting	  to	  carve	  out	  new	  export	  markets	   but	   it	   also	   invests	   in	   setting	   up	   independent	   distribution	   channels	   to	   avoid	  intermediaries	   such	   as	   retail	   chains	   –	   a	   strategy	   usually	   reserved	   to	   the	   biggest	  MNC	  food	   processors.	  What	   is	  more,	  Mlekovita	   also	   entered	   a	   partnership	  with	   Lithuanian	  food	  wholesaler	  Prefita:	  using	  Prefita’s	  wholesale	   stores	   in	   the	  Baltic	   states,	  Mlekovita	  products	  are	  sold	  through	  Mlekovita	  Baltica	  in	  the	  region.	  Overall,	  Mlekovita’s	  marketing	  strategy	  both	  domestically	  and	  on	  export	  markets	   is	  highly	   innovative	  as	   it	  establishes	  new	  distribution	  channels	  by	  eliminating	  intermediaries,	  which	  reduces	  dependency	  on	  large	   retail	   chains:	   the	   cooperative	   carves	   out	   a	   place	   in	   foreign	   export	   markets	   by	  setting	   up	   its	   own	   distribution	   and	   production	   facilities	   in	   the	   neighboring	   countries.	  Since	   2012,	   there	   have	   been	   insistent	   rumors	   that	   the	   managements	   of	   Mlekpol	   and	  Mlekovita	  would	  be	  negotiating	  a	  merger	  of	   the	  two	  companies,	  which	  would	  not	  only	  create	  a	  giant	  on	  the	  Polish	  dairy	  market	  but	  also	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  dairy	  companies	  in	  Europe89.	   	   The	  market	   position	   of	   the	   two	   firms	   is	   so	   solid	   that	   domestic	   and	   foreign	  competitors	  have	  little	  prospect	  of	  catching	  up:	  instead	  of	  competing	  on	  quantities,	  the	  latter	  often	  specialize	  in	  niche	  products	  with	  high	  value	  added	  such	  as	  specific	  types	  of	  cheese	  and	  yoghurt	  drinks.	  	  	  
The	  challenges	  of	  medium	  and	  small	  Polish	  dairies	  	  Since	  the	  Polish	  market	  remains	  substantially	  less	  concentrated	  than	  EU15	  or	  even	  the	  Hungarian	  market,	  the	  two	  giants’	  combined	  market	  share	  still	  leaves	  a	  relatively	  large	  space	   for	   competitors.	  However,	  whether	   domestic	   or	   foreign	   owned,	   cooperatives	   or	  limited	   liability	   companies,	   virtually	   all	   other	   dairies	   capture	   market	   shares	   that	   are	  orders	  of	  magnitudes	  below	  the	   two	   flagship	  processors	  (with	   the	  partial	  exception	  of	  Danone).	  For	  Polish	  dairies,	  two	  strategies	  remain	  open:	  medium-­‐sized	  dairies	  attempt	  to	  catch	  up	  with	  Mlekpol	  and	  Mlekovita	  before	  the	  latter’s	  foreseeable	  merger.	  Smaller	  domestic	   dairies	   try	   to	   specialize	   either	   in	   higher	   value	   added	   products	   or	   in	   specific	  export	  markets.	  The	  first	  strategy	  is	  exemplified	  by	  Polish	  cooperatives	  such	  as	  Lowicz,	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  accessed	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Piatnica	  or	  Spomlek90.	  Lowicz	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  the	  new	  challenges	  for	  medium	  sized	  Polish	  cooperatives:	  it	  is	  a	  dairy	  cooperative	  set	  up	  in	  Russian-­‐occupied	  Poland	  in	  1906	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Wladylaw	  Grabski	  –	  a	  Western	  educated	  aristocrat	  who	  would	  become	  a	  prominent	  figure	  of	  independent	  Poland	  as	  he	  was	  elected	  Prime	  Minister	  in	  192091.	   In	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   1990	   Law	   on	   Cooperatives,	   which	   attempted	   to	   renew	  management	   through	  mandatory	   elections,	   the	  membership	   elected	   Jan	  Dabrowski	   as	  Head	   of	   the	   cooperative,	   a	   young	   technical	   engineer	   who	   had	   been	   working	   at	   the	  cooperative	   since	   1983:	   just	   like	   his	   peers	   at	   Mlekpol	   and	  Mlekovita,	   he	   has	   been	   in	  place	  ever	  since	  the	  1980s.	  Lowicz	  is	  today	  the	  fourth	  biggest	  dairy	  with	  a	  market	  share	  of	  6%	  behind	  Mlekpol,	  Mlekovita	   and	  Danone.	  Throughout	   the	  1990s,	   the	   cooperative	  followed	  a	  similar	  trajectory	  to	  Mlekpol	  and	  Mlekovita,	  the	  difference	  mainly	  lying	  with	  its	   smaller	   size:	  Lowicz	  had	  half	   the	   sales	   revenues	  of	   its	  eastern	  competitors	   in	  2012	  (330	   million	   euros)	   (Janiuk,	   2014).	   The	   cooperative	   also	   tried	   to	   gradually	   expand	  capacities	  by	  absorbing	  smaller	  processors	  -­‐	  between	  2006	  and	  2013,	  it	  bought	  6	  dairies	  –	  however	  a	  notable	  difference	  is	  that	  it	  is	  weaker	  in	  exports	  than	  its	  bigger	  rivals:	  while	  Lowicz	  exports	   to	   the	  EU	  and	  Eastern	  markets	   (Russia,	  Mongolia,	  China),	  exports	  only	  represent	  17%	  of	  its	  production92.	  Due	  to	  lower	  capitalization	  and	  capacities,	  it	  failed	  to	  exploit	  the	  export	  opportunities	  afforded	  by	  EU	  accession,	  which	  benefitted	  Mlekpol	  and	  Mlekovita.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  an	  inward	  development	  strategy	  on	  the	  domestic	  market	  is	   getting	   more	   difficult	   to	   sustain	   in	   an	   increasingly	   competitive	   environment:	  Alongside	  Mlekpol	  and	  Mlekovita,	  Lowicz	  was	  also	  supplying	  retailer	  Biedronka	  (owned	  by	   Portuguese	   Jeronimo-­‐Martins)	   but	   in	  March	   2015,	   it	   was	   de-­‐listed	   as	   a	   supplier	   –	  officially	   as	   a	   result	   of	   unsatisfactory	  quality93.	   Lowicz	   thus	   exemplifies	   a	   problem	   for	  middle	  sized	  domestic	  cooperatives,	  which	  didn’t	  manage	  to	  carve	  out	  substantial	  export	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  Interview	  with	  Agnieszka	  Maliszewska,	  Polska	  Izba	  Mleka	  	  91	  From	  then	  on,	  the	  Lowicz	  cooperative	  followed	  the	  typical	  route	  of	  commercial	  expansion	  throughout	  the	   1930s,	   stopped	   short	   by	   the	   second	   world	   war,	   nationalization	   in	   1951	   and	   re-­‐established	  cooperative	  autonomy	  in	  1957.	  	  Source:	  http://www.mleczarnia.lowicz.pl/lowicz/index.php?strona=historia	  	  accessed	  01/06/2015	  	  92	  Source:	  http://www.portalspozywczy.pl/mleko/wiadomosci/osm-­‐lowicz-­‐wyda-­‐na-­‐inwestycje-­‐70-­‐mln-­‐zlotych,114835.html	  accessed	  01/06/2015	  	  93 Source:	   http://www.strefabiznesu.pomorska.pl/artykul/mleko-­‐mleczna-­‐dolina-­‐z-­‐biedronki-­‐juz-­‐nie-­‐bedzie-­‐produkowane-­‐przez-­‐osm-­‐lowicz-­‐mlekpol	  accessed	  01/06/2015	  	  
	  	   193	  
market	  shares	  and	  whose	  market	  share	  on	  the	  Polish	  market	  is	  also	  threatened	  by	  larger	  competitors:	   short	   of	   innovative	   distribution	   channels	   such	   as	   Mlekovita,	   Lowicz	  depends	  on	  stable	  relations	  with	  retail	  chains,	  and	  the	  recent	  de-­‐listing	  had	   important	  reputational	  consequences	  on	  the	  cooperative’s	  products.	  	  	  
MNCs	  vs	  domestic	  firms	  	  Unlike	   in	  Hungary,	  MNCs	  never	  managed	   to	   threaten	   the	  dominant	  market	  position	  of	  Polish	  dairies:	  not	  only	  was	  there	  a	  strong	  developmental	  coalition	  in	  place	  between	  the	  state	  and	  cooperatives,	  which	  strengthened	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  domestically	  owned	  dairies,	  but	  –	  as	  discussed	  below	  –	  establishing	  a	  stable	  supplier	  base	  proved	  very	  costly.	  By	  contrast,	  domestic	  cooperatives	  de	  facto	  enjoyed	  a	  guaranteed	  access	  to	  an	  extensive	  supplier	   base	   via	   their	   own	   membership.	   However,	   this	   doesn’t	   mean	   that	   foreign	  investors	  didn’t	  try	  to	  penetrate	  the	  Polish	  market,	  only	  that	  they	  specialized	  in	  specific,	  high	  value	  added	  market	  segments.	  Among	  MNCs,	  only	  Danone	  is	  a	  major	  player	  in	  the	  overall	  dairy	  market	  with	  a	  market	  share	  of	  6%	  (similar	  to	  Lowicz)	  (Janiuk,	  2014),	  while	  the	   rest	   of	   foreign	   firms	   specialize	   in	   a	   very	   restricted	   range	   of	   high	   value	   added	  products.	   FDI	   penetration	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	   was	   initially	   motivated	   by	   domestic	  demand	   rather	   than	   using	   Poland	   as	   a	   stepping-­‐stone	   to	   re-­‐importing	   towards	   EU15	  markets	   –	   a	   fact	   which	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   import	   tariffs	   in	   place	   at	   the	   time,	  transportation	  costs	  and	  pre-­‐existing	  subsidiaries	  in	  Western	  Europe	  (Zinsou,	  1997).	  	  A	  common	  strategy	  for	  MNCs	  was	  to	  begin	  prospection	  by	  testing	  local	  demand	  for	  their	  products:	   instead	   of	   investing	   directly	   in	   purchasing	   processing	   facilities,	  many	  MNCs	  initially	   functioned	   as	   importers,	   often	   building	   joint-­‐stock	   companies	   with	   a	   Polish	  partner,	  which	  meant	   a	   three	   year	   tax	   exemption	   Danone	   for	   instance	   set	   up	   a	   joint-­‐stock	   company	   in	   1990	   in	   Wola,	   near	   Warsaw,	   which	   was	   only	   importing	   finished	  products	   from	   France	   until	   1992.	   Similarly,	   German	   dairy	   Zott	   set	   up	   a	   distribution	  center	   in	   Wroclaw	   in	   1992	   for	   yoghurts	   imported	   from	   Germany	   (Ricard,	   2010).	  	  Another	   German	   dairy	   firm,	   Hochland,	   adopted	   the	   most	   aggressive	   strategy:	   it	   had	  begun	   selling	   imported	   cheese	   from	  Germany	   as	   early	   as	   1989	  which	   it	  would	   sell	   in	  their	  original	  German	  packaging	  as	  a	  means	  to	  exploit	  the	  appeal	  of	  Western	  products.	  However,	  its	  marketing	  strategy	  proved	  too	  successful	  as	  it	  raised	  concern	  among	  Polish	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cooperatives,	   which	   successfully	   lobbied	   the	   state	   to	   raise	   import	   duties	   on	   cheese.	  Hochland	   reacted	   by	   selling	   at	   a	   loss	   until	   demand	   for	   its	   brands	   would	   be	   secured.	  However,	   it	   became	   clear	   for	   MNCs	   after	   1992	   that	   if	   they	   wanted	   to	   remain	   on	   the	  Polish	   market	   and	   continue	   supplying	   the	   demand	   they	   had	   established	   via	   their	  importing	  operations,	  only	  local	  processing	  facilities	  could	  help	  them	  overcome	  import	  duties	  and	  the	  ire	  of	  domestic	  producers	  (Ricard,	  2010).	  	  Danone	  thus	  began	  producing	  locally	   in	   1992,	   Hochland	   bought	   and	   modernized	   an	   old	   cheese	   processing	   plant	   in	  Kazmierz	   in	   1995	   and	   Zott	   bought	   a	   processing	   plant	   in	   Opole	   (Southern	   Poland)	   in	  1999.	  Other	  MNCs	  also	   invested	   in	   local	  production	   facilities	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	  such	  as	  French	   Bongrain	   and	   Lactalis:	   Bongrain	   bought	   a	   processing	   facility	   near	   Warsaw	   in	  Kierniewice	   and	   another	   one	   near	   Gdansk	   in	   Paslek,	   while	   Lactalis	   (owner	   of	   the	  President	   brand	   of	   butter	   and	   cheese)	   acquired	   a	   limited	   liability	   cheese	   processor,	  Polser	  in	  1996.	  Although	  these	  firms	  have	  remained	  on	  the	  Polish	  market,	  the	  challenges	  often	   proved	   bigger	   than	   expected	   for	   other	   foreign	   investors:	   	   integrating	   local	  production	   capacities	   that	   lagged	   behind	   in	   technology	   and	   were	   (initially	   at	   least)	  utterly	  incapable	  of	  adapting	  to	  modern	  supply	  chains	  and	  food	  standards	  proved	  costly.	  For	   instance,	   the	   quality	   of	   fresh	   milk	   among	   its	   suppliers	   was	   so	   bad	   that	   Danone	  resorted	  to	  supplying	  its	   farmers	  with	  animal	  feed	  which	  it	   imported	  itself	   from	  Dutch	  company	   Provimi	   (Ricard,	   2010;	   Zinsou,	   1997).	   This	   sort	   of	   technical	   setback	   proved	  overwhelming	   for	   a	   number	   of	  MNCs	   that	  were	   not	   prepared	   to	   tackle	   organizational	  problems	  among	  undercapitalized	  small	   farmers	  operating	  with	  obsolete	   technologies.	  After	  initial	  exploratory	  investments,	  a	  wave	  of	  MNCs	  left	  Poland	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s:	  Friesland	   left	   in	   1998,	   Nestlé	   in	   2003,	   Campina	   and	   Avonmore	   in	   2004.	   This	   also	  corresponds	  to	  the	  period	  when	  the	  same	  MNCs	  progressively	  left	  the	  Hungarian	  market	  (later	  followed	  by	  a	  subsequent	  wave	  of	  departures	  in	  2013-­‐2015):	  in	  Poland	  however	  this	  wave	  of	  market	  exit	  didn’t	  have	  dramatic	  consequences	  on	  the	  sector’s	  organization	  and	  viability	  since	  MNCs	  had	  never	  represented	  but	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  dairy	  processing.	  	  	  MNCs	  that	  remained	  in	  Poland	  were	  those	  that	  successfully	  surmounted	  their	  suppliers’	  backward	  technology	  and	  undercapitalization:	  while	  the	  present	  thesis	  rejects	  the	  claim	  that	  FDI	  was	  the	  crucial	  factor	  behind	  the	  competitive	  modernization	  of	  Polish	  dairy	  as	  argued	   by	   Swinnen	   et	   al.,	   the	  work	   of	   these	   authors	   nonetheless	   points	   at	   important	  investments	   on	   the	   part	   of	   MNCs	   directed	   at	   improving	   the	   capacities	   of	   their	   own	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suppliers94.	  Overall,	  successful	  strategies	  among	  MNCs	  that	  remained	  -­‐	  such	  as	  Danone,	  Zott,	  Hochland,	  Bongrain	  and	  Lactalis	   	   -­‐	   rested	  with	  a	   specialization	   in	  niche	  products	  such	   as	   premium	   cheese	   and	   yoghurt	   drinks:	   MNCs	   couldn’t	   outcompete	   domestic	  dairies	  that	  benefited	  from	  an	  extensive	  supplier	  base	  as	  production	  and	  processing	  are	  strongly	  integrated	  in	  cooperatives.	  While	  big	  domestically	  owned	  cooperatives	  regroup	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  farmers-­‐producers,	  MNCs	  are	  directly	  confronted	  with	  the	  problem	  of	   land	   tenure	   fragmentation:	   in	   2008,	   87%	   of	   dairy	   farms	   still	   had	   below	   ten	   cows	  (Bryla	  &	  Domanski,	   2012).	   Given	   the	   high	   costs	   involved	   in	   stabilizing	   even	   a	   smaller	  technologically	  backward	  supplier	  base,	  MNCs	  couldn’t	  establish	  vast	  supplier	  networks	  the	  likes	  of	  which	  Mlekpol	  or	  Mlekovita	  could	  rely	  on:	  thus,	  MNCs	  couldn’t	  outcompete	  domestic	   dairies	   on	   volumes.	   However,	   MNCs’	   competitiveness	   lay	   with	   substantially	  easier	  access	  to	  financial	  capital	  and	  technologies	  than	  their	  domestic	  competitors:	  these	  assets	  could	  be	  efficiently	  exploited	  in	  high	  value	  added	  market	  segments.	  	  	  This	  in	  turn	  creates	  challenges	  for	  smaller	  Polish	  dairy	  processors.	  If	  Lowicz	  exemplified	  the	   competitive	   challenges	   for	   medium	   sized	   domestic	   processors	   that	   pursue	   an	  inward-­‐oriented	  strategy	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  products,	  a	  recent	  case	  study	  by	  Domanski	  and	  Bryla	  (2012)	  focusing	  on	  Bakoma	  illustrates	  the	  difficulties	  of	  smaller	  Polish	  dairies	  that	  specialize	  in	  premium	  products:	  a	  market	  segment	  where	  MNCs	  are	  tough	  rivals	  to	  beat.	  Bakoma	  is	  an	  atypical	  Polish	  dairy.	  It	  was	  set	  up	  in	  1989	  as	  a	  joint-­‐stock	  company	  between	  Polish	  engineer	  Zbigniew	  Komorowski	  and	  an	  American	  businessman	  of	  Polish	  descent,	   Edward	  Mazur,	  who	   had	   been	  working	   as	   a	  marketing	   representative	   for	   US	  firms	   in	   Socialist	   Poland	   since	   the	   1970s.	   Mazur	   contributed	   with	   capital	   and	  connections	  to	  US-­‐	  and	  EU15	  early	  foreign	  investors,	  while	  Komorowski	  provided	  land	  and	   infrastructure.	   Bakoma	   specifically	   targeted	   the	   yoghurt	   segment	   from	   the	  beginning	   and	   entered	   a	   five-­‐year	   licensing	   agreement	   with	   German	   dairy	   company	  Onken	   in	  1992,	  which	  provided	  the	  technological	  know-­‐how	  for	   introducing	  a	  modern	  line	   of	   products.	   In	   1998,	   the	   company	   was	   introduced	   on	   the	   stock	   exchange	   while	  Mazur	   sold	  his	   shares	   to	  Danone	   the	   following	  year95.	   Initially,	  Bakoma	  proved	  highly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Typically,	   MNCs	  would	   guarantee	   collateral	   for	   loans	   contracted	   by	   their	   suppliers	   from	   commercial	  banks	  (Dries	  &	  Swinnen,	  2005).	  	  95	  As	  Domanski	   and	  Bryla	   (2012)	   single	   it	   out,	  Danone’s	  decision	  was	  partly	  motivated	  by	   the	  desire	   to	  control	  a	  potential	  competitor:	  which	  explains	  why	  the	  dairy	  giant	  would	  accept	  only	  18%	  of	  votes	  at	  the	  Board	  whereas	  it	  came	  to	  control	  52%	  of	  Bakoma’s	  shares.	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successful	  in	  the	  premium	  yoghurt	  segment	  with	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  firms,	  however,	  it	  became	   clear	   by	   the	   2000s	   that	   unlike	   low	   value	   added	   products	   where	   advertising	  plays	  a	   lesser	  role,	   financial	  success	  depends	  on	  marketing	  for	  this	  range	  of	  products	  -­‐	  which	  necessitates	  substantial	  investments.	  And	  here	  the	  financial	  advantages	  of	  MNCs	  re-­‐asserted	  themselves.	  Although	  Danone,	  Zott	  and	  Bakoma	  jointly	  control	  80%	  of	  sales	  in	   the	   premium	   yoghurt	   category,	   differences	   in	   marketing	   expenses	   are	   substantial:	  while	  Bakoma	   spent	   18	  million	  PLN	  on	   advertising	   in	   2008,	  Danone	   could	   afford	  160	  million	  PLN	  and	  Zott	  30	  million	  PLN.	   In	  parallel,	  Bakoma	  started	   to	   lose	  ground	   to	   its	  MNC	  competitors:	  in	  2001,	  Bakoma	  had	  a	  market	  share	  of	  18%	  in	  the	  premium	  yoghurt	  segment,	  Danone	  28%	  and	  Zott	   19%.	  By	  2008,	  Danone	   increased	   its	   position	   to	  40%,	  Zott	   to	   23%,	   while	   Bakoma’s	   position	   decreased	   to	   14%	   (Bryla	   &	   Domanski,	   2012,	  p.631).	  Furthermore,	  there	  has	  been	  speculation	  over	  German	  dairy	  giant	  Müller’s	  plans	  to	   enter	   the	   Polish	   market	   precisely	   in	   the	   same	   product	   category	   –	   which	   would	  undoubtedly	  accelerate	  Bakoma’s	  marginalization	  even	  further.	  	  	  Bakoma’s	   trajectory	   cannot	   be	   generalized:	   the	   choice	   to	   specialize	   in	   a	   small	  market	  segment	   is	   not	   necessarily	   a	   bad	   option	   for	   medium	   dairy	   processors.	   Piatnica	   for	  instance	   is	   a	   domestic	   cooperative,	   which	   specialized	   entirely	   in	   cottage	   cheese:	   its	  exports	  are	  minimal	  (4%)	  but	  it	  controls	  60%	  of	  the	  domestic	  market	  in	  this	  category96.	  However,	   Bakoma’s	   dilemma	   represents	   a	   real	   problem	   for	   smaller	   domestic	   dairy	  processors,	   which	   can’t	   compete	   with	   giants	   on	   volumes	   and	   choose	   to	   specialize	   in	  more	  lucrative	  market	  niches:	  in	  these	  segments,	  the	  stronger	  financialization	  of	  MNCs	  represents	  a	  strong	  competitive	  challenge.	  	  
A	  brief	  note	  on	  different	  constraints	  and	  benefits	  for	  domestic	  firms	  	  A	   brief	   overview	   of	   different	   firm-­‐level	   strategies	   shows	   that	   the	   clear	  winners	   of	   re-­‐structuring	  were	  the	  biggest	  domestic	  dairy	  cooperatives,	  which	  could	  efficiently	  exploit	  a	  vast	  supplier	  base,	  directly	  integrated	  to	  a	  network	  of	  processing	  plants.	  Concentration	  in	   the	   Polish	   sector	   is	   still	   underway:	   there	   is	   every	   reason	   to	   expect	   flagship	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96Source:	  	  http://www.portalspozywczy.pl/mleko/wiadomosci/osm-­‐piatnica-­‐produkuje-­‐dla-­‐biedronki,23007.html	  	  	  accessed:	  01/06/2015	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cooperatives	   to	   continue	   their	   domestic	   expansion	   strategies	   by	   buying	   out	   smaller	  cooperatives	   and	   private	   processors	   –	   and	   there	   are	   equally	   strong	   reasons	   to	   expect	  mergers	  between	  the	  biggest	  Polish	  cooperatives,	  which	  would	  create	  new	  giants	  on	  the	  EU	  market.	   The	   prospects	   of	   smaller	   domestic	   cooperatives	   are	  more	   problematic:	   as	  Lowicz	   illustrates	   it,	   competing	   with	   the	   big	   players	   in	   volumes	   proves	   increasingly	  difficult:	  even	  if	  food	  safety	  standard	  compliance	  is	  achieved,	  lower	  quality	  products	  can	  result	   in	   a	   loss	  of	  distribution	   channels.	  An	  alternative	   strategy	  –	   specializing	   in	  more	  lucrative	  market	  segments	  instead	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  products	  –	  is	  equally	  challenging	  as	  outcompeting	   MNCs	   on	   marketing	   strategies,	   financialization	   or	   RD	   is	   difficult	   for	  domestic	  dairies.	  This	  point	  also	  illustrates	  the	  argument	  presented	  in	  the	  first	  chapter:	  the	  higher	  the	  technology	  content	  of	  an	  industrial	  sector	  (or	  even	  a	  range	  of	  products	  in	  this	  case),	   the	  more	  patent	  are	   the	  disadvantages	  of	   late-­‐industrializers,	  where	  a	   long-­‐term	  scarcity	  of	  financial	  and	  human	  capital	  put	  a	  limit	  on	  innovation	  feedback	  loops.	  	  	  
Conclusion:	  the	  co-­‐production	  of	  developmental	  upgrading	  in	  an	  autonomist	  model	  	  The	   developmental	   outcomes	   in	   terms	   of	   economic	   competitive	   upgrading	   and	  inclusiveness	  for	  domestic	  private	  actors	  in	  the	  transition	  period	  paints	  a	  fundamentally	  different	   picture	   compared	   to	  Hungary:	   Surprisingly,	   the	   Polish	   dairy	   sector	   began	   its	  post-­‐Socialist	   journey	   under	   worse	   conditions	   and	   facing	   deeper	   structural	   problems	  than	   its	  Hungarian	  counterpart.	   	  Agricultural	   land	  and	  thus	   the	  production	  segment	  of	  the	  dairy	  supply	  chain	  had	  been	  traditionally	  extremely	  fragmented,	  while	  the	  quality	  of	  fresh	   milk	   and	   the	   international	   competitiveness	   of	   processed	   dairy	   goods	   was	  extremely	   weak	   in	   1989.	   In	   spite	   of	   these	   structural	   difficulties,	   Poland	   became	   the	  world’s	  13th	  biggest	  dairy	  exporter	  in	  25	  years	  and	  the	  dairy	  sector	  can	  arguably	  called	  one	   of	   the	   clearest	   winners	   of	   EU	   accession.	   Just	   as	   importantly	   for	   our	   theoretical	  framework,	   the	   dairy	   sector	   is	   still	   controlled	   primarily	   by	   domestically	   owned	  cooperatives.	  	  	  This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  explain	  such	  a	  radical	  reversal	  of	  fortunes:	  long-­‐term	   historical-­‐institutional	   legacies	   had	   created	   stronger	   resources	   for	  cooperatives	   to	   fight	   for	   their	   survival	   at	   the	   onset	   of	   transition.	   Polish	   dairy	  cooperatives	  showed	  that	  as	  they	  had	  resisted	  nationalization	  in	  the	  1950s,	  they	  would	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also	  resist	  re-­‐privatization	  after	  1989:	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  state	  never	  managed	  to	  get	   full	  ownership	  of	  productive	  assets	   in	  the	  sector	  during	  the	  Socialist	  era	  also	  hindered	  the	  capacity	   of	   the	  most	   radical	   reformists	   in	   the	   Balcerowicz	   administration	   to	   follow	   a	  Hungarian	   model	   by	   selling	   off	   these	   assets	   to	   foreign	   investors.	   In	   that	   regard,	   FDI	  penetration	  was	   checked	   by	   long-­‐term	   historical	   legacies.	   Nonetheless,	   the	   success	   of	  Polish	   restructuring	   was	   far	   from	   predictable	   in	   1989:	   even	   if	   re-­‐privatization	   was	  avoided,	   the	   sector	   needed	   tremendous	   investments,	   which	   neither	   the	   state	   nor	   the	  commercial	   banking	   sector	   could	   finance.	   The	   determining	   feature	   of	   successful	  competitive	  upgrading	  rested	  with	  the	  coordinative	  role	  of	  the	  state,	  which	  learned	  how	  to	  pool	  foreign	  capital	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  creditors	  and	  aid	  providers	  and	  which	  coopted	  cooperatives	  in	  designing	  a	  developmental	  agenda	  for	  modernizing	  domestic	  capacities.	  In	   that	   sense,	   Poland	   illustrates	   the	   successful	   co-­‐evolution	   of	   private	   and	   public	  capacities,	   which	   co-­‐produced	   developmental	   upgrading.	   This	   pathway	   also	  corroborates	   Hirschman’s	   insights	   as	   well	   as	   later	   institutionalist	   approaches	   to	  economic	   development:	   a	   scarcity	   of	   resources	   is	   one	   thing,	  what	  matters	   however	   is	  how	  public	  and	  private	  actors	  coordinate	  and	  recombine	  (scarce)	  resources.	  	  	  The	   Polish	   sector’s	   trajectory	   also	   questions	   a	   fundamental	   axiom	   of	   post-­‐Communist	  transition	   in	   CEE,	   namely	   the	   alleged	   necessity	   for	   dismantling	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	  industrial	  capacities	  inherited	  from	  state	  Socialism:	  throughout	  the	  1990s,	  the	  dominant	  opinion	  in	  CEE	  was	  that	  Socialist	  firms	  and	  conglomerates	  were	  simply	  too	  outdated	  and	  too	  unproductive	  to	  survive	  under	  the	  conditions	  of	  open	  markets.	  Poland’s	  dairy	  sector	  shows	   on	   the	   contrary	   that	   with	   dedicated	   public	   assistance,	   even	   an	   objectively	  uncompetitive	  sector	  could	  not	  only	  be	  saved	  but	  even	  transformed	  into	  a	  free	  market	  champion	  that	  went	  on	  to	  flood	  export	  markets,	  once	  it	  had	  been	  upgraded	  sufficiently	  and	  after	  the	  political	  barrage	  to	  it	  accessing	  foreign	  export	  markets	  was	  removed.	  	  Finally,	   it	   is	   also	   worth	   emphasizing	   the	   functional	   role	   played	   by	   the	   long	   decade	  between	  1989	  and	  EU	  accession	  in	  2004.	  Although	  the	  promise	  of	   full	  EU	  membership	  was	   continuously	   delayed	   throughout	   the	   1990s	   frustrating	   CEE	   voters	   and	   elected	  officials,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  that	  this	  long	  waiting	  period	  in	  the	  EU’s	  antechamber	  could	   also	   serve	   a	   highly	   positive	   developmental	   role	   for	   specific	   sectors.	   In	   Poland’s	  case,	  this	  transitory	  period	  allowed	  the	  state	  to	  use	  support	  mechanisms	  that	  would	  be	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later	   banned	   inside	   the	   EU’s	   common	  market	   such	   as	   import	   duties	   and	   a	   variety	   of	  subsidies,	   in	   conjunction	   with	   modernization	   investment	   programs	   financed	   from	  bilateral	   aid,	   EU	   pre-­‐accession	   funds	   and	   even	   the	  World	   Bank’s	   adjustment	   loans.	   In	  other	  words,	  the	  pre-­‐accession	  phase	  functionally	  offered	  a	  place	  for	  nurturing	  an	  infant	  industry	  in	  a	  relatively	  protected	  environment:	  a	  strategy	  which	  early	  industrializers	  in	  the	  West	  also	  utilized	  before	  conquering	  foreign	  markets.	  	  	   	  
	  	   200	  
	   	  
	  	   201	  
Chapter	  5	  	  	  
Part	  1.	  An	  overview	  of	  diverging	  developmental	  pathways	  in	  the	  Hungarian	  and	  
Polish	  dairy	  sectors	  	  	  
Hungary:	  From	  failed	  integrationism	  in	  the	  1990s	  to	  re-­‐domestication	  in	  the	  2000s	  	  Hungarian	   dairy’s	   form	   of	   post-­‐Communist	   restructuring	   and	   integration	   to	  transnational	  markets	  occurred	  through	  MNCs	  that	  rapidly	  went	  on	  to	  control	  the	  entire	  sector	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  domestic	  and	  export	  market	  shares,	  but	  in	  the	  form	  of	  direct	  ownership	  over	  productive	  assets.	  This	  period	  was	  marked	  by	  an	  apparent	  laissez-­‐faire	  attitude	  on	  the	  part	  of	  public	  authorities:	  intervention	  on	  the	  market	  was	  minimal	  after	  the	   state	   had	   overseen	   the	   transfer	   of	   property	   rights	   to	   foreign	   investors	   during	   the	  privatization	   phase,	   which	   was	  mostly	   complete	   in	   processing	   and	   retail	   by	   the	  mid-­‐1990s.	   	   We	   have	   shown	   in	   the	   second	   chapter	   that	   a	   vast	   literature	   on	   competitive	  upgrading	  would	  expect	  MNCs	  to	  play	  a	  highly	  positive	  role	  by	  compensating	  for	  a	  lack	  of	  capital	  and	  technology,	  which	  neither	  the	  state,	  nor	  domestic	  firms	  possess.	  However,	  in	  the	  Hungarian	  case,	  in	  spite	  of	  these	  theoretically	  grounded	  hypotheses	  for	  expecting	  economic	  upgrading,	   the	   transfer	  of	   ownership	   rights	   to	  MNCs	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  gradual	   competitive	  collapse	  of	   the	  sector,	  a	  breakdown	  of	  vertical	   coordination	  along	  the	   supply	   chain	   and	   a	   strongly	   exclusionary	   process,	   which	   forced	   farmers	   and	  domestically	  owned	  processors	  out	  of	  the	  market.	  	  	  In	  a	  second	  period,	  which	  began	  at	   the	  very	  end	  of	   the	  1990s,	  MNCs	   in	   the	  processing	  segment	  gradually	  began	   leaving	   the	  domestic	  market.	  This	  process	  was	  reinforced	  by	  the	  minority	  of	  domestically	  owned	  processors,	  which	  enlisted	  the	  state	  to	  play	  a	  more	  proactive	   role	   in	   regulating	   the	   sector	   in	   countervailing	   the	   buyer	   power	   of	   MNCs.	  During	   the	   2000s,	   a	   process	   of	   re-­‐domestication	   thus	   took	   place,	   where	   the	   formerly	  foreign-­‐owned	  processing	  sector	  was	  gradually	  bought	  back	  by	  a	  small	  pool	  of	  domestic	  actors	   –	   specifically	   the	   agri-­‐food	   empire	   of	   a	   billionaire	   tycoon	   and	   a	   newly	   created	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cooperative	   of	   market-­‐savvy	   producers.	   In	   parallel,	   the	   state	   enforced	   a	   series	   of	  increasingly	   adversarial	   regulations	   not	   only	   limiting	   the	   buyer	   power	   but	   also	   the	  market	  share	  of	  MNCs	  in	  the	  retail	  segment.	  This	  second	  period	  is	  in	  turn	  marked	  by	  a	  slow	  recovery	  in	  the	  value	  added	  content	  and	  trade	  competitiveness	  of	  Hungarian	  dairy	  products	   although	   farmers	   are	   still	   marginalized,	   even	   when	   their	   plight	   legitimizes	  regulatory	   action:	   farmers	   remain	   largely	   fragmented,	   without	   a	   secure	   access	   to	  investment	   capital	   which	   could	   guarantee	   them	   a	   stable	   position	   as	   suppliers	   to	  processors	  and	  supermarket	  chains.	  	  	  
Poland:	  the	  unforeseen	  successes	  of	  an	  autonomist	  developmental	  strategy	  	  The	   Polish	   trajectory	   offers	   a	   stark	   contrast,	   as	   both	   the	   mode	   of	   transnational	  integration	  of	   the	  sector,	   the	  developmental	  outcomes	  thereof	  –	  as	  well	  as	   the	  method	  and	   timing	   of	   public	   intervention	   –	   were	   almost	   symmetrically	   opposite	   to	   the	  Hungarian	  pathway.	  	  In	  the	  Polish	  case,	  the	  1990s	  were	  marked	  by	  a	  different	  form	  of	  restructuring:	  instead	  of	  relying	  on	  FDI	  and	  foreign	  ownership	  for	  engineering	  competitive	  upgrading,	  public	  interventionism	   played	   a	   crucial	   role.	   The	   state	   offered	   a	   legal	   safeguard	   to	   the	  cooperative	  form	  of	  ownership,	  it	  authorized	  the	  renaissance	  of	  cooperative	  unions	  and	  it	  coopted	  dairy	  cooperatives	  as	  co-­‐managers	  in	  an	  ambitious	  modernization	  plan,	  which	  spanned	   over	   fifteen	   years.	   The	   consolidation	   of	   this	   alliance	   also	   necessitated	   strong	  social	   capital	   and	   mobilizational	   resources	   among	   dairy	   farmers,	   who	   fought	   for	  organizational	  continuity	  in	  the	  sector.	  One	  consequence	  was	  that	  the	  cooperative	  form	  of	   production	   remained	   the	   defining	   organizational	   model	   of	   vertical	   coordination	  where	   producers	   (farmers)	   and	   processors	  were	   integrated	   in	   a	   single	   structure.	   The	  second	   consequence	   was	   that	   MNCs	   never	   managed	   to	   fundamentally	   challenge	   the	  market	  share	  of	  domestically	  owned	  dairy	  cooperatives	  neither	  on	  the	  domestic-­‐	  nor	  on	  export	   markets:	   The	   Polish	   state	   not	   only	   blocked	   dairy	   cooperatives	   from	   being	  privatized	   to	  MNCs	  but	   it	   also	  bailed	   them	  out	  when	   financial	  bankruptcy	  would	  have	  forced	   them	   to	   seek	   foreign	   investors.	   The	   starting	   conditions	   for	   the	   sector’s	  restructuring	   were	   mired	   by	   deep	   structural	   problems:	   land	   tenure	   and	   dairy	  production	  had	  been	  historically	  fragmented	  in	  Poland	  since	  the	  mid	  20th	  century,	  which	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made	  milk	   collection	   and	   processing	   challenging	   even	  within	   a	   cooperative	   format	   in	  light	  of	  heavy	  transaction	  costs.	  Technology	  was	  severely	  outdated:	  the	  genetic	  stock	  of	  the	  herd,	  as	  well	  as	  extremely	  restricted	  access	  to	  capital	  among	  farmers	  translated	  into	  low	  value	  added	  products,	  extremely	  low	  productivity	  and	  an	  incapacity	  to	  comply	  with	  basic	  modern	  quality	  and	  food	  safety	  standards	  –	  thus	  also	  limiting	  the	  export	  markets	  where	  Polish	  products	  could	  be	  sold.	  In	  spite	  of	  these	  fundamental	  problems,	  the	  Polish	  state	  utilized	  a	  variety	  of	  capital	  sources	  from	  foreign	  actors	  –	  bi-­‐lateral	  aid,	  adjustment	  loans	  by	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  EU’s	  pre-­‐accession	  funds	  –	  to	  invest	  massively	   in	   the	   competitive	   upgrading	   of	   dairy	   production	   and	   processing.	   The	   first	  challenge	  –	  providing	  the	  necessary	  capital	  for	  investing	  in	  the	  sector’s	  modernization	  –	  was	   thus	   efficiently	   overcome	   by	   the	   state,	   which	   utilized	   all	   its	   available	   sources	   of	  foreign	   capital.	   A	   second	   challenge,	   which	   Polish	   public	   actors	   had	   to	   overcome	  necessitated	   upgrading	   the	   state’s	   own	   administrative	   and	   regulatory	   capacity	   for	  overseeing	  this	  program	  of	  modernization.	  New	  institutions	  –	  public	  regulatory	  agencies	  specialized	   in	   agri-­‐food	   and	  dairy	   in	   particular,	   veterinary	   inspectorates,	   public	   credit	  agencies	  –	  alongside	  coherent	   long-­‐term	  developmental	  planning	  had	  to	  be	  set	  up	  and	  learnt.	  The	  Polish	  state	  proved	  highly	  efficient	  in	  utilizing	  the	  opportunities	  afforded	  by	  technical	  assistance,	  which	  the	  EU’s	  gravitational	  pull	  afforded	  during	  the	  pre-­‐accession	  phase	   for	   learning	   how	   to	   set	   up	   and	   coordinate	   public	   bureaucracies,	   which	   could	  coordinate	   various	   actors,	   mobilize	   resources	   and	   monitor	   the	   implementation	   of	  specific	  policies.	  These	  efforts	  were	  sustained	  throughout	  the	  1990s	  by	  a	  stable	  coalition	  between	  the	  state	  and	  domestic	  dairy	  cooperatives,	  which	  became	  co-­‐managers	  in	  their	  own	   modernization.	   As	   such,	   one	   can	   speak	   of	   a	   co-­‐evolution	   of	   public	   and	   private	  capacities	   in	   Poland,	   where	   development	   was	   ultimately	   co-­‐produced	   by	   a	  developmental	   alliance	   in	   line	   with	   the	   definition	   provided	   by	   Elinor	   Ostrom:	  “coproduction	  is	  a	  process	  through	  which	  inputs	  from	  individuals	  who	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  
organization	  are	  transformed	  into	  goods	  and	  services”	  (Ostrom,	  1997).	  As	  such,	  economic	  development	   –	   understood	   as	   an	   increase	   in	   competitive	   positions	   and	   an	   inclusive	  distribution	  of	  profits	  for	  domestic	  actors	  –	  can	  arguably	  be	  called	  a	  co-­‐produced	  public	  good	  in	  Poland.	  By	  the	  time	  the	  country	  joined	  the	  EU,	  this	  strategy	  paid	  off:	  Poland	  had	  managed	   to	   upgrade	   standard	   compliance	   and	   the	   financial	   viability	   of	   dairy	  cooperatives	   to	   a	   point	   where	   they	   could	   efficiently	   “withstand	   the	   competitive	  pressure”	  of	  an	  open	  market.	  In	  fact,	  not	  only	  did	  Polish	  dairy	  cooperatives	  survive,	  but	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after	  they	  were	  given	  full	  access	  to	  the	  EU’s	  market,	  the	  Polish	  dairy	  sector	  became	  one	  of	   the	   world’s	   foremost	   exporters	   within	   a	   decade.	   Once	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   the	  sector	  had	  been	  upgraded	  to	  a	  sufficient	  level,	  the	  Polish	  state	  gradually	  retreated	  from	  market	   interventionism:	   after	   2004,	   it	   refrained	   from	   experimenting	   with	   new,	  “creative”	  forms	  of	  regulatory	  support	  or	  state	  aid	  like	  Hungary.	  In	  fact	  by	  2012,	  when	  the	   EU	   Commission	   proposed	   new	   regulatory	   tools	   for	   strengthening	   the	   bargaining	  power	   of	   domestic	   producers	   vis	   a	   vis	   MNCs,	   and	   incentivized	   the	   creation	   of	   new	  sector-­‐level	   institutions	   of	   multi-­‐stakeholder	   representation	   and	   coordination	   –	   the	  Polish	   state	   as	  well	   as	   Polish	   dairy	   cooperatives	   considered	   these	   instruments	   largely	  superfluous.	  	  	  
Part	  2.	  Explaining	  the	  puzzle	  	  	  
How	  Polish	  and	  Hungarian	  Dairy	  Sectors	  Diverged:	  differentiated	  public	  policies	  	  	  
Different	  public	  policy	  answers	  to	  the	  structural	  lack	  of	  capital	  	  Different	   policy	   choices	   for	   solving	   the	   question	   of	   access	   to	   capital	   (and	   to	   a	   lesser	  extent	  technology)	  contributed	  to	  entrenching	  diverging	  modes	  of	  transnationalization.	  Contrary	   to	   late-­‐industrializers	   in	   the	  Global	  South	   in	  previous	  periods,	   the	   sources	  of	  foreign	   capital	  were	   substantially	   reduced	   for	   Poland	   and	  Hungary:	   unlike	   South	   East	  Asian	   economies,	   they	   couldn’t	   count	   on	   foreign	   creditors	   to	   continue	   financing	   their	  budgets	  as	  they	  had	  already	  been	  entangled	  in	  a	  debt	  crisis	  by	  the	  early	  1990s.	   In	  this	  situation,	   the	   available	   sources	   of	   foreign	   capital	  would	   take	   on	   different	   shapes:	   IFIs	  and	  the	  EU’s	  financial	  transfers	  were	  initially	  the	  only	  sources	  on	  which	  the	  state	  could	  count.	   Surprisingly,	   Poland	   even	  utilized	   a	   structural	   adjustment	   loan	   from	   the	  World	  Bank	   called	   ASAL	   for	   saving	   domestic	   dairy	   cooperatives	   from	   bankruptcy.	   Later,	   the	  Polish	   state	   built	   a	   complex	   institutional	   framework	   for	   pooling	   domestic	   and	   foreign	  capital,	   and	   channeled	   it	   specifically	   for	   the	   investment	   needs	   of	   domestic	   agri-­‐food	  firms	  (among	  which	  dairy):	  newly	  created	  public	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Agricultural	  Modernization	   Agency	   (ARMA)	   and	   the	   Foundation	   of	   Assistance	   Programs	   for	  Agriculture	   (FAPA)	   were	   tasked	   with	   coordinating	   foreign	   capital	   accessed	   from	   the	  World	  Bank,	  bilateral	  aid	  from	  Western	  Europe,	  and	  the	  EU’s	  early	  assistance	  programs.	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In	   a	   stark	   contrast,	   the	   Hungarian	   state	   solved	   the	   financial	   appetite	   for	   capital	  investments	   by	   privatizing	   domestic	   dairy	   processing	   firms	   and	   transferring	   them	   in	  bulk	  to	  MNCs.	  In	  other	  words,	  by	  selecting	  different	  methods	  for	  solving	  the	  problem	  of	  undercapitalization,	   Poland	   and	   Hungary	   also	   selected	   widely	   different	   modes	   of	  transnationalization	  for	  their	  sectors.	  The	  Polish	  strategy	  -­‐	  although	  relying	  on	  aid	  and	  structural	  adjustment	   loans	   instead	  of	  public	   foreign	  debt	  –	   in	  many	  ways	  mirrors	   the	  “traditional”,	  autonomist	  developmental	  strategy	  of	  20th	  century	  late	  industrializers.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  Hungarian	  strategy	  closely	  followed	  Amsden’s	  “integrationist”	  model	  –	  relying	  on	  MNCs	  for	  accessing	  financial	  capital	  and	  technology,	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  through	  horizontal	   and	   vertical	   spillovers,	   they	   would	   upgrade	   the	   sector’s	   overall	  competitiveness	   and	   domestic	   capacities.	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   Polish	   model	   fared	  substantially	  better	  both	  in	  upgrading	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  domestic	  dairy	  sector	  on	  transnational	  markets	  and	  in	  securing	  the	  position	  of	  domestic	  dairy	  producers	  and	  processors.	  	  	  
Different	  public	  policy	  choices	  for	  reforming	  property	  rights	  institutions	  	  The	   second,	   and	   largely	   related	  dimension	  where	  public	   agency	  proved	   crucial	   rested	  with	  the	  state’s	  ability	  to	  shape	  and	  reform	  property	  rights	  institutions.	  Poland	  chose	  to	  keep	  dairy	  cooperatives	  inherited	  from	  the	  Socialist	  era,	  where	  farmers-­‐producers	  also	  owned	   directly	   processing	   plants.	   The	   state	   enacted	   new	   legislation	   in	   1991,	   which	  enshrined	  dairy	  cooperative	  ownership	  as	  a	  legitimate	  form	  of	  private	  property	  in	  spite	  of	   pressures	   from	   creditors	   such	   as	   the	  World	   Bank	   to	   push	   privatization	   ahead	   and	  dismantle	   collective	   forms	   of	   ownership	   inherited	   from	   Socialism.	   In	   contrast,	   the	  Hungarian	  state	  restructured	  entirely	  both	  the	  production	  and	  the	  processing	  segment	  of	   its	   dairy	   industry:	   producer	   cooperatives	   were	   sacrificed	   on	   the	   altar	   of	   re-­‐privatization,	  which	   led	   to	  a	   fragmentation	  of	   agricultural	   land	  property.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  the	  state	  severed	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  ties	  between	  dairy	  processing	  plants	  and	  their	  local	   network	   of	   cooperative	   suppliers	   by	   transferring	   the	   ownership	   of	   processing	  plants	   to	   the	   State	   Asset	   Management	   Agency	   (AVU),	   which	   in	   turn	   was	   tasked	   with	  selling	   these	   assets,	   so	   that	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1990s,	   virtually	   the	   entire	   processing	  segment	   of	   the	   sector	   was	   foreign-­‐owned.	   Put	   differently,	   while	   the	   Polish	   state’s	  privatization	   agenda	   sanctified	   an	   inclusive	   form	   of	   domestic	   ownership	   in	   an	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institutional	   format	   where	   the	   production	   and	   processing	   segments	   were	   integrated	  within	  the	  same	  firms,	  the	  Hungarian	  state	  on	  the	  contrary	  dissociated	  production	  from	  processing:	   by	   fragmenting	   land	   ownership	   and	   encouraging	   a	   rapid	   transfer	   of	  ownership	   from	  domestic	  public	   to	   foreign	  private	  hands,	   the	  Hungarian	  privatization	  scheme	   created	   exclusionary	   property	   rights	   institutions	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	  domestic	  actors.	  This	  fundamental	  difference	  should	  naturally	  be	  put	  in	  light	  of	  different	  strategies	  at	  raising	  foreign	  capital	  for	  financing	  the	  investment	  needs	  of	  domestic	  dairy	  firms	  as	  we	  discussed	  previously.	  	  	  Polish	   autonomist	   developmentalism	   and	   Hungarian	   integrationism	   fared	   very	  differently:	  while	  the	  Polish	  strategy	  was	  able	  to	  overcome	  economic	  backwardness	  in	  a	  relatively	   inclusive	   way,	   the	   Hungarian	   pathway	   not	   only	   discriminated	   against	  domestic	  actors,	  but	  also	  largely	  failed	  at	  engineering	  upgrading.	  The	  Hungarian	  state’s	  later	  use	  of	  increasingly	  protectionist	  regulations	  against	  MNCs	  thus	  reads	  as	  an	  explicit	  recognition	   that	   the	   integrationist	   pathway	   proved	   to	   be	   a	   developmental	   failure.	  Nonetheless,	   regulatory	   activism	   remains	   a	   “low-­‐cost”	   developmental	   strategy,	   which	  still	   refrains	   from	   undertaking	   the	   costly	   investments	   that	   the	   Polish	   sector	   had	   long	  carried	  out.	  	  
Why	  the	  trajectories	  diverged:	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors’	  resources,	  organization	  and	  
linkages…and	  institutional	  legacies	  	  These	  policy	  choices	  didn’t	  occur	  in	  a	  vacuum:	  diverging	  public	  developmental	  policies	  merely	  reflected	  different	  combinations	  of	  the	  three	  core	  variables	  identified	  by	  Evans,	  namely	  (1)	  state	  capacities	  and	  the	  sector-­‐level	  organization	  of	  the	  state,	  (2)	  non-­‐state	  actors’	  capacities	  and	  their	  organization	  at	  the	  sector	  level,	  as	  well	  as	  (3)	  state-­‐non-­‐state	  relations	   between	   these	   two	   types	   of	   actors.	  What	   is	  more,	   in	   the	   second	   chapter	  we	  complemented	   these	   variables	   with	   the	   role	   of	   historical	   institutional	   legacies	   in	   the	  
longue-­‐durée	  as	  a	  scope	  condition	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  different	  developmental	  models.	  	  	  In	   Poland,	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   developmental	   coalition	   between	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	  actors	   was	   an	   outcome	   of	   a	   fundamentally	   different	   configuration	   between	   specific	  public	   administrations	   and	   farmers	   than	   in	   Hungary.	   In	   the	   former,	   the	   Ministry	   of	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Agriculture	  (soon	  followed	  with	  FAPA	  and	  ARMA)	  was	  the	  decisive	  public	  actor,	  which	  determined	   public	   policy	   in	   the	   restructuring	   phase.	   In	   Hungary	   on	   the	   contrary	   the	  divorce	  between	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  the	  Privatization	  Agency	   in	  charge	  of	   the	  processing	   sector	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Agriculture	   in	   charge	   of	  producers	   on	   the	   other	   –	   created	   a	   fragmented	   state	   apparatus,	   with	   competing	  interests.	  Furthermore	   in	  Poland,	   the	  emerging	  developmental	  coalition	  was	  sustained	  by	   farmers	   who	   could	   count	   on	   a	   stable	   and	   inclusive	   property	   right	   regime	   that	  strengthened	   their	   resources,	   while	   in	   Hungary,	   the	   fragmented	   state’s	   privatization	  agenda	   virtually	   cancelled	   out	   from	   the	   beginning	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   developmental	  coalition	   by	   dealing	   a	   fatal	   blow	   both	   to	   the	   economic	   interests	   and	   the	   political	  representation	   of	   farmers.	   It	   would	   take	   another	   two	   decades	   before	   some	   form	   of	  developmental	  alliance	  emerged	  between	  state	  and	  domestic	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  While	  in	  Poland	  development	  was	  co-­‐produced	  by	  the	  state	  and	  farmers,	   in	  Hungary	  the	  lack	  of	  internal	  coherence	  within	  the	  state	  soon	  translated	  into	  the	  sector’s	  own	  fragmentation.	  	  Importantly,	   different	   experiences	   of	   collectivization	   under	   Socialism	   proved	   to	   have	  long-­‐term	  effects:	  while	  Hungary	  managed	  to	  nationalize	  dairy	  cooperatives	  in	  1948,	  in	  Poland	   the	   state	   was	   forced	   to	   retrocede	   the	   ownership	   of	   processing	   plants	   to	  cooperatives	   in	  1957	   in	   the	   face	  of	   overwhelming	   resistance	   from	  society.	  Until	   1989,	  this	  difference	  was	  not	   fundamental,	   since	   the	  actual	   autonomy	  of	   cooperatives	  under	  state	   Socialism	   was	   still	   limited.	   However,	   differences	   in	   ownership	   became	   salient	  overnight	   in	   1989,	   when	   both	   states	   were	   tasked	   with	   solving	   their	   primary	  macroeconomic	   problem	   –	   managing	   foreign	   debt.	   The	   fact	   that	   a	   segment	   of	   the	  Hungarian	  state	  could	  dispose	  over	  these	  assets	  without	  resistance	  from	  farmers	  largely	  explains	  why	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  included	  dairy	  processing	  plants	  in	  the	  first	  group	  of	   state-­‐owned	   assets	   to	   be	   sold	   in	   1993.	   It	   has	   to	   be	  mentioned	   also	   that	   Hungary’s	  democratic	  governments	  prided	  themselves	  on	  repaying	  foreign	  debt	  contracted	  under	  Socialism,	   while	   Poland	   managed	   to	   secure	   a	   massive	   debt	   restructuring	   from	   its	  creditors.	   Whether	   that	   option	   would	   have	   been	   available	   to	   Hungary	   is	   another	  question,	  what	  remains	  is	  that	  the	  two	  successive	  debt	  forgiveness	  programs	  negotiated	  by	   Poland	   in	   1991	   and	   1994	   also	   eased	   the	   pressure	   on	   the	   state	   to	   fast-­‐track	  privatization	   at	   all	   costs:	   	   “In	   particular,	   while	   negotiated	   debt	   rescheduling	   and	   relief	  
initially	  offered	  Poland	  to	  consider	  a	  national	  capitalist	  path	  of	   transformation,	  Hungary	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barely	  had	  the	  same	  option	  and	  essentially	  adopted	  foreign-­‐led	  capitalism	  from	  the	  start.	  
(…)	   Thus,	   foreign	   debt	   and	   its	  management	   appeared	   among	   the	  main	   determinants	   of	  
Hungary’s	   strong	   export	   orientation	   and	   policy	   of	   privatization	   through	   massive	   direct	  
sales	  to	  foreigners.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  its	  reliable	  debtor	  status	  made	  Hungary	  an	  attractive	  
location	  for	  FDI”	  (Bohle	  &	  Greskovits,	  2012,	  p.143).	  	  	  However,	   we	   don’t	   embrace	   a	   deterministic	   view:	   developmental	   pathways	   and	  outcomes	   are	   not	   over-­‐determined	   by	   a	   fixed	   set	   of	   institutional	   determinants.	   The	  opportunity	  structure	  for	  public	  developmental	  agency	  is	  shaped	  in	  part	  by	  institutional	  legacies	   -­‐	   some	   obvious,	   others	   more	   paradoxical:	   who	   could	   have	   predicted	   that	   a	  deeper	  degree	  of	  Sovietization	  in	  Hungary	  would	  have	  given	  more	  ammunition	  precisely	  for	   disintegrating	   public	   and	   collective	   ownership	   after	   1989?	   Or	   conversely,	   that	   in	  Poland	  where	  cooperatives	  represented	  a	  form	  of	  resistance	  against	  state	  ownership	  in	  the	   1940s,	   they	   would	   be	   praised	   for	   their	   socially	   inclusive	   traits	   in	   free	   markets?	  Borrowing	   from	   the	  work	   of	   Orion	   A.	   Lewis	   and	   Sven	   Steinmo,	   (2012)	  we	   see	   public	  developmental	  agency	  and	  institutional	  legacies	  as	  co-­‐extensive	  evolutionary	  forms.	  	  	  The	   fact	   that	   in	   Poland	   the	   state	   did	   not	   directly	   own	   processing	   facilities	   certainly	  hindered	   disintegration,	   but	   it	   was	   not	   a	   sufficient,	   nor	   a	   predictable	   condition	   for	  explaining	   efficient	   and	   inclusive	   modernization.	   We	   cannot	   generalize	   from	   a	  comparative	   study	   of	   two	   cases,	   and	   thus	  we	  would	   refrain	   from	   arguing	   that	   farmer	  ownership	   over	   the	   vertically	   integrated	   supply	   chain	   is	   a	   necessary	   condition	   for	  efficient	   co-­‐produced	   upgrading,	   nor	   that	   state	   ownership	   in	   Hungary	   could	   have	  predicted	   the	   ensuing	   debacle:	   all	   we	   can	   say	   is	   that	   it	   was	   a	   scope	   condition,	  which	  weakened	   the	   coherence	   of	   a	   public	   developmental	   roadmap	   in	   Hungary	   –	   while	   it	  contributed	  to	  maintaining	  it	  in	  Poland.	  	  
Part	  3.	  Contributions	  	  
Diverse	  developmental	  pathways	  at	  the	  sector	  level	  in	  Visegrad	  countries	  	  At	   a	  most	   basic	   level,	   this	   thesis	   sought	   to	   stress	   that	   there	   is	   a	   substantially	   greater	  scope	  for	  variation	  in	  modes	  of	  transnationalization	  for	  developing	  economies	  than	  what	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is	   usually	   assumed.	   Faced	  with	   the	   same	   problems,	   similar	   developing-­‐	   or	   transition-­‐	  economies	   can	   –	   and	   empirically	   do	   -­‐	   embrace	   different	   pathways	   for	   integrating	  transnational	  markets,	  each	  having	  different	  developmental	  costs	  and	  benefits.	  We	  are	  very	   much	   cognizant	   of	   this	   work’s	   limitations:	   no	   robust	   theory	   can	   come	   out	   of	   a	  comparative	   framework	   focusing	   on	   merely	   two	   cases	   in	   a	   sector	   such	   as	   dairy.	  However,	   even	   within	   this	   modest	   scope,	   we	   would	   argue	   that	   more	   sector-­‐level	  comparative	   work	   would	   be	   beneficial	   for	   testing	   the	   real	   plurality	   of	   transnational	  integration	   modes,	   which	   might	   characterize	   developing	   economies:	   Julia	   Langbein	  (2015)	   has	   for	   instance	   studied	   different	   sub-­‐national	   modes	   of	   transnationalization	  within	   different	   sectors	   in	   Ukraine	   under	   the	   dual	   pressure	   of	   Russia	   and	   the	   EU.	  However,	  she	  has	  done	  so	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  regulatory	  integration–	  while	  it	  could	  be	   also	   stimulating	   to	   study	   potentially	   diverging	   developmental	   outcomes	   between	  individual	  sectors	  of	  a	  developing	  economies.	  	  	  We	   have	   argued	   that	   there	   is	   a	   priori	   a	   greater	   scope	   for	   variation	   in	   modes	   of	  transnationalization	  –	  and	  the	  developmental	  consequences	  thereof	  –	  in	  less	  technology-­‐intensive	   sectors,	   than	   in	   high-­‐tech	   ones	   where	   proprietary	   technology	   belonging	   to	  MNCs	  doesn’t	  offer	  many	  alternatives	  for	  late-­‐industrializers.	  It	  could	  also	  be	  interesting	  to	   study	   the	   coordination	   –	   or	   lack	   thereof	   –	   between	   integrationist	   and	   autonomist	  sectors	  of	  a	  single	  economy	  from	  a	  developmental	  perspective:	  for	  instance	  what	  is	  the	  political	   economic	   relevance	   of	   a	   co-­‐existing	   re-­‐domestication	   in	   Hungarian	   food	  processing-­‐	   or	   retail	   sectors	   all	   the	  while	   the	  most	   important	   sector	   for	   the	   country’s	  GDP	  –	  automotives	  –	  continues	  to	  depend	  entirely	  on	  foreign	  capital?	  	  	  
Illiberal	  democracy	  as	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  developmental	  failure	  of	  integrationism?	  	  This	   thesis	   also	   speaks	   to	   a	   broader	   debate	   regarding	   convergence	   and	   divergence	  within	  CEE.	  Most	  students	  of	  post-­‐Socialist	  CEE	  agree	  that	  different	  attempts	  at	  building	  a	   national	   variety	   of	   capitalism	   could	   be	   observed	   throughout	   the	   region	   at	   the	   very	  onset	  of	  transition	  in	  1989-­‐93,	  -­‐	  models	  characterized	  by	  domestic	  ownership	  and	  often	  mobilizing	   the	   social	   capital	   and	   networks	   of	   the	   former	   nomenklatura	   (Drahokoupil,	  2009).	   This	   often	   manifested	   in	   early	   and	   unregulated	   privatization	   schemes	   where	  state	   property	   was	   massively	   transferred	   to	   a	   complex	   alliance	   composed	   of	   party	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apparatchiks	   and	   the	   managers	   of	   conglomerates	   and	   cooperatives.	   In	   Hungary,	   this	  phenomenon	   was	   called	   “spontaneous	   privatization”	   and	   it	   actually	   started	   slightly	  before	  the	  official	  collapse	  of	  state	  Socialism,	  but	  the	  seminal	  work	  of	  Szelényi,	  Eyal	  and	  Townsend	   (1998)	   also	   identified	   a	   similar	   pattern	   in	   Poland	   and	   the	   Czech	   Republic.	  However,	  with	   the	  partial	   “anomaly”	  of	  Slovakia’s	  Meciar	  who	   tried	   to	  advance	   in	   this	  direction	   until	   1998,	   these	  models	   were	   generally	   quickly	   abandoned:	   after	   1993-­‐95,	  most	   CEE	   countries	   chose	   to	   privilege	   foreign	   investors	   –	   primarily	   MNCs	   –	   for	  restructuring	  remaining	  Socialist	  firms	  in	  a	  number	  of	  crucial	  sectors.	  The	  consolidation	  of	   FDI	   and	   foreign	   ownership	  were	   the	   results	   of	   this	   second	   period	   of	   privatization.	  Drahokoupil	   (2009)	   argues	   that	   the	   original	   alliance	   of	   domestic	   actors	   –	   party	  apparatchiks	   and	   managers	   –	   was	   in	   fact	   replaced	   by	   a	   second	   strategic	   coalition	  composed	   of	   a	   fraction	   of	   the	   former	   nomenklatura	   that	   already	   had	   international	  contacts	   throughout	   the	  1980s	   and	  quickly	   capitalized	  on	   these	  networks	   in	   the	   early	  1990s:	  teams	  of	  negotiators	  within	  ministries	  that	  struck	  deals	  with	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  organizations,	   high-­‐level	   bureaucrats	   within	   the	   national	   privatization	   agencies	   etc.	  According	  to	  them,	  this	  relatively	  small	  pool	  of	  domestic	  actors,	  with	  strong	  links	  both	  in	  the	  former	  one-­‐party	  system	  and	  with	  international	  organizations	  successfully	  entered	  new	  alliances	  with	  their	  former	  foreign	  partners	  –	  IFIs,	  foreign	  creditors,	  consultancies	  and	  MNCs	  –	  at	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  crucial	  reversal	  in	  privatization	  strategies.	  They	  call	  the	  emerging	   coalition	   the	   “comprador	   service	   sector”,	   and	   fundamentally	   derive	   the	  transnationalization	  of	  CEE	  economies	  through	  FDI	  –	  in	  other	  words	  the	  transformation	  of	  CEE	  into	  “dependent	  market	  economies”,	  with	  the	  interest-­‐motivated	  agency	  of	  these	  networks:	   foreign	  public	   and	  private	   actors	  prospecting	   the	  post-­‐Socialist	  markets	   for	  potential	  investments	  among	  the	  ruins	  of	  the	  Socialist	  economies	  -­‐	  and	  a	  new	  domestic	  élite	   who	   saw	   a	   new	   opportunity	   in	   facilitating	   FDI	   as	   a	   way	   of	   strengthening	   their	  economic	   and	   political	   position.	   It	   seems	   that	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   scholarship	   has	   until	  recently	  considered	  this	  story	  closed:	  foreign	  ownership	  as	  well	  as	  the	  potential	  interest	  coalitions	  that	  had	  originally	  enabled	  it	  have	  been	  assumed	  stable	  and	  cemented	  in	  CEE	  economies.	  	  	  By	  contrast,	   the	  Hungarian	  pathway	   in	  the	  dairy	  sector	  shows	  that	  alliances	  as	  well	  as	  the	  very	  mode	  of	  transnationalization	  through	  FDI	  might	  be	  substantially	  more	  fragile	  or	  transient	  than	  previously	  assumed.	  At	  the	  sector	  level	  in	  Hungary,	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	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types	  of	  coalitions	  between	  the	  state	  and	  an	  emerging	  national	  bourgeoisie	  with	  stakes	  in	   the	   processing	   and	   retail	   sectors	   -­‐	   has	   indeed	   replaced	   the	   previous	   alignment	   of	  interests.	  We	  believe	  that	  modestly	  as	  it	  may	  be,	  the	  present	  work	  might	  also	  contribute	  to	  shedding	  light	  on	  seemingly	  surprising	  transformations	  that	  characterize	  the	  current	  Hungarian	   regime:	   one	   that	   claims	   to	   cancel	   out	   dependency	   on	   MNCs	   but	   also	   to	  replace	   “imported”	   ideals	   of	   liberal	   democracy	   –	   with	   a	   new	   political	   economy	  characterized	  by	   domestic	   ownership	   (in	   particular	   sectors)	   as	  well	   as	   a	   “labor-­‐based	  economy”.	   In	   fact,	   a	   particularity	   of	   Hungary’s	   new,	   „illiberal”	   model	   is	   that	   crucial	  industrial	  sectors	  such	  as	  automotive	  remain	  entirely	  foreign-­‐owned,	  as	  domestic	  actors	  simply	   don’t	   dispose	   of	   the	   human	   capital	   necessary	   for	   replacing	   the	   know-­‐how	   of	  German	   car	   manufacturers.	   Integrationism,	   or	   hyper-­‐integrationism	   as	   termed	   by	  Scepanovic	   –	   is	   not	   (and	   cannot	   be-­‐)	   questioned	   in	   technology-­‐intensive	   sectors.	  However,	   in	  a	  number	  of	  other	  economic	  sectors,	  which	  rely	  more	  on	   financial	   capital	  than	   proprietary	   technologies,	   the	   state	   clearly	   aims	   at	   building	   on	   a	   new	   nationalist	  coalition	  meant	  to	  curb	  MNC	  ownership:	   food	  processing,	  retail	  –	  but	  also	  segments	  of	  banking	   fall	   in	   this	   latter	   category.	   An	   aggressively	   nationalistic	   narrative,	   which	   is	  supposedly	   at	   loggerheads	  with	  MNCs	  –	   in	   fact	   tolerates	   and	   even	   encourages	   foreign	  investments	  in	  industrial	  sectors	  where	  the	  lack	  of	  domestically	  engineered	  innovation	  prevents	  an	  autonomist	   strategy.	   In	  parallel	  however,	   the	   „struggle	   for	   sovereignty”	   is	  carefully	   staged	   in	   sectors	   such	   as	   food	   processing	   and	   retail.	   These	   dynamics	   can	   be	  captured	  at	  a	  micro-­‐level	  in	  the	  transformations	  characterizing	  the	  public	  re-­‐regulation	  and	  the	  re-­‐domestication	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  dairy	  sector.	  In	  fact	  the	  empirical	  description	  of	  the	  sector’s	  trajectory	  also	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  inconsistencies	  or	  cynical	  omissions	  that	  sustain	  this	  new	  regime:	  most	  notably	  a	  strategic	  manipulation	  of	  narratives	  concerning	  the	   exploitation	   of	   domestic	   actors	   (in	   this	   case	   farmers)	   by	   foreign	   capital	   –	   a	   trope	  used	  to	  legitimize	  increasingly	  adversarial	  forms	  of	  regulations	  towards	  MNCs	  under	  the	  pretense	  of	  establishing	  a	  more	  inclusive	  developmental	  model.	  As	  described	  previously,	  this	  narrative	  is	  misleading	  in	  as	  much	  as	  farmers	  continue	  to	  be	  marginalized	  and	  the	  state	   doesn’t	   display	   any	   more	   appetence	   for	   strengthening	   their	   competitiveness,	  upgrading	   their	   capacities	   and	   fostering	   new	   forms	   of	   institutional	   representation	   for	  their	   interests	   than	   in	   the	   preceding	   period.	   The	   real	   winners	   of	   the	   new	   era	   are	   a	  handful	  of	  capital-­‐rich	  domestic	  companies	  at	  the	  processing	  and	  retail	  level	  with	  strong	  connections	  to	  the	  government	  party.	  This	  divorce	  between	  a	  nationalist	  developmental	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narrative	   and	   the	   empirical	   reality	   of	   a	   continued	   marginalization	   of	   vulnerable	  domestic	  actors	  is	  prevalent	  throughout	  the	  economy	  well	  beyond	  dairy.	  	  	  	  As	  such,	  Hungary’s	  new	  political	  economic	  system	  doesn’t	  actually	  attempt	  at	  redressing	  the	  shortcomings	  experienced	  by	  an	  overly	  integrationist	  developmental	  strategy,	  which	  is	  bound	  to	  hit	  the	  glass	  ceiling	  of	  a	  middle-­‐income	  trap:	  investments	  in	  human	  capital	  remain	   minimal.	   Similarly,	   while	   integrationism	   did	   in	   fact	   marginalize	   particular	  domestic	  groups	  such	  as	  farmers-­‐producers	  –	  their	  plight	  is	  used	  as	  a	  narrative	  device,	  meant	   to	   legitimize	   a	   re-­‐domestication	   of	   property	   rights,	   which	   is	   not	   substantially	  more	  inclusive	  than	  transnational	  integration	  through	  FDI.	  	  	  These	  dynamics	  could	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  Polanyian	  motion	  of	  a	  pendulum	  oscillating	  between	   the	   forces	   of	   market	   autonomy	   and	   those	   pushing	   toward	   the	   social	   re-­‐embedding	   of	   markets:	   this	   was	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   in	   which	   Bohle	   and	  Greskovits	   (2012)	   described	   CEE	   economies.	   In	   short,	   the	   current	   Hungarian	   model	  might	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  attempt	   to	  check	  some	  of	   the	  most	  patent	  shortcomings	  of	  integrationism,	  and	  it	  may	  translate	  a	  desire	  to	  re-­‐embed	  market	  forces	  in	  society.	  	  	  However,	   this	  model	   seems	  more	   preoccupying:	   Firstly,	   as	   briefly	   described	   above,	   it	  doesn’t	   provide	   solutions	   to	   the	   crucial	   problems	   of	   integrationism	   –	   namely	   the	  marginalization	  of	  domestic	   firms	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  MNCs,	  and	  the	  developmental	  glass	  ceiling	  of	  a	  middle-­‐income	  trap	  resulting	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  endogenous	  innovation.	  Instead,	  it	  perpetuates	   these	  deficiencies	  –	  which	   it	   seeks	   to	   conceal	  by	  building	  on	  aggressive	  forms	  of	  nationalism.	  The	  second	  reason	  for	  concern	  is	  that	  a	  large	  body	  of	  scholarship	  seems	   to	   indicate	   that	   the	   developmental	   shortcomings	   of	   integrationism	   are	  increasingly	   obvious:	   short-­‐term	   gains	   in	   export	   revenues,	   wages	   or	   employment	   are	  more	   than	  offset	  by	   the	  marginalization	  of	  domestic	  actors	  and	  a	   lack	  of	   technological	  spillovers	  (Baldwin,	  2013;	   Jacoby,	  2010;	  Scepanovic,	  2013).	  Giant	  emerging	  economies	  such	  as	  China,	  India	  or	  Brazil	  might	  use	  market	  access	  as	  a	  bargaining	  chip	  for	  building	  stronger	   linkages	   between	  MNCs	   and	  domestic	   sectors	   (Scepanovic,	   2013,	   p.194).	   For	  smaller	   developing	   economies	   however,	   the	   regulatory	   tools	   of	   the	   state	   might	   only	  attempt	   at	   curbing	  MNC	  market	   shares	   –	   as	   occurred	   in	   Hungary.	   Even	   that	   requires	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some	  degree	  of	  Weberian	  competence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  a	  minimal	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  from	  MNC	  interests,	  which	  might	  be	  available	  to	  Hungary	  but	  in	  short	  supply	  in	  LDCs.	  As	   the	  developmental	   trap	  of	   integrationism	  is	  becoming	  ever	  more	  manifest,	  the	   danger	   is	   that	   transition-­‐	   and	   developing	   economies	   that	   had	   embarked	   on	  integrationist	  strategies	  since	  the	  1980s	  might	  opt	  for	  chaotic	  policy	  re-­‐orientations	  that	  combine	  the	  worst	  of	  both	  worlds:	   it	   is	  conceivable	  that	  Hungary’s	  current	  experiment	  in	  “illiberalism”	  might	  become	  an	  appealing	  model	  in	  CEE	  and	  beyond.	  	  	  
The	  relevance	  of	  dairy	  for	  re-­‐evaluating	  the	  developmental	  role	  of	  low-­‐tech	  sectors	  	  Besides	   the	   descriptive	   nature	   of	   a	   relatively	   under-­‐studied	   industrial	   sector,	   the	  question	   is	   what	   the	   present	   case	   study	   adds	   to	   existing	   theories	   of	   developmental	  pathways	  in	  CEE	  and	  potentially	  beyond,	  in	  peripheral	  and	  semi-­‐peripheral	  economies:	  What	   is	   the	   dairy	   sector	   really	   a	   case	   of?	   In	   that	   regard,	   we	   would	   argue	   that	   a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  current	  literatures	  on	  economic	  development	  is	  focused	  on	  high-­‐tech	   sectors,	   while	   less	   technology-­‐intensive	   sectors	   have	   received	   less	   attention:	  agriculture	   and	  agri-­‐food	   for	   instance	   are	   thus	  often	   implicitly	   tied	   to	   the	  question	  of	  food	  security	  for	  LDCs	  –	  as	  if	  less	  technology-­‐intensive	  sectors	  were	  the	  sole	  concern	  of	  the	  poorest	  economies	  and	  a	  matter	  of	  physical	  survival	  rather	  than	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  sustainable	  and	  diversified	  economies.	  In	  our	  view	  this	  reflects	  a	  positivistic	  bias,	  which	  doesn’t	   reflect	   the	  opportunities	   –	  or	   even	   the	   long-­‐term	  needs	  of	   smaller	  developing	  economies:	   the	   assumption	   that	   high-­‐tech	   stands	   for	   high	   growth	   and	   fully	   “modern”	  ought	   to	   be	   fundamentally	   questioned.	   Case	   studies	   in	   high-­‐tech	   industrial	   sectors	  converge	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  proprietary	  technologies	  inhibiting	  technology	  transfers	  –	  a	  fact	   adamantly	  demonstrated	  by	   Scepanovic	   in	   relation	   to	  CEE	  automotive	   sectors.	   In	  this	   game,	   it	   should	   be	   clear	   that	   smaller	   economies	   cannot	   all	   replicate	   India’s	   or	  China’s	  successful	  conversion	  into	  technology	  powerhouses:	  thus,	   low-­‐tech	  sectors	  are	  bound	  to	  remain	  an	  important	  part	  in	  the	  industrial	  structure	  of	  smaller	  peripheral	  and	  semi-­‐peripheral	   nations.	   Neither	   would	   it	   be	   desirable	   if	   less	   technology-­‐intensive	  sectors	  were	  considered	  as	  antiquated	  relics:	  they	  continue	  to	  be	  important	  employers	  of	  a	  domestic	  workforce,	  which	  cannot	  realistically	  be	  absorbed	  by	  high-­‐tech	  industries	  –	   especially	   not	   when	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   game	   actively	   prohibit	   smaller	   developing	  economies	  from	  building	  their	  own	  innovation	  feedback	  loops.	  Spurring	  innovation	  and	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investments	   in	  human	  capital	  are	  rightly	  considered	  crucial	  developmental	  objectives,	  but	  rather	  than	  betting	  everything	  on	  high-­‐tech,	   the	  place	  of	   less	  technology-­‐intensive	  sectors	  should	  in	  our	  view	  be	  re-­‐evaluated	  when	  thinking	  of	  sustainable	  developmental	  pathways.	   Upgrading	   in	   less	   technology-­‐intensive	   sectors	   seems	   just	   as	   vital	   as	  (attempting	  to	  build)	  high-­‐tech.	  This	  is	  a	  fact,	  which	  fortunately	  begins	  to	  permeate	  the	  mindset	   of	   transnational	   developmental	   organizations	   as	   well,	   as	   demonstrated	   for	  instance	  by	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  EU’s	  5th	  Framework	  Program	  on	  innovation:	   	  “Low-­‐tech	  
and	   medium-­‐to-­‐low-­‐tech	   (LMT)	   industries	   in	   the	   OECD	   countries	   employ	   many	   more	  
people	  than	  high-­‐tech	  industries.	  Moreover,	  many	  firms	  in	  these	  industries	  are	  innovative	  
and	  knowledge	  intensive	  without,	  by	  definition,	  engaging	  in	  R&D	  to	  any	  great	  extent.	  Thus,	  
they	   provide	   a	   striking	   challenge	   to	   currently	   held	   notions	   about	   the	   sources	   of	   future	  
industrial	   growth.	   Our	   analysis	   suggests	   that	   while	   new	   sectors	   emerge	   within	   the	  
economy,	  and	  some	  sectors	  disappear,	   this	  does	  not	  account	   for	  the	  processes	  of	  growth,	  
which	  actually	  occur	  across	  the	  OECD.	  The	  growth	  trajectories	  of	  the	  advanced	  economies	  
seem	  to	  rest	  as	  much	  on	  such	  sectors	  as	  engineering,	  food,	  wood	  products,	  and	  vehicles	  and	  
so	  on,	  as	   they	  do	  on	  such	  sectors	  as	   ICT	  or	  biotech.	  Medium-­‐low	  and	   low-­‐tech	   industries	  
have	  persisted	  over	  the	  past	  decades	  despite	  the	  claims	  that	  we	  are	  undergoing	  a	  kind	  of	  
structural	   revolution.	   In	   terms	   of	   industrial	   structure,	   change	   and	   growth,	   there	   is	  
substantial	   variation	   across	   OECD	   countries	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   shares	   of	   output	   and	  
employment	   accounted	   for	   by	   high-­‐tech	   industries	   –	   there	   are	   quite	   different	   sectoral	  
mixes	   that	   persist	   over	   time.	   In	   this	   context	  we	   found	  no	   evidence	   of	   any	   direct	   linkage	  
between	   technological	   intensity	   of	   the	   industrial	   structure	   and	   economic	   growth	   at	   the	  
level	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.	  There	  is	  no	  simple	  relationship	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  high-­‐
tech	  economies	  are	  also	  the	  high	  growth	  economies.	  This	  suggests	  that	  different	  economies	  
can	   follow	   different	   routes	   to	   economic	   growth.	   Countries	   play	   different	   roles	   in	   an	  
economic	  system	  which	  is	  differentiated	  at	  the	  international	  level,	  and	  in	  which	  there	  is	  a	  
division	  of	   labour	  among	   the	  highly	  developed	   economies.	  These	   research	   findings	   show	  
that	   growth	   is	   primarily	   based	   not	   on	   the	   creation	   of	   new	   sectors	   but	   on	   the	   internal	  
transformation	   of	   sectors	   that	   already	   exist.	   Overemphasising	   the	   role	   of	   high-­‐tech	  
activities	  ignores	  this	  major	  dimension	  of	  change	  in	  advanced	  economies.	  As	  a	  corollary,	  in	  
order	  to	  ensure	  continued	  future	  growth	  prospects	  for	  advanced	  economies,	  policy-­‐makers	  
need	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  processes	  of	  innovation	  and	  creativity	  in	  firms	  in	  all	  sectors,	  not	  just	  
high-­‐tech	  firms”	  (European	  Commission	  DG	  Research,	  2006,	  p.13).	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  From	   this	   perspective,	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   Polish	   dairy	   sector’s	   successful	   post-­‐Socialist	   upgrading	   in	   particular	   might	   justify	   a	   degree	   of	   optimism:	   as	   the	  developmental	  glass	  ceiling	  is	  substantially	  thinner	  in	  less	  technology-­‐intensive	  sectors,	  there	   is	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   inclusive	   economic	   upgrading	   is	   equally	   (relatively)	  easier	  to	  attain	  than	  in	  high-­‐tech	  sectors.	  	  	  What	  is	  more	  surprising	  is	  that	  Poland’s	  successful	  upgrading	  strategy	  largely	  relied	  on	  the	  “protection	  and	  promotion”	  toolkit	  used	  by	  “traditional”,	  autonomist	  developmental	  states	   –	   as	  described	  by	  Evans	  or	  Amsden.	   In	   light	  of	   a	  host	  of	   reasons	  underlined	   in	  chapter	   one	   –	   among	   which	   the	   timing	   of	   transition,	   the	   role	   of	   foreign	   capital	   and	  externally-­‐steered	   institutional	   change	   by	   the	   EU	   –	   post-­‐Socialist	   CEE	   struggling	   to	  avoid	  a	  general	  economic	  collapse	  during	  the	  1990s	   is	  arguably	  one	  of	   the	   least	   likely	  candidates	  for	  observing	  the	  persistence	  of	  20th	  century	  developmental	  public	  policies…	  Yet	   this	   is	   precisely	  what	   happened:	   a	   sectorial	   developmental	   state	   in	   a	   (neoliberal)	  context	   where	   it	   wasn’t	   supposed	   to	   exist.	  Without	   overstretching	   the	   argument,	   we	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  pathway	  of	  Polish	  dairy	  testifies	  of	  a	  substantially	  larger	  room	  for	  public	   developmental	   maneuvering	   in	   less	   technology-­‐intensive	   sectors	   where	  technology	   can	   be	   purchased	   for	   the	  most	   part	   -­‐	   than	   in	   high-­‐tech	   sectors	  where	   the	  structural	   lack	  of	   financial	   capital	   is	   aggravated	  by	  a	   lack	  of	  domestically	  owned-­‐	  and	  engineered-­‐	  innovation.	  	  	  The	   present	   thesis	   sought	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   there	   is	   indeed	   a	   strong	   relevance	   for	  complementing	   preexisting	   sector-­‐level	   case	   studies	   in	   high-­‐tech	   sectors	   with	   less	  capital-­‐intensive	  ones	  such	  as	  dairy:	  Not	  only	  because	  these	  sectors	  continue	  to	  matter	  
a	   priori	   even	   in	   core	   capitalist	   economies,	   and	   far	   from	   relics,	   are	   actually	   vital	   for	  smaller	   developing	   countries	   –	   but	   also	   because	   they	   shed	   light	   on	   certain	  developmental	   aspects	   of	   transnational	   economic	   integration	   in	   CEE	   (and	   beyond	  potentially),	   which	  might	   otherwise	   be	   overlooked.	  We	  would	   like	   to	   emphasize	   two	  points	  in	  that	  regard:	  Firstly,	  the	  degree	  of	  heterogeneity	  characterizing	  developmental	  pathways	  among	  similar,	  small	  developing-­‐	  and	  transition	  economies	  caught	  in	  deeply	  transnationalized	   markets,	   and	   second,	   the	   transient,	   evolving	   nature	   of	   these	  pathways.	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  Modes	  of	  transnationalization	  in	  high-­‐tech	  sectors	  appear	  relatively	  uniform	  across	  the	  CEE	  region	  and	  Visegrad	  countries	   in	  particular:	   it	   seems	  virtually	   impossible	   to	  shed	  integrationism	   or	   hyper-­‐integrationism	   for	   alternative	   strategies	   given	   the	   lack	   of	  endogenous	  innovation.	  The	  developmental	  outcomes	  thereof	  are	  equally	  similar	  across	  the	   region:	   short-­‐term	   gains	   -­‐	   yet	   a	   very	   real	   danger	   of	   digging	   oneself	   in	   a	  middle-­‐income	  trap.	  However,	  when	  studying	  less	  capital-­‐intensive	  sectors	  such	  as	  dairy,	  which	  offer	   theoretically	   a	  wider	   scope	   for	   different	   policy	   choices,	   one	  might	   genuinely	   be	  surprised	  by	  the	  empirical	  diversity	  of	  transnationalization	  modes	  not	  only	  at	  the	  intra-­‐regional	  but	  also	  at	  the	  sub-­‐national	  (sector)	  level.	  It	  seems	  to	  us	  that	  neither	  the	  early	  1990s	  literatures	  on	  privatization,	  nor	  the	  later	  typologies	  developed	  in	  reference-­‐	  or	  in	  reaction-­‐	  to	  the	  VoC	  agenda	  fully	  account	  for	  this	  diversity,	  which	  is	  worth	  exploring,	  for	  one	  can	  grasp	  counter-­‐intuitive	  processes	  along	  the	  way:	  for	  instance	  and	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  fact	  that	  “traditional”	  protection	  and	  promotion	  policies	  are	  alive	  and	  kicking	  in	   some	   low-­‐tech	   sectors	  –	   in	  other	  words	   that	   the	   classical	   toolkit	  of	   the	  autonomist	  developmental	   state	   can	   survive	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   era	   even	   in	   smaller	   developing	  economies	  -­‐	  albeit	  constrained	  to	  low-­‐tech.	  	  	  	  A	   second	   important	   element	   is	   that	   in	   these	   sectors,	   there	   doesn’t	   seem	   to	   be	   a	  developmental	   lock-­‐in:	   the	   VoC	   literature	   for	   instance	   displays	   a	   rather	   schematic	  periodization	   of	   developmental	   strategies	   in	   CEE,	   where	   early	   attempts	   at	   building	  national	  forms	  of	  capitalism	  were	  swiftly	  replaced	  with	  more	  FDI	  friendly	  strategies.	  As	  the	  present	   case	   study	   shows,	  while	   early	   choices	   -­‐	   such	  as	  managing	  privatization	   	   -­‐	  proved	   tremendously	   consequential,	   lock-­‐outs	   from	   a	   certain	   developmental	   pathway	  do	  exist:	  the	  belated	  emergence	  of	  a	  developmental	  coalition	  in	  Hungary	  between	  state-­‐	  and	   non-­‐state	   actors	   shows	   that	   in	   low-­‐tech	   sectors	   at	   least,	   it	   remains	   possible	   to	  abandon	  an	  inefficient	  developmental	  model	  and	  explore	  alternatives	  (notwithstanding	  the	   developmental	   efficiency	   of	   newer	   strategies).	   In	   other	   words,	   developmental	  pathways	  are	  not	  only	  more	  diverse	  in	  low-­‐tech	  sectors	  such	  as	  dairy,	  but	  they	  are	  also	  fundamentally	  dynamic	  and	  transient.	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